Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam

Cooperation and tension in times of turmoil

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Suzanne Roggeveen

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aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam

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Turfmarkt rose above 30 degrees in the summer so that going out for ice cream was the only solution. Events that were also often joined by Sakina and Dorieke. Besides being my colleagues, you have all become truly great friends.

During my PhD trajectory I belonged to several other groups and networks, such as NOSTER (Netherlands School for Advanced Studies in Theology and Religion), the platform for the study of relations between Jews and Muslims and the NGG network which discusses how to teach religion in secondary schools in the Netherlands. I would like to thank all my colleagues in these groups. Our discussions taught me a lot about Judaism and Islam, but also provided me with a broader and more informed look on religion in general. Our program group *Religie in de Moderne Samenleving* (Religion in Modern Society) of which this project is a part must also be mentioned here, because my colleagues working in this program have provided very helpful comments on my texts, presentations and my research in general.

Although my project started in 2014, many others have supported me before then and it is only fair to mention them here. Before this project I worked in the sociology department, first as a research assistant and then as a junior researcher. Over the five years I was there I worked with many wonderful colleagues, but most often with Imrat Verhoeven, Evelien Tonkens, Marianne van Bochove, Loes Verplanke and Jan-Willem Duyvendak. We studied volunteering, citizenship, participation policies, professionalization and the relations between professionals and volunteers in health care and community services in the research projects '*Burgers maken hun buurt*', '*Leren participeren*' and 'K*unnen we dat (niet) aan vrijwilligers overlaten?*' I am very grateful for the opportunity you gave me to work with you on these projects, for your support in my attaining my academic dreams, for training me in qualitative methods and helping me gain insights into a wide range of phenomena. Moreover, your knowledge and insights on citizenship, framing and emotion management inspired this study.

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To Robin, for everything.

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PART 1

Jewish-Muslim Relations
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INTRODUCTION

Contemporary Jewish-Muslim Relations in Amsterdam

In the summer of 2014, as one of the activities in their interreligious network,[1] a group of Jewish and Muslim religious and community leaders organized an interreligious iftar – the Muslim tradition of breaking the fast, during the month of Ramadan.[2] The event took place at a venue in the east of Amsterdam, near the water. The event contained an informal opening, speeches by members of the network and a dinner that started at ten in the evening, because at that time the sun went down and Muslims were allowed to break their fast.

That evening, from 8 p.m. onward, about 30 Jews and Muslims start gathering in the venue. It is a warm evening, the sun is shining and Jewish, Muslim and other guests slowly fill the space. Some already know each other and greet each other warmly; others are new or have not found their friends yet and are looking for people they can join. Slowly they form small groups that spread out over the outdoor space. In the kitchen, women are preparing food.

In one small group, two Muslim men (Marouan and Ismail), a Jewish woman (Sarai) and a Jewish man (David) are talking about the airplane, MH17 of Malaysian Airways, which was shot down and crashed in the Ukraine. All 298 passengers and staff died in the crash, of whom 193 were Dutch citizens. The group talks about losing people and different ways to mourn. Sarai mentions a specific form of psychotherapy that helped her a lot when she lost her loved ones. One of the Muslim men listens, interested, while the others talk between themselves. A bit later, the subject changes and they talk about the demise of the Jewish-Moroccan Network Amsterdam (JMNA), in which

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1   This study uses the term 'interreligious' instead of 'interfaith', because Dutch makes no distinction between 'interreligious' and 'interfaith' and respondents use the word interreligieus, which translates to interreligious. It means an activity, a group or network that aims to bring together adherents of different religions and philosophies of life and/or focuses on interreligious subjects. This is not to say that the interreligious networks attract only religious people to their activities or discuss only religious topics. In some cases, they also attract people who identify as non-religious and they often discuss other topics besides religion. It does mean, however, that the focus of the activity is on bringing together people who identify as religious and/or the activity focuses on interreligious subjects. In some cases, I will use the word 'intercommunal' if the initiative focuses on bringing together different people who feel they belong to (ethnic) communities and/or cultural practices, instead of focusing on religious communities and religious practices. In practice interreligious and intercommunal activities can also overlap.

2   Religious and community leaders are Muslims, Jews and others – such as youth workers – who manage, regulate, guide and advise self-identified religious and ethnic communities. For example, think of imams, rabbis, board members of mosques and synagogues, but also of educators and organizers of cooperation projects.

Muslims and Jews had worked together. Marouan calls this group a failure. The other Muslim man, Ismail, says: "Shush, we're not talking about that." Marouan clearly shows that he finds Ismail's remark unnecessary, and starts talking about something else.

Later on, I speak to Ismail and Marouan separately and ask them why they think the network fell apart. Ismail says he was cautious before because he thought 'failed' was quite a strong word to use, because the network had also contributed good things. He thinks that the tension in the Middle East created tensions in the network and the unequal distribution of administrative positions among the various Jewish and Muslim groups involved did not help either. Besides that, both Ismail and Marouan think that government interference contributed to the network's demise, especially the government subsidies that caused conflict (see e.g. Targhi Bakkali, 2013 for a description of this conflict). After a while, Ismail and Marouan start discussing the bureaucratic changes the local government wants to make to the layout of the city's boroughs [In Dutch: *stadsdelen*].[3]

In the other groups, Jews, Muslims and others talk animatedly until it is time for the speeches that some of the organizers have planned for this evening. The topics range from empowerment in women's groups – 'When to say no in life' – to tensions ascribed to pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations in the Netherlands, and the Syrian refugee crisis, which are discussed seriously, but with occasional humor and references to friendship. Next, everyone goes outside and, in a small ritual, take group photos in the sunset. When the sun has gone down it is time to break their fast and start eating. A refugee group invited to attend starts singing and playing music. After a while the participants spread out over the venue again and at about 11 p.m., people start going home.

During my fieldwork I observed this example of an interreligious meeting between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam. It reveals a few of the central elements of Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam, which is the main topic of this dissertation.[4] It demonstrates that Jews and Muslims come together to get to know each other or revive their bonds, and that their get together is influenced by – the framing of – international developments such as conflicts in the Middle East and the MH17 airplane attack, but also by local factors such as the way the Dutch government facilitates

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3   Amsterdam has its own local government, which consists of a central city council and the councils of the stadsdelen. Amsterdam contains seven stadsdelen: Amsterdam-North, Amsterdam-East, Amsterdam-Center, Amsterdam-South, Amsterdam-Southeast, Amsterdam-West and Amsterdam-New-West.

4   It is important to realize that all the quotes and extracts from my field notes have been translated into English. It was often necessary to adapt the Dutch syntax or insert a few words to make the quotes understandable, but I tried to remain as close to the original texts as possible.

subsidies. It also shows that tension can emerge and how cooperation strategies – what and how are we going to talk about delicate issues? – can help or hinder the dialog.

When I began my fieldwork for this study in 2014, Jewish-Muslim relations had clearly become a topical issue in Amsterdam. In 2014 the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had escalated in the Gaza War and the extremist attacks in Brussels (2014), Paris (2015) and Copenhagen (2015) on Jewish targets had provided unrest in the city.[5] These events also inspired Muslims and Jews from various groups to work together – as described in the example above.

Jewish-Muslim relations have gained attention in the Dutch public debate in recent years (see "Asscher: Kinderen Beschermen tegen de Kinderlokkers van de Jihad", 2015; BNN-VARA, Witte Geit & Wesselink, 2016; "Saïd Bensellam en Lody van de Kamp Schrijven Handboek voor Jongerenwerkers", 2018; Van Weezel, 2017). In the documentary *Mijn Jodenbuurt* [My Jewish Neighborhood] Wesselink discusses anti-Semitism and Muslim discrimination in the Rivierenbuurt – a neighborhood in the South of Amsterdam (BNN-VARA, Witte Geit & Wesselink, 2016). Author and journalist Van Weezel (2017) wrote a book about her experiences with Jewish-Muslim dialog and the tensions that emerge within Jewish-Muslim relations and Dutch society, such as those arising in the Gaza War of 2014 and when Muslims and Jews were asked to distance themselves from violence and various discriminatory incidents. The Dutch TV news channel NOS reported on an interreligious meeting between religious leaders, religious youngsters, politicians, mayors and policymakers and Amsterdam's news network AT5 reported on Jewish-Muslim cooperation between Lody van de Kamp and Saïd Bensellam, key figures in Jewish-Muslim cooperation in Amsterdam ("Asscher: Kinderen Beschermen tegen de Kinderlokkers van de Jihad", 2015; "Saïd Bensellam en Lody van de Kamp Schrijven Handboek voor Jongerenwerkers", 2018).

In academia as well, attention for relations between Jews and Muslims has intensified in recent years.[6] In 2013, Meddeb & Stora published their encyclopedic *A History of Jewish-Muslim Relations* and in 2016 Meri published *The Routledge Handbook of Muslim-Jewish Relations* discussing topics such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, shared food traditions and 'sonic encounters'. These impressive works show Jews

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5   Other extremist attacks also happened, e.g. in Turkey (2015) and Yemen (2015) (see Yourish, Watkins & Giratikanon, 2016). However, the attacks often discussed by my respondents happened in Brussels (2014), Paris (2015) and Copenhagen (2015). These particular attacks had the greatest impact on Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam, so I will focus on them.
6   I cannot do justice to all of these studies here, but I will name a few and discuss some others in the empirical chapters.

and Muslims experiencing both historical and present-day tensions, but also sharing similar aspects of their lives.

In *A History of Jewish-Muslim Relations*, Bahloul (2013: 1052-1058), for example, describes how Jewish and Muslim culinary traditions in the Maghreb and Middle East have influenced each other, especially through the exchanges that took place between women, since traditionally they were often the ones preparing the food. Interestingly, Bahloul describes how the culinary traditions changed among Jews and Muslims who migrated to France due to the availability of ingredients, but also due to the changing roles of women and social mobility of some families. She concludes that the shared food traditions from the Maghreb and Middle East now rely on collective memories and French Muslims and Jews keep these memories alive by sharing their recipes online.

In *The Routledge Handbook of Muslim-Jewish Relations*, Frishman & Ryad (2016) show that similarities can be found in Islamic and Jewish religious law. They show, for example, that Jewish and Muslim laws address many similar topics – such as dietary laws, fasting and purity – that have been developed in similar ways and face some of the same kind of challenges in contemporary societies. The authors describe, for example, how different Islamic groups and Jewish movements asked themselves the same questions about women's rights, such as: "How flexible is the law, and how open is it to debate and contextualization?" and "Should one wish to bring about change, how could one go about doing so?" Both groups answered these questions with similar methods and came to similar answers. This is not to say that all Jews and Muslims came up with the same answers, since liberal and orthodox Jews answered these questions differently than moderate and conservative Muslims, but Frishman (2009: 9) argues in her inaugural lecture that, for example, Jewish reformers answered these questions in much the same ways as moderate Muslim intellectuals.

Media coverage and these studies show why it is important to study Jewish-Muslim relations. In a variety of contexts, Jews and Muslims experienced tension. To understand the origins of these tensions – and other tensions, as we will see below –we need to study the dynamics within Jewish-Muslim relations. However, the studies also point out that Jews and Muslims share certain aspects of their lives: some Muslim and Jewish groups feel that they share cultural aspects, such as culinary traditions, while other shared aspects can be found in religious laws and practices. As we will see in this book these experienced similarities can help Muslims and Jews to solve some of their problems (see Chapter 8). Besides the two handbooks that discuss Jewish-Muslim relations in different eras worldwide, other studies focus on Jewish-Muslim relations

in specific times and places (see Bekerman, 2003; Ben-Layashi & Maddy-Weitzman, 2010; Egorova & Ahmed, 2017; Katz, 2015; Kenbib, 2014; Kessler, 2010; Mandel, 2010; 2014; Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson, 2016; Reedijk, 2015; Yablon, 2006).[7]

Katz (2015) and Mandel (2010; 2014), for example, describe the relations between Jews and Muslims in France. Mandel (2010; 2014) describes how several international conflicts such as the First Gulf War and the 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors influenced Jewish-Muslim relations in France and how the national and local context reshaped its effects (see Chapter 4). Katz (2015) also discusses the interplay between local, national and international influences on Jewish-Muslim relations and argues that twentieth century Jewish-Muslim relations in France can be seen as 'triangular' relations. By triangular he means that Jewish-Muslim relations are not just defined by Jews and Muslims themselves, but emerge in interaction with French society and the French state.[8]

Egorova & Ahmed (2017) study Jewish-Muslim relations in the United Kingdom. Like Mandel and Katz, they describe the importance of studying Jewish-Muslim relations in context. They show how in the United Kingdom Jewish-Muslim relations are shaped by international factors, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but are also impacted by the local context. One of their findings is, for example, that anti-Jewish imagery – which the authors trace back to anti-Jewish campaigns by evangelizing Christians in the Middle Ages – damages Jewish-Muslim relations in the United Kingdom today. They convincingly argue that this imagery is connected to contemporary imagery of Muslims as 'the dangerous Other'. They state: "… [anti-Jewish imagery] both spreads anti-Jewish attitudes among local Muslims and contributes to the overall sense of insecurity among British Jewish communities which, then, combined with the general negative stereotyping of Muslims propagated by the mass media, interpellates their perceptions of their Muslim neighbours" (290).

The studies by Egorova & Ahmed, Mandel, and Katz show that the factors creating the tension between Muslims and Jews are interrelated and ranged from international aspects such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to national and local factors such as anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents and imagery. These studies all plead for studying Jewish-Muslim relations in context, because historical processes as well as contemporary societal changes influence these relations.

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7   Strictly speaking the studies by Kessler and Reedijk do not discuss Jewish-Muslim relations, but Jewish-Christian-Muslim relations. However, they provide interesting insights for Jewish-Muslim relations and so I included them here.
8   The Dutch political landscape is also an important factor that influences Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam (see Chapter 3).

To find the factors that influence Jewish-Muslim relations in similar ways and which are more context-specific calls for in-depth analyses of Jewish-Muslim relations in several European contexts. This study tries to add to this endeavor by studying Jewish-Muslim in Amsterdam. It is part of the overarching research project 'Delicate Relations: Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and London' that aims to study Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam and London in their historical, contemporary and international contexts and puts the results of the studies in Amsterdam and London in a comparative perspective (for an interesting article on the London context, see Van Esdonk & Wiegers, 2019).

Finally, besides these studies, many other studies focus on specific topics in Jewish-Muslim relations such as anti-Semitism and Islamophobia (see for example Bunzl, 2005; 2007; Bobako, 2018; Ensel & Stremmelaar, 2013; Ensel, 2014; Ensel, 2017a; Ensel, 2017b; Gans, 2013; Gans, 2017a; 2017b; Meer, 2013; Vellenga, 2014; 2018; Weaver, 2012; Westerduin, Jansen & Neutel, 2014).[9] These studies ask if anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are the same kind of phenomena or should see them as different. They also explore whether Muslims are the new perpetrators of anti-Semitism and, a question posed in the public debate, if the position of Muslims in European society can be seen as similar to the stigmatization and discrimination of Jews in the run-up to the Holocaust. In answer to the first question Bunzl (2007) argues that anti-Semitism and Islamophobia share resemblances because both can be regarded as exclusionary ideologies. However, he argues that the similarities end there, because of their different historical origins. Bunzl argues, for example, that anti-Semitism was used as a form of what he calls a secular concept in the project of nationalism, while Islamophobia finds its origin in the idea of a European civilization which regards Muslims as incompatible with Western culture. In his book, other scholars, such as Benbassa (2007: 88), Diner (2007: 47-49) and Silverstein (2007: 68), answer to Bunzl's argument and argue for conceptual similarities that Bunzl does not take into account (see also Chapter 6).

Answering the second and third questions, Ensel & Stremmelaar (2013) describe the public commotion that emerged in 2001 when a teacher announced in the press that his students – described as nearly always of Moroccan origin – refused to talk about Jews and the Shoah. Subsequently other teachers reported similar experiences in the press and their reports were connected to disturbances at Holocaust commemorations in the Netherlands (see Chapter 7). These incidents brought about

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9   Some can be in both categories, such as the studies of Egorova & Ahmed (2017) and Westerduin, Jansen & Neutel (2014).

an assessment in the public debate that integration issues were putting Holocaust education in the Netherlands under pressure. A few years later, in 2010, media reports of a survey of teachers revealed that one in five history teachers in the four big cities of the Netherlands felt (nearly) prevented from talking about the Holocaust because Muslim pupils especially had problems with the subject. The results created a lot of turmoil in the public debate.[10] These incidents set into motion multiple conflict resolution projects. The authors studied one such project to find out how students actually talk about Jews and the Holocaust. They show – among other findings – that some of the Muslim and non-Muslim pupils they observed made anti-Jewish remarks, that the position of minorities is comparable with the position of Jews before the Second World War and that pupils used a repertoire of provocative slogans, songs and associations.

These studies show that when we zoom in on certain aspects of Jewish-Muslim relations, each has its own dynamics, and it is important to understand all of them to see how they interrelate. It is not just important to study discriminatory practices in majority-minority relations, but also in minority-minority relations, considering that Muslims and Jews are not just discriminated against by majorities, but also by one another.[11] That is not to say that majorities are not involved in anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. As we will see in Chapter 6, discriminatory practices are often a product of multiple factors.

All in all, we have seen that there is substantial literature on Jewish-Muslim relations that provides important insights into their relations in several times and places. However, there are few ethnographic analyses of contemporary relations between Jews and Muslims in Western-Europe (for exceptions see Egorova & Ahmed, 2017; Ensel & Stremmelaar, 2013; Ensel, 2014; Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson, 2016; Reedijk, 2015).[12] In European societies, where the majorities often call the position of Muslim and Jewish minorities in question, discussion about diversity in the public arena often becomes tense. Tension also emerges between minorities, so it is vital to understand where it comes from as well as to know how Jews, Muslims and others try to solve some of these problems (see Gans, 2013: 85; Vasta, 2007: 714; Van Es, 2018: 146-147). In the Netherlands, for example, debates emerged about male circumcision (Westerduin, Jansen & Neutel, 2014), ritual slaughter (Vellenga, 2014), violent extremism (Van Es, 2018) and anti-Semitism and Islamophobia (Ensel, 2014).

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10   It is important to note here that the authors criticized the survey for flaws in the survey design.
11   In this dissertation majorities or majority population refers to the group that is often seen as the dominant group of white, non-Muslim and non-Jewish Dutch people without a recent family history of migration (see also Van Es, 2018: 150).
12   All the exceptions are described in Chapter 1.

Qualitative research is especially suited to studying the underlying mechanisms to thoroughly understand how tensions emerge and how Muslims and Jews try to solve them, because of – among other factors – the possibilities to ask open questions. Moreover, qualitative research is especially suited to studying phenomena from the perspective of the people who are involved in them and to understanding these perspectives in a broader context. This research thus provides us with additional insights into how Muslims and Jews experience their relations and helps to untangle the factors that influence them.[13]

This study contributes to our understanding of these tensions and their solutions by studying Jewish-Muslim relations *in Amsterdam*. This city is interesting because it has been considered fairly 'Jewish' since the 19th century. The Second World War had a devastating effect on Dutch Jews, especially in Amsterdam, where most of them lived at the beginning of the 20th century (see Chapter 3). In the post-war period, the city retained its reputation for being 'Jewish' and since then, it has had four Jewish mayors. Even today, Amsterdammers often call it *Mokum*, the Yiddish word for 'place' or 'safe haven'. Amsterdam is also often described as a tolerant city that prides itself on its diversity and openness in regard to its other minorities.

As we will see in Chapter 3 and the empirical chapters, the local government plays an important role in the cooperation and tension between Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam. Studying Jewish-Muslim relations in this context allows one to analyze the interplay between international, national, local, political, ethnic and religious dimensions of Jewish-Muslim relations.[14] Finally, in the Netherlands, the relations between Muslims and Jews are most visible in Amsterdam, because 47% of the Jews in the Netherlands live in the city and its neighboring towns, Amstelveen and Badhoevedorp. Many Muslims live in the Dutch conurbation called the Randstad, which includes Amsterdam (see FORUM, 2010: 9; Van Solinge & Van Praag, 2009: 32). Direct contact between Muslims and Jews is thus most probable in Amsterdam. In this dissertation I describe and analyze the factors that influence contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.[15]

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13   In Chapter 2, I will elaborate on the chosen approach.
14   Jewish-Muslim relations elsewhere in the Netherlands might look quite different because fewer Jews and Muslims live there. However, I did find some patterns in Amsterdam that might be found elsewhere because they have the same their origins in their national and international contexts (see Part 2). When trying to solve problems between Muslims and Jews in other contexts, we can thus learn from Amsterdam.
15   This dissertation is part of the broader research project 'Delicate Relations: Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and London' and of the overarching NWO research project called "Religion in Modern Society" [In Dutch: Religie in de Moderne Samenleving] (see Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek, 2019).

My study contributes insights into the dynamics between minorities in contemporary societies. It deepens our understanding of the underlying mechanisms that structure Jewish-Muslim relations, describes their strategies in regard to these structures and broadens our view on their relations with each other. It aims to add theoretical insights into the study of relations between minorities that are often seen or identify as ethno-religious groups through the lens of Bourdieusian theories complemented by social identity theory, emotion management theories and in comparison to the empirical studies on Jewish-Muslim relations described above (see Brown, 2000; Bourdieu, 1979; 1989; 1990; 1991; 1999; Hochschild, 1979; Rey, 2007; Verter, 2003).[16]

I will try to answer three main questions. First, the context in which Jewish-Muslim relations take place; *what* does that look like in Amsterdam? Second, *which* factors influence the relations between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam? And finally, *how* do these factors influence these relations?

Concepts: Jews, Muslims and Contemporary Relations

To answer these questions, however, we first have to know what is meant by 'Jews', 'Muslims' and 'relations'. Whoever considers themselves or is considered a Jew or a Muslim is not straightforward. Jewish and Muslim identities can have religious elements, but this is not a necessary component for people identifying as Muslim or Jew. As Katz (2015: 4-5) describes, Jewish-Muslim relations are often categorized in ethno-religious groups. However, people who consider themselves to be Muslims and Jews also relate to each other in other categories, such as being friends or neighbors. Moreover, some Muslims call themselves 'cultural Muslims' because they regard themselves as not religious but still feel part of an (ethnic) group that calls themselves Muslims. Some 57% of Dutch Jews consider themselves religious; the remaining percentage consider themselves part of the Jewish people or Jewish tradition. The latter groups do not identify as religious, but do consider themselves Jewish (Van Solinge & Van Praag, 2009). To understand the scope of what is happening in Jewish-Muslim relations it is thus important to not only include Muslims and Jews who identify as religious, but also look at the people who feel connected to an ethnic group, tradition or a people that defines as such.

Trying to define what is meant by being Jewish or Muslim becomes more complicated if identities are ascribed or denied by others. For example, during my fieldwork, Sharif, a man with a Moroccan background, whom I interviewed about his role in

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16   See Chapter 1 for the theoretical framework.

pro-Palestinian demonstrations, explained that people with a dark skin color are often assumed to be Muslims. In his case, however, he did not identify as Muslim. Not only are identities ascribed, in some cases identities are also denied. In *Halachic* (orthodox) definitions, for example, people who do not have a Jewish mother, only a Jewish father, are not considered Jewish (see Berg & Wallet, 2010: 12). Also, during my fieldwork, I attended a meeting between Jews and (Protestant and Catholic) Christians. I heard Sara, a member of a Protestant church involved in cooperation projects with both Muslims and Jews, call a man a 'fake Muslim'. In her eyes he was not religious and therefore, she claimed, he was not a real Muslim. So, not being religious does not mean that people do not call themselves Muslim. In this case the Muslim she was talking about actually considered himself to be a religious Muslim.

The aim of this study is to understand a wide range of Jewish-Muslim relations. Therefore, I chose to use emic definitions, specifically self-definitions of the concepts 'Jew' and 'Muslim' (see Katz, 2015: 4-5).[17] This means that anyone who calls themselves a Jew or Muslim is included as such. Using emic definitions enabled me to include those who might otherwise have been excluded by other definitions. Moreover, I wanted to do justice to the views that Jews and Muslims have of themselves and not impose any identities on them, which is a second reason to interview and observe people who self-identify as Muslim or Jew.[18]

Now we know what is meant by Muslims and Jews, we need to identify what is meant by relations, specifically *relating*. Relating to the Other can be done both directly and indirectly. Relating indirectly means forming a perception or an opinion about the Other – even without direct contact. For example, think of stereotypes presented in certain media sources or in the public debate, such as those that present Muslims as the violent Other or Jews as rich and powerful, and how these stereotypes might influence how Jews and Muslims think and feel about each other. In contrast, relating directly involves personal interaction between people who identify as Muslims and Jews, meaning the actual, face-to-face contact they have with each other. The contact

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17   An emic definition means that the definition is defined by respondents themselves, not a researcher (see Bowie, 2006: 83).
18   Although I use self-definitions, large parts of this dissertation describe the political, ethnic and religious dimensions of Jewish-Muslim relations because many of my respondents foregrounded these aspects. This is not to say that people who identify as Jews and Muslims do not feel connected to other identities, e.g. employer, employee, father, mother, sister, brother, friend, partner. However, the political, ethnic and religious dimensions were often described as important elements within Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam and they are therefore elaborately described.

can be in cooperation projects, where Jews and Muslims meet, or in more strained situations, such as demonstrations related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[19]

These forms of relating sometimes overlap. Engaging directly with the Other does not mean that relating indirectly has to stop. It might even be encouraged. Think, for example, of a situation where Muslims and Jews actually interact and their ideas change because of this interaction. Indirectly relating might also lead to more direct forms of relating. For example, fear of the Other might influence how Muslims and Jews interact. If Jews and Muslims are afraid the Other would discriminate against them, they might start to try and cooperate to try to understand each other better, or avoid or confront each other. This study thus focuses on factors that influence Jewish-Muslim relations, which involve indirect relating, but can also involve direct relating between those who self-identify as Jewish or Muslim.

That leaves us with the meaning of 'contemporary'. As said above, I focus on contemporary relations, especially between the summer of 2014 and the winter of 2015, when I conducted my fieldwork. However, the Jewish-Muslim relations that I examined on my fieldwork were influenced by past events. Respondents mentioned significant historical events that influenced relations between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam, such as the extremist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 and the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh.[20] Therefore I included my respondents' narratives of historical events and also used secondary data, such as newspaper articles and online articles. Most of this data covers the period 2001–2015, since 2001 was the reference point for the extremist attacks on the World Trade Center. However, I will also refer to earlier events, if they influenced relations between Jews and Muslims in 2014 and 2015.

Outline of the Dissertation

To study contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam and answer the research questions, this book is divided in three parts. In Part 1 I describe the theoretical framework used to analyze contemporary relations, the methodology, and the context in which Jewish-Muslim relations take place. Then I dive into the empirical world of Jewish-Muslim relations in Part 2 and Part 3. The chapters in Part 1 thus form the framework of the book.

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19   I use 'Israeli-Palestinian conflict', rather than the Gaza War of 2014, because my respondents not only referred to this war, but also to other conflicts between the Israelis and Palestinians in the past.
20   I use the concept 'violent extremism'. By that I mean the public, physical and symbolic violence aimed at people with an ascribed group identity or violence that is aimed at their property. I explain this usage of the concept in Chapter 5.

Chapter 1 *introduces* the theories used to understand Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. It shows how Bourdieusian theories, social identity theory and emotion management theory are helpful to disentangle Jewish-Muslim relations and that combining these theories can especially enhance our understanding of these relations (see Bourdieu, 1979, 1990, 1991, 1999, Brown, 2000, Hochschild, 1979). It also argues that the empirical studies described above help to put Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam in an international perspective. In the empirical chapters, the theories are put into practice and examined in more depth. Chapter 2 describes the methodology used for this research. Here I explain why qualitative methods, such as interviewing and observation, capture important parts of Jewish-Muslim relations, which sampling techniques were used and how my dataset was analyzed. Chapter 3 presents the histories of various Jewish and Muslims groups in the Netherlands to understand 'who is who' in the next chapters. Here I also provide a contextual overview of Jewish-Muslim relations, focusing on the political and ethno-religious landscapes in both the Netherlands and Amsterdam,[21] and trying to answer the question of whether Jewish and Muslim fields exist in Amsterdam.[22]

Parts 2 and 3, look at how Jewish-Muslim relations work in practice. Each chapter is dedicated to one factor that influences Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. The factors discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 mainly create tension between Jews and Muslims: the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the extremist attacks in 2014 and 2015 and Islamophobic and anti-Semitic incidents. Chapter 4 focuses on the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I discuss how this conflict is framed as a problem that lies at the heart of Jewish-Muslim relations and examine if and how Jews and Muslims were actually involved in tensions that arose in Amsterdam in response to the conflict. Chapter 5 deals with the effects of the extremist attacks that happened in Brussels (2014), Paris (2015) and Copenhagen (2015). Many topics could be discussed in regard to the impact of these extremist attacks, considering the effect they had on Dutch society, on the position of minorities and Jewish-Muslim relations specifically. However, this book is limited to the relations between Jews and Muslims and therefore I focus on the two main effects. Chapter 5 focuses first on security policies and the emergence of fear within Muslim and Jewish communities and secondly on the call from Dutch society for Jewish and Muslim communities to distance themselves from violence.

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21   This is not to say that Jewish-Muslim relations consist of ethno-religious components alone. However, these components were important elements in my fieldwork and therefore need to be contextualized.
22   Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu coined the term 'field'. In short, it means 'a small and relatively autonomous social world, a micro-cosmos, inside a larger social world' (Bourdieu 2001: 41; translated by Thielmann, 2013: 204) (see Chapter 1).

Together these chapters show how international tensions influenced Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam and how these tensions were reshaped by the national and local context. Chapter 6 moves on to local factors: the effect of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents on Jewish-Muslim relations.[23] I discuss forms of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia that respondents experience, and the impact this has on their lives and on Jewish-Muslim relations in general. I describe the discussions surrounding perpetrators of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, experiences of inequality and the occasional competition between the two.

Besides these main factors, other factors create tensions in Jewish-Muslim relations, such as religious differences and the role the local government played in Jewish-Muslim relations. These factors do not have their own chapters, because my respondents did not mention them as often as the three main factors. But, as will become clear, they are intertwined with the main factors and therefore receive ample attention in Part 2.

As the example at the start of this Introduction shows, there is not only tension between Muslims and Jews, but cooperation as well. Part 3 analyzes the local cooperation between Jews and Muslims. I found 40 cooperation projects between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam between 1990 and 2015 (see Roggeveen, Vellenga & Wiegers, 2017). The initiatives I found included dialog meetings, as well as educational projects, interreligious walks, art exhibitions and cooperation between the Moroccan and Jewish gay pride boats. These projects often addressed and tried to diminish the effects of the three main tension-creating factors, and also addressed other topics, such as religious similarities between Jews and Muslims or the experience of being seen as ethnic and religious minorities in the Netherlands. Chapter 7 addresses these projects by analyzing two cases: who are the organizers, what resources do they have and what are their motives and goals? Among other aspects we will see how Jewish and Muslim religious and community leaders use their social capital, but often lack economic capital to take a next step in their projects.[24] Chapter 8 shows what kind of strategies Jews and Muslims use to reach their goals and change the ideas the participants in these projects have of the Other. Besides changing attitudes, Muslims and Jews also tried to change the negative feelings that some participants have

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23   They are somewhat local, because anti-Semitism and Islamophobia can also be rooted in international conflicts.
24   Economic and social capital are the resources individuals or groups can use in a certain setting to gain a certain profit (Wacquant, 2006: 7). The meaning of economic and social capital is further explained in Chapter three.

about the Other. In doing so, they used emotion management (Hochschild, 1979).[25] Managing emotions is the theme of the final chapter (9).

All of these chapters treat the factors that influence Jewish-Muslim relations separately, but we will see that in some instances these factors also influence each other. In the conclusion, I bring the separate factors together and explain their interrelatedness through the theoretical lenses of a Bourdieusian framework, social identity theory, emotion management theory and empirical studies that focus on historical and contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations (see Bourdieu, 1979, 1990, 1991, 1999, Brown, 2000, Hochschild, 1979).

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25   Again, other themes in cooperation, such as the role of the government, intertwine with these main themes.

CHAPTER

1

Theoretical Framework:
An Interdisciplinary Approach

INTRODUCTION

Bourdieusian theories have the advantage that they help us see (power) relations in context. Social identity theory provides insights into strategies that influence both in-group and out-group processes. Together, they help us analyze both contextual factors and strategic elements in Jewish-Muslim relations. Bourdieusian and social identity theories, however, often do not take the emotional dimension of relations into account (see Lizardo, 2004: 394).[26] Emotion management theories bring these dimensions to the fore (see Hochschild, 1979). Insights from the studies that focus on contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations provide insights into the specific dynamics of Jewish-Muslim relations and help put my findings in an international and historical perspective (see e.g. Mandel, 2014; Katz, 2015).

Together, these theories form a relational approach that contributes to insights into power dynamics, have an eye for both macro- and micro-interactions, and not only provide insight into cognitive processes, but into the construction of emotions as well. As the Introduction has shown, these are important aspects when studying Jewish-Muslim relations. Here I describe Bourdieusian theories in depth because they help us interpret the data presented in subsequent chapters. The other theories were either introduced in the Introduction or are explained extensively in Chapters 4, 6, 8 and 9 so I will address them only briefly here.

Bourdieu's analytic tools include 'field', 'capital' and 'habitus'. These concepts deal with the relational dimensions between Muslims and Jews and provide a bridge between – or as is sometimes argued, go beyond – 'structures' on the one hand and 'agency' on the other (see Lizardo, 2004: 394-395; Rey, 2007: 40-48).[27] Generally speaking, 'structures' often mean the dynamic institutional arrangements, frames, cognitive systems, symbolic representations, rules, norms, values and discourses that shape our thinking (see Bourdieu, 1990: 52-53; Lizardo, 2004: 384).[28] Often associated with agency are such concepts as freedom, initiative, creativity and motivation (see Emirbayer & Mische, 1998: 962). I elaborate on these concepts below.

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26   This is not to say that Bourdieu's theories have no implications for emotional dynamics. One famous work, Distinction deals with cultural capital that influences how people feel about music, visual arts and movies (see Bourdieu, 1979). But he does not pay deep attention to emotions, so other theories are more helpful to explain the emotional dynamics in Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.
27   To bring these concepts closer together, Bourdieu calls his theories 'generative structuralism', 'constructivist structuralism' or 'structuralist constructivism'.
28   While some scholars argue that habitus is the point where structure and agency come together, Lizardo (2004: 381) argues that Bourdieu's concept of habitus goes beyond structure and agency.

Providing clarity on dynamics between structures and agentic behavior is vital, because this study aims to understand which factors – structural, agentic or both – influence Jewish-Muslim relations. It has the benefit of analyzing the dynamics between Muslims and Jews, instead of merely describing them, and can help answer questions like: does being in the minority in the Netherlands influence Jewish-Muslim relations? Does it bind Muslims and Jews together or are there structures in play that create competition between them? And, what kind of strategies do Muslims and Jews develop because of their experience in different contexts?

Conceptual Tools

The first tool that can help study Jewish-Muslim relations is the concept of 'field'. Bourdieu defines a field as "a small and relatively autonomous social world, a micro-cosmos, inside a larger social world" (Bourdieu 2001: 41 cited in Thielmann, 2013: 204). This means that certain social worlds in society contain their own elements and rules. Examples are the economy, national and local political systems and religious fields.

For a field to be relatively autonomous implies that it can only exist if it has its own outer boundaries and is not submerged in other fields (Bourdieu, 1991: 6-8; Thielmann, 2013: 204-205; Wacquant, 2006: 8). Nevertheless, fields depend on each other and can overlap because resources are exchanged between them. According to Bourdieu, this can occur because fields are structured in a way that permits the exchange of resources. As both independent and dependent, they are *relatively* autonomous (Bourdieu, 1991: 6-8; Wacquant, 2006: 8).

According to Wacquant, fields are not neutral. Wacquant (2006: 8) states that a field is "a structured space of positions, a force field that imposes its specific determinations upon all who enter it." Fields, thus, contain power plays of dominant and dominated groups, who occupy different positions in the field. Although there are power differences between the dominant and dominated, they are not defined as polar opposites; they can be found on a continuum from dominated to dominant and every group in between. Hence, individuals or sometimes entire groups can occupy a higher position in society than others (Bourdieu, 1979). It is important to note that power positions depend on given and obtained resources, which Bourdieu calls 'capital' – the second conceptual tool used for this research. Wacquant (2006: 7) describes the meaning of capital as follows:

> "For Bourdieu (1986), a capital is any resource effective in a given social arena that enables one to appropriate the specific profits arising out of participation and contest in it. Capital comes in three principal species: economic (material and financial assets), cultural (scarce symbolic goods, skills, and titles), and social (resources accrued by virtue of membership in a group)."

Capital can thus assume all forms. It can be economic, social and cultural, but basically consists of resources valued by society. Bourdieu (1989: 22) and Wacquant (2006: 7) also address a fourth form called symbolic capital. According to Bourdieu, symbolic capital is the power of 'world making', which involves the symbolic labels and categories that provide meaning to the world (Bourdieu, 1989: 22). As we will see in Chapter 4, this is an important form of capital when we look at the influence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.

Fields are important to study because individuals and groups get socialized in them. This means that fields have two dimensions. On the one hand, they impose power structures on individuals and groups that are reproduced over time through internalization. On the other hand, according to Wacquant (2006: 8) and Rey (2010: 44), capital is produced, consumed and negotiated within a field. Fields can thus be seen as an 'arena of struggle' between actors with different amounts of capital who aim to gain social mobility through the accumulation of capital (see Rey, 2010: 44; Wacquant, 2006: 8).

I use the field concept in Chapter 3 to describe the ethno-religious and political landscapes of Amsterdam, and to identify if we can speak of Jewish and Muslim fields. The field concept, however, has often been criticized. Thielmann (2013: 208), for example, shows more than one Islamic field in his study of Muslim groups in South Germany. Krech (2008: 13-14) shows that fields can exist within other fields, which he designates regional fields. In my study, I show that Jewish and Muslim fields are both embedded in and connected to other fields. From this criticism, it might be concluded that the structure and form of a field can only be established by empirical investigation. In Chapter 3, I do that for the Jewish and Muslim fields.

The concepts of field and capital have great potential for bringing structuralists and constructivists together or for going beyond these opposites. The third conceptual tool I used to study Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam, however, is the concept par excellence for where structure and agency come together: the idea of 'habitus'. Lizardo (2004: 379) clarified habitus as "a perceptual and classifying structure"

and "a generative structure of practical action." It works as a tool to understand the dynamics between societal and cognitive structures mediated by operational schemes and embodied practices (see Lizardo, 2004: 394). Concretely, this means that societal structures both form and socialize actors in a field or multiple fields. The actors internalize the structures, which become part of the self, which then – through embodiment – re-establish or change the structures they are structured by (see Rey, 2007: 47).

Structures are not reproduced directly by an actor but transformed by processing past experiences, the immediate environment and in relation to other agents in the field. And, habitus can also change through the encounter of new situations (see Lizardo, 2004: 386). Bourdieu describes habitus as (1990: 53):

> "…systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them."[29]

Although the concept of habitus can help to show how Jewish-Muslim relations are shaped by several fields and how Jews and Muslims contribute to these fields, habitus might be the most criticized concept in Bourdieu's toolbox. Not for Bourdieu's work on structures or the fact that both structures and agency influence the way people behave, but because of its presumed lack of agency (see Adams, 2006: 514-515; Lizardo, 2004: 378; Sewell, 1992: 15). Lizardo (2004: 378) writes that Anglo-Saxon sociology did not engage as much with Bourdieu's concept of habitus, because of its presumed lack of agency:

> "Thus, while the reaction of many American sociologists when faced with this perplexing conceptualization of *habitus* is to dismiss it as a fuzzy idea or to treat it as under-specified and abstract, others worry that it harks back to the Parsonian 'oversocialized' actor (Wrong, 1961), and regard it as a foreign object in Bourdieu's overall theoretical scheme, deeply at odds with his otherwise purposive and agentic conceptualization of the social agent."

Emirbayer & Mische (1998) criticize Bourdieu for oversocialization. They do not claim that he pays no attention to agency but acknowledge that he shows how one form of

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29   Also quoted by Lizardo (2004: 378).

agency works, which they call iterative agency. It means that agents living in a field can learn strategies from that field to become socially mobile; described by Bourdieu as the conduct of the 'good player', who is both more restricted and has more room for agency than the average actor in a field. Emirbayer & Mische criticize this form of agency, because they think radical change is very hard to explain, although it is not impossible to explain slower change. Emirbayer & Mische add a second form of agency, 'creativity', in the sense that agents are able to creatively *combine* insights from different fields and project knowledge they have gathered in the past onto future plans. Being discriminated against, but having support of the own community can, for example, lead to someone coming up with the idea to organize the community and speak up against discrimination.

In Bourdieu's work on religion we do indeed see a lack of agency. For example, Verter (2003: 156-157) shows that in Bourdieu's work on religion, Bourdieu focuses on the institution of the Roman Catholic church, but does not provide much agency to the laity. However, the more general claim that Bourdieu does not give much space for agency can be disputed. Verter, for example, argues that Bourdieu's other texts, such as his works on aesthetics, provide more agency and are therefore more suitable to study interaction (see also Lizardo, 2004: 394). Therefore, Verter argues to not use Bourdieu's work on religion to study the interaction between religious groups, but argues for using Bourdieu's general concepts such as 'field', 'strategy', 'habitus', 'capital' developed in his other works to study these interactions. Verter calls this "theorizing religion with Bourdieu against Bourdieu." I use this approach to analyze Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.

Bourdieu responded to the criticism that his work does not pay enough attention to agentic behavior. Interviewed by Lamaison in 1986, Bourdieu said that his work on structures had become more famous than his work on constructivism and that therefore agency seems lacking in his work (Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1989: 111). In this interview, Bourdieu stated that strategies are the connection between structures and agency. Strategies break with agentless action in structuralism, but also break with the lack of structures in constructivism, because they are based on and come from social games. Bourdieu (1989: 112-113) writes:

> "The good player, who is as it were the embodiment of the game, is continually doing what needs to be done, what the game demands and requires. This presupposes a constant invention, an improvisation that is absolutely necessary in order for one to adapt to situations that are infinitely varied."

Strategies are important in Jewish-Muslim cooperation. I found that some religious and community leaders are very aware of the rules and structures in each other's fields. Having internalized this knowledge they created strategies, such as 'searching for similarities', 'decategorizing' and 'avoidance', as we will see in Part 3.

Finally, in regard to Emirbayer & Mische, in *The Weight of the World*, Bourdieu (1999: 507-513) explains that different structures can form an individual living in different fields and so tensions between the fields can emerge within that agent. Think of religious children going to a non-confessional school, or someone who has grown up in a left-wing family now working in a right-wing environment. When combining these structures, changes can occur. So, Bourdieusian theories can address change. I therefore agree with Lizardo (2004: 394) that habitus is a more complex concept than usually presented and that Bourdieu's theories are more adaptable and flexible in regard to the structure-agency debate.

I use Bourdieu's concept of habitus – or rather the attention for studying both structure and agency – as a tool to study the relations between Jews and Muslims and to grasp the processes underlying their relations.[30] I do not predetermine if and how structures or agency influence these relations, but investigate them empirically. Parts 2 and 3 present the results of this investigation. I demonstrate that structures such as state arrangements, international developments, framing and being a minority in the Netherlands create tensions and sometimes limit the opportunities of Jews and Muslims and the relations between them. Sometimes being part of a minority limits what actors can do. Consider the debates on enacting religion in public spaces in Europe, such as wearing headscarves, or on ritual slaughtering (see Gustavsson, Van Der Noll & Sundberg, 2016; Vellenga, 2014). In addition, structures in society often favor the majority population and Jews and Muslims cannot gather as much in-group social capital as the majority simply because they are fewer. Structures might be hard to change, because they feel so 'natural' – in the sense of feeling logical – because they converge with internalized structures within the habitus (see Lizardo, 2004: 391).

In some cases, however, structures and strategies can help Muslims and Jews cooperate. In Chapter 8 we will see that a discourse on cooperation between Jews and Muslims in Morocco helped bond the two groups in Amsterdam. We will also see that Jews and Muslims find ways to change, re-establish and benefit from structures

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30   From now on I will not use the term habitus much, because it requires comparative analysis of two sep-
      arate groups and their capital. Here, I do not necessarily compare groups, but focus on the dynamics
      in their relations. I do, however, use the lens the habitus concept provides to bridge or go beyond the
      structuralist-constructivist divide.

that bring people together. For example, in joint educational projects Muslims and Jews stand up for each other in the classroom to show pupils that they are not just in conflict with each other.

Social Identity Theory, Emotion Management and Empirical Studies on Jewish-Muslim Relations

Although I agree with Lizardo that habitus is flexible and adaptable, and I use the notions of field and capital, Bourdieu's concepts are not enough for us to grasp all aspects of Jewish-Muslim relations. So I also use social identity theory, emotion management theory and empirical studies that focus on historical or contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations. When talking about strategies, Bourdieu describes their importance in relations between people and lists some concrete strategies, but misses others, which can be found in social identity theory. As Lizardo (2004: 394) puts it, we can regard Bourdieu's theories as cognitive sociology that does not pay much attention to emotions. Here, emotion management theories become useful. Finally, Jewish-Muslim relations have specific traits that cannot be easily explained by Bourdieusian, social identity and emotion management theory. Discussions on religious aspects, international conflicts or in-group developments in Jewish-Muslim relations have their own dynamics that can better be understood by the insights from and comparisons with other empirical studies on Jewish-Muslim relations (see Egorova & Ahmed, 2017; Katz, 2015; Mandel 2010; 2014; Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson, 2016; Reedijk, 2015; Tessler & Levy, 2013).

Social identity theory describes how groups try to include some people and exclude others from their own in-group (Brown 2000, 746–747; Tajfel 1982, 2–3). It is based on the idea that people separate 'us' from 'them' to make sense of the world around them, and so create different groups and boundaries between outsiders and themselves (see Barth 1969; Castells 2010; Nagel 1994). The boundaries consist of categorizations that signify who does and does not belong to the group. Examples are being Muslim or Jewish, male or female, straight or gay, and so forth. Social identity theory pays ample attention to strategies considering boundaries, such as expansion, contraction, transvaluation, blurring and positional moves (see Wimmer, 2008b). In Chapter 8, I will come back to these theories and as we will see below, Jews and Muslims use some of these and other strategies too, such as one I call 'searching for similarities'.

Second, when studying the data for this research, I found that managing emotions plays an important role in cooperation projects between Muslims and Jews. In 1979 Arlie Hochschild wrote about feeling rules and emotion management. The main idea

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is that emotions are not only the result of drives, but are also sparked and managed by the environment in the form of framing rules, feeling rules and emotion management. Framing rules prescribe how meaning should be given to a certain situation. These normative rules can be regarded as a form of Bourdieu's idea of structures. Feeling rules prescribe how people should and should not feel (see also Verhoeven & Tonkens, 2013: 416-417), and emotion management is the work actors do to cope with feeling rules. Hochschild distinguishes several strategies, such as cognitive, bodily and expressive emotion management.

As we will see below, being discriminated against, disagreements over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or being afraid of extremist attacks make both Muslims and Jews feel angry and fearful about each other. When Jews and Muslims wanted to work together they had to find strategies to overcome or negotiate these 'negative' emotions. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 show how the emotions are stirred while Chapter 9 shows how they are managed in cooperation projects. This chapter describes Hochschild's theory and concepts in depth and uses them to analyze the workings of emotions in cooperation.

Finally, I apply insights from the empirical studies on Jewish-Muslim relations in different contexts and at different times than introduced in the beginning of this study. They are important to gain insights into specific Jewish-Muslim dynamics, such as interreligious dynamics. Reedijk (2015), for example, studied the relations between Jews, Christians and Muslims in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and demonstrates that religious and interreligious rituals can contribute to *and* hinder interreligious relations. She shows, for example, that some of her respondents felt they could not cooperate with the Other when rituals were involved, because they believed that it would go against their religious beliefs. Other respondents, however, enjoyed certain rituals of the other religious group and others again applied a strategy Reedijk calls 'participating without participation', in which they observed a ritual yet did not engage in it.

These studies are not only important for their insights into religion. They are valuable in comparing findings in different contexts – also an endeavor of the overarching research project 'Delicate Relations: Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and London'. I will provide one example here to illustrate this argument, and in the subsequent chapters and the Conclusion I will frequently compare the empirical findings of this study to those of the other empirical studies on Jewish-Muslim relations in different European countries. Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson (2016) conducted fieldwork on a project concerning young Jews and Muslims playing cricket together in a large

city in the United Kingdom.[31] They saw that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict caused tension between Jewish and Muslim communities in the United Kingdom and that the Iraq war, the attacks on 9/11 and the London subway bombings, together with the representation of Jews and Muslims in the media caused fear and prejudice. Moreover, contact was limited between Jews and Muslims in the studied city because of spatial segregation. The cricket project gave the young Muslims and Jews a place to meet, interact and challenge prejudice. The authors conclude that it was quite successful in that it gave the participants three types of space.

First, there was a safe, structured and organized place to talk about similarities and differences. Second, there was a common activity – playing cricket – and finally, there was a place to 'hang out', where young Jews and Muslims could discover similarities between them outside the boundaries of the project. An interesting finding is that religion acted as both a bridge and a problem. It functioned as a binding mechanism, because Muslims and Jews were surprised by the religious similarities they found. However, even if the Jewish participants did join in religious communities, some did not believe in God and saw Judaism as a culture rather than a religion. The Muslim participants, however, believed in God and felt that monotheism bound Judaism and Islam together. When they learned that not all Jewish participants believed in God they felt some difficulty in finding common ground with the Jewish participants. A professional mediator helped to create understanding for each other.

This situation resembles yet differs from the situation in Amsterdam. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and extremist attacks in 2014 and 2015 caused tension between Jews and Muslims in both cases. The paradoxical divisive and bridging influence of religion in cooperation projects mentioned by Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson were apparent in my study. However, in Amsterdam the strategy of using different spaces to create connections between Muslims and Jews was not used as often as in Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson's cricket project. The comparison is useful for seeing if the factors I found are specific to Amsterdam or influence the relations in wider contexts as well. In the Conclusion I come back to these comparisons.

To sum up, Bourdieu's tools, social identity theory, emotion management theory and insights from empirical studies on Jewish-Muslim relations complement each other and help us to interpret the data gathered for this research. Chapters 4–6 attend to power relations between Jews, Muslims and the majority population in the Netherlands and the role of symbolic power. Chapters 7– 9 show how not just

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
31   They do not mention the city in which they conducted their fieldwork.

structures, but also strategies and emotions are important in Jewish-Muslim relations. Before going into empirical depth, Chapter 3 describes the context of Jewish-Muslim relations and answers the question if we can speak of Jewish and Muslim fields in Amsterdam. But first, it is important to describe how this research was conducted, which is what the next chapter does.

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CHAPTER

2

Methodology: Fieldwork in Diverse Jewish and Muslim Communities

INTRODUCTION

Between June 2014 and December 2015, I conducted fieldwork on Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.[32] For 18 months I observed, talked with, interviewed and listened to Muslims, Jews and others involved in Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. I visited places of worship, and attended demonstrations and activist meetings. I visited people at home and observed educational projects in schools. Diverse Jewish and Muslim respondents showed me around their daily lives, and let me into some of their events, such as dialog meetings and a religious market. In this chapter, I address my methodological approach and the methods used, including sampling technique, implementation, and data coding and analysis.

Qualitative Methods

Before starting the fieldwork, I had to decide on how to do it. My research combined an inductive and a deductive approach. This means that I began with a literature study, which guided my fieldwork, but when other factors came up they received ample attention.[33] Bryman (2004: 399-404) calls this an iterative process, which is quite common in qualitative research. The iterative approach – going back and forth between theory and data – is suitable for studying Jewish-Muslim relations because theories guide the fieldwork. But as we will see, Jewish and Muslim communities are very diverse and you are likely to find something that has not been described in the theory. Working inductively provides room for these findings. The collected data is viewed through the theoretical perspectives described in Chapter 1, so that it contribute to these theories, while the inductive part also contributes to theory building.

After deciding on the approach, I chose the methods. I wanted to understand the processes influencing the tension and cooperation in Jewish-Muslim relations, why people who identify as Muslims and Jews act the way they do and what forms their opinions of each other (see Weiss, 1994: 9). I used three qualitative methods: interviewing, observations and focus groups. Then, to contextualize the data derived

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32   Some expert interviews and one observation were conducted earlier, in April and May of 2014, but the main fieldwork was done between June 2014 and December 2015.

33   Chapter 1 presents the literature study. It influenced my fieldwork in that my interview guide included questions on power derived from Bourdieu, and social identity, which are both included in the theoretical angle of the broader research project 'Delicate Relations: Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and London', which this dissertation falls under. I included questions about 'third parties', such as the role of people who identify as Christians, and about international developments, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because both the broader project and literature on Jewish-Muslim relations indicate these factors play roles in Jewish-Muslim relations (see e.g. Egorova & Ahmed, 2017; Mandel, 2010; 2014).

from these methods, I collected other material, such as newspaper articles, pamphlets and booklets, during the fieldwork.

The three qualitative methods each have their strengths and weaknesses. Qualitative interviewing gives the researcher the tools to grasp the mechanisms behind opinions, because you can ask probing and follow-up questions (see Weiss, 1994: 2-3; 9-10). It helps understand the respondent's worldview through their own experience, instead of relying on theoretically inspired questions. There is more time to gather information from one person and hear the full story. For this research, I conducted 73 interviews with 75 respondents from diverse backgrounds and with different beliefs and opinions.

Interviewing alone, however, will not provide a researcher – to speak in Bourdieusian terms – with 'a feel for the game'; with an idea of what is seen as appropriate or inappropriate behavior in certain settings and what strategies are used unconsciously (see Bourdieu, 1990: 61-64). In interviews the researcher might not grasp the lifeworld of the respondent. This is easier in participant observation, because the researcher is present in the respondent's lifeworld. That is why I decided to also conduct observations. It had the additional advantage of letting me see Jewish-Muslim relations in practice, which allowed me to compare the interviews with observed behavior (see also Bryman, 2004: 166). This resulted in 50 observations in various settings, which I describe below.

If I had chosen to just do observations, however, I would have missed crucial information. Informants might tell more of their story during an interview than during observations when they are interacting with others as well as with the researcher. The narratives are often more complete in interviews than during observations when you are studying many respondents at the same time. So, for this study, the strength of these methods lies in their combination.

I also conducted two focus groups, adding this method because in the educational projects I observed, I only encountered Muslim pupils, but no Jewish pupils, partly because some Jewish parents prefer to have their children attend Jewish schools and at the time, the educational projects I followed did not visit or were not visited by Jewish schools. Jewish communities are relatively small and the chance of encountering Jewish pupils in a non-confessional school class is quite small. Some non-confessional schools in Amsterdam have more Jewish pupils, but the educational projects I followed did not go to these schools either. So, I did not encounter Jewish pupils in my observations in non-confessional schools. Muslim pupils are enrolled

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more often in non-confessional schools. Consequently, in the educational settings, while I heard Muslim pupils talk about their own backgrounds, prejudice and discrimination and religion, I could not gather this information from Jewish pupils. So I decided to do a focus group with Jewish pupils to learn their views. Another reason for choosing the focus group method was that it resembled the classroom settings in which I observed Muslim pupils.

At a certain point in my fieldwork, I noticed that I was meeting more pro-Palestinian activists than pro-Israel activists. So, when one respondent provided the opportunity to conduct a focus group with pro-Israel activists, I decided to do one with them. These focus groups helped me obtain more balanced information.

The interviews, observations and focus groups were complemented by documents that I collected during fieldwork, such as pamphlets, flyers, booklets and magazines. Most documents were given to me by my respondents, others were free leaflets on Jewish and Muslim organizations, religious activities or interreligious projects lying on reception desks. Besides these documents, two research assistants (Dorieke Molenaar and Annemiek Lely) reviewed Jewish and Muslim journals, local and national newspapers and online articles. They collected over 800 articles and organized them in a database. Sakina Loukili and Emma Post gathered policy documents and organizational data online while I collected another 231 articles found online and in newspapers. I did not analyze all of these documents for this study, but the ones I use add to insights into public debates, mobilization for demonstrations and historical processes and I used them to check statements made in the interviews or during observations. These sources are listed in the bibliography at the end of this book.

I did not use much social media material, firstly because it is very hard to determine if expressions on social media come from Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and secondly, a thorough study of Jewish-Muslim relations on social media lies beyond the scope of this study. However, I do discuss events on Twitter or Facebook that my respondents discussed during interviews and observations.

These complementary research methods were used as a form of triangulation (Bryman, 2004: 275). Triangulation means that one research method can be validated by another to gain a comprehensive understanding of the phenomena under study. It also means that the combination of qualitative methods might capture insights that otherwise would be overlooked (see Carter et al., 2014: 545-547). Triangulating the interviews, observations and focus groups thus improved the quality of the study, because it provided different insights into the same processes, which made the dataset more

complete and made it easier to explain the diverse workings of Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. Moreover, the documents that I collected contextualized the data gathered from the three research methods. Combining three methods and contextualizing them with extra data increased the internal validity. In the next section, I describe how these methods were implemented.

Methodological Implementation

There are different ways of conducting interviews and observations. For example, you can use a detailed questionnaire or an open topic list (Bryman, 2004: 318-342). For the interviews and focus groups, I started out with a very detailed interview guide (see Appendix 1). However, in practice I found that probing and listening were more effective tools than preconceived questionnaires to grasp the underlying processes. I interviewed respondents from all walks of life. Some had a wide knowledge of Jewish-Muslim relations, while others did not come into contact with each other very often. Some were religious, others were not. When interviewing such a diverse group with different kinds of knowledge of Jewish-Muslim relations, it is hard to work with a predetermined interview guide. The questions on cooperation are exemplary: if someone was not involved in the cooperation projects, they might not be able to answer questions about these projects, but they could have valuable information on the effect of the extremist attacks happening in 2014 and 2015 in neighboring countries.

Therefore, at an early stage of the study, I decided to use the main themes of my interview guide as a topic list. I added extra topics, because in the first interviews I noticed that respondents mentioned topics that I had either not included or had not given enough attention to in the interview guide. These topics were: role of local government, role of the mayor of Amsterdam, changes in the relations between Jews and Muslims over time, and role of the media. Finally, I also included extra questions tailored to the individual respondent, because some people knew a lot about some subtopics, but were not as knowledgeable about other topics. Some respondents, for example, knew a lot about the demise of the Jewish-Moroccan network, while others did not even know they existed.

This does not mean that either topic list or interview was unstructured. First, the interview guide contained the topics and a few central questions (see Weiss, 1994: 48 for a similar method). Then, I used follow-up questions on, for example, local and national incidents of discrimination or exclusion and the role the (local) government plays in relations between Jews and Muslims. The interviews also had a sequence.

As Hermanowicz (2002: 488-490) says, it is important to order an interview, because it can build trust and rapport with your informants. Therefore, I usually asked 'easy' questions first, getting respondents to introduce themselves or tell me how they got involved in activism or cooperation projects. The middle section was dedicated to more difficult questions and at the end, respondents could elaborate on topics they deemed important.

This approach had the advantage that while I had a clear vision of the questions I wanted to ask, it left room for respondents to answer in their own terms and for my probing and listening. It also allowed me to ask other questions if my respondent told me something interesting on a topic I had not thought of or when a respondent was very knowledgeable about a topic (see also Hopf, 2004:205 for a similar argument).

The focus groups and almost all of the interviews were audio-recorded. Recording has the advantage of accuracy, because the researcher does not have to rely on notes and memory. Also, it helps in the analysis to capture the smaller details or nuances respondents describe in interviews (Kuckartz, 2014: 123). However, five of the orientation interviews with academic experts and experts in the field were informal in character and were therefore not recorded (see Kuckartz, 2014: 123). I did make notes during these interviews which I then transcribed. The other interviews were either transcribed by students who signed a confidentiality agreement or I transcribed them. The interviews lasted an hour on average.[34]

There are several ways to conduct observations, ranging from very structured to totally unstructured (see Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007: 142-152). Which form you use depends on the research question and the field. For this study, the observations were documented in semi-structured observational reports for the same reasons I conducted semi-structured interviews. This left room for unexpected findings, but allowed me to answer my research questions. The reports focused on the same topics as in my interviews but I also described the location, how many people were present and how they verbally or non-verbally interacted with others present in order to place what was said in context. Without context much of the meaning of the words gets lost (see also Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007: 146-147). Take the pro-Palestine and pro-Israel demonstrations: my observational reports included where the demonstration took place, an estimate of the number of people present, the groups and organizations I could identify and the flags or symbols people brought to these events. As we will see

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34   Hermanowicz (2002: 487) recommends conducting interviews that last between 60 and 90 minutes, because an hour provides the interviewer with detailed and in-depth information and respondents usually grow tired and become less detailed after 90 minutes.

in Chapter 4, the findings on the influence of the Israeli-Palestinian on Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam would be less contextualized and the insights about symbolic power – which that chapter explains – would be less precise if I had not written down all the different symbolic expressions on these demonstrations.

The duration of the observations was 1.5–7 hours, depending on how long the event lasted. Educational projects, for example, lasted between 1.5 and 4.5 hours, while one of the interreligious walks I observed lasted the whole afternoon and part of the evening.

Unlike the interviews, almost none of the observations for this research were recorded on tape. First of all because it was not allowed in some situations, but second, because recording would have been too disruptive in many situations (Kuckartz, 2014: 123). Imagine a dialog table, with eight Jews and Muslims meeting each other for the first time. The dialog leader starts the discussion, trying to create bonds between the participants. They discuss the neighborhoods they live in, explain something about their background, and address delicate topics, such as extremist attacks and discrimination. Compared with an interview, they do not have to tell their stories to just one researcher, but to seven strangers as well. Having a tape recorder on the table would add to the tension and respondents might feel that they have to mind their words, because every word is noted or recorded. In four events taking place in public space, such as at demonstrations and an interreligious market, I could record the speeches. In these cases, recording did not disrupt the situation, because so many people were there and others, such as journalists, were also recording the speeches.

Hammersley & Atkinson (2007: 143) point out that in many situations, no matter how welcoming the hosts might be, continuous notetaking would also be too disruptive. Therefore, I often took notes after the event. Sometimes I did take notes during the event, when I could sit in the back of the class in an educational project, or at large meetings where lots of people were listening to speakers. In these cases, I could make notes without disturbing anyone (see also Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007: 143).

Sampling

Besides preparing suitable methods, I needed to speak to Jews, Muslims and others who could provide as many different angles as possible on the processes happening in Jewish-Muslim relations. In other words, I needed to find the variation of possible factors in their relations (see Becker, 1998: 71). Therefore, I used a sampling technique which Weiss (1994: 22-23) calls a 'sample to maximize range'. In practice, this means

that for the interviews and focus groups I selected Jews and Muslims of different ages and genders, from different religious groups and ethnicities and different organizations. I also interviewed academics, politicians, policy makers, youth workers and people who identified as Christians and were engaged in Jewish-Muslim relations. In some cases these respondents were actively involved in cooperation projects. For example, some cooperation projects not only included Jews and Muslims, but also people who identified as Christians – sometimes referred to as a 'trialogue' by respondents. In other cases, I spoke to politicians or policy makers who made the policies that influenced the relations between Muslims and Jews or spoke to academics and youth workers who had worked with Jewish and Muslim communities. I selected respondents through religious and migrant organizations, by contacting organizers of events such as demonstrations or cooperation projects, by meeting respondents during observations, with the help of key informants and through further snowball sampling (see also Bryman, 2004: 100-102). Together, these respondents formed a diverse sample that contributed to my understanding of the various sides of Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.

The sampling technique for observations was the same as for interviews in the sense that I used a sample to maximize range. This led to a selection of different events and activities in which Jews and Muslims engaged. I conducted observations in the course of educational projects, dialog meetings, interreligious meetings of religious leaders, (inter)religious activities, women's groups, meetings on anti-Semitism or Islamophobia, meetings of activists and during pro-Israel or pro-Gaza demonstrations.

Combined, data collection resulted in 73 qualitative interviews (75 people in total), two focus groups (16 people in total) and 50 observations. Regarding observations, the smallest group was an interreligious meeting of three respondents – one Jew and two Christians. The biggest was the pro-Gaza protest on August 3, 2018 held on Museum Square in Amsterdam in which some 3000 people participated. On all occasions, I witnessed the interaction of people from different backgrounds with an age range of 10–80 years old. I met Muslims who frequented the mosques of the Turkish Reform movement Milli Görüş, and others who attended mosques that cater to people with Moroccan or Pakistani backgrounds. The result was a diverse sample and thus a multifaceted view of Jewish-Muslim relations.

Of the 75 interviewees, 29 were women and 46 were men[35] with an age range of 18–77 years old (average age: 43). Of the interviewees, 30 identified as Jew and 26 identified as Muslim. Of the 30 Jews, six identified as 'cultural' Jews and of the 23 Muslims one identified as a 'cultural' Muslim. Two of the Muslims I spoke to were converts; one had converted from Judaism to Islam but still also identified with Judaism, although she described herself as Muslim. The remaining respondents identified themselves as Christians, members of the Sufi movement in the Netherlands or as non-religious. The religious background of the five expert respondents is unknown because they were interviewed as subject experts and not about their personal backgrounds.[36]

The religious Jews belong to the liberal Jewish community, the Ashkenazi modern-orthodox communities or the Sephardic orthodox community. Although most Jewish respondents were born and raised in the Netherlands, a few had been born in Israel, the United States or Indonesia. Most Muslims were either first or second-generation migrants of Moroccan or Turkish descent. All Muslim respondents were Sunnis, but belonged to different groups. The sample included informants connected to such organizations as Milli Görüş, the Gülen Movement, mosques that were affiliated with the Islamic Foundation of the Netherlands [ISN], the Cooperation Collective of Moroccans in the Netherlands (*Samenwerkingsverband Marokkanen in Nederland*) and representatives of various other mosques.[37] The focus groups were conducted with 11 Jewish pupils, five girls, six boys and all aged between 16 and 18 years old. The other focus group was conducted with five pro-Israel activists, two women and three men, all middle-aged.

In the effort to establish a balanced sample I had to speak with Jews and Muslims from different self-identified ethnic and religious communities.[38] Leaders of organizations and grass-roots leaders were often good starting points to gain access to these communities. I spoke with many organization leaders and key persons in communities as well as young, starting leaders. Often highly educated, these people were very

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35   More men were interviewed because about half of the respondents were religious or community leaders, who are more often men than women.
36   When I speak of Christians, I mean people who identify as religious Christians. Non-religious people identify as such.
37   I did not speak to Muslims who identified as Shi'i, because I did not come across them participating in Jewish-Muslim relations, in cooperation projects or in conflict. This might have to do with the fact that I only found one Shi'i organization that might have been active in Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam (see also Van den Bos, 2011: 562). I did approach this organization for an interview, but I did not hear back from them. It might be argued that individual Muslims who identify as Shi'i did engage in the events I visited, but they were not visible as Shi'i. In big events, such as protests, I could not identify all participants as either Sunni or Shi'i.
38   This is not to say that Jewish-Muslim relations only happen in self-identified ethno-religious groups. However, many Jews and Muslims organized themselves in self-identified religious or ethnic communities and therefore I had to speak to them.

valuable to interview, because they often knew lots about their communities and interreligious/intercommunal relations. However, for this study, I also wanted to understand the views of less educated Jews and Muslims. Therefore, I interviewed a few people with less education and ensured that I observed and spoke to Jews and Muslims (and others) who were less educated during my observations. For example, in my sample I included two educational projects. For the most part the first works with pupils attending Regional Education Centers [in Dutch: ROCs] that offer Vocational Education and Training and the second works at least partly with school pupils following preparatory vocational secondary education [In Dutch: VMBO].

I chose to start my fieldwork where Jews and Muslims directly interacted with each other, such as cooperation projects and educational projects. I also chose spaces where I thought Muslims and Jews who had experienced conflict would be present, such as the pro-Israel or pro-Palestine demonstrations. In these spaces the contacts were most visible and clear.

However, direct contact is not the only part of Jewish-Muslim relations. As I said in the Introduction, the perception of the Other is also part of the relation. For example, religious and community leaders explained that media coverage contributed to (young) Jews and Muslims forming stereotypes of the Other. In this case, Jews and Muslims did not have much direct contact, but were informed about the Other through a third party: the media.[39] So I included some Jews and Muslims in my sample who did not have much contact with each other. Including them helped me gain insight into the less visible relations that were important for understanding the range of different opinions.

In late 2015, after 18 months of fieldwork, I was not collecting much new material and had found patterns in my data. A wide variety of respondents had shed their different lights on the main events happening in Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. This was the moment of saturation for the main topics of research in the period under study (2014–2015) (Bryman, 2004: 403). After talking to all these different people, I had an extensive database with a widely diverse range of narratives, information and opinions, which helped me to gain insight into the processes that shape Jewish-Muslim relations. Therefore, in December 2015, I decided to stop the fieldwork and began the main phase of analysis.

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39   This does not mean they had never seen or talked to a Jew or a Muslim before, just that contact was limited.

Coding and Analysis

As Kuckartz (2014: 47) argues, qualitative coding often involves a circular or iterative approach where you move between several steps in your research or coding. While in quantitative research you often start with the research question, then turn to data collection, analysis and results, in qualitative research this process moves to and fro between these steps. It helps the researcher reflect on the initial coding and change codes if they do not fit all data. So, while doing fieldwork, I was also coding and analyzing my initial findings, although the main part of the analysis was completed after December 2015. I used the software program Atlas.ti to analyze the data. Using data analysis software has many advantages. It makes the transcripts and observational reports easily searchable and manages the created codes. It makes analysis more consistent and enables coding combinations to detect patterns in the data, which benefits analysis (see Kuckartz, 2014: 133-139).

For coding and analysis, I used an approach that comes close to grounded theory (see Bryman, 2004: 401-405). In its classic form, grounded theory is an inductive approach to research. Instead of testing a theory, it builds theories from the bottom up through studying the data. However, one of the main criticisms of classic grounded theory is that it does not implement relevant theories or only implements them in a late stage of the study, while in practice researchers are no *tabula rasa* and use their theoretical knowledge to code and analyze their data. What is more, if they did not use their knowledge and theoretical frames they could be missing important insights from other researchers (Bryman, 2004: 407; Kuckartz, 2014: 50; Weiss, 1994: 155). In new forms of grounded theory, contrasting with the classic version, it is widely accepted that researchers use theory to interpret their data during the coding process. So, while my codes remain close to the data, some codes are inspired by theoretical knowledge. This made my coding strategy – in line with my methodological approach – inductive as well as deductive (see also Kuckartz, 2014: 26; 63). Inductive-deductive coding uses theoretical knowledge, but does not forget that data might differ from theory and not fit the theoretical frameworks used.

Therefore, I used open coding. This means first reading the hard copy transcripts of a few interviews and observations, in which Jews and Muslims expressed different opinions and narratives. Then I created descriptive codes that stayed close to the data. General codes that were influenced by the theories I applied were also added. When coding these first transcripts, I found patterns in the data, which inspired new codes and subcodes. After this phase I started reading more interview and observation transcripts, developed more codes, investigated if they could be applied to other

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data and where applicable did so. I developed main codes that were divided into subcodes, which I used to code the rest of the data. If I found something that did not fit the coding scheme I added new codes (see also Bryman, 2004: 404; Kuckartz, 2014; 24-26; Weiss, 1994: 156). But, as Kuckartz (2014) argues, this does not mean that the coding process does not evolve to an endpoint. Although I went back and forth between coding and analyzing, eventually I made a definitive code scheme.

The main codes of the code scheme are 'Discrimination', 'Israeli-Palestinian Conflict', 'Emotions', 'Strategies', 'Role of the Government', 'Symbolism', 'Comparisons', 'Conditions for Cooperation', 'Capital', 'Terrorism',[40] 'Problems' (meaning problems in Jewish-Muslim relations that do not fall under the other categories), 'Solutions' and 'Motives'. The main codes were divided in subcodes. For example, 'Discrimination', used to describe cases of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, was divided into subcategories as 'perpetrators' and 'victims'. Other subcategories that fell under 'Discrimination' were causes and kinds of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, such as 'online', 'verbal' or 'physical'.[41] Besides thematic codes, I used descriptive – sometimes called factual – codes to draw connections between the codes (see Kuckartz, 2014: 41).

All the interviews were coded throughout, except in a few instances due to interruptions, when tea was served or when the conversation became informal and we talked about things that were irrelevant to the study. This means that almost everything was coded and I did not use focus coding, which is when researchers code part of the interviews only. The reason for coding so extensively is that parts of the interview that may seem unimportant at first, might be quite important on second glance (see also Friese, 2014: 135).

Before introducing the context of Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam in the next chapter, it is important to provide one other methodological note. Real names are used in only very few cases, such as for the speakers at demonstrations taking place in public space whose speeches are often published online. I also sometimes provided real names when referring to publicly available sources, such as newspaper articles. In all other cases, however, pseudonyms make the respondents anonymous. Wherever I could I used pseudonyms *and* added background characteristics, because I wanted

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40   I used terrorism here, instead of violent extremism, because it refers to the emic descriptions used by respondents. In the rest of the study I use 'violent extremism' instead. The reasons for this usage are explained in Chapter 5.
41   Discrimination was used as a code, instead of anti-Semitism or Islamophobia, because at the beginning of the study I was unsure of the categories I would use. For the coding I used 'discrimination', but for the report I decided to use anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. The reasons for this usage are explained in Chapter 6.

to give my respondents a name and in many cases it is important to know if the person speaking identifies as a Jew, a Muslim, a Christian and/or as non-religious. In some cases, I could only use the background characteristics because otherwise the respondent would be recognizable. Then I used terms like 'a Jewish man' or 'a Muslim woman' to describe the respondent (for a list of pseudonyms see Appendix 2).

These measures contributed to external confidentiality – which means trying to protect respondents from being recognized by outsiders. However, as Tolich (2004: 101-102) states for studies in communities, it is also important to protect internal confidentiality – protection against recognition by insiders. To try to diminish the chance of insiders identifying respondents I anonymized not just the respondents, but also most of the organizations in the sections where I discuss my data derived from interviews and observations. In the next chapter (and Chapter 7) I provide an overview of Jewish, Muslim and Jewish-Muslim organizations in Amsterdam and the Netherlands, to be able to comprehend what these organizations look like in practice and understand the context in which Jewish-Muslim relations take place. But this overview is not linked to specific respondents. A few cases do mention the names of organizations. For example, the Jewish-Moroccan Network Amsterdam (JMNA) is sometimes mentioned by name in the empirical chapters, because many respondents – individually unrecognizable – described aspects of this network.

In summary, I used qualitative methods: interviews, focus groups and observations. The study sample maximizes a broad range of opinions, attitudes and behavior. The resulting data was coded and analyzed iteratively in a process best described as an adjusted form of grounded theory. The benefits of using these methods to study Jewish-Muslim relations include the opportunity to gather data that does not fit theoretical frameworks and improving internal validity through triangulation. It allowed me to grasp the processes involved in Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam and explain how and why they are happening.

In the next chapter, I will describe the Jewish and Muslim organizations found in the Netherlands, as well as the various religious, ethnic and political fields in Amsterdam and the Netherlands to which Jewish and Muslim communities belong.

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CHAPTER

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Jewish and Muslim Fields in Amsterdam and the Netherlands

INTRODUCTION

We cannot understand contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam without knowing how they are embedded in Amsterdam and Dutch society and international contexts because such relations do not occur in a vacuum, but emerge and get established in a wider context (see also Egorova & Ahmed, 2017: 284; Katz, 2015: 4; Westerduin, Jansen & Neutel, 2014: 37). Especially when we try to understand the influence of structural factors on Jewish-Muslim relations, it is important to know the context in which they emerge. As Katz (2015: 5) puts it: Jewish-Muslim relations are 'triangular', with society and its politics as the third party. Therefore this chapter focuses on a description of the Amsterdam and general Dutch political contexts. Specifically, the focus is on the part of the political field that influences groups that are seen as religious and ethnic communities in the Netherlands. As we will see, these entanglements are crucial for Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.

However, national and local levels are not the only contexts that influence Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. International political contexts also play an important – although I agree with Egorova & Ahmed (2017) and Katz (2015), not the only – role in Jewish-Muslim relations. International political contexts, such as the influence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the extremist attacks in Brussels (2014), Paris (2015) and Copenhagen (2015), are briefly discussed at the end of this chapter, but discussed in-depth in Chapters 4 and 5.

Knowing how Jewish and Muslim communities are established in the local and national context is key to obtaining a general sense of the actors involved in the field and to understanding what their communities look like. Therefore, the second aim of this chapter is to examine the ethno-religious landscape in Amsterdam and the Netherlands, applying the *field* concept, as described in Chapter 1, to determine the extent to which it is possible to identify Jewish and Muslim fields and see if Jewish and Muslim communities are embedded in a larger ethno-religious field (see Bourdieu, 1991: 6-8; 2001: 41). This latter point is pivotal for this study, because it will show where Jewish-Muslim relations take place.[42]

This chapter first discusses the part of the political field in the Netherlands where groups that are seen or identify as ethnic and religious communities intersect with local and national government. It goes on to outline the demographics of the ethno-

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42   As noted above, this is not to say that Jewish-Muslim relations only consist of ethno-religious compo-
        nents. However, these were important components of my fieldwork and so need to be contextualized.

religious landscape and then zooms in on the historical development of Muslim and Jewish communities in the Netherlands. Finally, it will answer the question if we can speak of one larger ethno-religious field or of Jewish and Muslim fields in Amsterdam and the Netherlands.

The Dutch Political Field: 'Ethno-religious' Minorities and the State

In recent years, integration and radicalization policies that address religious and/ or ethnic minorities have changed. The nationalistic, populist *Partij voor de Vrijheid* [Party for Freedom], made Muslims and Islam its main policy objective (see De Graaf & Weggemans, 2018; Vossen, 2011: 184-186). And, as we will see, groups that are seen as ethno-religious minorities have a long history of cooperation and strife with the Dutch state (see Kennedy & Zwemer, 2010; Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011). Thus when we try to understand Jewish-Muslim relations we cannot understand them without seeing them in relation to political authorities.

In this section, I describe four major societal changes in the Netherlands that show where the political field entangles with groups that are seen or identify as religious and ethnic communities in Dutch society and thereby provide the context for contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. These four changes are: pillarization/secularization processes, multiculturalism, the separation between church and state and finally the call for self-reliance and self-sufficiency.

To start with the first, contemporary relations between the Dutch state and groups that are seen or identify as ethnic and religious communities are influenced by processes that began at the end of the 19th century. From the 1880s onwards, processes such as improving infrastructure, social mobilization and migration, and the disestablishment of the Protestant church led to the phenomenon known as 'pillarization' (see Kennedy & Zwemer, 2010: 250-255; Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 36-38). Pillarization is when population groups unite in their own religious or ideological networks or organizations and in doing so create boundaries between their own communities and others (see Kennedy & Zwemer, 2010: 250-251; Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 36). In the Dutch system of pillarization Roman Catholics, Protestants, Socialists and Liberals all formed their own pillars (Kennedy & Zwemer, 2010: 250-251; Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 36).

As Spiecker & Steutel (2001: 294-295) describe these pillars, each had its own 'ideologically sensitive' organizations, such as a political party, schools and broadcasting stations. They also developed institutions with predominantly social functions, such as hospitals, housing associations or animal protection societies.

These institutions were often completely funded by the state, such as schools and hospitals or they were partly state funded, such as broadcasting stations and housing corporations.

The relations between these groups were not always amicable. Vellenga & Wiegers (2011: 37), for example, mention the anti-clerical and partly anti-religious climate among the socialists, while the Roman Catholics regarded Protestants as "wayward daughters of the mother church that were threatening the Truth." Both Kennedy & Zwemer (2010: 253) and Vellenga & Wiegers (2011: 37), however, say that pillarization not only caused division, but also integration. Kennedy & Zwemer say that communities became closer internally because of their increased organization and Vellenga & Wiegers emphasize that the elites of the different pillars kept working together.

There are some problems with the concept of pillarization described by Kennedy & Zwemer (2010: 255-261). First, historians debate when the pillarization process started. Specifically, they debate if it can be seen as a modern phenomenon in relation to upcoming nationalism or if it is based on previous confessional cleavages and earlier processes of improved organization. The second problem is that pillarization suggests internal coherence. Kennedy & Zwemer argue that the Orthodox Protestant and Roman Catholic pillars under their study also experienced tension within their own pillars. Thirdly, historians show local differences in the extent of pillarization (Blom & Talsma, 1995, cited in Kennedy & Zwemer, 2010: 255-261). Moreover, they debate whether the socialists and liberals could be considered to have their own pillars, particularly because the liberal pillar was loosely organized. Fourth, focusing on pillarization as a national process ignores the international influences on Dutch history, as the same kind of thick networks formed in some of the surrounding countries.

Although these objections add nuance to what pillarization is, Kennedy & Zwemer (2010: 261) show that the pillarization processes apparent in the Netherlands put their mark on Dutch society and resulted in certain political arrangements that still influence the relations between the Dutch state and religious and ethnic groups today. They claim:

> "The relatively rapid acceptance of homosexuals in Dutch society has been attributed to the room that was made for their 'pillarized' associations, and subsidies to Muslim and Hindu groups from the 1980s was justified on the same principle. The extent to which the Dutch were willing to finance the institutions of even tiny religious minorities prompted one studying

the 1990s to praise the equitability of Dutch arrangements in contrast to countries like the U.S., England, Germany and Australia." (261)

The 1960s saw the start of depillarization and secularization processes. Religious organizations ceased to exist, broadened their identities or merged with non-religious parties (Kennedy & Zwemer, 2010: 265-267). Kennedy & Zwemer (2010: 265) explain the decline of the pillars as follows:

> "Luykx, as well as the Belgian historians De Maeyer and Hellemans[43], hold that Roman Catholicism, in reaction to the modernisation challenge of the nineteenth century, precipitated a religious revival culminating in the pronounced pillarization of the Interbellum. The depillarization and secularization of the 1960s and after was simply the counterpart of this upsurge, a return to a 'normal' level of adherence to Roman Catholicism. Seen this way, the secularization of the 1960s and after was not a unique occurrence within European Roman Catholicism, but was a return to the pre1850 situation. Like Luykx, De Maeyer and Hellemans, Wintle sees Dutch pillarization as a phenomenon that could only be temporary. In the nineteenth century, new groups knocked on the door who wanted to become an integral part of the nation. After these new groups had taken in their positions, pillarization began to lose its function and faded away."

Both Kennedy & Zwemer and Vellenga & Wiegers also point out other factors influencing depillarization and secularization processes, such as the rise of the welfare state, which transferred dependency structures from religious organizations to the state. Kennedy & Zwemer also mention urbanization and social and geographical mobility, referring to the idea that religion relies on personal ties and smaller communities and when communities grow larger religious organizations struggle to survive.[44] They show that the new social movements of the 1960s provided other worldviews and forms of engagement that proved to be competitive in relation to religious worldviews such that secularization processes emerged in Dutch society.

Kennedy & Zwemer, however, also argue that Dutch society does not fit secularization theory as much as meets the eye. The Christian Democratic Party is still one of the biggest political parties in the Netherlands – in 2018 they won the most seats in

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43   Kennedy & Zwemer describe Hellemans as a historian. However, he is a professor in the sociology of religion.
44   This idea, however, ignores the existence of thriving religious communities in urban areas (see Burchardt & Becci, 2013: 1).

local councils. Moreover, religious schools and broadcasting stations are financed by the government. It might be argued that religion has not merely declined; it has sometimes transformed to more individual or less organized forms (see also Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 42-43). And finally, Islam has become a prominent feature of Dutch society through migration processes and heated discussions in the public debate (Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 38-40).

As Spiecker & Steutel (2001: 296) show, at the peak of depillarization, the Netherlands experienced immigration. In the 1960s, the Dutch economy was expanding rapidly and Dutch businesses were having problems finding low-skilled industrial workers. In cooperation with the Dutch government, these businesses recruited people from the Mediterranean. Initially, these so-called 'guest laborers' came from countries such as Spain, Italy and Greece, but eventually were mainly recruited in Morocco and Turkey (Beck, 2002: 97–100; Essers & Benschop, 2007: 51; FORUM, 2010: 6).

The guest laborers were joined by growing groups of migrants from the Antilles and Surinam. After World War II, the migration flow from Surinam began rising due to cheaper transport and an improving economy in Surinam. But in the 1970s, before Surinam gained its independence from the Netherlands and in the following five years, the number of Surinamese immigrants grew rapidly (Van Amersfoort & Van Niekerk, 2006: 334-335).[45] Surinamese migrants searched for better living conditions and better social security, but also because they feared ethnic tensions after decolonization, to lose their Dutch nationality and their right to enter the country when a visa procedure would be implemented in 1980 (Van Amersfoort & Van Niekerk, 2006: 334-335). As a result, approximately 300,000 Surinamese migrants came to the Netherlands (FORUM, 2010: 6).

Antillean migration began in 1634 when slaves were brought to the Netherlands from the Antilles (Van Amersfoort & Van Niekerk, 2006: 337-338). Later on, servants, nannies and (common-law) wives came to the Netherlands, as well as small numbers of students. In the 1920s oil industries settled in Curaçao and Aruba, which benefited the local economy and attracted migrants to the Dutch Antilleans. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, employment opportunities declined drastically and with the withdrawal of oil industries from the islands in the 1980s the economic situation worsened, leading to a rise in migration to the Netherlands. In total, approximately 82,000 Antilleans settled in the Netherlands (Van Amersfoort & Van Niekerk, 2006: 337-338).

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45   From the 19th century onwards, Surinamese students, as well as small numbers of sailors, adventurers, musicians or other artists were coming to the Netherlands (Van Amersfoort & Van Niekerk, 2006: 334).

Due to migration, ethnic diversity increased in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s. Although many new migrants were arriving, up until the late 1970s the Dutch government was reluctant to set policies to help them find their way in Dutch society. This reluctance came from the idea that the Netherlands was not an immigration country and most of these groups – especially the guest laborers – would return home after working in the Netherlands for a few years (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2012: 272). In the late 1970s and 1980s, the Dutch government designed an Ethnic Minorities Policy, which no longer regarded migrants as temporary guests. These and other policies to do with the integration of minorities are sometimes seen as stemming from pillarization and are often referred to as 'multiculturalist' (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2012: 267-272).[46]

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The ideas behind these multicultural policies were to improve the socio-economic position of migrants, combat discrimination and rested on the belief that cultural emancipation of new ethnic minorities was key to their integration (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2012: 267-272). Several policies were set to help migrants participate in Dutch society. Training courses and educational programs were introduced for ethnic minorities, anti-discrimination policies were extended and migrants were allowed to develop their own religious, cultural and linguistic traditions (Vasta, 2007: 716-717).

Vasta (2007: 719-720) shows that the multiculturalist policies did not solve all the differences in socio-economic participation. Ethnic minorities were still more likely to be unemployed and less likely to acquire higher education. In the early 2000s, public debates heavily criticized these policies for failing to integrate the new minorities and ignoring the associated problems (see Scheffer, 2000; Spiecker & Steutel, 2001: 297-300; Vasta, 2007: 714).[47] Vasta (2007: 714) describes this shift as follows:

> "In 2000 journalist Paul Scheffer attracted considerable attention with his claim that the Dutch had been too generous by not insisting that immigrants learn the Dutch language, culture and history (Engbersen 2003, 4). According to this line of thinking, the Dutch had ignored basic liberal democratic values in favour of the acceptance of diverse cultural identities which would ultimately destroy social cohesion. Populist politician Pim Fortuyn claimed that the Netherlands had too many immigrants and

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46 However, as Duyvendak & Scholten (2012: 273) describe, the continuation of pillarization can be questioned. First, it was not intended to continue because depillarization processes were in place in the 1960s and 1970s. Second, pillarization was not so strong in 'multiculturalist' policies such that migrant organizations ever gained their own pillar in Dutch society.

47 Duyvendak & Scholten (2012: 270-271) show that this critique was already being expressed in the 1980s and 1990s.

that Islam is a backward religion.[48] Matters escalated even further when filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered in 2004. Van Gogh was famous for a film on Muslim women and domestic violence, as well as for his polemics against Islam. These events have fueled perceptions of a schism between immigrant Muslims and the 'native Dutch' over basic democratic values such as freedom of speech and the position of women in Muslim communities. Issues of immigration, asylum and cultural and religious diversity have become highly politicised."

In the early 2000s, the multicultural policies that Scheffer calls a 'multicultural tragedy' were pinpointed as one of the main reasons for the lack of integration. These policies were regarded as too soft and ineffective. Minorities were blamed for not wanting to integrate and the Dutch were accused of being too tolerant of cultural differences. The multiculturalist policies shifted to stricter, assimilationist policies (see Vasta, 2007: 733).

Vasta (2007: 731-734) shows that problems with multicultural policies were not necessarily present in the principles of multiculturalism. They were predominantly visible in the implementation and hampered by structural marginalization and what Vasta defines as 'institutional racism'. She concludes that the problem with Dutch multiculturalist policies is not that they were too accommodating, but not accommodating enough. Duyvendak & Scholten (2012: 280) also show that multiculturalist policies might have had implementation problems and were not as consistent as often described. They show that multiculturalist approaches were already being criticized in 1979. Some policies were not implemented on a local level and there was a discrepancy between the policies that were actually implemented and the advocated policy frame.

Duyvendak & Scholten (2012: 279) argue that it would be a misconception to see all Dutch policies implemented since the late 1970s as multiculturalist. There are elements of multiculturalism in the policies developed in the late 1970s and 1980s, but a critical frame also emerged at that time, which gained momentum in the early 2000s. They conclude that seeing the Netherlands as a liberal, multicultural society is only partly correct and "since the 1990s, Dutch politicians are becoming less willing to make room for cultural differences." When looking at the rise of populist parties, this trend seems to continue today (see Van Es, 2018: 147).

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48   In an interview with De Volkskrant, Fortuyn did not say that Islam is a backward religion, but a backward culture [achterlijke cultuur] (see Poorthuis & Wansink, 2002). Although he said culture instead of religion, his statements did provoke many discussions about migration and Islam in the public debate.

Moving away from policies viewed as multiculturalist, pillarization, depillarization and secularization also transformed contemporary relations between the state and groups that are seen or identify as religious and ethnic communities in the Netherlands. Consequently, the principle of the relation between church and state obtained a specific character. In the Netherlands, this principle between church and state is shaped such that contact between religious organizations is possible, but there are limits to it.

In Europe, there are roughly three kinds of models for the relations between government and religious organizations: state church, relations between church and state, and separation between church and state. In the United Kingdom, we find an example of a state church, where the Anglican Church is supported by the state. In France, we speak of '*laïcité*'; religion is supposed to be a private affair, not expressed in public, and the state should not interfere with religion and vice versa (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2008; Vellenga, 2009).[49]

In the Netherlands, the relations between religion and the state fall into the second model, in between the French and English models. Dutch academics have categorized these relations between church and state, explaining that they are based on three main principles: freedom of religion; equal treatment of religions and philosophies of life; and the separation of church and state (see Maussen, 2006: 17-19, Nickolson, 2012: 24-27; Vellenga, 2009: 22-24). These principles are not unique to the Dutch, as similar principles are valued in France or the United Kingdom, but the specific implementation of these principles is sometimes referred to as 'the Dutch model' (see Nickolson, 2012).

Freedom of religion protects the right – individual or collective – to express religious ideas and practices within the boundaries of the law. Equal treatment of religions and philosophies of life means that everyone should be treated equally regardless of their religious beliefs or background.[50] Separation between church and state means that hand the government should not interfere with internal religious affairs, such as the appointment of clerics. It also means that religious specialists should not interfere with the internal affairs of the government. There are some exceptions to this as dialog between the state and religious organizations is allowed and so is financing religious education in non-confessional schools (see Gemeente Amsterdam, 2008: 3-8; Maussen, 2006: 17-19; 41; Nickolson, 2012: 24-27; Vellenga, 2009: 22-24). For

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49   These are ideal types. As Katz (2015: 14) argues laïcité in France is not as absolutist as is often portrayed.
50   This principle also applies to gender, race or political affiliation ("Artikel 1: Gelijke Behandeling en Discriminatieverbod", 2008).

Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam, this means that they can have a relation with the government, but under prescribed principles.

However, Nickolson (2012: 23-24) points out that these principles are not always clear. The separation between church and state, for example, is not stated as such in the Dutch Constitution, although it could be derived from its general principles. And it is not always clear if and how (local) government should finance religious organizations. So local governments provide subsidies to religious organizations in various pragmatic ways (see also Maussen, 2006: 50-65).

Vellenga (2009: 22-24) argues that although the state should not interfere with the internal affairs of religious groups, it does sometimes when trying to prevent radicalization. He says that Dutch state officials sometimes want to promote liberal Islam among young Muslims to provide an alternative to more orthodox or more radical thinking. In providing an alternative, Vellenga argues, the state is interfering with the inner workings of religion.

The unclarity about what is seen as an appropriate relation between state and religion also provides challenges for the local government of Amsterdam. They have to work in a – sometimes contradictory – national framework, and have to develop their own policies with their own emphasis. For contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations, the policies implemented from 2004 onwards are most relevant. In 2004, Theo van Gogh, a Dutch filmmaker, was murdered in the east of Amsterdam by Mohammed Bouyeri (see also Komen, 2014: 47). Maussen says that from that moment on, the city of Amsterdam focused its integration and religion policies on dialog and diversity (see also Maussen, 2006: 63-65). The policies urged citizens to embrace their differences and expected them to form a shared, strong and local identity through dialog. That identity was supposed to be 'Amsterdammer' (Maussen, 2006: 71-74).

Characteristic of this vision is a broad diversity policy the local government developed. This policy saw religion as part of a cultural background, a form of diversity or an individual lifestyle. According to Maussen (2006: 63-65) in this diversity policy, religious organizations would only get subsidies if they arranged projects that were meant to improve integration or bring diverse groups together. Projects that were focused on religion alone were not supposed to be financed. So, in regard to the separation between church and state, there was frequent contact with religious groups, but this contact was structured around diversity in general (Maussen, 2006: 63-65).

For Jews and Muslims this meant that they could apply for subsidies to increase the dialog between different groups in the city, but not specifically for religious activities. In interviews conducted for this research, long term volunteers in cooperation between Jews and Muslims described this period as a blooming time for cooperation. Kevin, a liberal Jew active in many dialog projects, for example, explained that when they began some of their activities they 'got lucky' [In Dutch: *met de neus in de boter vallen*] not because they received lots of funding, because Kevin said they did not receive much, but because the local government helped organize dialog meetings, getting Jews and Muslims together and helping them spread the word of their activities.

In 2008, the local government wanted to call the relations between church and state into question. Amsterdam's mayor, Job Cohen, and aldermen of the central City Council published a report on the separation between church and state that argued for financial compensation for non-established religious groups. Established religious groups had received funding in the past. The report argued that in some cases they could provide extra financial support to newly established religious groups to create equal opportunities for religious communities in the city (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2008). This was called 'compensating neutrality' [In Dutch: *compenserende neutraliteit*].

This report caused great turmoil in Amsterdam. Political parties, such as the CDA and PvdA, and opinion leaders argued that the local government would cross the boundaries between religion and the state if they implemented compensating neutrality. It was also argued that the policy would benefit some and not others, which would harm the principle of equal treatment (Van Der List, 2008; Limmen & Van Der Werf, 2008; Soetenhorst, 2008).

The turbulence could be partly explained by the cooperation between the local government and the Wester Mosque (*Westermoskee*). This mosque in Amsterdam-West was intended to become a symbol of the city's religious tolerance. However, the negotiations between local government and the mosque, and internal turmoil among religious leaders, including the German headquarters of Milli Görüş and the constituency of Milli Görüş made building the mosque a difficult process (Janssens & Halfman, 2013: 43-55). It was especially difficult because of what was becoming known as the 'land deal' [In Dutch: *gronddeal*]. Janssens & Halfman (2013: 43-55) explain that this deal entailed Milli Görüş selling the plot of the mosque to the local government and then partly taking it back in leasehold [In Dutch: *erfpacht*]. The local government paid more than the market value for the plot, because the plot was seen as non-saleable real estate. A contract stated that ownership of the property of the Wester Mosque would be transferred to the German headquarters and the arrest of one of

the religious leaders on suspicions of fraud made this deal even more complicated. In 2007 and 2008, these entanglements came to light to a bigger audience (see also Janssens & Halfman, 2013: 43-58),[51] which may have contributed to the resistance to the report on compensating neutrality.

In 2010, Amsterdam elected a new mayor: Eberhart van der Laan. At least rhetorically, Van der Laan distanced himself from the 2008 report (see '*Van Der Laan Kraakt Visie Cohen over Kerk*', 2010). As described above, the public debate in the Netherlands at large shifted with the rise of nationalist populist parties and rhetorically at least from a focus on multiculturalism to a more restrictive integration discourse (Vasta, 2007: 714; Van Es, 2018: 147). Although dialog and cooperation are still seen as important, some policy makers and politicians I interviewed said that policies shifted to preventing radicalization and security measures. Although radicalization policies did not receive much more funding over the years, the part of the budget that went to public order and safety – which radicalization falls under – did gain more. Moreover, the diversity departments have seen their budget shrink from €8.2 million in 2012 to €3.2 million in 2016 (see Gemeente Amsterdam, 2018b).[52] This has consequences for Jewish and Muslim relations because, as respondents report, the enthusiasm for and financing of cooperation activities has decreased.

The fourth development is found in a broader societal shift. In recent years, the national government tried to stimulate citizens to show more engagement and be more self-reliant. This trend fits into broader European trends of scaling down welfare states and shifting responsibility from the government to citizens (see also Kampen, Verhoeven & Verplanke, 2013; Vasta, 2007: 725). Vasta (2007: 725) showed in 2007 that this shift also influenced national policies for minority groups.

My respondents confirmed that in accordance with national policies that expect more engagement and self-reliance from citizens, the local government in Amsterdam is also striving for a 'bottom-up' approach in the case of interreligious or intercommunal cooperation. Diane, one of the policymakers I interviewed, for example, said that the city of Amsterdam is active in Jewish-Muslim relations, but expects the initiative to come from the parties involved. This means that the local government will not organize cooperation between what they perceive as religious or ethnic groups, but want citizens to come up with their own ideas, which they will facilitate – sometimes

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51   Today the Westermosque has been built; for a detailed study of the construction process see Janssens & Halfman (2013).
52   This is based on an analysis of policy documents found on https://www.amsterdam.nl/bestuur-organ-isatie/financien/.

with subsidies and sometimes by 'thinking along' [in Dutch: *meedenken*] – if the ideas agree with the goals of the local government.

This does not mean that these policies were always executed in accordance to the shifts or that the former policy has altogether disappeared. Government employees or social workers are supposed to implement local policy, but can sometimes make exceptions in cases where they are not strictly forbidden to do so – a form of value-based agency that civil servants have derived from, for example, their past experiences with interreligious groups. Van der Leun (2006: 317) calls this 'discretionary power'. In Amsterdam this meant that although local civil servants encouraged Jews, Muslims and others to start initiatives, others also sometimes used their discretionary power to resist the bottom-up approach. They encouraged dialog, starting initiatives like interreligious networks in several boroughs [in Dutch: *stadsdelen*] or bringing key persons of communities together to talk about tensions in the city. In Chapters 7 and 8 we will see the consequences of these approaches to interreligious/intercommunal projects.

For now, we have seen that groups that are seen or identify as ethnic and religious communities are often connected to political developments in the Netherlands. The connections, however, are contested and changing. Although religious and ethnic minorities are part of Dutch society, they are also kept at bay and are sometimes seen as a threat. For both Muslims and Jews the political field is important because political dynamics shape their relations, for example, in the way minorities are viewed and how political decisions determine subsidies for cooperation projects. Parts 2 and 3 will explain these dynamics further, but before we can do that it is important to visualize the ethno-religious landscape in the Netherlands and explain how Jews and Muslims established their communities and created their organizations in these changing contexts.

The Ethno-religious Landscape in the Netherlands

The religious landscape in the Netherlands cannot be simply described with census data. This has to do with the fact that the last census in the Netherlands was in 1971. According to Wallet (2017: 447), many Dutch citizens, especially Jewish communities, criticized the census. (Jewish) activists noted that the Jewish population had been easily traceable during the Second World War because of the meticulous registration of religion in the Netherlands (Wallet, 2017: 447). Since then no conducted census has included religion. To provide insight into religious dynamics, survey data is available for the number of people that are religious in the Netherlands.

These Dutch surveys, however, use different concepts of what it is to be religious, which makes them hard to compare and obtain a conclusive overview of the number of people who can be considered religious. Some surveys focus on membership of a religious institution to measure religiosity (Bernts & Berghuijs, 2016: 21). For example, Bernts & Berghuijs report that 67.8% of the Dutch population is not a member of a religious institution, 25.3% of the Dutch population is Christian, 4.9% is Muslim and 2% are affiliated to other religious organizations. As the authors acknowledge, although membership can be an indication of religiosity, it excludes people who regard themselves as religious but do not belong to a religious institution. Additionally, some people are members of a religious organization, but no longer consider themselves religious.

Other surveys use people's self-identifications instead of or in addition to membership or other signifiers of religiosity – such as how often adherents of religious groups go to places of worship. For example, De Hart (2014: 22) determines the population that can be considered as religious based on two large-scale surveys. The first asked two questions. First, does someone feel they belong to a religion or philosophy of life [in Dutch: *levensbeschouwing*] and second, if so which one. The second survey presented a list of religions and worldviews or lifestyles and asked respondents to state to which religion or worldview/lifestyle they feel they belong. In 2008, the first survey established that approximately 49% of the population considered themselves religious; it was 57% in the second.

Unfortunately, I did not find available survey data that provide insights for 2014 and 2015, when my fieldwork was done. Probably around half of the Dutch population considered themselves religious in 2014 and 2015, based on a comparison of the surveys cited. The surveys above, however, do not include the people who consider themselves 'spiritual', which can mean a range of different things, such as belonging to new spiritual groups, being a yoga practitioner or believing in an undetermined transcendent reality, but not feeling that they belong to a religious movement.[53] It also excludes people who feel they are religious, but do not feel they belong to a religion (see also Schippers & Wenneker, 2014). This might be a considerable group, given that Bernts & Berghuijs (2016) show that in 2015, 28% of the population said they believed in a transcendent reality, while not officially belonging to a religion. In Amsterdam, based on surveys that asked if respondents felt they belonged to a religion, Schippers & Wenneker (2014: 9-12) estimate that 38% identifies as religious.

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53   Spiritual can also mean spiritual elements within an established religion, but that is not what is meant here.

Islam is the biggest religion in the city (13% of the population), followed by Roman Catholic (7%), "Christianity in general" (4%), Judaism (1%) and other religions (1%).[54] Again this excludes people who consider themselves 'spiritual' or who define themselves as religious but do not feel they belong to a religion.

Besides religious groups, there are various ethnic groups in the Netherlands and Amsterdam. It is important to note that where I use 'ethnic groups' as a broad concept, it includes self-identifications and thus minorities who organize themselves around ideas of heritage. The statistics available for the Netherlands focus mainly on people with a migration background. This makes it hard to place Jewish and Muslim minorities in this framework, because Jews often see themselves as a minority and a people, not as a group with a (recent) migration background. Muslims with a migration background also do not always consider themselves migrants, especially when their grandparents migrated to the Netherlands, whereas their parents and they themselves were born and raised in the Netherlands. That said, it is still important to provide some information on these narrowly defined ethnic groups as well, because within Jewish and Muslim communities are people who feel that they belong to a migrant group.

The CBS provides data on these kinds of constructed ethnic groups in the Netherlands. CBS data show that in 2016 some 22% of the Dutch population had a migration background (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2018), meaning that people in this group were either born outside the Netherlands or at least one of their parents was. Of these Dutch people with a migration background, 44% had a Western migration background, and 56% had a non-Western migration background (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2018). Under 'Western migration background' the CBS categorizes people from Europe (excluding Turkey), North America, Oceania, Indonesia and Japan while people from Latin-America, Asia (excluding Indonesia and Japan) and Africa are categorized as having a non-Western migration background.

The largest group of people with a Western migration background come from Indonesia (22%), closely followed by people from Germany (also 22%). Next are people with a Polish (9%) and Belgian (7%) migration background (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2018). Most people with a non-Western migration background come from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam or the Antilles. Of the non-Western migrants, 19% has a Turkish migration background, 18% has a Moroccan migration background, 16% a

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54 One of the categories respondents could fill in was "Christianity in general" [In Dutch: christendom in het algemeen]. The authors suspect that people who feel they belong to Evangelical and Pentecostal churches filled in that they felt they belonged to "Christianity in general", but since it was an unspecified category we cannot be sure.

Surinamese background and 7% has an Antillean background (see Huijnk, 2017: 32). Besides these larger migrant groups, the Netherlands counts many smaller ethnic groups, such as labor migrants from Ukraine and Bulgaria or recent refugees from Eritrea and Syria (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2018).

Several factors influenced the migration from Indonesia, Germany, Poland, Belgium, Turkey, Morocco, Surinam and the Antilles to the Netherlands. German and Belgium migration can be explained by the fact that both countries are neighbors of the Netherlands, but the other migration flows have different reasons. Van Amersfoort & Van Niekerk (2006: 323) eloquently argue that these patterns can be explained in part because "nation states that have a history of colonial expansion see this past reflected in their immigration history." The Netherlands is no exception, as we have seen in regard to the decolonization processes in Surinam.

The establishment of Indonesian communities in the Netherlands also had to do with decolonization processes. Indonesia – then called the Dutch East Indies – had been a Dutch colony. During World War II the Japanese occupied the Dutch East Indies, halting the Dutch colonization (Van Amersfoort & Van Niekerk, 2006: 325). After the defeat of the Japanese, the Dutch tried to re-establish their authority, but Indonesian nationalism had strengthened and international ideas about colonialism had changed. In 1949, Indonesia became an independent state. The migration flow had already begun by the start of the war and intensified after independence because of the strained relations between Dutch colonials and Indonesians. Among those who came to the Netherlands were Europeans who had settled in Indonesia, the *Molukkers* [Moluccans], who fought on the side of the Dutch army in the decolonization period as well as Indonesians of mixed ancestry who were Dutch by legal definiton (Van Amersfoort & Van Niekerk, 2006: 323-326).

Other migrant groups established themselves for labor- and family-related reasons. As stated above, migration from Turkey and Morocco can be explained by the recruitment of guest laborers. Polish migration gained momentum after Poland joined the EU in 2004 and work permits were abolished in 2007 (Gijsberts & Lubbers, 2013: 32). According to Gijsberts & Lubbers (2013: 33) Polish citizens mainly migrate to the Netherlands to find employment and increasingly also for family reasons.

To sum up, we have seen how local governments and groups that are seen or identify as religious and ethnic communities interacted in general and how such processes as pillarization, multiculturalism, church-state relations and the shift to self-reliance influenced these interactions. We have also seen what kind of groups are established

in the Netherlands. What we are still missing, however, is how Jews and Muslims fit into this picture.

Muslim and Jewish Communities in the Netherlands

Several Jewish and Muslim groups have established themselves in the Netherlands, creating their own organizations and communities. The Jewish organizations were founded between 1814 and 1992 and were shaped by pillarization processes, multiculturalism, the consolidation of then-current ideas about the relations between the state and religious organizations and self-reliance processes. Most Muslim organizations were formed more recently but were influenced by the same processes because these were still happening when Muslims established themselves in the Netherlands. [55]

In the next two sections I describe how Muslim groups established themselves and the organizations they formed over the years. Then I do the same for Jewish communities and organizations. Besides the communities' own organizations, there are networks and organizations active in Jewish-Muslim cooperation and some Jewish and Muslim groups are in conflict with each other. Such cooperation projects and tension form the core of this dissertation and will be extensively described and analyzed in the empirical chapters.

Muslim Communities
In 1879, the Netherlands first registered Muslims among its residents. By 1889 there were 49 '*Mohammedanen*' registered (FORUM, 2010). Before World War II, there were few Muslim residents compared to residents from other European countries, although it should be noted that the Dutch East Indies had a large Muslim population (see Kennedy & Valenta, 2006: 344-345; Stutje, 2016: 125; Shadid & Van Koningsveld, 2000: 18).

Stutje (2016: 125-127) states that in the interwar period migrants from the Dutch East Indies founded the first Muslim organization in the Netherlands. By 1942 it had grown from 60 to roughly 300 members. Called *Perkoempoelan Islam*, this organization had a religious, communal and political function for Indonesian Muslims living in the Netherlands (Stutje, 2016: 133). Stutje (2016: 138-144) says that along with Muslim students from the interreligious student organization *Perhimpoenan Indonesia*, this

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55   Although the first Muslim organization was established in the 1930s, the first Dutch mosque was not founded until 1955 and many Muslim organizations were founded after the guest laborers arrived (see Stutje, 2016: 125-127).

organization maintained international networks with Muslims abroad, such as the Jawi community in Cairo.

In the 1940s and 1950s, due to decolonialization, groups of migrants came from the former Dutch East Indies to the Netherlands. Among the Indonesian migrants were the *Molukkers* [Moluccans], who had fought on the side of the Dutch army during the decolonization and of whom a small percentage was Muslim (see Beck 2002, 97; Shadid & Van Koningsveld, 2000: 18).

However, the biggest migration of Muslims took place in the 1960s and 1970s when many guest laborers arrived in the Netherlands. First, they were recruited in Spain, Italy and Greece, but were then mainly from Morocco and Turkey. Most were Muslims. By the 1970s, when it was apparent that guest laborers would settle in the Netherlands, the Dutch government allowed them to reunite with their families and apply for permanent residence. Because of these policies, the number of Muslims in the Netherlands increased (Beck 2002, 97–100; Essers and Benschop 2007, 51; FORUM, 2010: 6). After the independence of Surinam, approximately 300,000 Surinamese migrants came to the Netherlands, including groups of Muslims. In the 1990s and into the beginning of the 21st century, asylum seekers and refugees from Iraq, Iran, Ethiopia, Somalia, the Balkan countries and more recently Syria increased the Muslim population (see FORUM, 2010: 6).

Nowadays, some 950,000 Muslims live in the Netherlands (FORUM, 2012: 8). The majority are first- or second-generation migrants. About 70% were either born in Morocco or Turkey or have at least one parent who was born in those countries. The other 30% are largely from Surinam, Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia (FORUM, 2012: 8). Approximately 13,000 Muslims are considered by FORUM (2012: 8) to be autochthonous Muslims, sometimes third-generation Muslims and sometimes converted Muslims.[56] Of the (Turkish and Moroccan) Muslims, approximately 89% consider themselves to be Sunnis (Maliepaard & Gijsberts, 2012: 71). Estimates of the number of Shi'i Muslims living in the Netherlands are scarce, but according to Van den Bos (2011: 562) approximately 7–13% of all Muslims in the Netherlands consider themselves to be Shi'i. Maliepaard & Gijsberts (2012: 18) write that there are also minorities who can be considered 'cultural Muslims' or 'non-practicing Muslims'. The percentages of non-practicing Muslims varies between ethnic groups. According to Maliepaard & Gijsberts (2012: 18) 18 percent of the Muslims with a Turkish background

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56   Autochthonous means 'indigenous' or 'native'. It is a controversial term in the Netherlands and I only use it here because the FORUM report uses the term. I do not use it further on in this study.

calls itself 'non-practicing', while this is only 3 percent for Muslims from a Moroccan background. The biggest group of non-practicing Muslims can be found among the Muslims with an Iranian background of whom 56% identifies as non-practicing Muslims.

There are no statistics on the overall socio-economic backgrounds of Muslims in the Netherlands. However, there are some for Muslims with a Turkish or Moroccan background. On average 14% of the men and 17% of the women with a Turkish or Moroccan background are higher educated. According to the FORUM report, 32% of what they call the autochthonous men are higher educated and 34% of the autochthonous women. FORUM explains the difference by the fact that many first-generation Muslims were less educated when they arrived in the Netherlands (FORUM, 2010: 12-15).

As from the 1960s, Muslims established several organizations in the Netherlands, divided along ethnic, religious and political lines (see Polderislam, 2015). I cannot do justice to all these organizations here, but I will mention some of the biggest and the ones that are most relevant for this study.[57,58] It should also be noted that there is cooperation between these organizations. Since 2004, some of them, for example, work together in the umbrella organization Contact Institution Muslims and Government [In Dutch: *Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid* (CMO)] that functions as a representative body for Muslim organizations and as a liaison with the national government – although not all Muslim organizations feel represented by the CMO (see Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 61-63).

The communities with a Turkish background resemble the political-religious lines in Turkey and can be divided into organizations related to Diyanet Işleri Baskanlığı, Milli Görüş, Alevism, the Gülen movement and the Sulaymaniyah movement (see Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 73-108). All of these strands of Turkish Islam have their own umbrella organizations in the Netherlands. The three biggest are the Islamic Foundation the Netherlands, Milli Görüş and the Gülen movement.

The Islamic Foundation of the Netherlands [In Dutch: *Islamitische Stichting Nederland* (ISN)] is closely related to Diyanet Işleri Baskanlığı, which is the Turkish Presidency of

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57   Other organizations are relevant to this study but they were mentioned less often in the interviews/observations.

58   Note that some migrant organizations in the Netherlands and Amsterdam cater largely to Muslims, such as the activist organization EMCEMO. However, these organizations are not strictly Muslim organizations, but specifically migrant organizations. The activist organizations are also not mentioned here, because they are discussed in Chapter 4.

Religious Affairs (Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 73). The Presidency of Religious Affairs was founded in 1924 to fill in the power vacuum after Atatürk had dismantled the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman *Şeyhülislam*, which was the highest religious authority of the empire (Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 73). Nowadays, Diyanet functions as the successor of the Şeyhülislam and provides religious leadership to Sunni Muslims in Turkey and beyond (Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 73). The ISN was founded in 1982 and follows the religious orientation of Diyanet and therefore Turkish Sunni Islam (Islamitische Stichting Nederland, 2018; Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 74). In 2018, ISN claimed 146 mosques were affiliated with them (Islamitische Stichting Nederland, 2018).

Milli Görüş is a political movement based on the ideas of Necmettin Erbakan (Sunier & Landman, 2015: 68-69; Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 87-88). Erbakan was critical of the strict control the Turkish state enforces on religious matters, felt the moral basis of Turkey had diminished with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and wanted to restore the Turkish state (Sunier & Landman, 2015: 68-69, Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 87-88). Today's *AK Parti* [the official abbreviation of *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, Justice and Development Party] of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan originates from Milli Görüş, but has departed from Erbakan's ideas (Sunier & Landman, 2015: 68-69). Founded in 1981, the Dutch Islamic Federation [In Dutch: *Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie*] is now split into northern and southern chapters. Today Milli Görüş claims to represents 50 organizations, including ones for women and youth (Milli Görüş, 2019; Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 87).

The Gülen movement [Turkish: *Hizmet*] was founded in 1960 by its current leader Fethullah Gülen and is currently one of the fastest growing Islamic organizations in the world (Sunier & Landman, 2015: 82; Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 105). The movement makes a strict separation between a secular public space and confines religious life to the private space. In the public space, the movement focuses on education and dialog (see Sunier & Landman, 2015: 82; Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 105). In the Netherlands, the Gülen movement claims it has no central guidance and is established in national, provincial and local networks that come together for consultations (Hizmetbeweging in Nederland, n.d.).

Organizations representing Muslims with a Moroccan background are structured differently than those that represent Muslims with a Turkish background. The ones that cater to people with a Moroccan background are divided in religious organizations, such as the Union of Moroccan Muslim Organizations in the Netherlands (UMMON) [In Dutch: *Unie van Marokkaanse Moslimorganisaties in Nederland*] and community

organizations like the Association of the Moroccan-Dutch (SMN) [In Dutch: *Samenwerkingsverband Marokkaanse Nederlanders*] (see Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 64-65).

The UMMON constituency belongs to the Mālikī school and Ash'ari theology. UMMON was established in 1982 and claims to represent 90 Moroccan, Sunni mosque organizations. It aims to promote and encourage cooperation between Dutch-based Moroccan mosque organizations and when needed provides help to these organizations (Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 64). The UMMON has been accused of being subservient to the Moroccan government, although it denies the accusation (Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 64-65).

Founded in 1987, SMN is a community organization that tries to improve the position of all people with a Moroccan background in the Netherlands (Stichting Samenwerkingsverband Marokkaanse Nederlanders, n.d.). They organize and participate in poverty reduction projects and train people with a Moroccan background to recognize radicalization (Stichting Samenwerkingsverband Marokkaanse Nederlanders, 2016).

Muslims with different ethnic backgrounds and religious beliefs are organized in other organizations. To name a few: there is the Union of Lahore Muslim Organizations in the Netherlands (ULAMON) [In Dutch: *Unie van Lahore Moslim Organisaties in Nederland*] who mainly represent Surinamese Ahmadiyya Muslims, HAK-DER, an umbrella organization for Turkish Alevites and the Shiite Umbrella Organization [In Dutch: *Overkoepelende Sjiitische Vereniging* (OSV)], who represent Dutch Shiite communities (see Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 117-130). Besides these organizations that focus on ethnic and/or religious groups, two national organizations focus on gender or converts: Al Nisa and the National Platform for New Muslims, respectively [In Dutch: *Landelijk Platform Nieuwe Moslims* (LPNM)] (see Polderislam, 2015; Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 99-100).

When we zoom in on Amsterdam, we see roughly the same community divisions as on the national level. The larger national organizations are present in Amsterdam because they are either located there or have local subsections – often mosques – there. The Shiites seem to be not strongly represented in Amsterdam, because I did not find many Shi'i organizations in Amsterdam (see also Van den Bos, 2011: 562).

The share of all Dutch Muslims living in Amsterdam is about 13% (Bureau Onderzoek & Statistiek, 2013). They reside in several areas of the city, but over time we can see

some patterns. Musterd & Deurloo (2002: 498-502) show that in the 1970s people of Moroccan and Turkish descent – the vast majority Muslim – began moving from privately rented dwellings near the center to the periphery. This trend increased in the mid-1990s, especially toward west Amsterdam. According to the authors, the clusters of people with Moroccan and Turkish backgrounds grew because these groups gained access to social housing.[59] Suburbanization in the 1990s amplified the clustering process as established groups moved out of the city, to be replaced by people with a migration background moving in. However, despite this trend, the authors mention that during this time two-thirds of people with a Turkish and Moroccan background still lived outside of these clusters.

Van Der Laan Bouma-Doff (2007: 291; 306) states that although the clustering in Amsterdam is often attributed to social housing, it has to do with other factors as well, such as interethnic prejudice, especially by 'native Dutch' toward migrant groups, which influenced self-segregation, whereby 'native Dutch' separated themselves from 'ethnic' neighborhoods. Uitermark & Bosker (2014) show that the clustering of Muslims (with a Turkish or Moroccan background) in Amsterdam was not just influenced by the availability of social housing and practices of in- and exclusion, but local government policies as well. Implementing a 'market rule' often leads to segregation, they argue. To counter this the local government had implemented a 'restructuring policy'. This involved demolishing social housing, building owner-occupied houses and selling off a small portion of social housing. Uitermark & Bosker show how these measures lowered segregation, but especially in the neighborhoods that were already gentrifying, which had the unintended effect of contributing to pushing 'ethnic' groups to the periphery. All these factors contributed to clustering so that nowadays, large groups of Muslims live in the north, (far) west and east of the city (Moskeewijzer, 2014; Dienst Onderzoek & Statistiek, 2011; Bureau Onderzoek & Statistiek, 2013; Onderzoek, Informatie & Statistiek, 2018; Schippers & Wenneker, 2014: 17–18).[60] However, as both Musterd & Deurloo (2002) and Van Der Laan Bouma-Doff (2007) demonstrate, Muslims also live in other areas of the city, such as the south and the south-east.

Jewish Communities

Jews began migrating to the Netherlands much earlier. At the end of the 16th century, Sephardic Jews fled to the *Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden* [Republic of the United Netherlands] from Spain and Portugal (Van Creveld 1997, 19–20; Wallet 2007,

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59 According to Musterd & Deurloo (2002: 496) a cluster is a neighborhood in which 21.2% of the inhabitants has the same ethnic background. At the time that was four standard deviations away from the percentage of the population category in the city share.

60 The indication for neighborhoods is based on the mentioned sources and confirmed in my interviews with experts .

12). At the beginning of the 17th century, groups of Ashkenazi Jews from Poland and Lithuania also began arriving (Fuks, 1970: AII; Van Creveld, 1997: 19–20; Van Solinge & de Vries, 2001: 71; Van Deursen, 2006: 120; 177).[61] In 1796, Jews were granted the same rights as other religious groups and Dutch citizens. However, in these early years their rights did not translate into being treated equally in society, and were in practice often still excluded. The integration of Jewish communities into Dutch society is therefore often dated back to 1813, because that is when the Dutch government actively started trying to help to put these rights into practice (see Van Lunteren-Spanjaard & Wijnberg-Stroz, 1998: 9; Van Solinge & de Vries, 2001: 71; Wallet, 2007: 12).

Before World War II, there were approximately 112,000–150,000 Jews in the country, of whom 65,000 lived in Amsterdam (Blom & Cahen, 2017: 283). At first, Jews lived predominantly to the east of the city, which up to 1940 remained the center for Jewish communities in the city, although socially mobile Jews were moving into the city center and to the south (Blom & Cahen, 2017: 283). Shortly before World War II, many German and east European Jews fled to the Netherlands, establishing themselves in the Blasiusstraat and the Nieuwe Kerkstraat in the east of the city (Blom & Cahen, 2017: 283). The better-off Jews and Jewish German refugees chose to live in the Rivierenbuurt in the south of Amsterdam, while Jews with lower incomes remained in the 'old' Jewish neighborhoods (Blom & Cahen, 2017: 283). During World War II many Amsterdam Jews were transported to concentration camps and murdered there. The Holocaust decimated the Jewish population in Amsterdam. Of the 112,000 to 150,000 Jews living in the Netherlands, only 28,000–30,000 Jewish community members and 20,000 Jewish children and grandchildren from mixed marriages survived the war (Berg & Wallet, 2010: 8; Blom & Cahen, 2017: 279-283; Brasz, 2001: 150; Van Solinge & de Vries, 2001: 29–30).[62]

Currently some 52,000 Jews live in the Netherlands. Most were born and raised there, but 5,000-10,000 were born in Israel (Berg & Wallet, 2010: 12). About 57% of Dutch Jews consider themselves religious; the others consider themselves part of the Jewish community or the Jewish tradition, but do not identify as religious (Van Solinge & Van Praag, 2009). Of the 52,000 Jews in the Netherlands, 22% (11,400 people) belong to a religious organization. Approximately 5,000 of these religious Jews belong to an orthodox organization, 3,000 to a religious liberal organization

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61 Between 1594 and 1795 the largest part of what is now called the Netherlands was united in the Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden (Van Deursen, 2006: 120; 177).
62 This included all members of the Israelite Church Communities (Israëlitische Kerkgenootschappen). In the 1930s, there were probably more Jews but some no longer belonged to these communities (Van Solinge & De Vries, 2000: 29-30).

and 800 to the Sephardic-Portuguese organization (Berg & Wallet, 2010: 12). Of Jewish men and women, 73% and 69%, respectively, were higher educated in 2009, which is a lot higher than the average population (Van Solinge & Van Praag, 2009: 34). Of all Jews in the Netherlands, 47% live in Amsterdam. Many, but not all, reside and have their meeting places in the inner city, in the south of the city, Amstelveen and Badhoevedorp (both small towns on the south periphery) and sometimes in the east (see Joods Amsterdam, n.d.; Bureau Onderzoek & Statistiek, 2013: Schippers & Wenneker, 2014: 17–18; Van Solinge & Van Praag, 2009: 32).

Jewish communities have also organized themselves in several institutions. As stated before, Jewish communities can largely be divided into orthodox, liberal and Sephardic-Portuguese organizations (Berg & Wallet, 2010: 12). Smaller numbers of Jews have not joined a religious organization, but support or feel represented by other Jewish organizations, which have to do with well-being, the protection of Jewish communities, Jewish culture or Israel. I will mention the biggest ones or the ones that are most relevant to this study, because they have the biggest influence on the Amsterdam context.[63]

Jewish organizations were threatened or ceased to exist because of the atrocities and genocide of World War II. Following the war, the umbrella organization *Nederlands-Israëlitisch Kerkgenootschap* (NIK), founded in 1814, became the main representative of Dutch Jewry (Berg & Wallet, 2010: 14-15; Brasz, 2001: 152). In the 1960s and 1970s, it lost many members due to changes within Jewish communities, such as the growing number who joined liberal Jewish communities (see Brasz, 2001: 152). Today the NIK represents approximately 5000 members and 30 ultra-orthodox and traditional orthodox strands of Jewish communities, which also includes the modern-orthodox (see Nederlands-Israëlitisch Kerkgenootschap, n.d.; Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 175-178).

The *Nederlands Verbond voor Progressief Jodendom* (NVPJ, Dutch Association for Progressive Judaism) was founded in 1931 and represents what is often called Reform Judaism (Nederlands Verbond voor Progressief Jodendom, n.d.). This movement remained very small until the mid-1950s, but grew strongly from the mid-50s onward (Brasz, 2001: 152; Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 175-178). NVPJ represent approximately 3700 members and ten Jewish communities and have founded four additional

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63   Again, this does not mean that the other organizations are irrelevant. It just means that they were mentioned less often in the interviews and observations. Activist organizations are also not discussed here, because they are discussed in Chapter 4, except for the organizations that participate in the CJO and are considered – at least by some respondents – as activist, because it would otherwise be unclear which organizations are united in the CJO.

organizations that work for the education of and communication with their members. These are the (Foundation) *Stichting Robert A. Levisson*, *Stichting Sja'ar*, *Stichting Levend Joods Geloof* and *Jong LJG Netzer* (Nederlands Verbond voor Progressief Jodendom, n.d.; Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 175-178).

The *Portugees-Israëlitisch Kerkgenootschap* (PIK), has become very small in the Netherlands and now contains some 600 members (Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 175-178). Although small, this organization is often said to hold a prominent place in Dutch Jewish history, because of its role in the *Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden* [Republic of the United Netherlands] in the 17th century (see Berg & Wallet, 2010: 8). It is still a very visible community; its synagogue is placed very centrally in Amsterdam.

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These three organizations are the most prominent religious organizations within the Dutch Jewish communities. However, other Jewish organizations are active as well, such as the *Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israel* (CIDI), *Federatie Nederlandse Zionisten* (FNZ), the *Joods Maatschappelijk Werk* (JMW) and the *Stichting Bij Leven en Welzijn* (BLEW) (see Vellenga & Wiegers, 2011: 175-178).

Founded in 1974, the CIDI describes their main goal: "We are supporting the right for peace and safety for Israel and the Jewish people, everywhere in the world." They also register anti-Semitism in the Netherlands and provide information about Israel to the Dutch media (Centrum Informatie en Documentatie Israël, n.d.). As Malcontent (2018: 133-134) puts it, the CIDI is often suspected of being an 'extension' of the Israeli embassy. However, the CIDI denies this and says that they are not financed in any way by the Israeli government.

In 1899, the *Nederlandse Zionistenbond* (Dutch Zionist Association) was founded to raise funds to help Jews follow an agrarian education and move to the land then called Palestine. Before World War II, not many Dutch Jews went on an *alija*, but after the foundation of Israel their numbers increased (Joods Cultureel Kwartier, n.d.). In 1992, the *FNZ* succeeded the *Nederlandse Zionistenbond* and functions nowadays as an umbrella organization for Zionist organizations in the Netherlands (Centraal Joods Overleg, n.d.).

JMW was founded in 1946 to organize social care for Jewish victims of persecution in World War II. Since the 1980s, they have broadened their function and now also tend to post-war generations, strengthen identities and develop Jewish networks (Joods Maatschappelijk Werk, n.d.).

BLEW is an advisory body for the protection of the Jewish community in the Netherlands. It was founded in 1972, when Israeli athletes were taken hostage and were murdered by the Black September group (see Fogteloo, 2014; Lensink, 2010; Malcontent, 2018: 118-119). BLEW protects events that expect to have many Jewish attenders, analyses the threat levels for Dutch society and Jewish communities, provide consultancy services and crisis management for Jewish communities (Stichting Bij Leven en Welzijn, 2018).

These seven organizations, together with two youth representatives, are represented in the *Centraal Joods Overleg Externe Belangen* (CJO, Central Jewish Consultation External Interests), which was founded in 1998 to advocate for the interests of Jewish communities in the Netherlands with regard to the national government and Dutch society at large. They represent the Dutch Jewish communities, defend their rights in the Netherlands and meet and consult with the government (Centraal Joods Overleg Externe Belangen, 2018). The NIK and the NVPJ are also represented in the *Interkerkelijk Contact in Overheidszaken*, which is a cooperation between 28 Christian organizations and these two Jewish organizations. They advocate for the interests of these organizations in regard to the national government (Interkerkelijk Contact in Overheidszaken, 2018).

Conclusion: Interactions between Jewish and Muslim Fields

Jewish and Muslim Fields?
When we assess the political field, the ethno-religious landscape and the established Jewish and Muslim communities, we can try to answer the question of whether we can speak of Jewish and Muslim fields in the Netherlands and localize where Jewish-Muslim take place (see Bourdieu, 1991: 6-8; Wacquant, 2006: 8). It might be argued that we can speak of one ethno-religious field in the Netherlands, separated into smaller religious and ethnic groups.

However, based on the data presented above, I argue that it is more accurate to see Jewish-Muslim relations as happening in the overlap of separate fields – one Jewish and the other Muslim – which both contain religious, ethnic, political and other aspects. First, because in the Netherlands, the Jewish field emerged before the Muslim field. Muslims and Jews have a different history and different relationships with the Dutch state. Jewish institutions are, for example, well established, while Muslim institutions are more recently established and as we will see in Chapter 5 sometimes experience more difficulty in dealing with the government. Second, Muslim communities are bigger and split into ethnically segregated groups, while Jewish communities are

smaller and ethnically more homogeneous. Moreover, whereas Jews are often, but not always, born and raised in the Netherlands, Muslims or their parents often have a migration history.

Thirdly, to a certain extent, their institutional and religious structures also have different rules; think for example of different rules surrounding prayer or rituals as well as the way authority is organized even if, as we will see below, they also experience similarities in their religious structures (see also Bahloul, 2013; Kessler, 2010; Frishman & Ryad, 2016). As described in the Introduction, Frishman (2009) and Frishman & Ryad (2016), for example, show that similarities can be found in Islamic and Jewish religious law and face some of the same challenges in contemporary societies. Finally, it could also be argued that Jews and Muslims have – on average – different positions in Dutch society, considering their socio-economic backgrounds. For example, Jews are more highly educated than the Dutch average, while Muslims are slightly less educated (FORUM, 2010: 12-15; Van Solinge & Van Praag, 2009: 34).

Considering Jewish and Muslim spaces as part of the same field would disregard too many differences between these groups. Therefore, I argue that there is not just one ethno-religious field in the Netherlands at large, but two distinct Jewish and Muslim fields, and those in Amsterdam are (important) subfields of the national fields.[64] This does not mean that Jews and Muslims do not interact, or that they are not in touch with the rest of Dutch society. On the contrary, Jewish and Muslim fields interact when conflict or cooperation emerges and their fields are shaped by other fields. But Jews and Muslims do have their own interaction spaces in their own communities where additional and sometimes different rules apply.

The Overlap of Jewish and Muslim Fields
This distinction made above is important, as relations between Muslims and Jews emerge when these fields interact and these are the spaces that are studied in this dissertation. Before turning to the empirical chapters that describe the overlap of these fields and the interactions between Jews and Muslims in-depth, I will briefly introduce the overlap of Jewish and Muslim fields here to provide an idea of what the overlap of Jewish and Muslim fields look like and how interaction takes place in these spaces.

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64   An additional advantage is that the categories Jewish and Muslim fields encompass more dimensions of Jewish-Muslim relations, than the dimensions that can be described as religious or ethnic.

The differences in the fields can be potentially fertile grounds for problems and tensions, while the similarities provide opportunities for cooperation. As mentioned in the Introduction, tensions emerged due to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the extremist attacks in Brussels (2014), Paris (2015) and Copenhagen (2015) and local incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. These events sometimes made Muslims and Jews suspicious of the Other, made them afraid of each other and caused frustration in Jewish-Muslim relations. While we have also already seen that there were cooperation projects that tried to diminish these tensions and create bonds between Muslims and Jews.

In Amsterdam, certain moments and events brought Jewish and Muslim fields together and made tensions run high. Regarding the effect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, two moments were especially influential on Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. The first occurred in the summer of 2014, during the Gaza War. In the Netherlands, the Gaza War initiated pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations, five of these demonstrations were held in Amsterdam. The second moment did not originate within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but began with the idea to start twin Amsterdam with Tel Aviv and reached its peak in the spring and summer of 2015. This idea sparked new, although smaller, demonstrations. The utterances at all these demonstrations, the symbolism used saw the emergence of a polarizing frame that put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the heart of Jewish-Muslim relations. It invoked tensions between Muslims, Jews and others in the city and produced frustration with the Other. In Chapter 4 discusses these tensions, their origins and effects.

The extremist attacks in Brussels (2014), Paris (2015) and Copenhagen (2015) also put strain on the relations between Muslims and Jews. In itself these attacks caused fear in Jewish communities considering that all of these attacks involved Jewish targets, while Muslims feared for retaliations. These attacks influenced Jewish-Muslim relations in the sense that some Jews became more afraid of Muslims. However, the Dutch and Amsterdam context re-shaped the effects of these attacks through two developments: the security measures taken by the (local) government to protect Jewish buildings and the discussion that emerged in the public debate that asked Muslims to distance themselves from these attacks and was sometimes connected to asking Jews to distance themselves from the violence used by the Israeli state. In Chapter 5, we will see how both (the perception of) security policies and the 'distancing debates' hurt Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.

Muslim and Jewish respondents also reported physical, verbal and institutional anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents. They ranged from being refused entrance to

a shop or a club, pulling of headscarves and verbal abuse such as statements like "Uncle Adolf has forgotten you" and "go back to your own country." The perpetrators of these anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents were not always described as being Muslim or Jewish, and in these cases Jewish and Muslim fields did thus not overlap. They started to overlap when Jews or Muslims were the perpetrators of anti-Semitic or Islamophobic incidents, when Muslims experienced unequal treatment between themselves and Jewish communities and when anti-Semitism and Islamophobia was compared to each other in such a way that competition between these forms of discrimination emerged. These interactions between Muslims and Jews are the focus of Chapter 6.

All of these events not only caused tensions between Muslims and Jews, but also inspired some Muslims and Jews to work together. Between 1990 and 2015, I found 40 initiatives that Jews and Muslims organized or in which they participated in Amsterdam (see Appendix 4). Of the 40 initiatives twelve were started in 2014 and 2015, including an interreligious neighborhood network in the southern parts of Amsterdam, and Salaam-Shalom, a network of Jews and Muslims that attracted almost 3,000 people to like their Facebook page.

The main forms of cooperation that took place were dialog meetings, educational projects and interreligious/intercommunal activities. The latter are activities such as interreligious walks or a project where Muslim and Jewish adolescents helped to restore a Jewish graveyard (see "Marokkaanse en Joodse Jongeren Knappen Joodse Begraafplaats Op", 2011). The religious and community leaders of all of these projects were either liberal or (modern) orthodox Jews or Sunni Muslims, the latter usually with a Turkish or Moroccan migration background. Their projects were visited by Jewish and Muslim participants, but also by people who identified as Christian or non-religious. Projects attracted from about 30 to several hundred people, while meetings between religious and community leaders were usually smaller. Participants came from all over the city and from different (self-identified) ethnic and religious communities.

In these cooperative spaces, Jewish and Muslim fields overlapped and the religious and community leaders, sometimes the participants themselves, used strategies to be able to bring their fields closer together. They, for example, searched for similarities in their religious and cultural traditions, deconstructed stereotypes, but also tried to enhance positive emotions. In Part 3 of this study, I focus on the attempt to cooperate and bring Jewish and Muslim fields closer together. Chapter 7 extensively discusses

the overlap of Jewish and Muslim fields in regard to cooperation, while Chapters 8 and 9 focus on different forms of strategies.

The next chapters will address the overlap of these fields, since that is where Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam take place and this study tries to understand the dynamics in these relations. I will discuss both the tensions that emerge and the cooperation that took place. I will also show how other structures influence and shape both Jewish and Muslim fields as well as Jewish-Muslim relations, especially when we look at the role between these groups and the local and national government. In the next chapter, I will show how internal field dynamics as well as the structures in political fields have influenced what is often described as the most delicate problem between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

PART 2

Transnational Conflicts, National and Local (Re-)Configurations

Israeli and Palestinian Flags in the east of Amsterdam
Photo by the author

INTRODUCTION

The years 2014 and 2015 were turbulent for Jewish-Muslim relations. In 2014, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict escalated with the Gaza War, and extremist attacks in Brussels, Paris and Copenhagen on Jewish targets also affected Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the attacks had a devastating impact on the countries concerned but also caused tension outside of these geographical contexts (see e.g. Egorova & Ahmed, 2017; Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson, 2016). The fieldwork I did in those years made it clear that Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam felt the effects of these conflicts first hand. Jews reported anti-Semitic incidents and Jewish buildings were placed under protection because of heightened threat levels. Muslims reported harassment, discrimination and exclusion. Heated debates on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict arose in the public debate. The events influenced not only Muslims and Jews individually, but also their *relations*. For example, a polarizing frame emerged about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that made Muslims and Jews avoid talking about it. When it came to discrimination, Muslims experienced inequalities when they compared their situations to those of Jewish communities.

The influence of international conflicts, does not, however, mean that conflicts get imported directly into countries and have the same effect there as in the countries they originated in. The effects of transnational conflicts are also shaped by national and local contexts (see also Egorova & Ahmed, 2017: 284; Katz, 2015). Tension in Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam was influenced by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and extremist attacks but it also had both national and local origins, such as experienced unequal treatment by local institutions.

It is important to note that not all Jews and Muslims I spoke with or observed experienced conflict with *each other*. As Chapter 4 describes, other groups such as people who identified as Christians or those regarded as the majority population were also involved in the tensions that emerged from pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations that were held in Amsterdam and provided tensions in the city. Also, the Jews and Muslims who did experience conflict with each other did not always mention all of the forms of conflict listed above. Some Jews and Muslims had no experience of being discriminated against, while others did not want to get involved with anything that had to do with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is also important to note that because of the tensions, Muslim and Jewish groups started cooperation projects. These projects, their organizers and participants are discussed extensively in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 (Part III).

This is not to say that the tensions that did arise were minor. Some incidents influenced the lives of Muslims and Jews in deep and fundamental ways. As we will see, Jews and Muslims became frightened of or angry with each other about the Israel-Palestinian conflict, experienced unequal treatment and often felt frustrated by being asked to distance themselves from violent extremism or the policies of the Israeli state. Other tensions, such as religious differences and the lasting impact of remembering and commemorating the Holocaust, also play a role in the tension between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam. These issues will be addressed, but both Muslim and Jewish respondents mentioned the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, extremist attacks and anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents more often as divisive factors in their relations. This is why Part II focuses on these topics. Besides them, however, the local and national governments' approach to relations with groups that are seen as or identify as ethnic and religious communities was also quite influential on the relations between Jews and Muslims. Therefore, Part II will discuss the role of local and national governments as well.

The following chapters deal with the influence of two international factors on the lives of Muslims and Jews and their relations: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the extremist attacks of 2014–2015. Chapter 4 discusses the effects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict while Chapter 5 looks at the influence of the extremist attacks. Both chapters show how these international conflicts were shaped by the national and local context and how two main frames emerged: a polarizing debate on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the question whether ethnic and religious minorities should distance themselves from international violence. We will also see how the inequalities surrounding the protective measures taken by local and national governments created tensions in Jewish-Muslim relations. Completing Part II, Chapter 6 looks at local tensions and shows how anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents affected the relations between Muslims and Jews.

CHAPTER

4

The Influence of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict on Relations between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam

INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 2014, three Israeli boys on the West Bank were kidnapped and killed by an autonomous Hamas cell. In revenge, Jewish extremists kidnapped a Palestinian boy, poured gasoline over his body and burned him alive (Malcontent, 2018: 239-240). These events led to the so-called Gaza War of 2014, which began in the context of the broader history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[65][66] In 2014, the outbreak of the Gaza War caused pro-Palestine and pro-Israel organizations in Amsterdam to organize demonstrations and engage in heated debates.[67] Tensions arose from the demonstrations and public debate, with arguments about who the wrongdoer in the conflict was and about the symbolism used in pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations in Amsterdam and elsewhere in the Netherlands. The citizens and local government were both afraid that the Gaza War would be 'imported' to Amsterdam. Although the war was not literally imported, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did cause tension in the city. By the winter of 2014-2015, the tensions surrounding the demonstrations and debates seemed to decrease. However, in June 2015, in an attempt to bring groups of opponents closer together, the Amsterdam government announced that it intended to twin the city with Tel Aviv and Ramallah. Instead of bringing the opponents together this led to new debates and demonstrations.

The effect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Jewish-Muslim relations has been studied in several European contexts (see Debrauwere-Miller, 2010; Egorova and Ahmed, 2017; Katz, 2015; Mandel, 2010; 2014). It is important to gain insights into the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in different contexts, specifically Jewish-Muslim relations, because this conflict affects complex tensions in several European contexts and is often connected to tensions between Jewish and Muslim communities. Untangling these tensions in Amsterdam will add to the findings on other European contexts and will provide the opportunity for comparisons. However, the Dutch case is not just interesting for comparisons in Europe. It is also particularly important, because since 1967 the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been the most discussed foreign conflict in the Second Chamber of Dutch Parliament and often produces tension in Dutch society (see Ensel, 2014; Malcontent, 2018: 245; Wallet, 2017).

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65   For an overview of the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict see Malcontent (2018).
66   As stated in the Introduction, I use the concept of 'Israeli-Palestinian conflict', rather than just 'Gaza War of 2014' because my respondents referred to both the Gaza War and previous conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians.
67   I chose to use the term 'pro-Palestine demonstration' and not 'pro-Palestinian demonstration' because at the time such demonstrations in the Dutch context were called pro-Palestina demonstraties, which translates to the term I use.

In this regard, this study focuses on the effect that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has on contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations. I focus on a narrative expressed during my fieldwork both Muslims and Jews often shared. It was one of the most important effects of the conflict on Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam that I found. This narrative framed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in language that suggested that it was seen as the most delicate source of tension between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam. It put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the heart of Jewish-Muslim relations.[68] Because this narrative – or frame – was so pervasive in my data I wanted to know if Jews and Muslims were indeed so involved in the pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations and if indeed they had such widely differing opinions that made the conflict one of the most delicate problems between them.[69] From this narrative alone, however, it is unclear if Jews and Muslims are actually involved in pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations nor do we know what kind of opinions they actually express. Therefore, Chapter 4 answers the following questions: Are Muslims and Jews actually involved in the tensions that emerge from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Amsterdam? And do they express diverging opinions about it?

First, however, I describe the pervasive narrative that connects Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and frames it as their most delicate problem. This is necessary to understand the components of the frame. Then, I focus on who actually participates in the demonstrations, and discuss the opinions of Amsterdam Jewish and Muslim respondents about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular. I will show that some Amsterdam Muslims and Jews participate in demonstrations and have opposing opinions that add to the tension in their relations. There are, however, other Jews and Muslims who hold more compatible opinions, for example, Muslims and Jews who condemn violence by both Israel and the Palestinians. Although some Jews and Muslims have compatible opinions, these opinions are not often heard because of the frame that presupposes that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the most delicate problem between them. In other words, there is some discrepancy between what is happening in Jewish-Muslim relations and the frame that shapes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the most delicate problem between Jews and Muslims in particular.

In the second half of the chapter, I pay attention to the emergence of this frame, which puts the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the heart of Jewish-Muslim relations, while the

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68   This is not to say that there are no other narratives, but it does mean that this is a very prominent frame in Jewish-Muslim relations.

69   Verhoeven & Tonkens (2013: 416) define a frame as "a goal-oriented process of meaning production through which actors select, accentuate, characterise and increase the importance of certain aspects of observed reality". The use of a frame can be a conscious, but also an unconscious act.

underlying relations between Muslims and Jews prove to be far more complex. In this section, I use Bourdieusian theories to analyze the data and provide three explanations for the emergence of the frame: the influence of actual conflicts that occur between Jews and Muslims; being asked by communities, the media and the general public to take a side in the conflict; and finally the symbols, concepts and flags – in other words, the symbolic power – used in pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations and debates.

Before going into the empirical sections, I will provide a theoretical overview of conflict 'importation' or 'delocalization' and the effects that these conflicts have in countries other than where they take place. I zoom in on the effects that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had in several other countries before turning the lens specifically to the Netherlands and Amsterdam.

Theory: the Delocalization of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

'Delocalization' of conflict means that conflict in one country might affect the relations between groups in other countries and – in interaction with the local context – create tension in these other countries. Examples of delocalization are the conflicts between the Turks and the Kurds, the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tigers, and Israel and the Palestinians (see Demmers, 2014: 85).

Literature on the delocalization of conflict shows that the increasing use of social media, together with increasing migration and the intensification of international networks contribute to the transportation of conflicts (see Demmers, 2014: 85). Social media makes it easy to transfer news of conflict to other geographic locations and allows migrants – and people without a migration background – to remain easily in touch with their families and friends abroad. Polarizing public debates arising in many European countries in recent decades also delocalize conflict (see Egorova & Ahmed, 2017: 295-296). In these polarizing debates, what can be seen as majority populations also associate migrants and minorities to transnational conflicts (see Modood, 2003: 113-114; Tufail, 2016). Think, for example, of the extremist attacks in France, Belgium, and Denmark and the call to Muslims in other countries to denounce violent extremism. As we will see below, asking Muslims to denounce the violent extremism that happens overseas creates additional problems in European countries.

In the scholarly literature, conflict delocalization or 'transportation' is often studied in such fields as Diaspora Studies and Migration Studies.[70] Scholars working in these fields show the effect that diaspora communities, migrants, and other groups have on the 'homeland,' as well as the influence the diaspora has on the policies of the host land or on the changing identities of the diaspora itself (see also Al-Ali & Pratt, 2009; Brinkerhoff, 2011; Demmers, 2014; Shain, 2002). For example, Shain (2002) explains that American-Armenian and Jewish-American diasporas often take on the role of a third party in conflict resolution. He shows how these groups lobby in their host countries to help groups in the homeland and how the interests of diaspora communities sometimes collide with those of the home state or the people living in the homeland.

Alongside the studies that focus on the relations between migrants/diaspora and the homeland/host land, some studies explain the effect of international conflict on relations between groups living in countries other than where the conflict takes place. With regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a number of studies examine the impact of this conflict on other localities (Debrauwere-Miller, 2010; Egorova & Ahmed, 2017; Katz, 2015; Mandel, 2010; Tessler & Levy, 2013).

Tessler & Levy (2013: 522-528), for example, surveyed the attitudes of citizens of Egypt, Kuwait, the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and conducted a general survey in 18 Arab countries. They asked respondents for their opinions of Israel. The results show that the attitudes of Arabs change over time, becoming more positive with visible, ongoing attempts at peace between Israel and the Palestinians and more negative when conflict flares up between Israel and the Palestinians.

Mandel (2010: 167-175) studied the effects of the First Gulf War and the occupation of Kuwait by the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein on Jewish-Muslim relations in Marseille, France. Before and during the war, many people feared 'the war would come home', because Jewish and Muslim communities in the city lived in close proximity to one another. Mandel says that before the First Gulf War and the occupation of Kuwait, the majority French population criticized Jews for their bonds with Israel and regarded them as being in the wrong.

During the First Gulf War, however, France decided to join the coalition that tried to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait. This changed the position of Jews in France, especially

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70   Not all my respondents would say they belong to a diaspora or are migrants because they were born in the Netherlands. I use these terms only when appropriate. I address the relevant literature because it deals with the delocalization of conflict.

after Iraq launched scud missiles on Tel Aviv. Now seen as being on the 'good' side, Jewish communities felt increasingly secure in Marseille. For Muslims, these dynamics worked the other way around. Since France had joined the coalition against Iraq, they felt their loyalties were questioned.

This period saw some violent incidents between Jews and Muslims in Marseille and, as stated above, many were afraid 'the war would come home'. However, Mandel argues that although there were incidents, it would be a stretch to say that the war had indeed come home. In her study, Mandel explains why this war was not imported by citing the strong ties between religious leaders of the different groups in Marseille who encouraged their communities to keep the peace, and, more importantly according to the author, Muslims were heavily monitored by the French police. Mandel observes, it was the "increased surveillance, expulsions and a sense that their future in France was in peril, [that] did much to quell public activities" (174-175). However, Mandel also says that the increased surveillance made Muslims feel increasingly like second-class citizens, especially in comparison to their Jewish neighbors, and this damaged the relations between Jews and Muslims.[71]

These studies provide us with important insights into the mechanisms of the transportation and transformation of conflicts in local contexts in recent decades. They show how the intensity of the conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians steer the opinions of people in other countries and how it influences the relations between communities in countries outside Israel and the Palestinian territories. In addition, Mandel's study shows how local factors such as the political stance of the French government impacts on relations between Muslims and Jews. These findings are important because they show that tension emerging from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in other contexts is both directly influenced in the sense that attempts of peace in one area can contribute to a reduction of tension in another and that the effects are also a result of reshaping the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the local context. What it does not show, however, is the effect the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has had in the Netherlands.

The influence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the relations between Jews, Muslims, and other groups in the Netherlands has seldom been studied. There are a few exceptions (Ensel, 2014; Malcontent, 2018; Wallet, 2017). In his study on the history of Dutch Jewry, for example, Wallet (2017: 416; 430-434; 448-452; 478-479)

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71   Interestingly, both Katz (2015: 325-327) and Egorova & Ahmed (2017: 283) mention this foregrounding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Jewish-Muslim relations in France and the United Kingdom.

shows that both national and international developments – such as public morale in the Netherlands, World War II, the Cold War, the Six Day War of 1967, and the first Lebanese War of 1982 – influenced both Jewish opinion and that of Dutch society as a whole. He mentions that there was a lot of support for Israel in the 1960s and 1970s among Jewish communities and the majority population in the Netherlands. During the Six Day War of 1967 and the Lebanese War in 1982, however, this support was challenged by left-wing parties and new activists such as the Palestine Committee [In Dutch: *Palestina Komitee*] that began defending the case of the Palestinians. Left-wing Jews also began reconsidering their position on Israel.

In general, support for Israel remained strong throughout the population but, according to Wallet, at the start of the 21st century, Dutch society witnessed decreasing solidarity with Israel. In Jewish communities, too, opinions about Israel began changing, and Muslims started to speak up about the Palestinians. Wallet attributes this to several factors, including the idea that World War II no longer determines public morale, even if it remains important in the country's history.

Malcontent (2018: 70-71) confirms many of these findings. Like Wallet, he notes that after World War II there was not much attention for the suffering of Jews during the Holocaust. But in the 1960s and 1970s, the Holocaust became the center of public debate because of the Eichmann trial and television series and books that described the suffering of Jews during the Holocaust. Malcontent describes how this partly influenced the strong support for Israel among the Dutch, along with the influence of the Social Democrats and smaller Christian parties. According to Malcontent the Social Democrats supported the 'social welfare paradise' Israel had created. For Dutch Calvinists, Israel remained the Promised Land where the savior would come back after the return – and conversion – of the Jewish people.

Like Wallet, Malcontent also shows that the violence committed by the Israeli state during the Six Day War, the Lebanese War, and also the more recent Gaza Wars of 2002 and 2009, lessened the support for Israel among the Dutch public and within Jewish communities as well. Other factors that influence this shift are the public engagement of Dutch citizens with a Moroccan or Turkish migration background who started speaking up for the Palestinians, and the influence of public figures such as Gretta

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Duisenberg and former prime minister A.M.M. (Dries) van Agt.[72] Although Malcontent notes this decrease in support for Israel, he does not think it led to increased support for the Palestinians because, he explains, in the public imagination Israel feels more familiar and similar to Dutch culture than the Palestinians' and the pro-Israel lobby is better organized than the pro-Palestine lobby.

These studies provide interesting insights into the changes in Dutch public opinion, and Jewish and Muslim opinions as well, which may have influenced how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shaped Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. For example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is often connected to Jewish and Muslim communities, but Dutch political parties and non-Jewish and non-Muslim citizens also express views on and take sides in discussions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What is understudied, however, is how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict influenced Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.

As stated in the introduction of this chapter, the Gaza War of 2014 inspired several parties to organize pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations. Ensel (2014) describes tensions in the recent past surrounding the *Kristallnachtherdenking* – a commemoration of the night of November 9, 1938 when Jewish houses, shops, and synagogues in Germany were damaged, burned, and destroyed. Since 1992, the Netherlands commemorates this night every year. Ensel (2014: 191-197; 2017a: 486) says that during the ceremony of 2000, the speaker Abdou Menebhi, was asked to talk about the occurrence of anti-Semitic incidents caused by Dutch-Moroccan youth. However, in his speech, he also criticized Israel. According to some of the organizers this contradicted previous agreements and the chairman of the Auschwitz Committee urged him to end his speech. Since then, the *Kristallnachtherdenking* remains contested to such an extent that it has been split into separate events that take place on the same night.

More recently, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also made another impact on the city. During my fieldwork in 2014 and 2015, I found two principal moments when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had a clear effect in Amsterdam. The first occurred in the summer

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72   Gretta Duisenberg is a pro-Palestinian activist and spokesperson for the pro-Palestine movement. She was one of the driving forces behind the organization Stop de Bezetting [Stop the Occupation] and often made the news with statements, e.g. that she wanted to collect six million signatures for the Stop de Bezetting petition (Malcontent, 2018: 212-214). A.M.M. (Dries) van Agt, former prime minister of the Netherlands for the Christian Democrats (CDA), identifies as a Roman Catholic. During his term he often advocated for Israel, but in 2005 he said in the newspaper De Volkskrant that he had miscalculated the Palestinian situation (Malcontent, 2018: 212). In 2009, he established the Rights Forum, a Knowledge Centre that tries to critically question Dutch policies in regard to Israel (Malcontent, 2018: 212; The Rights Forum, 2017).

of 2014, during the Gaza War. In the Netherlands, this initiated pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations. Three pro-Palestine demonstrations [20-07-2014, 03-08-2014 and 23-08-2014] and two pro-Israel demonstrations [17-07-2014 and 01-03-2015] were held in Amsterdam. At the pro-Israel demonstration of 17-07-2014, organizers had planned a pro-Palestine counter-demonstration, but it was cancelled by the local government. However, that did not stop a group of pro-Palestine supporters from attending.[73] Other demonstrations were held in cities such as The Hague, Rotterdam, and Breda. During and after the demonstrations of 2014, there were debate evenings and two incidents with Israeli, Palestinian, and 'Hamas' flags in the east and west of Amsterdam, which I will discuss below.

The second moment did not originate in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians per se, but in the Amsterdam context. It began with the idea to twin Amsterdam with Tel Aviv, proposed by Ronny Naftaniel, the former director of the CIDI. The Christian Democrats took up the plan and discussed it in the city council (see also; Butter, 2015; Rijken, 2014). But after objections from the Socialist Party, the council decided to add the town of Ramallah to the twinning plan, according to some of my respondents, without informing the Ramallah city council.[74]

At first, there seemed to be lots of support for the plan in the city council. However, during my fieldwork, Amsterdam residents began protesting against twinning the city with Tel Aviv by organizing small demonstrations and signing a petition. They argued that after the turbulent summer, it would be unwise to start twinning with Tel Aviv, and some argued it was wrong to twin with a city in a country that they regarded as an oppressor. In response, others organized small pro-town twinning demonstrations and a petition, because they regarded Tel Aviv as a liberal, diverse city that resembles Amsterdam.[75] On July 1, 2015, the council decided to explore the possibilities for cooperation, and in October they decided not to twin the towns, but have some sort of

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73   'Supporters' is used here as a broad concept for Jews, Muslims, and others who showed their support or felt connected to Israel or the Palestinians. This support can be active and public in the form of demonstrating or contributing to public debates, but it can also be online support or 'private' feelings of connection or supportive opinions expressed in interviews with me. It should be noted that although some respondents supported either Israel or the Palestinians, they did not always deny the arguments of the Other and were also sometimes involved in cooperation between Jews and Muslims. Moreover, not all Jews and Muslims can be counted as 'supporters' or 'organizers.' For example, some did not clearly support one side, but condemned violence on both sides. I will come back to these different groups below.

74   It is unclear if this really was the case. I found no supporting evidence to confirm or deny these remarks. It is, however, in itself remarkable that there were doubts about informing Ramallah. It shows that there was at least some mistrust about the intentions of the local government to include Ramallah.

75   I will discuss who organized these demonstrations in the section 'who was involved?' below.

cooperation, though not with the Israeli army or with people living in the settlements (see Duin, 2016; Van Bokkum, 2017).[76]

Between the summer of 2014 and June 2015, besides the demonstrations described above, there were a few small-scale demonstrations in Amsterdam, and debate nights were organized at universities and in debate centers. These debates occasionally became quite heated. On November 9, 2014, for example, the public speaker and former prime minister A.M.M. (Dries) van Agt was at a debate when the evening was disturbed by a Jewish group who yelled at him and held up a banner that read "Van Agt, the Jews are sick of you" (see also "Protest tijdens Lezing: 'Dries van Agt de Joden Zijn Jou Zat'", 2014). Another example is a debate at VU University on the possible boycott of Israeli universities, which was given some exposure because the slogan "VU Israel Free" was used and because it was initially cancelled by the university. It was allowed to take place later in the year (see also Vrije Universiteit, 2015).

This overview has shown examples of the tensions surrounding the demonstrations in Amsterdam. What has not been answered yet is how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict influenced in particular the relations between Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam. I will answer that question below.

A Pervasive Frame: The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as the Most Delicate Problem between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam

As I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict created tension in Amsterdam and was re-shaped in the Amsterdam context. One of its main effects on Jewish-Muslim relations that I found is a frame that puts this conflict at the heart of Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. This frame became apparent in the interviews and observations I conducted. The frame users, men and women, young and old, came from various backgrounds, including left-wing, right-wing, Jewish, and Muslim. As we will see below, the local government also employed this language.[77] This frame is thus quite pervasive.

It has three main elements. It provides a certain importance that connects Jews and Muslims to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; it formulates it as a very delicate topic and suggests it is too delicate to talk about when Jews and Muslims are in direct

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76   This section is based on my observations of the pro- and anti-town twinning movements and the cited media.
77   Again, this is not to say that there are no exceptions. It is not the only frame in Jewish-Muslim relations. For other themes, such as the extremist attacks or anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, other frames are at work. It is only pervasive in the sense of the language used for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

interaction with each other – at least in cooperation projects and sometimes in day-to-day contacts. To start with the first element, my respondents Alexander and Rashid, for example, said the following:

> "The biggest problem between Jews and Muslims is Israel." (Alexander, Jewish community leader)

> "There is nothing wrong with the relations between Jews and Muslims. Especially reasoned from a religious angle, there is nothing wrong between these two population groups. (…) The only thing that creates trouble is the problem of Palestine." (Rashid, Muslim community leader with a Moroccan migration background)

Civil servants in the local Amsterdam government sometimes called the pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian demonstrations and public debate significant problems, which especially influenced the relations between Jews and Muslims. For example, the city council set up a dialog group mainly for Jews and Muslims because they were afraid that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would cause divisions between the groups (see Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2017: 30).

This does not mean that other problems, such as the extremist attacks in Brussels (2014), Paris (2015) and Copenhagen (2015) and local discrimination were not also regarded as big problems by all concerned. Nor did all my respondents consider it the most important problem, as Alexander and Rashid did – although some of them made similar statements. However, as we will see below, discussing these other problems with each other was not discouraged as often as any talk of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was. Instead, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was often given a certain centrality and, in these kind of statements, Jews and Muslims were sometimes placed in a central role in the tensions surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In other words, Amsterdam Jews and Muslims were easily connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and vice versa.

The second element of the frame added an element of sensitivity; the idea that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was the most delicate problem that Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam had. Jews and Muslims often said things like the following:

> "Honestly, I have to say we don't talk about it. I think the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is too delicate. (…) It's not easy to talk about." (Halil, youth leader Milli Görüş mosque)

> "This year we're going to debate conflict [in a trialogue between Jews, Muslims and Christians]. But we're going to avoid the Palestine conflict (…) because we only will get into an argument." (Kim, Muslim woman, organizer of women's dialogs)

Again, they were not the only respondents expressing statements like this. Most of the Jews and Muslims I interviewed framed the conflict in the same kind of language, as did many of the people I observed. In this narrative the tensions arising from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were regarded as the most delicate problem between them. For example, Rivka, a Jewish woman who took part in a dialog meeting for the first time, said:

> "I really liked the dialog day. Everyone has the same (…) yeah well, except for talking about Israel. You should avoid that topic."

Rivka's and Kim's statements overlap with the third element of the frame: avoiding any talk about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because the topic is too delicate. Other examples come from two Muslim youth leaders, Halil and Eray, who hesitated to talk about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with their Jewish acquaintances and Azize, a Muslim woman, who felt she could not discuss the topic in her women's group because she thought the Jews in the group would find the topic too sensitive. Omer, a Muslim community leader with a Turkish migration background, put it as follows:

> "[The Israeli-Palestinian conflict] is something that I would rather avoid. Not that I'm scared or anything, but I don't want to lose people over this subject. If it comes up in the conversation, let's not talk about it today. We're here [in a cooperation project] with other intentions, unity, doing things together. We're not going to talk about it, period."

Other respondents regarded the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians as 'emotional' and referred to it as the topic you cannot or should not talk about. Furthermore, in cooperation projects, Jews and Muslims agreed not to talk about this topic at their dialog meetings, and warned against 'importing' the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to Amsterdam. And although opinions were published in the media, Jews and Muslims in direct contact with one another, such as in cooperation projects and

sometimes in day-to-day interactions, started to avoid the subject and advised each other not to talk about it.[78]

Sometimes Muslims and Jews stopped talking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because they experienced actual conflict. But even if they did not experience conflict themselves, they still avoided talking about it with each other because they thought the other party would find the topic too sensitive.[79] All in all, as stated above, the majority of the interviewed respondents framed this in the same kind of language, regardless of age, ethnicity or religion. In my observations too, this kind of language was also prevalent. Civil servants also sometimes framed it as so delicate that Muslims and Jews should not talk about it. In some dialog meetings between Jews and Muslims, for example, I observed civil servants warning people against importing the conflict. At a dialog meeting between Jews and Muslims the attendees were divided in groups to talk about all kinds of issues and to get to know each other. One participant, an orthodox community leader, wanted to discuss the situation in Israel. The civil servant at the meeting, however, said that he did not want to talk about the situation in Israel, but the situation in the Netherlands. He explained that any discussion of the Israeli-Palestinian situation would pit the attendees against one another.[80]

Together, these three elements form the idea that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a special problem for Jews and Muslims. It is seen as such a very delicate problem that it should best be avoided in direct contact (see also Van Weezel, 2017: 220-233 who describes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the elephant in the room). But are Muslims and Jews actually the main parties involved in the tensions that emerged in Amsterdam because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Did the Jews and Muslims I interviewed express conflicting opinions? To try to answer these questions in the following sections I will first describe who was involved in the pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations, because these often evoked tension in Amsterdam, so that we can see if Jews and Muslims were indeed the main parties. Second, I will present the arguments Jews and Muslims make about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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78   This does not mean no Muslims or Jews dared discuss this topic with each other. Although this frame is quite pervasive, there are always competing frames. Thus, although Muslims and Jews often did not talk about this topic, there were cases where they did. Interestingly, when Jews and Muslims did discuss the conflict, it was often in controlled environments such as educational projects, and pre-viously it had sometimes happened in well-established cooperation projects. Interestingly, Ensel & Stremmelaar (2013: 168) say that in one educational project they studied, peer-educators did try to discuss this topic, but the students did not really want to talk about it, because they did not have the knowledge to talk about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, were not interested or did not want to speak out.

79   This argument expands an argument made in Roggeveen, Vellenga & Wiegers (2017: 370-372).

80   In the town twinning case, however, the local government wanted to stimulate dialog even if for various reasons it did not have the desired effect.

We will see that Jews and Muslims were involved in the demonstrations and did have opposing views. However, we will also see that others were also involved and some Jews and Muslims have more compatible opinions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than the first group. Therefore, following the next two sections, I will discuss how this pervasive frame could emerge within Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.

Who was Involved?

From my observations at demonstrations in 2014 and 2015 and my study of relevant media reports, I found that pro-Israel demonstrations were organized by the CIDI and the Christian group 'Christians for Israel' (see Appendix 3 for a list of media sources).[81] Members of these organizations were the main speakers at these events. They were joined by the Israeli ambassador Haim Davon, Dutch journalist Frits Barend, Frits Bolkestein, a former party leader of the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy [in Dutch: *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, or VVD], and Joel Voordewind of the Christian Union [in Dutch: *ChristenUnie*, CU] (see Appendix 3 for other speakers). Alongside these speakers and organizations, informal groups that organized themselves on social media and included Jews, Christians and people who identified as non-religious were also among the organizers of the events. Among the supporters participating in these demonstrations were members of the organizations, as well as small online groups, and individual Christians and Jews. The pro-town twinning demonstrations were visited and organized by some of the same groups.

The main goals of the pro-Israel demonstrations are to support Israel during a time of war, and – according to the organizers – to show that Israel upholds its 'right to support its citizens' and its 'right to defend itself' against attacks (see "Vier Arrestaties bij Pro-Israëldemonstratie op de Dam", 2014). CIDI has some of the same goals as the general goals of the demonstration (see also "Vier Arrestaties bij Pro-Israëldemonstratie op de Dam", 2014). 'Christians for Israel' also supported these goals. However, one of its members mentioned in an interview that their support had a religious reason: the restoration of Jews and return of Jesus. Speakers also mentioned what they considered to be an inaccurate depiction of Israel in the media and the importance of speaking out against injustice as goals for the demonstrations.[82]

The pro-town twinning demonstrations had more specific goals. Respondents involved in the pro-town twinning demonstrations argued that Tel Aviv is a left-wing,

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81 This section is based on my observations and the list of media sources presented in Appendix 3.
82 Malcontent (2018) says that pro-Israel supporters also stated these goals in the past. I elaborate on this point below.

gay-friendly, and progressive city that resembles Amsterdam. Moreover, they argued that there are town twinning bonds in the Netherlands with China and Turkey. These countries, they argue, violate human rights more than Israel, so they wonder why the bond with Tel Aviv is debated, while these other bonds are not. The pro-Israel demonstrations attracted an estimated 250 to 300 people (based on my observations and media sources; see also "Veel 'Bible Belt' bij Pro-Israël Demonstratie op de Dam", 2015). The pro-town twinning demonstrations were smaller and attracted between 5 and 30 people, on estimate.

The pro-Palestine demonstrations were initiated by such organizations as Youth for Palestine, Stand Up for Palestine, Students for Justice in Palestine, and Back to Palestine. The leaders were young (students), some Muslim, others non-religious. They were joined by established organizations, such as the Palestine Committee [In Dutch: *Palestina Komitee*] and DocP (former *Samenwerkingsverband voor Palestina*) (see also Malcontent, 2018) and by left-wing activists and human rights activists operating from such organizations as the International Socialists, the International League of Peoples' Struggle, sharenl.org, the Muslim organization R4bia, and *vrouweninhetzwart. nl* (womeninblack.nl). Finally, these demonstrations involved two Jewish organizations that support the Palestinians, called Gate48 and An Alternative Jewish Voice [In Dutch: *Een Ander Joods Geluid*] (see Appendix 3).

Among the supporters of these demonstrations were informal groups as well as individuals who identified as Muslims, as non-religious, and as Jews. Members of Dutch left-wing political parties, such as the Socialist Party, also joined in. On one occasion, a pro-Palestine demonstration took place during Gay Pride, so an LGBT group was also present. Anti-town twinning demonstrations were organized by many of the same organizations, and partly by a new network of 31 organizations who protested against town twinning (see "Wie Zijn Wij", 2015 and Appendix 3).[83]

During the protest on Museum Square, the organizers said that the main goals of the demonstrations were to raise awareness for the situation of Palestinians among the Dutch public and Dutch government, to boycott Israel, to challenge the occupation of parts of what they consider Palestinian territory, and to challenge the depiction of the Palestinians by Dutch media, which they considered inaccurate.[84] There were also more specific goals: Back to Palestine, for example, mentioned during a

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83   These sections are also based on observations at demonstrations and the study of media sources reporting on the demonstrations (see also Appendix 3).

84   During my fieldwork, for example, there was a debate between some pro-Israel and pro-Palestine groups with different interpretations of which parts of Israel or the Palestinian territories should be considered occupied and which should be depicted as occupied or not by the Dutch media.

demonstration that they wanted to raise awareness of the blockade of Gaza, while Stand Up for Palestine said they wanted to raise money during the protests to support Palestinian families.

Like the pro-town twinning demonstrations, the anti-town twinning demonstrations had specific goals. DocP, for example, said they helped organize an anti-town twinning demonstration because they found it "unbelievable" that Amsterdam wanted to cooperate with a country that violates human rights (Wolthuizen, 2015). Respondents involved in anti-town twinning also argued that Tel Aviv was not doing anything to stop the settlements and that the town twinning bond was a way of being able to "sell" Israeli policies. From the media sources listed in Appendix 3 and my own observations at the demonstrations I estimate that the pro-Palestine demonstrations attracted between 2000 and 3000 people. Again, the anti-town twinning demonstrations were smaller and attracted between 20 and 60 people.

This overview shows that Jews were active in pro-Israel, pro-Palestine, and pro- and anti-town twinning demonstrations, while Muslims were active in pro-Palestine and anti-town twinning demonstrations. Mosques and synagogues were not often officially present – or at least did not connect their names visibly to the organization of demonstrations – although religious organizations did sometimes express their political opinions online, issued political statements, and maintained connections with activists. Most demonstrations, however, were organized by political, community, or activist organizations, or by informal, online networks.

We can also see that Jews and Muslims were involved, they were both supporters and organizers of the demonstrations. However, the demonstrations were also organized and joined by left- and right-wing activists, Christian organizations, people who identified as non-religious, and human rights organizations. Some Jews were not active in pro-Israel demonstrations, but were active in the pro-Palestine demonstrations, such as Jews in Gate48 or An Alternative Jewish Voice [In Dutch: *Een Ander Joods Geluid*]. What is more, not all the Jews and Muslims I spoke to were involved in these demonstrations.[85]

This is important, because, as mentioned above, the tensions in Amsterdam over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are particularly associated with Jews and Muslims. The

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85   Ensel (2017b) and Malcontent (2018) show that in the Netherlands, non-Muslims and non-Jews were also involved in debates and demonstrations in the past as well. They mention, for example, left-wing, right-wing and Christian political parties, and public figures such as Gretta Duisenberg and ex-prime minister A.M.M. (Dries) Van Agt.

data, as well as the historical overview, however, show that the tensions rising over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are more complex than just Jews supporting Israel versus Muslims supporting the Palestinians. As we will see below, not all Jews and Muslims participate in the public debate. Here, thus, we see that the frame is partly confirmed, but there is also a mismatch between the pervasive frame and the actual involvement of Jews and Muslims in practice.

Jewish and Muslim Opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Some Jews and Muslims were involved in the demonstrations, but not *only* and not *all* Jews and Muslims were engaged. The second question, what do Jews and Muslims actually think about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not answered yet. To grasp what both parties actually think about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict I studied my respondents' opinions in interviews and observations. These were opinions of those actively engaged in demonstrations, the public debate or online, as well as of those who kept their viewpoints more private.

The Jews and Muslims who expressed support for either Israel or the Palestinians had various reasons for their engagement and support. Jews supporting Israel argued that they have family members living in Israel; they had lived in Israel themselves; they feel that Israel is disproportionally attacked in the media; that anti-Semitism in the Netherlands is related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and the idea that Jews could go to Israel if Dutch anti-Semitism got out of hand. Some others felt connected to Israel because they see it as part of Jewish identity. A few respondents explained that this is because of the historical, religious or cultural connections of Judaism with Israel. Finally, the media they watched or read at home also influenced their connection to Israel, as we will see below.

Muslims who felt connected to the Palestinians had diverse reasons for taking part in demonstrations and the public debate or their private feelings of connection. Their arguments included supporting others in need; supporting or feeling connected to co-religionists in need; supporting whom they considered was the weaker party; and, again, the media they watched at home gave them ideas and opinions in support of the Palestinians. In a few instances, Muslims, but especially others such as Christians, policy makers, or academic experts added that they thought Muslims felt connected to the Palestinians because they felt excluded in the Netherlands (see also Malcontent, 2018: 208).

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In these motives for (private) support we see that some Jews and Muslims have opposing arguments for their support; they would indeed disagree on some topics. Think, for example, of both parties stating that the Dutch media is on the side of the other party. I found these disagreements by comparing statements made in interviews about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but in some cases, these opposing opinions also led to actual conflict, either in the form of vigorous discussions in the public debate or sometimes in interpersonal conflict. Many disagreements found between Jews and Muslims can be grouped in two categories: clashes over the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or clashes over the contemporary Gaza War.

Clashes over the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict came up in discussions about the concept of 'the Palestinians'. Reuven, a Jew actively involved in pro-Israel demonstrations, for example, said in an interview that 'the Palestinians' as a people never existed; an argument more often heard among pro-Israel supporters. Pro-Israel supporters explain that before 1948, various ethnic groups lived in the areas now called Israel and the Palestinian territories. So, they argue, the concept of a 'Palestinian people' was invented by pro-Palestine supporters to make them look like one people, whereas historically they are not. However, Muslims who support the Palestinians speak of Palestine, as the region was historically called, and speak of Palestinians as a people living in the territories today. Another example of clashing opinions concerns the interpretation of events that happened in 1948 when the Israeli state was founded and 750.000 Palestinians fled or were expelled, by them referred to as the Nakba (see Blumenthal, 2015: 2). Tariq is one of my Muslim respondents who actively participates in pro-Palestine demonstrations. He drives a taxi and meets various people in his cab. About his conversation with an Israeli family, he explained the following:

> "I met an Israeli family and noticed during the conversation that the dad was saying that both sides are guilty. However, everyone forgets that ethnic cleansing of Palestine started in 1948. So [when someone says both sides are guilty] I shut up. I know for myself, if I say anything, the conversation will turn sour."

Muslims and Jews disagreed about the contemporary situation as well, for instance, about the use of violence in the Gaza War of 2014. Some Muslims who supported the Palestinians emphasized that the violence against the Palestinians was disproportionate, because many more Palestinians than Israelis were killed. On the other hand, some Jews who supported Israel argued that Israel has the right to defend itself and if Israel did not have its Iron Dome – its air defense system – there would have been more victims.

Such opinions did not come out of thin air. Malcontent (2018: 229; 240) shows that in the past the Israeli state defended its use of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while members of the international community condemned the violence of the Israeli state and referred to this violence as disproportional. This international rhetoric might well have influenced the opinions of Dutch Jews and Muslims, especially because, as we will see below, the Dutch – and other – media disseminated the international viewpoints.[86]

The differing opinions of Jews and Muslims expressed in interviews sometimes caused tension in Jewish-Muslim relations.[87] First, because when these opposing views were expressed in the public debate, they added to the idea that not just some Jews and Muslims had very different opinions, but that all Muslims and Jews held opposing opinions. Second, Muslims and Jews working in cooperation projects and sometimes in day-to-day life felt hesitant to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, when the subject did get discussed, opposing opinions sometimes led to clashes. In an interreligious network, for example, respondents said that the subject put a strain on their conversations and occasionally caused incidents. Barbara, a non-religious Jewish woman, who had been part of an interreligious/intercommunal network that had a youth group (but no longer exists), said that a Muslim man in their network had sent an "anti-Israel movie" to the youth network:

> "… [It was] an appalling anti-Israel movie, with terrible images. You can't tell if it was true … pure propaganda against Israel and it was an appalling movie with lots of violence. He e-mailed the movie through the account of the youth group, which was subsidized. I was furious. He didn't send it in his own name, but through the youth group's account. We had to organize something to bring our communities together, to create some understanding, and then he did this!"

Some Jews and Muslims were targeted and even threatened because of what they said on social media. Marike, a liberal Jewish woman, for example, told me she was threatened by Muslim acquaintances after she had posted about her holiday in Israel on Facebook. Similarly, but not necessarily of influence on Jewish-Muslim relations, Aysel, a Muslim woman who works for an organization that teaches parents and children how to use social media, told me that she had heard that children on the

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86   Interestingly, Malcontent (2018: 240-241) says that the Minister of Foreign Affairs did not express a strong statement. He did deplore civilian casualties and pleaded for international research, but did not predict the outcomes of this research.

87   Opposing attitudes not only occurred in Jewish or Muslim groups. The kinds of arguments described here were also used by non-religious, left-wing and right-wing activists, Christians and political parties.

media training course had been sent offensive cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed as a reaction to the 'Free Palestine' flags on their Facebook pages. She thought they were sent by extreme right-wing individuals, but was not sure.

When we compare this to the frame that many Jews and Muslims expressed, we see that Muslims and Jews expressed opposing opinions in the public debate and occasionally toward the Other. These opposing opinions also caused tensions, and sometimes led Muslims and Jews to even discontinue contact. However, other Muslim and Jewish respondents I spoke with or observed had compatible views on the issue and were more or less active in demonstrations and the public debates. These Jews and Muslims in my study can be categorized into four groups.[88]

First, there were Jews and Muslims who felt sympathy for both Israelis and Palestinians and supported and criticized both sides. Mathilde, a Jewish woman who organizes cooperation projects, for example, said at a dialog meeting that it hurts her when people say that Israel does not have the right to exist. She explained that for her, Israel is the place she shares a history with. Moreover, as a Jew in the Netherlands, she is always part of a minority, and Israel is the only country where she belongs to the majority population. However, she also said that she feels the pain of the Palestinians, and does not always agree with the Israeli government.[89] As Azize, mentioned above, explained: "Personally, I think that violence from both sides should stop [and] that they have peace and live peacefully together."

Second, there are Jews and Muslims who support either Israel or the Palestinians and have opposing opinions on some topics. Analyzing their opinions, however, makes clear that some of their ideas are not so different. For example, they view Israeli-Palestinian history from both sides, try to detach the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from Jews and Muslims in the Netherlands, and plead for a two-state solution and/ or condemn violence on both sides, but feel more loyalty to either Israel or the Palestinians. Although they disagree on some points, some of their ideas are not that different.

Third is the group who explained they did not have time to engage in public debate because they had to work, were on holiday at the time of the demonstrations in the summer of 2014, or did not want to get involved in demonstrations. For example, Arslan, a Muslim man on the board of his mosque who supported the Palestinians in

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88   These groups are ideal types and hence some respondents fit into more than one category.
89   I will come back to this example in Chapter 9.

principle, told me that he found it "un-Islamic" to go to demonstrations in general, because he felt religious rules and courtesies prevented him from participating. He said: "[W]e have rules, we have manners [polite forms of interaction] and then you're standing there yelling and making noise between [all these] men and women". He and his mosque felt that yelling slogans and making so much noise was indecent. Mounira, a Muslim woman of Kuwaiti descent active in an anti-discrimination movement, said that she did not go on demonstrations because she was afraid something bad would happen. This group did not necessarily agree, but also did not directly oppose each other, because they were not involved in demonstrations or not visible in the public debate.

Fourth, both Muslims and Jews were involved in the pro-Palestine movement. Their opinions differed in some aspects – for example, whether Israel should be boycotted – but were similar in many other aspects, and they stood together at demonstrations. This group was very active in the demonstrations and public debate, and did cooperate.[90]

Finally, it is important to note that the opinions of Jews and Muslims can change. As mentioned before, Tessler & Levy (2013) show that opinions in Arab countries change when there were attempts to create peace between Israel and the Palestinian territories. For the Dutch context, Malcontent (2018) and Wallet (2017: 416; 430-434; 448-452; 478-479), show that the opinions of Israel changed in the majority population and Jewish communities. During the Six Day War of 1967 many people in the Netherlands still supported Israel, but activist groups that supported the Palestinians started to emerge, and during the first Lebanese War of 1982 and the murders in the Palestinian refugee camps Sabra and Shatila protest against Israel increased. Similarly, my own data shows respondents mentioning that when something happens in Israel or the Palestinian territories, tension also increases in the Netherlands and when there is a quiet period, relations improve. Respondents also mentioned that images presented on the news or on social media triggered anger toward Israel, the Palestinians or both. Clearly, although some groups of Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam disagreed and others agreed, their opinions can change and are thus dynamic, not static.

When we compare these findings to the pervasive frame – which assumes that Muslims and Jews are (a) often involved in tensions stemming from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and (b) disagree on this topic which makes it (c) the most delicate problem

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90   I did not observe Muslims participating in pro-Israel demonstrations or pro-town twinning demon-strations, but given that these demonstrations were sometimes quite large some Muslims possibly did participate.

they have in common – we see that some Muslims and Jews are indeed involved in the demonstrations and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does produce tension in Jewish-Muslim relations. However, there are quite some discrepancies. We have seen that other parties were at demonstrations, not just Jews and Muslims. We have also seen that Jews and Muslims had both opposing and more compatible views. The pervasive frame, however, ignores these complexities.

In sum, although Jews and Muslims actually clash on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the frame creates a tendency to overestimate the level of opposition in both sides, and hides or ignores the more compatible opinions.[91] This is problematic, because the frame ignores these discrepancies and this produces problems of its own. The whole idea of the frame – that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is too delicate to talk about in direct contact with the Other – implies that Jews and Muslims feel that the other party would undoubtedly disagree with them, while in practice they might have more common ground. Also, in interviews, Jews said directly that they thought that Muslims would support the Palestinians, and Muslims explained that (young) Muslims thought Jews would support Israel. This frame thus stimulates the idea that the majority of Jewish and Muslim communities have opposing ideas and that adds to fear of each other.

This idea that Jews and Muslims only have opposing opinions was sometimes reinforced when Jews and Muslims had no contact whatsoever with each other. Joël, a Jewish pupil, for example, said in one of the focus groups that he would like to hear the other side of the debate, but because he had 'liked' Israeli pages on Facebook, Facebook recommended only similar pages. Khalid, a Muslim youth worker of Moroccan descent expressed the same thought:

> "My parents, my dad, he watches Arabic news and that kind of news is more focused on the Israeli-Palestinian topic than say RTL or NOS [news programs]. So when you're young, when you see this kind of broadcasting (…) you see the settlements, Israelis, Jews (…) become one category and automatically, whether you want to or not, it doesn't matter if you're smart

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91   While this frame mostly leads to overestimating the viewpoints of the Other, not talking about the topic can also lead to underestimations. In cooperation projects where they did not talk about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Jews and Muslims were sometimes surprised to see that the Other supported the Palestinians/Israel (see also Roggeveen, Vellenga & Wiegers, 2017: 370-372). Moreover, as we will see in Chapter 8, in some situations, avoidance helped reduce tension. When less compatible opinions are introduced too soon in newly established relations – such as new cooperation projects –tension can rise. At first, avoiding talking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can help to not start off on the wrong foot. However, not discussing this conflict at all can lead to wrong conclusions about the opinions of the Other.

or not, you'll say: 'Okay, Jewish people are probably all anti-Palestine.' Also, because in my own environment there are no Jewish people, so you never hear anything else."

In some cases, when Jews and Muslims worked together, the frame had another effect. Sometimes these groups thought that they were the ones with compatible opinions, and all other Jews and Muslims had divisive opinions. Two Jews, for example, said that the dialog meetings they attended were for "the ones who already want to do good," implying that other Jews and Muslims had more divisive opinions.

This case also shows how a frame that ignores discrepancies can create additional fear of the Other in Jewish-Muslim relations, while in reality there might be common ground, at least in some cases. The question that remains is: how did the idea that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was the most delicate problem between Jews and Muslims become so pervasive? In the next section, I explain why this frame become so pervasive.

Explanations: Conflict, Being Asked to Take Sides, and Symbolic Power

It is important to note that this frame did not become pervasive merely because Jews and Muslims told this narrative to each other. My data suggests three main explanations. First, a pervasive frame can emerge because of the actual tensions that the respondents described. As we have seen, some Jews and Muslims disagree about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This caused actual tension which made Jews and Muslims hesitant to talk to each other. Narratives about these conflicts are told to one another and often emphasized in newspapers and on social media, which adds to the idea that many Jews and Muslims hold opposing ideas. Because these narratives are put in the center of attention they sometimes overshadow other accounts and thus help build the pervasive frame.

Second, Jews and Muslims who do not participate much in the public debate or who hold more compatible opinions were asked to speak out by their own communities, the media, and the general public (see also Van Weezel, 2017: 220-233 for similar observations). Thirza, a Jewish woman active in cooperation projects, for example, told participants in a dialog meeting that she went to a pro-Israel demonstration to support the victims of violence. She did not go there for the political side of the debate but felt "like I'm being pushed into one of the extremes. I feel I can't be friends with the other side, which is why it is so important to try to stay friends." Hilal, one of the youth leaders mentioned above, also felt this pressure: "It's really hard, because on

both sides you have people who say: 'Why are you talking with those Muslims?' or 'Why are you talking with those Jews?' It's a small group, but you always have this kind of criticism." A few times, Jews and Muslims said that the media or the general public were forcing both groups to take a stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Noam, a Jewish artist, for example, told me about his own and his colleague's experience of the Dutch media:

> "You notice, or we've noticed, that you are pushed into the role of ambassador. Suddenly you're seen as a spokesperson and then you have to defend yourself, so you do that. Even if you're not in a danger zone in the Netherlands, you get conditioned to be an ambassador, because you get attacked a lot. You get maneuvered into it. We try to resist that."

The news and social media sources respondents mentioned sometimes depict only parts of the conflict, conflate categories such as 'Jews' and 'Israel,' and do not always show nuances, which makes it hard to understand the other side of the story or the nuances of the conflict. Combined with the first two factors, this can reinforce the pervasive frame in the sense that those who might have more nuanced views are asked to take a firmer stance. It can reinforce polarization, contribute to the idea that Jews and Muslims have opposing ideas and make it hard for Jews and Muslims with more compatible views to express their opinions.[92], [93]

The third explanation can be found in the way the frame is legitimized. A frame has to have some sort of legitimization, otherwise it would not be perceived as a credible narrative. This is often provided in the form of symbolic capital. According to Bourdieu (1989: 22), symbolic power is the power of 'world making' (see Chapter 1). Following Goodman, by 'world making' Bourdieu means that people see the world through the categories and labels they use. These labels "organize the perception of the social world and, under certain conditions, can really organize the world itself." Symbolic power, then, is the struggle over these categories; the power to decide which categories describe the world. Symbolic power can be acquired through deliberate strategies, but Bourdieu points out that actors can also apply this power unconsciously.

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92   Not just certain Dutch media sources make these connections, but other European media as well (see Egorova & Ahmed, 2017: 283; Mandel, 2010: 167-175).
93   Some civil servants contributed to this frame because they called the tensions arising from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a delicate problem for Jews and Muslims in particular. Sometimes they avoided or urged others to avoid this topic in cooperation projects.

Bourdieu (1989: 20) explains that symbolic power usually re-establishes existing power structures and is often monopolized by the state. However, he adds, the use of symbolic power is never uncontested. Therefore, non-state parties can also use symbolic power to try to reach their goals (Bourdieu, 1989: 20; see also Wacquant, 2013: 275-276). Interestingly, as an example, Bourdieu mentions demonstrations as a way in which groups try to get others to hear them and make themselves visible (Bourdieu, 1989: 20).[94]

In the Netherlands, at least part of the symbolic power used to legitimize the pervasive frame can be found in the pro-Israel and pro-Palestine movements. Organizers and supporters tried to get recognition for their ideals by using symbols, flags and certain concepts that often involved Jewish and Muslim identities. This use of symbolic capital is central in explaining why Jews and Muslims are so easily connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the next section, I first describe the use of symbols and flags at pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations and then describe the use of concepts.

Symbolic Power

Symbols and Flags
At pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations, symbols and flags were used that made connections to Jewish and Muslim identities. They were often heavily debated but it is important to note that not every symbol used in the demonstrations caused a heavy debate. At a pro-Israel demonstration, for example, people held a sign stating: "Save the peace!" and at a pro-Palestine demonstration people carried a sign with "Stop the War" (see also "Pro-Gaza-Demonstratie 20.07.2014", 2014). Neither my respondents nor the Dutch media usually found this kind of symbolism debatable.

However, in a few instances, symbols provoked fear and anger among Jewish communities, because they referred to the Holocaust. Examples are individuals carrying swastika signs (see Van Der Aa, 2014) and giving the Hitler salute at pro-Palestine demonstrations. At a demonstration against town twinning, three men wore yellow stars on their jackets, referencing the stars that Jews had to wear during World War II. This kind of symbolism targets Jewish communities as Jews. Using it at pro-Palestine and anti-town twinning demonstrations conflates the Israeli-Palestinian

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94   Bourdieu also wrote about power in regard to religious groups. Although interesting for work that focuses on the Catholic Church in France, this research is less fruitful for my own study, because it is quite specific in its conclusions on symbolic power used by religious institutions (see also McKinnon, Trzebiatowska and Brittain, 2011: 355; Thielmann, 2013: 204-205). Therefore I agree with Verter (2003: 151) who argues that Bourdieu's concepts, such as 'field', 'strategy', 'habitus', 'capital', as described in his other texts are more suitable to study religious groups (see also Lizardo, 2004: 394).

conflict with the Holocaust and therefore symbolically connects Jews as seen as oppressors to the demonstrations.

However, the symbolic connections did not always have to do with the Holocaust. A local incident in Amsterdam also connected both Jews and Muslims to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the summer of 2014, in a square in Amsterdam-East neighbors hung Israeli and Palestinian flags from their balconies. Six flags were Palestinian, while one was Israeli. The latter was put up by a Jewish woman. The flag hanging below hers was a Palestinian one put up by a Muslim family. While these flags were hanging there, the Jewish woman was beaten up and a Molotov cocktail was thrown through the window of the Muslim family living below her. Local media suggested that the Molotov cocktail was actually meant for the upstairs neighbor with the Israeli flag on her balcony ("Gaza-Conflict Leidt tot Brandbom en Bedreigingen in Oost", 2014).

According to my respondents, the perpetrator(s) were not caught, so their motives remain unknown. This incident caught the attention of the local and national press. At least for the local press it seemed that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had caused trouble between Jewish and Muslim neighbors ("Gaza-Conflict Leidt tot Brandbom en Bedreigingen in Oost", 2014). However, although all the neighbors concerned clearly showed their support for one or the other side, social workers and a resident explained to me that these neighbors had been quarreling with each other for years about unrelated themes. The flags, they argued, were not just to show their support for Israel or the Palestinians, but were used to annoy each other in the ongoing neighborly dispute. So the tension was not just due to disagreement between Jews and Muslims over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, other factors also played a role. The neighborhood quarrel also influenced the conflict, and the motive of the people who threw the Molotov cocktail was unknown.

These examples show that symbols referencing the Holocaust and reducing a complicated conflict to the use of Israeli and Palestinian flags contributed to the pervasive frame because they related Jewish and Muslim identities to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Individuals at the pro-Palestine demonstrations using offensive symbols drew Jews into the debate, while the flag example shows that some media sources underestimated the complexity of tensions; these did not stem merely from the opposing opinions some Muslims and Jews have of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Conceptual Discussions
The organizers and supporters of town twinning and pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations not only used symbolism that could strengthen the pervasive frame,

but also various concepts with different boundaries between them. The concepts used in the demonstrations, debates and narratives that respondents recalled in the interviews – and which sparked heated debates – are 'anti-Semitism,' 'anti-Zionism,', ' Judaism' and 'criticism on the policies of the Israeli state'.[95]

Several concepts, with different boundaries drawn between them, were used in the pro-Palestine demonstrations alone. First, some activists clearly crossed the boundaries between concepts. For example, at a pro-Palestine demonstration, one of the speakers was Rachid El Ghazaoui, better known as Dutch hip-hop artist Appa. During his speech he shouted, "F*ck the Zionists, f*ck the Talmud" (see also "Omstreden Rapper Appa op Grote Pro-Gaza Demonstratie in Amsterdam", 2015). Besides causing offense to the Jewish community, he clearly conflated the boundary between anti-Zionism and anti-Judaism by including the Talmud.

Second, some pro-Palestine activists tried to set boundaries between the concepts and distinguish between 'Jews,' and 'Zionists'. They argued that one could be against the people who favored the policies of Israel, they called Zionists, but that you should separate Zionists from the Jewish community in general and from other Jews who did not support Israeli policies.

Third, another group of pro-Palestine organizers and supporters wanted to establish clear boundaries, but besides making a distinction between 'Jews' and 'Zionists', they also drew a distinction between 'Jews' and the 'policies of the Israeli government'. At the start of the pro-Palestine demonstration on Museum Square, for example, the organizers stood on stage and announced that they were not against Jews, but against the policies of the Israeli government. And if the marchers saw any anti-Semitic slogans on flags or cardboard signs that they should report this.

Pro-Israel organizers and supporters, as well as Jews who were not as involved in these demonstrations, also employed a range of definitions. First, sometimes they made the same demarcations as the pro-Palestine organizers in the example mentioned above, in the sense that they felt criticism of the Israeli government was allowed, but discrimination against Jews was not.

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95   Here I do not define 'anti-Semitism', 'anti-Zionism', 'criticism of Israel', 'Hamas supporter' or 'ISIS supporter', because my aim is not to establish the definitions of these concepts, but show how they are constructed and what it does to relations between Jews and Muslims when their boundaries are blurred or contested. In Chapter 6, I will define these concepts.

Second, pro-Israel supporters made other demarcations as well. At a dialog meeting, for example, Benjamin, a rabbi, identified himself as a Zionist because he felt Israel has a right to exist, although he did not agree with the policies of the Israeli government. To him, being a Zionist meant that he supported the right of Israel to exist. From his perspective, an anti-Zionist would be someone who thinks Israel has no right to exist. This differs from the view that Zionism implies support for the Israeli government, as some pro-Palestine activists would say. Pro-Palestine supporters who call themselves anti-Zionists might not be against someone like Benjamin, but because he identifies as a Zionist, the two interpretations might cause confusion and conflict.

Finally, some pro-Israel organizers or supporters felt that no boundaries were drawn at all between anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, Judaism and the policies of Israel, even when different concepts were used. Mandy, a pro-Israel demonstration organizer said, for example:

> "And because the word anti-Semitism is not tolerated, they call it anti-Israel and anti-Zionist. It is used in the same way [by pro-Palestine supporters]."

For this group, creating a label like anti-Zionism was, in their eyes, an attempt to hide the true meaning of the message, which they thought was anti-Semitic. In addition, some pro-Israel organizers and Jews less involved in the demonstrations said that pro-Palestine supporters – especially Muslims or Arabs, sometimes used interchangeably – specifically chose to criticize Israel and no other countries. This accompanies the idea that pro-Palestine supporters criticize Israel because it is seen as a Jewish state. Barbara, a non-religious Jewish woman, felt that Muslims were particularly preoccupied with Israel:

> "I keep wondering about the preoccupation with the fate of the Palestinians, while in Iraq and Syria their fellow believers [Muslims] murder way more people. They don't call it genocide or demonstrate against it. I always find that suspicious. I can't grasp it."

The different use and boundaries of these concepts led to tension. Pro-Palestine organizers, supporters and some Muslims less involved in the pro-Palestine movement felt attacked by this kind of accusations of pro-Israel activists and supporters. Lianne, a pro-Palestine activist and organizer of pro-Palestine demonstrations, for example, said mockingly: "If you haven't been called an anti-Semite yet, then you haven't done enough for the Palestinians." In her opinion, criticism of Israel is not anti-Semitic and should not be treated as such, because it offends the people trying to criticize Israel.

Similarly, Halil, who was not involved in demonstrations, said that if you criticize Saudi Arabia, he would not think that you were criticizing Islam, whereas if someone criticizes Israel, it is often thought this person is also criticizing Judaism.

Sometimes pro-Palestine supporters argued that pro-Israel supporters, the media, and the Israeli state accused them of anti-Semitism to silence them, and a few respondents suggested that the Israeli state framed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a religious problem between Jews and Muslims as a strategy to gain more support. For example, a pro-Palestine activist, Salim said:

> "It's really easy to say: this is the threat to the world. And at the moment, Islam is seen as the threat to the world. It's real easy to put everything into [this frame], because many people see [it as a] threat from outside. And so it's real easy for Israel and the Israeli lobby to say: look, this is what we have always fought against."

These differences contributed to the pervasive frame. Because such categories as criticism of Israel and anti-Semitism were often conflated, Jews were easily connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.[96] Meanwhile, as we have also seen, in some cases Muslims were linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because they were suspected of being especially preoccupied with Israel.

In addition to anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, Judaism and criticism of Israel, there were also other contested concepts. Sometimes pro-Palestine supporters were thought to be 'Hamas supporters.' For example, the case of a flag perceived as a Hamas flag. On a balcony in the west of Amsterdam someone put up a flag with Arabic text on it. Neighbors complained because they thought it was a Hamas flag. The Arabic-speaking government official who was asked to talk with the owners of the flag explained that it was not a Hamas flag. However, because of the complaints, they convinced the owners to take the flag down anyway.[97]

Also in Amsterdam, pro-Palestine supporters were accused of bringing Hamas or ISIS flags to demonstrations. From my own observations, it was hard to determine if there

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96 Ensel (2017b: 204) shows how – already in the 1980s – demonstrations in the Netherlands that protested the mass murder in Sabra and Shatila described Israel as a "perpetrator state" and sometimes Jews as a people of perpetrators. We see that here already connections are formed between Jews as a people and violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ensel describes how these connections became part of the culture in the subsequent demonstrations.

97 It can be argued that this concerns a symbol, rather than a concept, but because the neighbors explicitly mentioned the text and interpreted the flag as a Hamas flag, I categorized it as a conceptual debate.

were any ISIS flags, because at the moment of observation I could not discern what was depicted on all the flags. Even in press photos it was very hard to interpret if they were ISIS flags. It is, however, very probable that two Hamas flags were present, one when pro-Palestine supporters showed up at a pro-Israel demonstration, and the other at a pro-Palestine demonstration in Museum Square.

Regardless, the debates – on whether or not flags were present and whether the majority or minority of the protesters supported Hamas or ISIS – created controversy and confusion. For example, one organizer of a pro-Palestine demonstration said that ISIS flags were just Islamic, while Joran and Hans, two Jews, told me that ISIS flags were at the pro-Palestine demonstrations. On other occasions, pro-Palestine and Muslim supporters were associated with concepts such as 'terrorist' or 'ISIS supporter.' Salim, a pro-Palestine activist said:

> "Straight away [everyone, CIDI, the government] says: 'ISIS is going to demonstrate' or 'the flags of terrorism are on the streets and the speakers are trying to mobilize people against the Jews.' That's unacceptable. I see it happening not just in organizations, like CIDI, but every time a demonstration is held."

Salim's comment might be seen in the light of Malcontent's (2018) study which concludes that the Netherlands, although less supportive of Israel than in the past, is still not very supportive of the Palestinians. It might, however, have to do with contested or confusing boundaries between related concepts. Accusations of anti-Semitism, of being a Hamas or an ISIS supporter and the blurring of boundaries were at times associated with Muslim supporters. So it was not just Jewish identities connected to pro-Israel and pro-Palestine demonstrations, but Muslim identities as well.

In conclusion, what we see here is that pro-Israel supporters, pro-Palestine supporters, Jews, Muslims and others use the same concepts, but attach different meanings to them and contest their boundaries. In this symbolic struggle they use concepts linked either to Jews or Muslims, or both. Jews are seen either as the ones negatively targeted or as those who accuse others too quickly of anti-Semitism. Muslims are often associated with these discussions because they are seen as preoccupied with Israel or associated with Hamas or ISIS. These incidents not only involved those actively engaged in the public debate, but because it concerned imagery of both Jews and Muslims, it also included the less involved or those who expressed their opinions privately. This adds to the notion that the opinions of Jews and Muslims are in

conflict and thus adds to polarization, that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a problem with special impact on these groups, and thus contributes to the emergence of the pervasive frame that puts Muslims and Jews in opposition to each other.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have seen how a conflict happening in one place of the world can influence another (see also Debrauwere-Miller, 2010; Demmers, 2014: 85; Ensel, 2014; Katz, 2015; Malcontent, 2018; Modood, 2003: 113-114; Shain, 2002; Tessler & Levy, 2013; Tufail, 2016; Wallet, 2017). Some scholars suggest that one factor that contributes to the transportation of conflict is the presence of migrants or the children of migrants in European cities, because they have connections with their homeland (see Demmers, 2014: 85). Amsterdam has substantial Jewish and Muslim communities living in the city. Some of these people did immigrate from either Israel or the Palestinian territories to the Netherlands. As we saw in Chapter 3, between one in ten to one in five Jews living in the Netherlands has an Israeli background.

However, most people in these communities do not come from Israel or the Palestinian territories. Those who show their political engagement in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have various reasons that have to do with religious or cultural identities – such as feeling that co-religionists in other countries should be supported – and feeling the need to counter injustice. Nevertheless, some Jews and Muslims have family ties or feel connected to these regions and this can create tension in Jewish-Muslim relations.

We have also seen that the transportation of conflict and emergence of polarizing frames might also have to do with European ideas about minorities. Here the Netherlands is no exception, as we have seen above (see Kurth & Glasbergen, 2015; Vellenga, 2014; Zoethout, 2013). Jewish and Muslim communities have been asked to take sides in the public debate. In a cultural climate that is not specific to the Netherlands, but is widespread in Western Europe, groups perceived as religious or ethnic are often connected by politicians, media sources and the public debate to conflicts overseas (see also Modood, 2003: 113-114; Tufail, 2016).

However, as Egorova & Ahmed (2017: 284), argue, alongside the European context, local factors shape how international conflict is perceived and how it influences relations between groups in the local context. What we see in Amsterdam is that Jews and Muslims had opposing opinions and were involved in conflicts. They argued over historical and contemporary conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians and

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some Jews and Muslims lost friendships or were threatened because of their opinions. However, it would be wrong to perceive the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a problem shared just by Jews and Muslims. The tensions the Israeli-Palestinian conflict creates are not a clear case of Jew versus Muslim or Muslim versus Jew: several parties are involved in the discussions and demonstrations in Amsterdam. Moreover, Jewish and Muslim opinions may be in opposition at times, but there are Muslims and Jews who criticize both sides, and others who feel connected to one side, but have compatible opinions on some aspects of the conflict and are not involved in the demonstrations. We have seen how a pervasive frame emerged, which sees the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as very central to Jewish-Muslim relations, which views this as the most delicate topic between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam and in certain contexts is considered so delicate that it is advisable to not talk about it. This frame erases the more compatible narratives, makes talking about this topic taboo, and creates anger and fear of the Other in Jewish-Muslim relations.

This frame is related to European ideas of otherness, but has local origins as well. The emergence of the pervasive frame can be partly explained by the actual, local conflict between Jews and Muslims over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Netherlands, because these local conflicts were often discussed. It also emerged when certain Dutch journalists and Dutch Jewish and Muslim communities asked people to take sides.[98] Moreover, the role of civil servants, who sometimes contributed to the pervasive frame by advising Jews and Muslim not to talk about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, can also be seen as a local factor. A third, more complex factor, namely the use of concepts, symbols and flags, taps into the symbols used in the wider European context, but also gain meaning and shape in local contexts. Given the involvement of Muslim and Jewish identities, this polarized the debate even more and reinforced the idea that Jews and Muslims had opposing opinions on this topic.

In conclusion, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did influence Jewish-Muslim relations, but in highly complex, multilayered ways. Both the European and local context shaped the influence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Jewish-Muslim relations. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict created actual conflict between Jews and Muslims, prompting fear of and anger toward the Other. However, the pervasive frame that emerged in Amsterdam hides the fact that it not only involved Muslims and Jews with opposing views, but also silenced the compatible opinions that Jews and Muslims also have. In doing so, it made the conflict bigger and harder to talk about, which in itself created additional tension between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam.

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98   Although it might be argued that they are influenced by European framing as well.

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CHAPTER

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The Divisive Effects
of Violent Extremism

INTRODUCTION

In 2014 and 2015, extremist attacks took place in and outside Western Europe. On May 24, 2014 a shooting took place in the Jewish Museum in Brussels and three people were killed. On January 7, 2015 the Charlie Hebdo editorial office in Paris was attacked by Saïd and Chérif Kouachi. They killed 12 people, among them cartoonists, editors and policemen (see Katz, 2015: 313-314; Saul, 2015). The next day, Amedy Coulibaly, a friend of the Kouachi brothers, took the customers and staff of a kosher supermarket hostage in the Paris suburb of Porte de Vincennes. He killed four people; 15 other hostages survived (see Katz, 2015: 313-314). On February 14, 2015 in Copenhagen, someone was shot at a meeting for freedom of speech and that night a Jewish guard of a synagogue was killed (see "Reconstructie van de Aanslagen in Denemarken", 2015). In December 2014 and January 2015, Swedish mosques were attacked with Molotov cocktails ("Sweden Protest after Three Mosque Fires in One Week", 2015).[99]

Outside Western Europe, there were multiple violent extremist attacks, such as on September 2, 2015 in Yemen when two mosques were bombed and on October 10, 2015 in Turkey when more than 100 civilians were killed at a peace rally (see Yourish, Watkins & Giratikanon, 2016). At the time, a growing number of European citizens was going to Syria to join rebel groups and fight against the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad (Weggemans, Bakker & Grol, 2014: 101).

The extremist attack in Brussels was associated with ISIS – Islamic State – in Iraq and Syria. Mehdi Nemmouche, who killed the three people in the Brussels museum, had been in Syria for a year and when the police found him he had a Kalashnikov wrapped in what was identified as an ISIS flag (see Speksnijder, 2014). The extremist who committed the attack on the kosher supermarket claimed to have bonds with ISIS. The extremist attacks in Copenhagen were carried out by someone who claimed to be an ISIS supporter (see Higgins, 2015; Katz, 2015: 313; Yourish, Watkins & Giratikanon, 2016). And the extremist attacks at the Yemen peace rally were associated with ISIS as well (see Yourish, Watkins & Giratikanon, 2016). In Sweden, it is suggested that the attacks came from far-right extremists. However, few far-right extremists have been caught, so it is unclear what the perpetrators' motives were ("Sweden Arrest Man over Arson Attack on Mosque", 2017; "Sweden Rallies after Trio of Mosque Fire Attacks", 2015).

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99   The first attack in the article was not deemed arson by the police. However, the other attacks were.

The past two decades have also seen extremist attacks in the Netherlands. On May 6, 2002 the Dutch right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn was assassinated by Volkert van der Graaf, an environmental activist, and in 2004, the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh was murdered by Mohammed Bouyeri (see also Bouma, 2003; Komen, 2014: 47; Van Es, 2018: 146-147). On April 30, 2009, Queen's Day in the Netherlands, Karst Tates tried to attack the royal family during their visit to Apeldoorn. Tates did not manage to harm the royal family, but he did kill seven bystanders and died from his own injuries (see "Terugblik op de Aanslag in Apeldoorn", 2010). More recently, five people considered to have extreme right-wing ideas threw Molotov cocktails at a mosque in Enschede. At the time of the attack, people were in the building but fortunately no one was hurt. The perpetrators were convicted of terrorism and sentenced to four years in prison, including one suspended sentence of a year (see Bahara, 2016).

On July 4, 2014, in The Hague there were events that are often described as an "ISIS demonstration" and an "anti-ISIS demonstration" (see "ME Grijpt in bij Onlusten IS-Demonstratie in Den Haag", 2014; "Ophef om Uitspraken ISIS-Demo", 2014; "Pro-ISIS-Demonstranten Aangehouden in Den Haag", 2014). At the first demonstration, people with mostly covered faces displayed flags that ISIS claims as their official flag and shouted "Death to the Jews", "Death to the Zionist. Dirty Jews. Death to the Zionist" and "Israel, go to hell" (see Rechtbank Den Haag, 2015). The second demonstration was organized by a group called pro-Patria, who brought along Dutch and Israeli flags. Opponents of this demonstration showed up, threw rocks at the police and vandalized a journalist's camera (see "ME Grijpt in bij Onlusten IS-Demonstratie in Den Haag", 2014).

Weggemans, Bakker & Grol (2014: 101-102) say that in 2012 and 2013, the Dutch authorities noticed that rising numbers of citizens were joining the fight in Syria on the side of identified jihadist groups. In the Netherlands, these travelers to Syria were often called the *Syriëgangers* (see e.g. Openbaar Ministerie, n.d.).[100] During my fieldwork period, these returning Syriëgangers were perceived as a threat to Dutch society because they might have learned combat skills in Syria and/or would be traumatized because of their experience in the Syrian war. This was a reason why in 2013 the Dutch General Security and Intelligence Services (AIVD) raised the official threat level of terrorism in the Netherlands to 'substantial', where it remains today (Weggemans, Bakker & Grol, 2014: 102).

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100   Literal translation: Syria-goers or 'the ones going to Syria'.

Although Europe and the Netherlands have suffered extremist attacks from several extremist groups, my data was collected in 2014 and 2015. The attacks most often discussed by my respondents happened in Brussels (2014), Paris (2015) and Copenhagen (2015). As these had the most impact on the Jewish-Muslim relations I studied, I will focus on them. This chapter answers the following questions: How did these extremist attacks of 2014 and 2015 influence relations between Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam? How did the local context shape these effects?

Much of the literature on extremism focuses on the question of why people resort to extremism (e.g. Borum, 2011; Juergensmeyer, 2017; Koehler, 2016; Komen, 2014). However, I will argue that it is just as important to study their effects. They have a dynamic of their own and could cause further problems if we do not understand how the attacks influence relations between several population groups. Therefore, I will describe what happened in practice to the relations between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam after the extremist attacks of 2014 and 2015.

First I define 'violent extremism' and 'radicalization' to make clear what is meant when I discuss these phenomena. Second, I address the mechanisms that influence the emergence of violent extremism, as discussed in the literature. This is important because if we want to study how extremist attacks influence Jewish-Muslim relations, we have to know something about the context in which radicalization can emerge. I cannot do justice to all of this literature, but I will provide a brief overview of studies that focus on the emergence of violent extremism. Thirdly, I address studies on the effect extremist attacks have on (Dutch) society and zoom in on two responses to these attacks: counter-terrorism policies and security measures implemented in the Dutch context and the 'distancing debate' (see also Loukili, 2017; Van Es, 2018).

These sections describe the changes that emerged in the Dutch context and empirically show how these two responses influenced Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam: fear and inequality arose in both parties and the 'distancing' debate not only asked Muslims to denounce violent extremism but sometimes also asked Jews to distance themselves from the Israeli government. In the conclusion, I explain how the impact of international events – the extremist attacks of 2014 and 2015 – interfered with the relations between Muslims and Jews in the local Amsterdam context.

Theory: Extremism in Europe

Concepts

In the past, the concept of terrorism was used in the Dutch public debate to describe extremist attacks by Moluccan groups, left-wing groups and Palestinian groups in the Netherlands (see De Graaf, 2010: 27-28). However, in recent years the concept of terrorism has gained a different meaning. Ahmed & Matthes (2017) reviewed 345 studies conducted between 2000 and 2015 that deal with the depiction of Muslims in the media. Their literature review shows that in the contemporary public debate, Muslims are often associated with the concept of terrorism and are often depicted as a threat. The Dutch media are no exception (Ahmed & Matthes, 2017: 231-235). However, the behavior described by the word terrorism – or extremism or radicalization – can be found in extreme right-wing groups, extreme left-wing groups, animal right groups, Christian, Jewish or other groups and has a long history in Europe and elsewhere (see Borum, 2011; Carson, LaFree & Dugan, 2012; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Jackson, 2008; Koehler, 2016; Shaffer, 2016).

The usage of the concept in the public debate might therefore be a reason to refrain from using 'terrorism'.[101] To be able to study the influence of violent attacks on Jewish-Muslim relations, I agree with Jackson (2008) that we need a concept to study behavior that is violent, public and symbolic. A clear definition allows us to compare different cases, better understand this kind of attack and distinguish it from other forms of crime. Moreover, as Koehler (2016: 99) argues, not using a defined concept risks hiding violent, public and symbolic acts in words like 'hate crime', which makes the violence used by extreme right-wing groups, for example, less visible.

A concept that does describe the violent behavior performed by extremists is 'violent extremism'. Less often primarily associated with Islam, the term in itself suggests that extremely violent behavior could emerge in any group (see Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Koehler, 2016: 86-87).[102] In this dissertation, by 'violent extremism' I mean the public, physical and symbolic violence aimed at people with an ascribed group identity or violence that is aimed at them, their buildings and properties.[103] Violent extremism is aimed at both people and their property because they are seen as a representative

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101 Even though I mainly study attacks conducted by Muslims, I think it is better to use a concept that is not associated with Islam so often in the public debate. Particularly when discussing the phenomenon of extremism in general, it is important to use one term consistently – as I do in the next section.

102 I sometimes do use the word terrorism, when my respondents mentioned it in the interviews or observations.

103 Here group identity means that the victims of the attacks are seen as members of a certain group, such as ethnic groups, religious groups, majority populations, and gender groups.

of a certain ideology. It is – as Juergensmeyer describes – seldom a lone act and is regularly used to establish fear or attempt to do so in wide populations (see Jackson, 2008; Juergensmeyer, 2017: 3-9 Koehler, 2016: 89).[104]

Two related concepts are 'radicalization' and 'extremism'. With radicalization I mean the process leading up to but not necessarily resulting in extremism or violent extremism. This process can be characterized by a 'journey of alienation' (Slootman & Tillie, 2006: 16). According to Slootman & Tillie it usually starts when someone has lost confidence in society and retreats within a counter-culture. Radicalization escalates when they start to experience a legitimacy conflict and not just criticize society, but dehumanize its citizens. The difference between extremism and violent extremism is that people who can be considered extremists condone violent extremism, but have not used violence themselves (yet), while in violent extremism the actors actually commit violence.

An objection to using a general concept like 'violent extremism' could be that concrete examples vary. For instance, the amount and content of symbolism can differ: the attacks on Charlie Hebdo in Paris were seen as an attack on Western values (see Fassin, 2015), while other attacks, such as on the mosque in Enschede, were not framed in this kind of symbolism-evoking language. Moreover, some attacks were perpetrated in public (e.g. Charlie Hebdo and Brussels) and were very present in the public debate in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Western Europe (see Fassin, 2015). In 2015, two attacks in Bosnia/Herzegovina – one on a police station and one on an imam – were both carried out in public, but they did not gain as much attention in the public debate (see Yourish, Watkins & Giratikanon, 2016). Therefore, I will see the aspects described in the definition as scales, not as fixed characteristics. They function more like 'family resemblances' than a set of traits found in all cases of violent extremism.

Finally, it is important to separate the definition of violent extremism from the actors and mechanisms that cause it. As we have seen above, the actors who carry out violent extremism come from different groups and as Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) and Koehler (2016: 86-87) point out, extremism in right-wing groups has different motives than extremism in Muslim groups. Therefore this definition refers to the act of this kind of violence, rather than the mechanisms or the people perpetrating it (see also Jackson, 2008).

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104 In many definitions of terrorism/extremism an additional factor is 'non-state violence', but I agree with Jackson (2008) and Koehler (2016: 87-88) that the state can finance extremism and can commit extremism itself, so 'non-state' should not necessarily be added to the definition.

Mechanisms Influencing Radicalization Processes

Scholars in various fields have tried to figure out the mechanisms causing individuals and groups to express extremist behavior. They often emphasize that the group of people ultimately conducting the violence is relatively small and that even in a group that plans and conducts violence processes of deradicalization are often found as well (Borum 2011: 49; Juergensmeyer, 2017). Although few in number, their actions have a big impact on society. Therefore, much attention has been paid to the extreme right, to left-wing extremism, Jewish and Christian extremism, extreme animal rights groups and Muslim extremism (see e.g. Borum, 2011; Carson, LaFree & Dugan, 2012; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Jackson, 2008; Juergensmeyer, 2017; Koehler, 2016; Shaffer, 2016). As I cannot do justice to all their findings, I will only discuss review articles that focus on social scientific empirical studies, articles that focus on the Dutch context, and either right-wing extremism or Muslim extremism, because these forms are most relevant to this study.[105]

In his review of ten empirical studies on various extremists in the United States, Europe and Arab countries, Borum (2011: 48-55) describes several motivations and mechanisms to join (violent) extremist groups. In the European studies, scholars describe the role of social networks in radicalization processes. They state that some European mosques used to be involved in the propagation of extremist ideas, but are now no longer networks for extremists. Nowadays, recruitment takes place on the Internet and 'places of vulnerability', such as prisons or other social institutions where people are marginalized and more likely to feel lost (see Neumann & Rodgers, 2007: 19-27). Moreover, according to Borum (2011: 48-55), social networks of family and friends who participate in these networks are influential as well. Other factors that influence the decision to join extremist groups are unequal treatment, exclusion, and discrimination and – among Muslims – dissatisfaction with the West and life in general might contribute to (violent) extremism.

The European studies described by Borum also mention religion as a factor that can influence the path to (violent) extremism. According to yet other studies, religion does not seem to have a strong impact at all (see Borum, 2011; Juergensmeyer, 2017: 266-268). Interestingly, Juergensmeyer (2017: 268-283) argues that religion may not cause violence, but can be seen as a "spark" contributing to the start of religious violence and as an aspect that can hinder attempts at decreasing violence. He eloquently

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105 I wanted to include the literature on Jewish extremism, but only found cases in Israel or the Palestinian territories, not in Europe. Because I focus on European literature here, and the Israeli case is very specific to the region, I did not include this literature. For future research, it would be very interesting to see if there are any cases of Jewish violent extremism happening outside the borders of Israel and the Palestinian territories.

describes how marginalization, global change and a lack of political power in societies that are perceived as predominantly secular, but also marginalization from the own religious group, can drive people toward participation in religious violence. The imagery of a cosmic war present in some religious concepts and the ability of violence to empower religious groups can contribute to further radicalization processes. Both Juergensmeyer and Borum conclude that no one factor leads to extremism on its own as radicalization is often 'multi-determined' and different people can react differently to these factors (see also Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 807-811).

While the studies Borum describes focus on all kinds of violent extremism, others scholars pay attention to violent extremism conducted by a specific group. These studies are important to see if there are group-specific origins to specific forms of extremism. For example Koehler (2016: 87-88; 96-97) describes various motives for joining right-wing extremist groups in Germany. He states that the refugee crisis and attacks claimed by Islamic State, combined with rhetoric used by the political extreme right, created a sense of insecurity among German citizens which led to the emergence of new extreme right-wing groups. Besides these factors, a new factor influencing the establishment of extreme right-wing groups, Koehler argues, is that its leaders specifically use a new tactic to include others who at first did not use violence. The leaders of extremist right-wing groups organize massive demonstrations which persuade previously non-violent citizens to use violence. These demonstrations function as a new bridge between the initially non-violent extreme right-wing groups and violent groups. This specific form of targeting new recruits makes it important to look not just at general factors influencing radicalization, but also specific groups and contexts.

A few studies specifically focus on extremism in the Netherlands. Komen (2014: 51-53) describes how higher-educated and better-off Muslims experienced discrimination and had to fight harder for their positions than established groups in Dutch society. This feeling of almost getting there could produce more anger and frustration with Dutch society than less-educated or first-generation Muslims might experience (Komen, 2014: 51-53). Komen argues that extremism is therefore more likely to occur in groups of second- or third-generation migrants of Moroccan descent, because according to her research these people are more integrated in Dutch society and thus more often in touch with the Dutch majority population than, for example, Muslims of Turkish descent.[106] She concludes that extremism does not happen more often when

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106   This statement should be treated with caution. Komen defines 'integration' on the basis of contact with the majority population, language fluency and educational level but it could also be defined as cultural or socioeconomic integration.

there are wide divisions of power, but when these gaps become smaller and minorities still face discrimination (Komen, 2014: 51).

Komen (2014: 49-50) also addresses upbringing, another factor not often mentioned in studies of violent extremism. She notes that the parenting style of some Dutch-Moroccan families can be described as having "a large measure of authoritarian control," meaning that these families resort more often to punitive measures. According to research by Patterson that Komen cites, coercive parenting is a strong predictor of delinquency and violence, both characteristics also found in youth involved in extremist behavior. It could be another factor influencing the decision to join extremist groups.

Besides Komen (2014), others have conducted empirical research on (violent) extremism in the Netherlands (De Graaf, 2010; Doosje, Loseman & van den Bos, 2013; Komen, 2014; Slootman & Tillie, 2006; Weggemans, Bakker & Grol, 2014). Weggemans, Bakker & Grol (2014: 104-107) studied violent extremism in Muslim groups. They find that growing up in 'bad' neighborhoods, coming from mid-to-low educated families, frustration at their position in society or the position of their ethnic group, and the role of social networks affects the decision to join extremist groups. Although their sample is small, their findings show that uncertainty and isolation can be push factors toward radicalization in the Netherlands as well. They also mention seeking stability in extremist religious groups because with their clear worldview and set of rules these groups can provide stability. Other influential factors include disruptive events, such as getting in trouble with the law or at school, made youngsters vulnerable to (violent) extremist groups, because these groups give them a place to shine or the chance to gain status. Interestingly, Doosje, Loseman & Van Den Bos (2013: 598-601) came to some of the same conclusions as Weggemans, Bakker & Grol, but add that seeing Dutch authorities as illegitimate and their own in-group as superior can contribute to sympathies for the use of violence.

We can draw two main conclusions from this overview. First, some scholars (Borum, Dalgaard-Nielsen, Koehler and Weggemans, Bakker & Grol) warn against assuming that the mechanisms causing extremism in one group are the same in another group. Koehler, for example, argues that right-wing extremism has a few specific origins that are different from Islamic extremism, such as encouraging people to act violently in demonstrations. Second, Borum and Juergensmeyer argue that even within one form of extremism – such as Muslim extremism – the reasons that drive people to extremism differ. Borum (2011: 57) calls this the principle of *equifinality* – meaning that different pathways in someone's life can lead to extremism.

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The existence of several paths to extremism does not mean that there are no patterns that could lead to extremism in certain groups and specific contexts. Some scholars (Komen, Juergensmeyer, Weggemans, Bakker & Grol, and Doosje, Loseman & Van Den Bos) observe that exclusion and a vulnerable position in society can contribute to radicalization. Of course not everyone who feels excluded becomes an extremist, but these factors might add to the vulnerability of groups, and it could act as a push factor to join extremist groups.

The Effects of Violent Extremism
As we can see, much has been written about the mechanisms influencing extremism. However, it is important to understand what effects extremist attacks have, because they make a big impact on society and come with their own set of problems (see Van Es, 2018: 147-148; Weggemans, Bakker & Grol, 2014: 101). For example, Van Es (2018: 147) shows that the extremist attacks of recent years contributed to an anti-Muslim backlash in the Netherlands, and as mentioned above Weggemans, Bakker & Grol (2014: 101-102) show that the threat level in the Netherlands rose with the return of the *Syriëgangers*. These effects need study in order to understand how problems emerge and what kinds of solutions are found in practice. It is also important to study these dynamics because (violent) extremism has its origins in societal processes and, as Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) suggests, security measures might fuel a second wave of anger and frustration.

The effects can be studied from several angles, for example, through the effect they have on the victims (Silke, 2003), the neighborhoods where the attackers come from (Devroe & Ponsaers, 2017) and their effect on society at large (Fassin, 2015: 3-7). Fassin describes the effects the extremist attack on Charlie Hebdo had on French society. He records how the attack was framed in the public debate as an attack on French values, especially *liberté* and *laïcité*. This was most apparent in the *Je suis Charlie* movement. However, as Fassin says, not everyone in France identified with this movement. He says that a heterogeneous group resisted joining the movement, but the indignation that this refusal sparked was focused on Muslims who refused to join. In 200 schools (0.3 percent of all schools in France) students refused to keep a moment of silence for the victims of the extremist attack or expressed "a different voice in the discussions initiated by their teachers" (Fassin, 2015: 4). These students complained about a double standard or asked why free speech was allowed "here and not there." Fassin explains that refusing to join the *Je suis Charlie* movement was not to deny the ideas of *liberté* and *laïcité* but could be interpreted as a form of protest against the unequal implementation of these values and that Muslims had a point in claiming this. Listing discrimination in the school system and the job market, double standards in

media outrage and stigmatization on both religious as well as ethnic grounds, Fassin concludes that these inequalities must be considered when trying to understand the response of Muslims who chose not to participate in the *Je suis Charlie* movement.

For this dissertation, it is important to see how the extremist attacks and their responses influenced Jews, Muslims and the relations between them. As we will see below, two responses to the extremist attacks were crucial for Jewish-Muslim relations. The first has to do with counter-terrorism policies, while the second has to do with asking Muslims to denounce violent extremism and sometimes asking Jews to denounce violence by the Israeli state. The next two sections describe both responses and empirically show how they influenced Jewish-Muslim relations.

Responses to Violent Extremism: Counter-Terrorism Measures

To start with the first, especially important for Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam were counter-terrorism policies and security measures taken in regard to the threat of violent extremism. On the European level, scholars who addressed the mechanisms behind violent extremism, Koehler (2016: 99), Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010: 800), and Mandel (2010: 174-175), included European counter-terrorism policies and counter-terrorism measures. Koehler (2016:99) refers to the German authorities' underestimation of extreme right-wing extremism and the lack of protection for the minorities targeted by extremist groups. The targeted minorities, often Jews and Muslims, became suspicious because of the unequal protection. Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010: 800) states that monitoring Muslims can create a "second wave" of feeling discriminated and stigmatized in Muslim minorities and, as stated in Chapter 4, Mandel (2010: 174-175) shows that monitoring Muslims during the First Gulf War made them feel like second-class citizens. This practice hurt the relations between Muslims and Jews.

In the Netherlands, preventing (violent) extremism and extremist attacks has been an important policy topic for the last ten years, especially after the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004, and in 2014 and 2015, after the attacks in France, Belgium and Denmark (see De Graaf & Weggemans, 2018: 3). The national government and local government in Amsterdam both set policies geared toward protecting Dutch citizens and preventing extremist attacks. The national government tried to prevent radicalization through measures such as limiting travel opportunities, penal interventions in the case of recruitment to extremist groups and cooperation with imams and the boards of mosques to signal radicalization and stimulate opposing forces. Important components of these policies were preventing discrimination of

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Muslims and opposing what is considered 'jihadist content' (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid & Ministerie van Sociale Zaken, 2014).

Local government in Amsterdam implemented additional measures to prevent radicalization in the city. For example, they taught teachers and youth workers how to detect radicalization, increase the resilience of vulnerable people, facilitate dialog and work with key persons in the neighborhoods. They also created a contact point for concerned citizens to report signs of radicalization and regularly talked with Jewish communities to discuss concerns (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2018a; Van der Laan, 2016). In 2011, the policies changed slightly and became more 'risk-based', meaning that formerly broad policies became more specific and the local government focused on identified risks and deradicalization. In 2014, the local government criticized the repressive counter-terrorism measures that the national government had implemented and decided to focus on prevention (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2015a; Van Der Laan & Van Gils, 2017).

In this section, I discuss the policies that most influenced Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. It can be argued that anti-radicalization policies heavily influenced the lives of both Muslims and Jews. However, for their *relations* in 2014 and 2015, the security measures taken to protect Jewish and Muslim communities and their property were more important. These policies have to do with the protection of Jewish and Muslim property *and* the communication of these policies. By analyzing policy documents, the secondary literature, interviews with policy makers and politicians, I tried to discover what these policies consisted of.

According to the advisor, Jewish communities had already requested more security measures before the extremist attacks of 2014 and 2015. However, the advisor explained, the local government could not grant this request because they had to follow national policy, which did not permit extra security measures. At the time of the attacks on Jewish targets in Paris, Brussels and Copenhagen, the Dutch government felt that there was a conceivable threat to Jewish targets in the Netherlands as well and took security measures. Synagogues were continuously protected by the police and by the Jewish foundation *Stichting Bij Leven en Welzijn* that protects Jewish communities in the Netherlands (see Stichting Bij Leven en Welzijn, 2018). The Jewish schools were protected by the Special Forces.[107]

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107   The visible security measures were taken during my fieldwork and the information about them was thus gathered during my observations.

Muslims and their buildings did not get the same police protection from the national government.[108] The advisor explained that the decision to protect Jewish and not Muslim institutions was based on a threat assessment by the NCTV, the National Coordinator of Counter-Terrorism and Security [in Dutch: *Nationale Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*]. It was also based on the idea that extremist attacks present a threat to the lives of Jews, while for Muslims, the threat regarded vandalism of their property. However, there were no indications that there would be extremist attacks on mosques. The extremist attack on the mosque in Enschede (see above) caused damage to the walls, but mosques could easily be defended by putting in impact-proof glass and fire-resistant doors. The advisor felt the threat to Muslims from extreme right-wing groups was small, because a report from the Anne Frank foundation showed the presence of only small groups of extreme right-wing groups in the Netherlands and no extreme right-wing organizations active in Amsterdam.

Police protection was not the only security measure taken in Amsterdam. Other policies were implemented for the protection of religious or ethnic groups. Between 2004 and 2008, the Amsterdam government was considered a forerunner in anti-radicalization and counter-terrorism policies, compared to their European counterparts, due to their focus on evidence-based policy making (see De Graaf & Weggemans, 2018). The local government implemented policies developed in cooperation with scholars and based on scientific insights (De Graaf & Weggemans, 2018). In 2010, however, the security level was lowered and in consequence, according to De Graaf & Weggemans, budget cuts were implemented which resulted in a loss of expertise – although from my analysis of the overall budget for anti-radicalization policies it seems that funds available for anti-radicalization policies remained stable between 2008 and 2015, and in 2011 there was even more budget than in other years (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2018b). In 2014 and 2015, the extremist attacks in several places in Europe targeted Jews, such as the extremist attacks in the Jewish museum in Brussel and the kosher supermarket in Paris. Security levels were raised again and the local government had to rebuild its expertise (De Graaf & Weggemans, 2018).

So, in this period, the Amsterdam government made extra funds available for "threatened community and religious institutions" (see Gemeente Amsterdam, 2015b; Gemeente Amsterdam, 2018c). These institutions could apply to install security measures, such as cameras, bullet-proof doors and fire protection. The fund totaled 2,875,000 euros, of which 750,000 euros came from the national government and was intended specifically for Jewish institutions. Any other religious or community

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108   I will come back to these retaliations below.

institutions that felt under threat could apply for subsidies from the remaining 2,125,000 euros. If an application was approved, the government paid 50% of the costs made to secure the building; the institution had to fund the rest (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2015b; Van Der Laan, 2015).

The policy documents made clear that religious organizations could apply for a subsidy if there was an increased, conceivable threat of extremist attacks, which should be demonstrated by supporting information or documentation. The evidence included showing that there had been extremist attacks on similar objects in other West-European countries, supporting information from the NCTV and that the police had indicated an increased threat. It also included showing that the government had recently placed security measures in the same objects or that there were "significant feelings of insecurity". Grounds for refusal were listed as well. These included not showing an increased, conceivable threat for the object, that the subsidy would not be spent on security measures, that the security measures were not sustainable, the application did not meet the submission date, there were no own funds to secure the building, costs would be made outside the period covered by the subsidy, no need to secure the building according to the advice of the NCTV or the mayor, aldermen and police, and finally if the proposed measures would not lead to more security (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2015b).

In 2015, the mayor of Amsterdam informed the city council that there were 17 applications in total, of which 15 were granted, all to Jewish institutions. Of the 15 institutions, nine could not pay for half of the costs. The mayor decided that the local government would pay for 75% of the costs for seven institutions and 87.5% of the costs for the remaining two. A total of 1,163,961.55 euros of the budget was spent on security measures for these buildings (Van Der Laan, 2015: 2). Two applications were declined. The first because it was deemed 'ineligible'.[109] The second application, submitted by the board of a mosque, was declined because the NCTV and the mayor, police and aldermen decided that the mosque did not face a heightened threat level (Van Der Laan, 2015: 3).

Jewish entrepreneurs also asked for protection for their shops, but received no funding at first. Although there was a risk of extremist attacks, the local government said that they had "no concrete information" that an attack on Jewish shops in Amsterdam "was being prepared." The mayor of Amsterdam – the late Eberhard van der Laan – said that while it was not possible for businesses to apply for subsidies from funds intended for

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109   No further statements about this application were made.

religious and community buildings, this did not mean that the government would not take measures if there was a threat. The local government did provide an inspection in the area where these entrepreneurs had their shops (Van Der Laan, 2015: 2-4) and in 2017, a subsidy of 100,000 euros was granted for the protection of these shops (see Koops, 2017).

According to De Graaf & Weggemans (2018) these policies were not always communicated clearly to the communities, – especially Muslim communities. They noted two important points on communication. They say the local government underwent a "religious spasm" [in Dutch: *religieuze kramp*]. First, the anti-radicalization policies paid attention to social and practical aspects, but did not effectively address religion. And although the local government did have some contact with religious groups and institutions when incidents occurred, compared to other Dutch cities they did not often engage in structural meetings with religious institutions to discuss tensions in the city. The general level of communication between a city and its religious institutions can determine how (well) the decision-making on security measures is received.

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Second, De Graaf & Weggemans (2018) noted a difference between the organization of the policies and their depiction to the outside world. There was substantial discrepancy between what was presented as anti-radicalization policies and the policies actually implemented. Again, this can hinder the communication of security measures to religious groups. However, according to the advisor from local government, the security plans were discussed with the boards of several mosques, but the mosques found it difficult to explain the measures to their constituency because they did not want to be regarded as mouthpieces of local government.

As we will see below, in 2014 and 2015, the direct effects of the extremist attacks in Brussels, Paris and Copenhagen together with these policies and their communication all influenced the relations between Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam. In the next section, I first describe how the extremist attacks influenced the individual lives of Jewish respondents, and their opinions of and relations with Muslims. Then I address how Muslim respondents reacted and which factors influenced their opinions of and relations with Jews. This is followed by a description of the 'distancing debate' that emerged in the Netherlands in reaction to the extremist attacks and an analysis of how this debate affected Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.

The Influence of Extremist Attacks, Security Measures on Jewish-Muslim Relations in Amsterdam

Jewish Responses and Their Opinions of Muslims
My observations and interviews with Jews made it clear that they were worried that an extremist attack would happen on a Jewish targets in Amsterdam. The violent extremist attacks in Brussels, Paris and Copenhagen included attacks on Jewish communities. Because of heightened threat levels to Jewish communities in Amsterdam, their property was protected in several ways. Visible security measures were heightened and included additional police booths and protective measures on the doors of Jewish buildings.

On my fieldwork I experienced these protective measures first hand. In November 2014, for example, I had to observe an educational project in a synagogue. When I arrived at the synagogue I noticed a mobile police booth, standing in front of the gate and facing the premises. After ringing the bell at the gate, I had to state my name and confirm whether I had an appointment. Someone pressed a button inside the building to open the gate for me and I walked through. In front of the synagogue door a young man asked me for my ID, so I showed it to him. Then he asked if he could check my bag and if I were a member of the school that was visiting. While he checked my bag, I told him that I was not a member of the school. I came from the University of Amsterdam and had an appointment with one of the Jewish educators. He asked if I had any ID from the university. I had my library card, which is also used as ID, and showed it to him. He did not find that good enough. He then asked if I would show my e-mail conversation with the Jewish educator on my phone. I showed him the e-mails. Only then did he let me pass but only after the first pair of doors closed behind me could I enter the building.

The extremist attacks, sometimes combined with a feeling that security measures were needed, led some Jews to express their worries, fears and a general unsafe feeling in Amsterdam to me and others during my observations. For example, Emma, a Jewish woman who organized social projects in Jewish communities, said:

> "Well, I don't know, it's my own… interpretation, but I think it is fueled by the media. I'm a little anxious, but I've never experienced anything. But I am anxious. My kids, they go to school in Amsterdam-East. I'm not going to act on it, but for the first time in my life I'm thinking… Do they need to wear a [necklace with the] Star of David to school? She [her daughter] never has, but lately she wants to wear it and I [think sometimes], luckily, she doesn't want to

wear it this morning. But yeah, those children, she's five, so it doesn't mean that much to her [or other children] yet, but for the fathers and mothers… of course that's my prejudice. But I think the media fuels it. I do think that. And that's not good, I think, but it does happen. It happens to me, even to me. I've always been for peace, and I also studied [a subject that includes diversity]. There are thousands of different ways to build bridges. I've done projects here, with Jews and Muslims (…), old and young, and tried to build bridges and I think they are beautiful projects. (…) Even I think, will everything be all right? And [other Jews] have the same thought… will everything be okay? There hasn't been… not yet… there hasn't been an attack on a Jewish school… But well, secretly [I think], something's going to happen, here in the Netherlands too. And if it happens here or at Jewish Social Work or at a Jewish school or at the Jewish Historical Museum, or a synagogue or the Jewish Cultural Center or the Jewish cemetery, or… it wouldn't surprise me if it did happen. I'm afraid of it and hope it won't happen, but why would it happen in Brussels and not here? Or in Paris and not here?"[110]

When asked where this threat comes from she replied:

"I think it would be from an extremist Islamic group. That's been the case every time now, so I can imagine that unfortunately it will happen. It's only a few percent [of all Muslims], you know. The mothers at my school are very sweet and my Muslim babysitter is also very sweet. We've celebrated Shabbat with her. So, that is the regular stuff, the normal people that you're in touch with. But people who are… displeased… that they've not been seen by others in their lives or… have been the victim of injustice or feel like they are [victimized]… those people, I'm afraid they are going to radicalize. That's what I'm scared of."

What is interesting from Emma's narrative is that she felt a tension between trying not to give into her fear and feeling afraid, as is clear from her remarks on the role of the media influencing her fear. It is also clear that she tries to distinguish between being afraid of an extremist attack by Muslim extremists and Muslims in general. A few of my other Jewish respondents also described this kind of struggle. In a focus group, for example, one of the Jewish pupils, Ruth expressed this iterative process

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110   In the rest of the interview she not only associated her fear with media coverage, but also to feeling that the more discriminatory statements were allowed in Dutch public debate were leading to an increase of incidents. The tensions between Israel and the Palestinians and something she called 'the always present, lingering anti-Semitism in Dutch society' was becoming more apparent now.

between fear and downplaying that fear. I asked her what she associated with the word 'Muslim'.[111] She replied:

> "Well, I don't know… it's strange to say, but yes, the first thing that comes to mind is, of course, danger. However, it's not always true. [If I say that] I'm prejudiced and that's not the case. I don't believe they are all like that."

When I asked her why the word 'danger' occurred to her, she explained that you hear about Muslims involved in extremist attacks on the news all the time so it was the first thing she thought of, but she also felt that she should not be so afraid. She would take care with her language when talking to Muslims, though, because she was afraid they would get angry if she discussed the extremist attacks. Talking to Muslims on that subject, she considered it a 'small threat'. Interestingly, Ruth felt fear but also that she should not be afraid, because when she thought about it she could come to a different conclusion.

Three of the Jewish boys in the focus group disagreed with Ruth. Joël had other associations with Muslims and pointed to the diversity among them. Pieter said he was not afraid because some of his friends were Muslim. However, he would not talk about Israel and the Palestinians or the extremist attacks, because he expected their opinions would be too different. Daniël said he was not afraid and everything should be open to discussion, but he would not start a conversation on Israel and the Palestinians.

Fear of an extremist attack was not unfounded, considering the attacks on Jewish targets and the governmental protection based on increased security levels. However, as we saw with the Jewish pupils, respondents experienced varying levels of anxiety and differed in their fear of an extremist attack and feeling afraid of Muslims in general.

Analyzing the narratives of Jewish respondents, I found two factors that influenced this fear. First, being visibly recognizable as a Jew influenced whether Jews felt at ease in public. After the extremist attacks in Brussels, Paris and Copenhagen some Jewish respondents said that they did not dare to wear symbolic clothing or jewelry anymore. Emma's account is one example, another is a discussion of conflicts in the Middle East organized for Jews to discuss the topic among themselves. A young Jewish mother,

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111   In one educational project Jewish educators asked (Muslim) pupils to write down everything they associated with the word 'Jew'. There was no comparable case for Jewish pupils answering the same question about the word 'Muslim' so that is why I asked the Jewish pupils in one of the focus groups this question.

Yentel said at this meeting that her young son had asked if he could wear a *kippah* [a cap worn by some religious male Jews] when his mother was riding him to school on her bicycle. She told him that he could when he was older, but she admitted to the audience that just after the attacks in Brussels she did not want him to wear a kippah, because she was afraid "a terrorist would kill the little children of the liberal Jewish community." Although they had police protection in front of the school, she was not sure if that would save her children. The last time she had checked, the police officer in front of the school was not paying attention and was looking at his phone.

During my fieldwork, some Jewish respondents said that bringing your children to a school guarded by the Special Forces was a particularly daunting experience when the children were visibly Jewish because of their kippahs or stars of David. An orthodox Jewish man, Niels, mentioned plans to locate an asylum center on the border of Amstelveen and Amsterdam south, near the neighborhoods where large parts of Jewish communities live. He did not support the plan because the predominantly Muslim asylum seekers would not be screened. He was afraid a small minority might hurt Jews in the neighborhood, especially those Jews identifiable because of their kippahs. Talking with another Jewish man who felt that the neighborhood should be open to asylum seekers, Niels said:

> "It's where [our] children walk by on their way to their youth clubs on Saturday. Where the children bike to school with their kippahs on. Where three hundred meters further on there is a playground where Jewish children play with their kippahs on. Where there are Jewish schools, where people with Kalashnikovs [Special Forces] have been standing by the front door for the past one and a half years. (…) That's easy for you [the other Jewish man] to say. You don't live in Amsterdam south, your children don't go to the Jewish school, and they don't wear a kippah in the neighborhood. (…) It is easy to say you are just whining and that [we] should be welcoming and open. But you don't live here."

Second, the kind of contact Jews had with Muslims also seemed to be influential. Take the example of Jewish pupils in the focus group. Ruth told me that she had known a Muslim girl, but they had fallen out and she no longer had any Muslim friends or acquaintances. The narratives of the boys gave the impression that they interacted with Muslims more often. Other respondents who had more contact with Muslims were sometimes less fearful of extremist attacks and of Muslims in general, such as the leaders of an interreligious network with a lot of experience of organizing cooperation projects. They mentioned, for example, that if they felt unsafe or sad, others would call

or e-mail to make sure they were okay. There were exceptions. In another interreligious network, one of the Jewish leaders, Joran argued that Muslims should take distance from ISIS, otherwise he would not feel safe with them. This might be explained by the fact that one aspect on its own might not explain fear, but a combination of some of them might.

Here it is not my goal to decide whose feelings and responses are appropriate in such a difficult situation. That some resisted fear does not mean that others should not be fearful. Fear was not just a fabrication of the mind because the attacks in Europe did target Jews and their property and the security measures were taken for a reason. Moreover, being more visible can indeed increase the chance of harassment on the streets, as we will see in the next chapter. Feelings of anxiety, however, also sometimes influenced both the opinions and behavior of some Jewish respondents. Some became afraid of wearing religious symbols on the street, and others felt distrust toward Muslims in general. Distrusting Muslims in general can hinder the relations between Jews and Muslims and create a threshold to joining cooperation projects. This latter distrust was addressed in cooperation projects by structuring the contact between Jews and Muslims in a positive direction through strategies and emotion management. In some cases at least, this proves to be helpful to reduce this fear. In Part 3, I will elaborate on this topic.

Muslim Responses and Their Opinions of Jews
Some Muslim respondents mentioned that they feared extremist attacks in the Netherlands and of retaliation by extreme right-wing groups or what they considered to be the majority population. Azize, a Muslim woman of Turkish descent who was a member of a Jewish-Muslim women's group said:

> "If Islamic fundamentalism continues then it threatens even me. Not just the community, but me too. In fact it's a dubious feeling, an idea that I cannot give a place yet."

And Jaeda, a Muslim woman who had started an initiative to collect and report on discrimination against Muslims, said:

> "After the extremist attacks on Charlie Hebdo in Paris we [she and her partners in the project] saw a wave of retaliation in our [social] environment. Not that these were coordinated, but there seemed to be a lot of incidents of Islamophobic violence."

Regarding this fear, some Muslims said that their mosques were not protected. They did not understand why mosques were left unprotected when they felt unsafe. Particularly because they witnessed Jewish buildings getting police protection and receiving other help on security measures. A representative of a Diyanet mosque, Omer, told me that his mosque had received threatening letters and someone had thrown a stink bomb inside. Mosque representatives had asked the police and local government for protection. Omer had heard about the policy for threatened religious buildings and asked if his mosque could apply for it. He expected that his mosque would get some kind of security measures, because at the time the police were guarding synagogues, Jewish schools and cultural centers in Amsterdam. The local government told him that these funds were just for Jewish buildings and his mosque did not get police protection. Omer was very frustrated, especially because the government had visited the mosque to check if any of the youth was radicalizing, yet did not protect his mosque when it was under threat.

These accounts made apparent that some Muslims felt like second-class citizens and distrusted the government. Aysel, a Muslim woman from a Milli Görüş mosque said:

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> "It's not a very logical, I think. It's a direct attack on Muslims and mosques, if you're [only] going to protect synagogues, give extra protection even, because they are already protected. Nothing is happening for the mosques. Muslims have to ask for protection and even then it's like, okay if they really are threatened then we'll look into it. It's supposed to go the other way around. You see, there are many reports now and there's a lot of hatred now. It should be self-evident that Muslims have the same rights. Now, it's presented like we are second-class citizens and for me it's not logical that the next step is to protect the synagogue. I mean, that attack in Paris was not on a synagogue. (…) I think there are political interests behind it. By spreading and creating fear they can make new laws. Privacy sensitive [laws]. Under the guise of security we have to hand over so much privacy."

Aysel did not seem to know about the Jewish victims of the attacks in France, which increased her distrust of the government. However, her account – and other accounts I heard in my fieldwork – makes apparent that the reasons why mosques did not get protection were not clearly communicated. Although the local government did have contact with some mosques and Muslim communities, the accounts of Muslims show that it is not clear why Jews got protection, while they did not. Moreover, only protecting Jewish property and not Muslim buildings contributed to their feeling like second-class citizens.

The differences that Muslim respondents noticed resulted first and foremost in distrust of the government, but in a few cases they regarded Jewish communities with suspicion. For example, Omer, assumed the Anne Frank house did not pay for security measures and found this suspicious:

> "Let them pay it themselves, they earn enough money. I find that disrespectful toward Anne Frank. That they try to capitalize from her suffering. It's all bullshit that people have to know about it, I don't have anything to do with it. Why don't they charge one euro, instead of nine euros [for an entrance ticket]? These things are so unequal. Trust is just not there."

Here we see that feeling unsafe after extremist attacks, the decision to not provide a subsidy and a lack of clarity why this was not granted, while Jewish buildings did get subsidies, could in some cases fuel existing stereotypes, such as the 'rich Jew'. These stereotypes could add to the tension in Jewish-Muslim relations, although it must be said that if distrust was expressed, it was mostly directed at the national and local governments.

The sense of inequality might be strengthened, because Muslims did not just experience inequality in regard to security measures, but also in the media. Muslims felt misrepresented with regard to other groups, when cases like the attacks in Sweden were framed as fires instead of as attacks. I will come back to these experienced inequalities in Chapter 6.

Responses to Violent Extremism: Denouncing Violent Extremism

Besides the first response to extremist attacks – the security measures taken by national and local governments – the second response to play a big role was the so-called 'distancing' debate. In this debate Muslims were asked to denounce violent extremism. Sometimes this was related to Jews being asked to distance themselves from the Israeli government. Not much research on distancing oneself from violence has been done in the Netherlands. In this section, I look at the only two studies conducted on the topic in the Netherlands, both focused on Muslims. After this section, I will add to these studies by addressing the distancing done by Muslims, but also by Jews and add how this influences their relations.

Van Es (2018: 148-149) studied how Muslims were asked to condemn violent extremism after the attacks on September 11, 2001 on the Twin Towers.[112] Analyzing the public debate in Dutch newspapers Van Es finds that most of the pressure put on Muslims to distance themselves from violent extremism came from whom she calls the "ethnic Dutch and non-Muslim majority" or the "dominant majority." She defines this group as "white, non-Muslim Dutch people without a recent family history of migration." Although Van Es says that asking Muslims this question does not always indicate bad intentions, it does reinforce a "gaze of suspicion." The dominant majority in the Dutch public debate used three main arguments to ask Muslims to distance themselves from extremist attacks (Van Es, 2018: 150-151). First, Muslims were asked to take a stance, because doing so would provide a clear message to others and those others would not equate Muslims with ISIS. Secondly, Muslims were accused of being too silent and should therefore speak up against ISIS. Finally, Muslims were urged to play a role in counter-radicalization practices. Adherents of this argument claimed, for example, that radicalization was happening in Muslim communities and so they should do something about it. According to Van Es (2018: 152-157) the problem with demanding Muslims to dissent from violent extremism is that it implies that they cannot be trusted and legitimizes the inspection and interrogation of Muslims. Moreover, Van Es (2018: 154) argues that:

> "The burden becomes perhaps even heavier when ordinary Muslims are asked to 'raise their voice' against terrorists and to de-legitimize violence committed in the name of religion. Although it may seem as if Muslims are positively included in a collective effort against terrorism, such demands suggest that Muslims have a special responsibility to protect Dutch society against other Muslims, instead of their being recognized as citizens who are entitled to protection against terrorism by the state."

Van Es (2018: 157-159) shows that in the past 15 years, many Muslims did not respond to this call and some refused to distance themselves because they felt pressured or were critical of this pressure. However, many others responded to the call and also made unsolicited statements in which they distanced themselves from extremist attacks. They took part in hashtag actions against ISIS and expressed their horror at big extremist attacks, such as against Charlie Hebdo and the kosher supermarket

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112   Van Es (2018: 148) studied 1000 articles in newspapers, magazines and press releases from the Dutch news agency ANP.

in Paris. In doing so, Muslims often presented Islam as a non-violent religion and presented extremist organizations, such as ISIS, as un-Islamic.[113]

Van Es (2018: 157-165) challenges this form of distancing, because she sees it as framing an equally essentialist image of Islam as the one presented by Islam critics who argue that Islam is a violent religion. Partly, this kind of distancing can be seen as a reaction to the second essentialist image of Islam. However, according to Van Es, there might be other reasons for this kind of distancing. She describes the first reason as "…drawing a boundary between terrorists and 'real' Muslims can be seen as a drastic way to oppose terrorism and take away its purported religious legitimacy. It is not simply a form of dis-identification" (2018: 163). However, she also points out that the media often leaves no space for nuances; messages become short and clear.

Where Van Es (2018) studied the denouncing of violent extremism in newspapers, Loukili (2017) studied online distancing practices, taking three hashtag campaigns in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States; #nietmijnislam, #NotInMyName and #MuslimApologies. In the Dutch case, she focused on Muslim reactions to these hashtag campaigns and found five patterns in their tweets. First, there are those who say that Muslims are also victims of ISIS in regions such as Syria, and that Muslims face increasing discrimination after the attacks in Europe. Second, Muslims in Loukili's sample responded by pointing to a double standard in media coverage of the attacks, highlighting those in Europe against non-Muslim victims. Third, Loukili found Muslims acting online in the same way as Van Es's respondents did, by stating that terrorism is not part of Islam. Fourth, she found Muslims citing the Qur'an or the Hadith and, finally, Muslims in her sample related personal experiences in combination with an emphasis on peaceful religious teachings.[114]

The social media response to these campaigns was quite positive. However, Loukili also reports some negative reactions. First, some non-Muslims used the space for comments on the campaigns to speak negatively about Islam and Muslims. However, other Muslim also criticized the campaigns themselves. Loukili says that some Muslims felt they were forced to speak out, given the double standard in media attention for the attacks on Charlie Hebdo and those in the Middle East. They explained that it should be self-evident that Muslims do not agree with horrific extremist attacks. Some Muslims questioned whether simply speaking up would ever be enough or if they

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113   There were exceptions. Some Muslims argued that Islam does not encourage violent extremism, but that violence was legitimized by some 'distorted' interpretations of the Qur'an (Van Es, 2018: 161). Others argued that ISIS does not embody the Islam they stand for.
114   One example of citing the Hadith Loukili mentions is this tweet: "The greatest Jihad is to battle your own soul, to fight the evil within yourself."

would be keep being asked to denounce terrorism. An interesting finding is that the Muslim organizers of the #nietmijnislam campaign shared some of these objections with those who did not want to be involved. The participants said that they felt they had to respond, because ISIS also attacks Islam and they feel they have to protect their religion. Another interesting find for strategizing around hashtag activism is the #MuslimApologies campaign in the United States, which adopted a different strategy to deal with the call for distancing (Loukili, 2017: 75). The American campaign used humor and sarcasm to criticize the call for Muslims to distance themselves from violent extremism, apologizing for advances in medicine or mathematics or discoveries ascribed to Muslims or Arabs, such as coffee, shampoo, the camera and chess.

In my fieldwork, it became clear that Amsterdam Muslims also responded differently to the 'distancing debate' and that Amsterdam Jews were also asked to distance themselves, not from violent extremism, but from the policies of the Israeli state. In the next section, I will address how the extremist attacks and the responses to these attacks influenced Jewish-Muslim relations.

The Influence of the Distancing Debate on Jewish-Muslim Relations in Amsterdam

Since 9/11, Muslims have been asked to distance themselves from Muslim extremism (Van Es, 2018: 146). In 2015, public debates restarted on whether Muslims in the Netherlands should distance themselves from violent extremism, this time specifically from ISIS (see "Donner: Zet Moslim Niet Voor Blok", 2014; "CMO: Waken voor Ontwrichting Samenleving", 2015; "Moslim Hoeft IS Niet Af Te Wijzen", 2014; Volkskrant, 15th of November 2015).

Sybrand Buma, leader of the Christian Democrats, for example, said that Muslims should distance themselves from ISIS. In an interview with the newspaper *Nederlands Dagblad* he said that Muslims should speak out against violent extremism, because it might be considered suspicious if they kept quiet [in Dutch: *er eerder een verdachtenbank ontstaan*] (Beverdam & Hol, 2015). He added that he was not accusing Dutch Muslims, but they belonged to Dutch society and therefore, he felt, they should take responsibility, as he himself would do in the case of Christian terrorists. He added that Dutch Muslims do not speak out as often as, for example, French Muslims (Beverdam & Hol, 2015). On the other hand, Eberhard van der Laan, then mayor of Amsterdam, argued in the *Abel Herzberg* lecture[115] that "we" [non-Muslims Dutch

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115   An annual meeting where public speakers commemorate the Jewish writer Abel Herzberg.

citizens] should not ask Muslims to distance themselves from ISIS. He explained, if we ask Muslims to distance themselves we equate them with extremists. This stigmatizes Muslim communities (see "Moslim Hoeft IS Niet Af Te Wijzen", 2014).

Muslims responded differently to these questions. I found the Contact Institution for Muslims and Government [In Dutch: *Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid*] distanced themselves from ISIS and condemned the participation of young Muslims in the ISIS demonstration, mosques in Utrecht condemned the attacks in France, and Yusuf Altuntas, previous chairman of the Organization for Islamic School Boards [In Dutch: *Islamitische Schoolbesturen Organisatie*], said that Muslims should clearly distance themselves from extremism. Meanwhile, Aissa Zanzen of the Council of Moroccan Mosques in the Netherlands [in Dutch: *Raad van Marokkaanse Moskeeën Nederland*] stated that the attacks are a "betrayal of Islam" (Franck, 2015; Obbink, 2015; NieuwWij, 2014; see also Loukili, 2017; Van Es, 2018).

I also found reactions in the media reporting on Muslims critical of this question, for example, a short movie by some Muslims who spoke up against Muslims distancing themselves from extremism (see "Dutch Children Apologize for Terrorism", 2015). The film shows children being asked to distance themselves from various extremist attacks, and concludes with "Do you think you are a villain?" One of the young boys in the movie then says "Yes" and when an adults asks why, he answers: "Because you said so" (see also Loukili, 2017; Van Es, 2018).[116]

Interestingly, not only Muslims were asked to distance themselves. In 2014, Jews were sometimes asked in the public debate to speak out against the violence conducted by the Israeli government. EMCEMO, an activist organization that stands up especially for the rights of migrants with a Moroccan background but also actively fights racism and discrimination against Muslims in general, asked Jews to distance themselves from the current Israeli policies (EMCEMO, 2014).

Jaap Hamburger, one of the leaders of An Alternative Jewish Voice [In Dutch: *Een Ander Joods Geluid*], stated in the *De Volkskrant* newspaper that Jews in the Netherlands should distance themselves from the actions of the Israeli state because

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116   Adelkarim El-Fassi, one of the directors says this about the movie: "I've never felt this uncomfortable while directing a video. Sure, it's totally unethical and pedagogically irresponsible, and yet as a society we've practiced this on the macro-level for years. We've been talking certain communities into feelings of collective guilt for years. This has to stop, otherwise the problem will fester on for generations to come. I don't want my nephew Hamza, who can be seen in the film, to be held accountable for matters that have nothing to do with him. He is a third generation Dutch-Moroccan. There is no justification whatsoever for him being treated differently from his white peers." ("Dutch Children Apologize for Terrorism", 2015).

of the atrocities they committed. He also said that supporting Israel or not speaking out against the violence committed by the Israeli state could lead to anti-Semitism (Hamburger, 2014). In a reader's letter to *De Volkskrant*, someone calling themselves S. Paul, reacted by stating that everyone in the Netherlands should be able to think what he or she wants, without having to fear for "their freedom, life or possessions" (Paul, 2014).[117]

The public debate was not the only space where 'distancing debates' took place. During my fieldwork, in 2014 and especially 2015, I noticed that respondents also had to deal with this topic in their daily lives. Both Jews and Muslims related the debate not only to Muslims distancing themselves from ISIS, but also linked it to the question of Jews being asked to distance themselves from the violence carried out by the Israeli state (see also Van Weezel, 2017: 135-137 for similar observations). As is also clear in the public debate, I found in my fieldwork that both proponents and opponents of this topic could be found within both Jewish and Muslim communities (see Loukili, 2017; Van Es, 2018).

Approximately half of the Jews and Muslims who discussed this topic during my fieldwork argued that Muslims should speak out against ISIS and these respondents also – less often – argued that Jews should speak up against atrocities committed in Israel.[118] Arguments they used were: if Muslims and/or Jews speak out against extremism and violence, others would understand that Islam is not the same as ISIS and that the violence committed by the Israeli state is not something all Jews agree with. This would, they argued, reduce stereotyping and if Muslims and Jews spoke out, others might feel more at ease with their communities. Some Muslims told me, for example, that when they heard that Jewish acquaintances did not support the violence committed by the Israeli state, this came as a surprise. And in regard to feeling at ease with each other, Joran, an orthodox Jewish man, for example, argued:

> "Recently, many organizations distanced themselves from ISIS, but [that movement] came from the United Kingdom. Then I think: 'Hey, great, you're thinking this through.' Islam is being tainted by the people of ISIS and if you speak up, collectively, 'that is not part of us, not in my name', then I'm completely at ease. But as long as they do not do that, I'm not sure who I've got standing in front of me. (…) If you do not speak out against ISIS and those

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117   The first name of S. Paul was not specified in the newspaper.
118   It is important to note here that in some cases the question to denounce violence was not just asked by non-Muslims and non-Jews to Jews and Muslims. Sometimes Muslims and Jews asked each other to speak out.

massacres then you support them implicitly. But if you [explicitly], state 'not in my name', then I'm totally at ease."

For some Muslims there was a third reason to show that they did not agree with violence. Van Es (2018: 157-159) also showed that Muslims present Islam in the public debate as a peaceful religion and doing so was sometimes used to delegitimize (violent) extremism. In my own research, I also found some evidence for this. Abdul, an imam of Moroccan background who worked with many young Muslims, for example, argued that stating ISIS is different from Islam or different from other Muslims, would also provide a steadying alternative for young Muslims, who look for meaning online. Interestingly, proponents of distancing did not expect Jews to distance themselves to show the Jewish religion was not violent. This might have to do with the fact that a large component of Jewish communities do not identify as religious – as described in Chapter 3 – and these communities might be less often framed as religious in the public debate than Muslim communities.

The other half of my respondents argued that both Muslims and Jews are not responsible for the violence committed by others in other geographical contexts. Therefore, they can be regarded as opponents of distancing. People identified as belonging to the majority population, Jewish and Muslim proponents of distancing, or members of their own community asked them to speak out against Israel or ISIS. A request opponents of distancing experienced as offensive.

In one of the cooperation projects, for example, I was sitting at a table with both Jews and Muslims. When the talk turned to discrimination one of the Muslims, Esam, said that people addressed him every time "a bomb goes off somewhere." He was asked to speak out in relation to "ISIS, the Palestinians and terrorism." During the conversation, Rivka, a liberal Jewish woman, said that people who can be considered the majority population also asked her about the violence used by the Israeli government whereas, she argued, she had nothing to do with that. These narratives functioned here as a bonding mechanism between them, a theme extensively discussed in Chapter 8, but it was also clear that both Esam and Rivka were annoyed by the question to distance themselves from violence.

Other respondents said that they did not want to be held accountable for violence committed by others, and that the actions of individuals were not the responsibility of the whole group especially when these groups did not operate in the same

country.[119] Levana, for example, argued that she was held accountable by Muslims with a Moroccan migration background for the violence committed by the Israeli state. When I asked her why they did she answered:

> "Well, because they're just stupid. They don't have any education. Or they have tunnel vision, they just want to believe this. (…) When something happens in Gaza or on the West Bank then they hold me accountable. I tell them, I don't hold you responsible for the politics in Syria and Iraq and I don't know what [else].'"

During a course that trains migrant and Muslim organizations to recognize and report Islamophobia, Julia, the trainer, a Muslim convert from France pointed out:

> "We have to know that we're not to blame for Islamophobia. If white pedophiles molest children, you don't ask all the whites to justify themselves. Genocide is happening in Burma, Buddhists killing Muslims, but do Buddhists all over the world have to justify themselves? Therefore you shouldn't adopt the view that you must apologize. Ask why youngsters want to go to Syria instead of pointing at 'the bad Muslims'."

As Julia said, the opponents to distancing argue that asking Muslims and Jews to speak out was a sign of distrust and that any answer would only give power to the question. During a first encounter between Jews, Muslims and Christians – at the start of an interreligious network – I witnessed how answering a distancing question could indeed strengthen the question. The meeting took place in a mosque and Aydin, the imam, had just told the group that his mosque tried to prevent radicalization. He wanted to show that they did not agree with radicalization and in doing so distanced themselves. In response, one of the Christian women, Els wondered if the mosque really had to prevent radicalization. Did that not mean that something was probably going on already? So, did they have to deal with radicalization? Eser, the chairman of the mosque tried to reassure her. He said, "When is someone radicalized? This guy over here [he pointed at a young Muslim in the room] has a beard. Is he radicalized?" Eser explained that of all Muslims who have gone to Syria to join ISIS, not one has come from Milli Görüş, of which the mosque is part. Els, however, was not convinced. She felt that if you have to challenge radicalization there is probably something going on in the mosque that needs challenging. Eser then explained that two of the young men sitting there were both studying and working hard. "We're taking care of that." Eventually,

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119   Van Es (2018: 151-154), also found some of these arguments in the public debate.

a youth leader and the government official at the meeting steered the conversation into another direction. Here we see that although the mosque distanced themselves from radicalization, for Els this did not engender trust, but distrust.

As we have seen, some Muslims and Jews find distancing offensive, a practice that is not demanded of other groups and leads to suspicion. Not distancing, however, could lead to other groups to feel insecure, even distancing could do the same. As we have seen, Joran felt relieved when Muslims distanced themselves; on the other hand, Els was unconvinced.

Interestingly, some Muslims and Jews tried to find a way out (see also Van Es, 2018: 161). Three strategies can be discerned: pragmatism, reclamation and decategorization. Some opponents, such as Salima, a Muslim woman who was visiting one of the cooperation projects and later on became one of its organizers, chose the pragmatic standpoint. She said that she found distancing "nonsense" and offensive because she argued: "Why would I have anything to do with chopping off heads?" However, when asked to, she argued that she would do it.

Najim belonged to a group of Muslims who stated online that they had "reclaimed" their religion from ISIS. In general Najim did not find it nice when people asked him to distance himself from ISIS, but he expected that they would ask anyway. However, he said that he had reclaimed his religion not to distance himself for the sake of others, but for himself:

> "This is what *we* stand for. Even more important, look, we've talked a lot about distancing yourself from [ISIS] and our argument is not that we distance ourselves, that's not necessary. Because those people [ISIS] did it first and better. Every time a bomb goes off the terrorist distances himself from Islam, not me. (...) So we don't interfere in the distancing discussion, that's not our thing to say, but we do stand up for our own religion, our own identity. [Distancing] is doing what someone else wants. [Claiming our religion] is doing something for yourself."

Reclaiming your religion can feel more powerful than defending yourself, because the initiative comes from inside the group. The third strategy, decategorization, also flips the power structure. It can be found in educational or cooperation projects where Jews and Muslims tried to deconstruct stereotypical images. Although Jews and Muslims in cooperation projects shied away from talking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in a few cases they used a decategorization strategy to explain why they

condemned violence. They, for example, sometimes explained that Jews do not all support the Israeli state, but that there is a variety of opinions on this topic (see also Chapter 4). The difference between decategorizing and distancing is that the initiative to decategorize was often in the hands of Jewish and Muslim organizers, while distancing often happens because Muslims and Jews are asked to do so. Again the power differences are on the other side of the table although one might argue that even decategorizing is a response to a deeper misunderstanding of minorities in society and that organizers built decategorizing into their cooperation projects to challenge this misunderstanding.

In conclusion, the question of denouncing violence could cause tension in Jewish-Muslim relations, because sometimes feeling secure with each other requires asking how the Other thinks about violence. Meanwhile the question itself can make the one asked feel like he or she is held accountable. Answering a distancing question can help to reassure, but it can also establish new suspicions as we have seen in the case of Els. Applying strategies such as pragmatism, reclamation and decategorization might help. However, considering that many of these questions were asked in wider contexts than within Jewish-Muslim relations, often by non-Muslims and non-Jews, broader changes that consider the underlying dynamics that cause fear of Muslims and suspicion of Jews might be needed to solve these debates about violent extremism. In the next chapter, I elaborate on these fears and suspicions, and discuss the cooperation processes in Part 3.

5

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have seen that social sciences literature suggests several origins for violent extremism, which lie in factors such as feelings of insecurity, of not belonging to society and the role of social networks that recruit potential new members and provide structure. Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam get shaped by processes that consider extremist attacks happening both in and outside Western Europe. These are direct effects in the sense that they directly create fear in both Jewish and Muslim communities. Jews who expressed their fear in interviews and observations, were frightened by the recent attacks on Jewish targets in name of Islam and feared that their lives could be on the line in Amsterdam as well. In some cases, this led to fearing Muslims in general, which could reinforce the stereotype of Muslims as the violent Other. Muslims also feared an attack in Amsterdam as well as retaliation, not from Jewish parties but from people they identified as the majority population or the extreme right-wing.

The relations were also shaped by 'intermediate' factors in the local context, such as security measures and the call for Muslims to denounce violent extremism and the call for Jews to condemn the policies of the Israeli government. As we have seen, several scholars looked at the effect of violent extremism and counter-terrorism in Western Europe. Koehler (2016: 99) showed how minorities felt insecure, because right-wing extremism was often not regarded as such and Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010: 800) showed that monitoring Muslims might cause a 'second wave' sense of discrimination and stigmatization among Muslim minorities. Mandel (2010) showed how the policies on monitoring in France made Muslims feel like second-class citizens.

In the Dutch case, we see that the decision-making process surrounding the security measures taken to protect Jewish buildings stimulated a sense of inequality among Muslims, who felt that the government applied double standards. In some cases, this created distrust of Jewish communities. This findings of my study thus confirm the findings by De Graaf & Weggemans (2018) that to Muslims it was often unclear why Jews were getting protection, while they were not. This could affect the tension between Muslims and Jews, especially if Muslim buildings fulfilled some of the publicly displayed requirements and it was known that all religious institutions could in principle apply for local government funding.

The second intermediate factor is the question whether Muslims should denounce violent extremism and Jews should distance themselves from the Israeli government. Interestingly, my findings confirm many of the findings of Van Es (2018) and Loukili

(2017). Muslims – and Jews – had different ideas on whether answering the question to denounce violence was appropriate. It was interesting to see that about half of the respondents who mentioned 'distancing' did denounce violence, while the others felt this question should not be asked of Muslims and/or Jews. Presenting Islam as a peaceful religion or trying to make clear demarcations between ISIS were strategies they used that were also found by Loukili (2017) and Van Es (2018: 159-161). My research adds to their insights by showing that some Jews also felt they were urged to distance themselves. In their case to speak out against Israel, to show that they did not support violence committed by the Israeli state. It also shows how Muslims and Jews not only have to negotiate these distancing debates online, but also in their daily lives and relations toward each other.

Van Es and Loukili also show in-between strategies to deal with the distancing debate, such as not letting extremists claim your religion and using humor. Again, my study confirms their findings, but also shows that some Jews and Muslims found other ways to work around distancing. Some stated that they had claimed their religion back from ISIS. In Salima's case, she approached the distancing debate pragmatically. In Najim's case, he reclaimed his religion and in the case of Jewish educators, they gave information that decategorized stereotypes. Interestingly, the latter two in-between strategies try to reverse power relations, because the respondents using them are the initiators and claim they do this either for themselves or to educate the Other.

While the distancing debate could create tensions within Jewish-Muslim relations, as is clear from the example described by Levana, sometimes distancing or refusing to distance brought Muslims and Jews closer together, either because they felt more sure of the Other or as we saw in the case of Esam and Rivka, being asked these questions by others all the time made them recognize their similar experiences (see also Chapter 8).

Finally, it is important to mention that Muslims and Jews, both minorities in Dutch society, have some influence in the debates on violent extremism by applying different strategies when being asked to distance themselves. Still, we should also take into account the international, national and local contexts that impacts their relations and feelings of security. First of all, extremist attacks on Jewish targets in Western Europe and a serious need for protection in the local context caused great concern in Jewish communities. In some cases these worries could fuel Muslim stereotypes. Second, the perception of national and local policies influenced how Muslims perceived the government and in some cases Jewish communities. Thirdly, it is important to see that in the national and local debates the majority population also played a role in calling

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for minorities to denounce violence. Thus, international violent extremism directly influenced Jewish-Muslim relations, but these effects are affected by the structures and actors in the national and local context. Jewish and Muslim responses toward violent extremism and toward each other are thus constructed in multiple contexts, which are then again influenced by the reactions and strategies of Muslims and Jews.

5

Anti-Semitic and Islamophobic Incidents and Their Effects on Jewish-Muslim Relations in Amsterdam

INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters showed the impact of international conflicts – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the extremist attacks in Brussels, Paris and Denmark – on Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. In this chapter I analyze the influence of national and local incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia on Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.[120] Sometimes these incidents originated in the transnational conflicts, but in other cases they emerged from national and local conflicts, institutional arrangements or ideas about religious or ethnic minorities. Sometimes their origin is unknown, because the perpetrators were never caught. As Egorova & Ahmed (2017: 295) argue in their study of Jewish-Muslim relations in the United Kingdom, it is important to study local dynamics, because anti-Semitism and Islamophobia do not stem merely from international developments, but are reconfigured and shaped by the local context.

Before going into empirical depth, it is important to define anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, because these concepts contain a wide range of meanings. Let us consider the narratives of Jaeda, a Muslim woman active in an organization that registers Islamophobia, and Mounira, a Muslim woman who migrated to the Netherlands from Kuwait:

> "Many white women wearing headscarves get attacked. In that sense it's not entirely racist… not explained by race, it can be explained by religion. But like I said, it often gets mixed up, because… you also see… I've noticed that [when people see me,] a tall woman wearing a headscarf, they often assume that I'm of non-Dutch descent." (Jaeda, Muslim woman)

> "My second culture shock [in the Netherlands] came from a French neighbor of mine. A truly elegant lady, daughter of a general, married rich. Very expensive, everything antique in her house. You know, a French lady, oh la-la… So, there I was standing by my front door, cleaning it. In a posh neighborhood, it's very posh. She said: "I'd like to speak to Madame [last name of respondent]." So I said: '*C'est moi. Comme*?' And she said: "No, no, no, no, the lady of the house." She could not grasp that [someone with] a

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120　With national I mean incidents that happened in and outside of Amsterdam, received a lot of media attention and were therefore part of the public debate in the Netherlands. I included these incidents in this chapter, because many respondents referred to these incidents. Local incidents are the incidents that Muslims and Jews experienced in Amsterdam or the incidents they described as happening in Amsterdam and were not part of the national public debate.

dark skin [could have] such a home. It's two floors, it's big. She got mad and couldn't understand." (Mounira, Muslim woman of Kuwaiti descent)

Mounira and Jaeda both consider these incidents Islamophobia, but we can already see a difference in their experiences. Whereas Jaeda sees religion as the most prominent feature of Islamophobia – even if related to ethnicity – Mounira finds skin color the main feature in her account. So, should we speak of Islamophobia in terms of religion, ethnicity or both? In the same fashion, how can we conceptualize anti-Semitism in regard to its ethnic and religious components?

These are not the only questions that can be posed about the concepts of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Could it not be better to speak of anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim hatred? Are the concepts of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia comparable? Such questions explain why it is important to define which phenomena I actually studied, for conceptual clarity is especially important when keeping in mind that anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are contested concepts in both academia and Dutch society. Unfortunately I cannot do justice to all the considerations of the concepts of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism, but I will discuss the ones most important to analyze the data used for this study.

Thus, in this chapter, I first establish the definitions of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia used in this study. Then I discuss the aspects that influenced a number of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents that arose in the Netherlands. Next, I present the empirical data. Unlike in the preceding chapters, here I pay close attention to the individual experiences of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia by both Jewish and Muslim respondents, respectively. Only then do I present the data concerning Jewish-Muslim relations. This is needed because the influence of discrimination and exclusion on Jewish-Muslim relations cannot be understood without including the wider experiences of respondents belonging to ethnic and/or religious minorities in the Netherlands. I show, for example, that the way some respondents in the Amsterdam context focus on Muslims as perpetrators of anti-Semitism shapes the images that Jews have of Muslims. I also show how institutional Islamophobia influences the way Muslims regard their relationships with Jews.[121]

In doing so, I answer the following questions: what forms of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia do Jews and Muslims experience in Amsterdam? What effects do these

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121 By institutional Islamophobia I mean Islamophobia experienced as happening within institutions by the individuals working in them or by the institutions themselves.

forms of discrimination have on their lives? And how do anti-Semitic and Islamophobic experiences influence the relations between Muslims and Jews? Answering these questions will provide a clearer idea of the kind of exclusion and discrimination both Muslims and Jews encounter in Amsterdam, of the effects they have on their lives and give insight into the consequences of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia for Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.

Conceptualization of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia

The problem with the terms anti-Semitism and Islamophobia is that they mean different things in different settings. Thus when studying the influence of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents, it should be very clear what is meant by these concepts. Here I focus on five most relevant problems with these concepts for this study.[122]

The first problem lies not so much in the conceptualization but in the words themselves. Klug (2014: 447) writes:

> "In both the public debate and the more scholarly literature, a great deal of attention is paid to these terms, as if a great deal hangs on the matter. Commentators point out that both words are complex; and, assuming that a word is the sum of its parts, they proceed to enumerate the differences of meaning by adding up the parts. 'Anti-Semitism' is the product of placing the prefix 'anti' before the substantive 'Semitism'. 'Islamophobia' combines 'Islam' with 'phobia'. Now, 'Islam' names a religion, while 'Semitism' [at the time that 'anti-Semitism' was coined] signified 'a body of uniformly negative traits supposedly clinging to Jews'. 'Phobia' means fear, 'anti' indicates opposition. Put the parts together and what do you get? What you seem to get, in the one case, is opposition to a particular group (or the traits ascribed to them), and, in the other, fear and trembling in the face of a certain religion."

Klug (2014: 447-448) argues that treating the concepts in their literal meaning, however, is a form of "etymological fundamentalism" and should be avoided, for meanings of words may drift away from their semantic origins. Klug says of Islamophobia that the word is "out of the box and into the language" and it is "too late for a committee of academics to veto it." He argues: "Like it or not, we are stuck with it. Rather than

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122   For other problems see, for example, Van Der Valk (2012) about cognitive versus emotional definitions of Islamophobia.

pursue a fruitless debate over the felicitousness or otherwise of the word, which I shall continue to use, better to pay attention to the concept, for the concept has arrived." Van Der Valk (2012: 18) also argues that the 'phobia' in the term Islamophobia should not be taken too literally, because in daily life the term gets other meanings, such as 'hate' instead of merely 'fear'. Like Klug, Van Der Valk argues that because of its frequent use in daily life it is "neither useful nor realistic" to invent a new term, but rather advocates to carefully define it.

In a similar vein, Renton (2017: 100-103; 111-112) describes how Jews and Muslims were both categorized under 'Semite' in the 18th century. Nowadays, however, 'Semitism' within anti-Semitism almost always refers to Jews. As Klug argues for Islamophobia, taking the origins of the 'Semitism' within anti-Semitism too literally ignores the general meaning of the word anti-Semitism in today's society.[123]

Against Klug, Renton and Van Der Valk it might be argued, however, that the general etic use of emic words is risky, since as Bourdieu reminds us, words can be used as symbolic violence (see Bourdieu, 1989: 22). With such politically charged words as anti-Semitism and Islamophobia it is especially important to be precise. However, my Jewish respondents widely accepted 'anti-Semitism' to address exclusion and discrimination of Jews. My Muslim respondents discussed the concept of Islamophobia more, but it was not uncommon for them to use the word in the context of protesting against discriminating and excluding Muslims – for example on the Day Against Racism, organized every year (see Chapter 4). Alternatives for anti-Semitism and Islamophobia have equally problematic connotations. 'Anti-Muslim prejudice' focuses too much on prejudice alone and not on broader forms of exclusion, 'anti-Muslim hatred' highlights hate over fear, while anti-Judaism has the problem that it does not do justice to the development into racism (see Wiegers, 2014; Wieviorka, 2014: 11-13; 21-28). Therefore, I will continue to use these words, but will – as Klug suggests – carefully conceptualize them below.

The second problem lies in the conceptualization of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and specifically in the inclusion of religion and ethnicity in the concepts. The word 'anti-Semitism' was first coined in 1860 in a scientific debate. Popularized in 1879 by the German publicist Wilhelm Marr it was soon used to indicate racist expressions against Jews and Jewish communities in Europe (Bunzl, 2005: 501-502; Wieviorka,

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123   There are exceptions. For example in my study, Rafik, a Muslim respondent, finds it strange when Muslims are called anti-Semites, because he considers himself a Semite. Therefore he argued he could not be an anti-Semite, because he could not hate himself. Also Renton (2017: 126) argues that the figure of the Semite still influences Western discourses today.

2014: 13-15). Scholars studying anti-Semitism ask whether this period also signified a break between 'old' forms of anti-Semitism and 'modern' ones or as others define it between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism (Meer, 2013; Wiegers, 2014; Wieviorka, 2014). The essence of the discussion lies in the questions if and when anti-Semitism is a form of exclusion aimed at the Jewish religion or the Jewish people. For example, Wieviorka (2014: 11-13; 21-28) argues that it is more accurate to speak of anti-Judaism before 1860, because at the time Jews were primarily discriminated against on the basis of their religion and not because of ideas about race. Today, Wieviorka argues, anti-Semitism can be understood as a hatred against a human group that is seen as a race.

Other scholars agree that long before World War II there are both racial as well as religious elements to what is often described as anti-Judaism (Meer, 2013; Wiegers, 2014). Meer (2013: 387-388), for example, shows that before the Second World War anti-Semitism – as well as Islamophobia – had racial characteristics intertwined with religious discrimination. As an example he quotes Matar (2009: 217-218) who shows that in the 16th century, English prejudices against Jews had racial elements, for example, by appointing certain odors to Jews. Wiegers (2014) and Nirenberg (2009) show that although the word anti-Semitism did not yet exist in 15th century Spain, exclusionary practices against Jews contained elements that can be regarded as racial. Wiegers (2014:3) describes how Jews living in Medieval Spain as acknowledged minorities could practice their religion within certain boundaries. However, they remained second-class citizens and still experienced times when their religious freedom was under pressure. In the 14th century, many Jews converted to Christianity. Known as *conversos*, they were able to gain social mobility in Spanish society, a privilege not available to Jews or Muslims. Irrespective of their social mobility, religious stereotypes were still applied to conversos (Wiegers, 2014: 3). In this context, Wiegers (2014: 3) and Nirenberg (2009: 249) argue that from the 15th century onwards the word *raza* was often associated with Judaism. Nirenberg (2009: 249) writes: "At more or less the same time in Castilian poetry, 'raza' emerged as a way of describing a variety of defects linked to poetic speech, to sexuality, and especially to Judaism."[124] Nirenberg (2009: 242) and Wiegers (2014: 4) show that these ideas resulted in the doctrine of the *limpieza de sangre*, [purity of blood], which argued that Jewish and Muslim blood was inferior to Christian blood. It was argued that this inferior blood made Muslims and Jews vulnerable to heresy and moral corruption. On these grounds Jews, Muslims and conversos from Jewish and Muslim descent were denied access to certain professions

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124   It is important to note that Nirenberg (2009: 263-264) argues that "… we can learn from the similarities we discover between, say, fifteenth-century ideologies and twentieth-century ones [while this] need not suggest that one followed from the other."

and were set apart in church. Here again we see religious elements and racial features prominent in exclusionary practices against both Jews and Muslims long before the word anti-Semitism was coined.

This discussion among scholars about religious and/or ethnic components is also apparent in the scholarly discussion of the concept of Islamophobia. According to Sheridan (2006: 317) the word 'Islamophobia' was first mentioned in 1991 in the United States in a periodical called *Insight* (February 4th 1991), and gained momentum in 1997 when the Runnymede Trust published its famous report *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All,* identifying what they considered to be its central characteristics (see Runnymede Trust 1997; Van Der Valk, 2012: 17). Sheridan describes the concept as follows: "This word is functionally similar to *xenophobia* and offers a useful shorthand way of referring to a dread or hatred of Islam and therefore a fear or dislike of Muslims" (317). Although this definition focuses on religion, Sheridan states that religious and ethnic discrimination often blur. In her further study, she does not draw a strict distinction between ethnic and religious forms of Islamophobia. Bunzl (2005: 504-506; 2007: 11-13), however, states that Islamophobia is generally not based on religion or race, but on ideas of inferiority and differences between civilizations prevalent in Europe. And according to Bunzl, Islamophobia emerges from the idea that Muslims threaten European unity.

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At the start of this study I observed that what is called anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in Amsterdam could have both religious and ethnic components – exemplified by Mounira and Jaeda's narratives. An interview with Fleur, an employee of an anti-discrimination agency, confirmed these findings. She told me about numerous instances of discrimination Jews and Muslims experienced, not only because they were seen as religious, but also because they were labeled Jewish people or Muslims of Moroccan or Turkish background. Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia both have to do with feelings of home, national or European identity, as we will see below when people refer to the ideas surrounding purging and Eurabia, a negative term with the connotation of the threatening influence and domination of Muslims (see also Meer, 2013). Therefore, the incidents of Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in my study are included on the basis of both religion and ethnicity, and I use the terms Islamophobia and anti-Semitism in this dual way.

The third problem with anti-Semitism and Islamophobia is that they are sometimes conceptualized as similar and sometimes as dissimilar. This is a vital problem because the comparability of concepts determines how to study them within Jewish-Muslim relations. One frequently cited recent study on the question of analogy between anti-

Semitism and Islamophobia is Matti Bunzl's book 'Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe' (2007). Here Bunzl (2007: 12-15; 45) concludes that there is some validity in analogies between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, because they are both exclusionary ideologies. However, says Bunzl, "the similarities end there. [While] anti-Semitism emerged in the late nineteenth century and had its greatest influence in the early twentieth century, Islamophobia is a phenomenon of the current age" (45). Moreover, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia have different historical origins. Anti-Semitism was used as a form of what Bunzl calls a secular concept in the project of nationalism "with the champions of anti-Semitism seeing themselves, first and foremost, as guardians of the ethnically pure nation-state" (12). As Jews were constructed as racially different they could never become part of this national project. On the other hand, Bunzl sees Islamophobia in its recent form, not as a form of exclusion based on race or religion because, he argues, actual debate "rarely engages religious questions in any meaningful way" (12). Crucial for Islamophobia is its use in constructing an idea of a European civilization which regards Muslims as incompatible with Western culture. According to Bunzl, these historical differences limit the usefulness of the similarities between both.

However, Benbassa (2007: 88), Diner (2007: 47-49) and Silverstein (2007: 68) argue for conceptual similarities that Bunzl does not take into account. Diner (2007: 47-49), for instance, argues that for both Jews and Muslims the emergence of a discourse that frames European culture as a secularized but still Christian culture could increase both anti-Semitism as well as Islamophobia when Jews and Muslims are framed as the Other. And Silverstein (2007: 68) states: "Insistence on such particularities does not blind us to the ways that they [Islamophobia and anti-Semitsm] are experienced, in the present, as equally violent modes of exclusion." Benbassa (2007: 88) adds that in the case of France: "In times of crisis, France constructs its identity in opposition to the Other. It did so in the nineteenth century, during the rise of a modernity which threatened its traditional social configuration. (…) Today, the expansion of the European Union, unfettered globalization, and economic neo-liberalism have resulted in the hardening of identities and the growth of nationalisms. This time, the Other is the Muslim Arab, who replaces the Jew of yesteryear."

While the Othering of Muslims does not have to mean that the Othering of Jews has altogether stopped, these three authors' pleas for comparison are shared more widely. Meer (2013: 391-393) and Weaver (2012) also argue that it is productive to study the commonalities between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Weaver shows that although the histories of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are different, the underlying racial structures are the same. The content of stereotypes may differ, but the 'jokes'

Weaver studies have similar logics of racism (see Meer, 2013: 391-393; Weaver, 2012). Moreover, Meer's (2013) data show a strong relationship between anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim sentiments: in countries where anti-Jewish sentiment is high, anti-Muslim sentiment is also high. Jews and Muslims alike face conspiracy theories, such as secret plots to conquer the world, the Illuminati (Jews) and Eurabia (Muslims). Studying anti-Semitism and Islamophobia as interrelated, therefore, has the advantage of bringing to light similar underlying mechanisms that cause the two phenomena (see Meer, 2013: 391-393).[125] Also, Bobako (2018) argues in a more recent article that in the mechanisms of Othering, European dimensions play a special role when studying anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.

I agree that studying possible commonalities between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia may contribute to our ideas about them. At least we should not exclude their possible interrelatedness beforehand, keeping in mind their historical differences and similarities. My analysis of the influence of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia on Jewish-Muslim relations therefore includes their possible interrelatedness.

The fourth problem is that, recently, scholars have begun distinguishing between 'old' and 'new' anti-Semitism. Here what is called 'modern' anti-Semitism now becomes the 'old' anti-Semitism and 'new' anti-Semitism is an anti-Zionistic anti-Semitism often attributed to Muslims (see Bunzl, 2007: 27; Gans, 2017a: 499-544; 2017b: 49; Wieviorka, 2014: 104-107). This is an especially important issue when studying Jewish-Muslim relations. Bunzl (2007: 27) suggests that new anti-Semitism is not about excluding Jews from society, but it is about the exclusion of Jews because they are regarded as belonging to a society that is seen as exclusionary to Muslims and is fueled by ideas of Israel seen as a European colony. Other scholars discuss two problems related to these ideas. In responding to Bunzl, Klug (2007: 56-60) argues that the new anti-Semitism might be not so new. He calls 'old' anti-Semitism a hate against Israel, because of a hate against Jews and nowadays it is the other way around. He also argues that in the past, hatred against Jews was not just about the nation, but about Europe as well. Gans (2017a: 499-544; 2017b: 49) argues that anti-Semitism is transferable, renews itself time and time again and 'new' forms are often mixed with 'old' forms of anti-Semitism. Aside from the question whether 'new' anti-Semitism is indeed 'new', there is the question whether Muslims can indeed be seen as new perpetrators of anti-Semitism par excellence. Gans (2017a: 533) argues that a focus on Islamic anti-Semitism obscures anti-Semitism conducted by the majority population. Bobako

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125   Meer does not deny the religious aspects in anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, but argues that these phenomena are also deeply racial.

(2018: 104-106), for example, criticizes the data and methodologies used to argue that Muslims are the main perpetrators of new anti-Semitism and suggests that it is especially difficult to distinguish between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism; blurring these categories de-politicizes Muslims.

The fifth problem lies in the operationalization of the concepts. Studying the influence of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia on Jewish-Muslim relations involves several questions and thus several aspects, such as the experiences of victims, the impact of conspiracy theories and the influence of the media. Not differentiating between these aspects creates problems in the analysis, because although they could all be understood as part of the concepts of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, they do not necessarily play the same role in Jewish-Muslim relations. Following Klug (2014: 449-455), I therefore distinguish between the form and the content of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Klug argues that the form of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are quite similar. Jews and Muslims are both constructed as the (hostile and dangerous) Other. Klug states: "Since both are forms of Othering, it is not surprising if the figures of 'Muslim' and Jew' have certain attributes in common: attributes they share with other Others." (452) The content of stereotypes and prejudice, however, can go along with both similarities and differences. In this study, I will add that I differentiate between the form and content of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, but also show their effects on the relations between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam.

In view of the preceding analysis, the present study defines anti-Semitism as exclusionary or discriminatory statements and practices against Jews, because they are perceived as Jewish. Similarly, Islamophobia is defined as exclusionary or discriminatory statements and practices against Muslims, because they are perceived as Muslim (see also Vellenga, 2018: 177-178).[126][127] By choosing these definitions, I maintain that anti-Semitism and Islamophobia have their differences. However, as Bobako (2018), Meer (2013) and Weaver (2012) describe, the underlying (European) exclusionary mechanisms are often the same, in the sense that they are both forms of (European) Othering (see also Klug, 2014: 452).[128] This study therefore differentiates between the form and content of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, but also takes into account their effects on Jews and Muslims and their relationships in Amsterdam. What this means is that I include both forms of Othering, based on religion and ethnicity, as well as all the reported perpetrators.

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126   This definition refers to excluded or discriminated against persons who perpetrators erroneously see as Muslims or Jews.

127   This definition comes close to Vellenga's (2018: 177-178) but is phrased slightly differently because this chapter focuses on exclusionary and discriminatory practices.

128   I do not exclude the possibility that the underlying mechanisms may be different as well.

I would like to stress that I include examples of discriminatory or exclusionary practices, matching the above definition, which my respondents reported in interviews and observations. These cases relate to the respondents' perceptions of the incidents, because, as we will see below, the experiential dimension of their narratives influence Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam, hence focusing on them serves the purpose of this study. But before going into empirical detail, let me discuss the factors that influence the emergence of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents and the numbers of reported anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents in the Netherlands to provide a context to the experiences of Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam.

Anti-Semitic and Islamophobic Incidents: Origins and Numbers

Scholars of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia pay attention not only to conceptual discussions but also to several factors that influence their emergence. First, they describe how the rise in anti-Semitism and Islamophobia has often been triggered by social, cultural and political changes, such as (postcolonial) migration, war and economic instability (see Van Der Valk, 2012: 18-19; Wieviorka, 2014: 109-112). Van Der Valk points to such changes as the establishment of the Islamic regime of Khomeini in 1979, the Rushdie Affair in 1988–1989, the First Gulf War and the end of the Cold War as the background of the rise of a new enemy image: Islam and Muslims. In addition, Islamic extremism, and local factors such as the role of some politicians, academics and policy makers have contributed to the image which portrays Islam as a threat. Bunzl (2007: 37) mentions that since the 1990s, there appears to be a shift in European societies. He points to the gaining popularity of extreme right-wing parties, combined with a discursive shift where the exclusion of migrants from non-Western origin is being reframed toward the exclusion of Muslims. He states: "Migrant became Muslims, and Europe's Right wing found its target." For anti-Semitism, Wieviorka (2014) finds an explanation in the formation of minorities within societies and argues that since throughout history Jews were almost always a minority in the countries where they lived they have been made a symbol of evil and misfortune and has thus been vulnerable to discrimination.

Secondly, other scholars argue that discriminatory and exclusionary practices also emerge from the lack of contact with and knowledge of the other. Without contact and knowledge, it is difficult to understand the Other and stereotyping occurs sooner (see also Kateman & Roggeveen, 2016; Pettigrew, 1998).

And finally, studies show that anti-Semitism and Islamophobia sometimes have religious origins (see Renton, 2017: 100; Wiegers, 2014: 1). As we have seen above,

Renton (2017: 108) describes anti-Semitism's roots in theological Christian anti-Jewish mythology and Wiegers (2014: 1-2) describes how modern forms of anti-Semitism have religious origins in Medieval ideas about supersessionism while modern forms of Islamophobia are at least partly rooted in Christian anti-Islamic attitudes.

In the Netherlands, these origins translate to many incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Since 2000, the numbers of registered anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents rose – although fluctuations are visible over time (see Vellenga, 2018: 182). However, it is very difficult to interpret the figures. First, there are many registration points in the Netherlands, such as the police or anti-discrimination organizations that often file reports under different categories. For example, when I talked to a director of an anti-discrimination organization she told me that she registers something as 'Muslim discrimination' if someone feels discriminated on the basis of religion. However, if someone is discriminated against for being both 'Moroccan' and 'Muslim', she registers it in the category most hurtful to the person concerned, to avoid counting the same incident twice. In contrast, the police register the total number of incidents and then show if one incident falls under one, two, three or four forms of discrimination (see Tierolf et al., 2014:21). A second problem with the numbers is that they depend on the willingness of Muslims and Jews to make a statement to the police or an organization that registers discrimination. This is especially problematic, because during my fieldwork both Muslim respondents and local government employees mentioned that Muslim communities are less inclined to report discrimination than other communities, which might cause bias in reports that measure the level of Islamophobia. Finally, the same director of the anti-discrimination organization told me that when the Dutch media highlight an incident, she receives many reports of the same incident, and these are all filed separately, even if they concern only one incident.

With these objections in mind, the numbers do give an impression of the reported anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents in the Netherlands. I focus on the numbers for 2014 and 2015, because that is the period of my fieldwork. Vellenga (2018: 182) shows that in 2014 and 2015, the CIDI registered 171 incidents (2014) and 126 incidents (2015) of anti-Semitism. The Notification Point for Islamophobia [In Dutch: *Meldpunt Islamofobie*] (2016: 13) said that they received 158 reports in their first annual report, published in 2016 (see Abaâziz, 2016).[129] The Notification Point for Discrimination on the Internet [In Dutch: *Meldpunt Discriminatie Internet*] reported 328 incidents of online anti-Semitism in 2014 and 142 in 2015. For Islamophobia, there were 219

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129   The reports were made in 2015.

incidents in 2014 and 330 in 2015 (see Vellenga, 2018: 182-183). A report by Panteia, quoted by Vellenga (2018: 176), shows that in a study of teachers, 61% observed pupils making Islamophobic comments and 36% observed anti-Semitic expressions. According to Vellenga (2018: 183), when compared to the 1990s, the numbers in his study show that incident reporting of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia has indeed increased in the Netherlands, but that there are also considerable fluctuations across time.

The qualitative data gathered for my study rely on the willingness of respondents to share their experiences in the interviews and so, in a sense, these have the same limitation as survey data. However, it also has some advantages over the surveys. The figures presented above may indicate the number of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents in the Netherlands, but they do not tell us much about how the incidents were experienced. Also, they do not show us the instances when respondents did not go to the police or an organization that registers these incidents to report what they may have experienced. However, in this study, through interviews and observations I managed to capture the experiential aspects of incidents in my qualitative data, also some of the incidents not registered with the police or other organizations.

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Therefore, complementing the quantitative data, the qualitative data provides additional examples of unreported incidents and additional insights into the processes that influence anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and their effect on Jewish-Muslim relations. In the next sections, I discuss these additional reports and the experiential side of these reports.

Forms of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in Amsterdam

The forms of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia my respondents encountered can be categorized as physical, verbal and institutional discriminatory and exclusionary statements and practices. By physical anti-Semitism and Islamophobia I mean all narratives that refer to physical violence and intimidation and by verbal I mean all narratives about spoken expressions of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Institutional forms refer to incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia perpetrated by individuals working in institution or by the institution itself. Sheridan (2006: 323) also points to a less visible form of Islamophobia, which she calls 'implicit racism'. She measures implicit racism with such items as 'being treated with suspicion, being stared at by strangers, being left out of conversation or activities, and being asked to speak for

one's entire ethnic, racial, or religious group'. My respondents also mentioned these forms of implicit racism.[130][131]

It is important to note that the perpetrators of reported incidents were not always Jews and Muslims. Also reported were people considered members of the majority population or identified as extreme right-wing individuals or groups. Moreover, in a substantial number of cases, Jewish and Muslim respondents did not know who the perpetrators were or they were reluctant to label them by physical appearances. Although these latter cases are not necessarily Jewish or Muslim, it is still important to include them here, because they inform how anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents influence Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam, as we will see below.

Physical and Verbal Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia
Cases of physical anti-Semitism or Islamophobia were reported least, but were not absent in the narratives of my respondents. Levana, a Jewish woman who was in an ongoing dispute with her Muslim neighbors told me that her son had been badly bullied in his younger years by children in the neighborhood. She explained that those whom she identified as Muslim children had forced him to remove his pants and show his penis, because they wanted to see a "Jewish penis." Another example is Mathea, a Jewish woman, who told her narrative at an interreligious dialog meeting. Mathea told the group that she was on a tram one day and saw an elderly man being insulted. The person doing this [whom she did not describe], called him a "dirty Jew" and threatened him. Mathea decided to speak up, whereupon the perpetrator said that she "must be one [a Jew] too." He cursed at her and when she got off the tram he punched her in the face. No one on the tram or on the street helped her.

Other respondents referred to an incident that happened in Amsterdam Central Station after the extremist attacks in Paris (2015), when a man threw beer over two Muslim women. The man had overheard them talking Moroccan Arabic on the train, screamed at them and called them terrorists. He said that they should burn their book and take off their headscarves, and drenched them in beer. Police officers convinced one of the women to file a report, which she eventually did (see also: Gabeler, 2015).

The women in Central Station, and Levana and Mathea were not the only ones physically targeted because they were identified as belonging to an ethnic or religious

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130   These three forms can sometimes overlap, such as when someone is both physically and verbally abused.
131   I also found some forms of discrimination that do not fit these categories. For example, Jews and Muslims reported being refused entrance to a shop or a club. Some reported property damage.

group. Other Muslims and Jews also reported physical violence: Jaeda and Fleur, mentioned before because of their work at registration points, reported nationwide and citywide incidents, such as hitting, spitting, pushing and pulling off headscarves.

Verbal abuse was often reported as happening on the street, in schools, at work, in the media, directed at places of worship and expressed by others in their own homes or in their own communities. Examples of verbal anti-Semitism ranged from name-calling on the street, to stereotyping and offensive remarks in schools and online. Jews mentioned incidents in which people referred to the Holocaust. Abraham, a Jewish man, told me that when he was young, pupils at his school would say to him: "Uncle Adolf has forgotten you." Mandy, who was active in pro-Israel movements said she and others were threatened by people who said things like "All Jews, Zionists, should go to Hamas and they have to finish where Hitler left off" and "They should be gassed" to them. Other incidents had to do with the stereotype of the rich or controlling Jew. Gideon, a Jewish peer-educator told me that pupils often asked him about a symbol they could see he was wearing and that they immediately connected it to the Illuminati.

Muslims mentioned three forms of verbal Islamophobia. First, they had to endure statements like "if you don't like it here, you should leave" or "go back to your own country." Aïcha and Suhayr, two Muslim women I came across in a mosque, told me that they had accidentally tripped over a dog when they were walking down the street. They apologized but then the dog owner shouted at them: "We're living in the Netherlands here!" referring to their headscarves as something un-Dutch. These exclusionary statements place Muslims in an outsider position. Another form of Islamophobia is stereotyping, which Merve experienced. She is a medical student and visibly Muslim because she wears a headscarf. In an interview she told me that in the hospital where she worked, she was often asked if she were the cleaner. Finally, in some interviews, I found Jewish and other respondents afraid that the Netherlands would become an Islamic country – sometimes referred to as being 'Islamized.' Jaap, a liberal Jew, said that he was worried that Europe would be Islamic in 10–15 years' time. We also see this in the narrative of Samuel, a Jewish orthodox man, who felt the Islam could 'take over' the Netherlands:

> "Well, Islamophobia, look, Islamophobia arises through the behavior of Muslims. It's not stimulated by Jews or Christians, but when people do weird things, then you get scared of them. If there are lots of break-ins all over in your neighborhood, then you start feeling afraid that they'll break in to your home too. That's the way it works. And that's why people are a bit scared of

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Islam. But also the fact that, not only Islam itself, but lots of Futurists say that by [the year] 2050 half the [world's] population will be Muslim."

Here we see that in both anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents, Jews and Muslims are placed in the role of the outsider who wants to rule the world. The difference between them is the content. Where anti-Semitic incidents refer to the Holocaust, this was not the case for Islamophobic incidents. Also, while Muslims are suspected of wanting to rule the world quite openly, this is seen as a covert mission for Jews. These differences do not end there. When we look at institutional anti-Semitism and Islamophobia there are even more differences. In the next section, I will describe incidents that can be seen as institutional anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.

Institutional anti-Semitism and Islamophobia
Muslims and Jews referred not only to interpersonal forms of discrimination but also to what they experienced as institutional anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.[132] Again, the accounts described below are based on incidents reported by respondents. When Jews mentioned institutional anti-Semitism, it was in terms of the police or media representations not taking the reports of Jews seriously. Levana, for example, said this about the anti-Semitic incidents that she had reported to the police:

"I think they have about six [of my] reports [lying about] the police station. We could play card games with them in due course. They never do anything about them."

And Emma, a Jewish woman who organized all kinds of social community projects, told me in an interview about a newspaper story on a member of the Amsterdam City Council:

"She has the portfolio for education. There was an incident, an Islamic school had to be closed, I'm not sure of the details, but in the newspaper it said 'the Jewish council member Kukenheim'. That's not relevant. She's just a council member called Kukenheim. Why does it have to say 'Jewish'? It was about an Islamic school, so that's a bit polarizing, don't you think? That kind of thing, it's not all… very wrong, but it is also not… It's polarizing both sides, the Islamic as well as the Jewish side and then you make people turn against each other."

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132   I include narratives that match the above described definitions of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.

My data, however, make apparent that when Jews, Muslims and non-Jewish or non-Muslim respondents, such as youth workers, spoke about institutional anti-Semitism or Islamophobia, Muslims more often than Jews were named the victims. A couple of often-mentioned examples took place in a school setting and in politics. These two examples were not the only forms of institutional discrimination that Muslims described. Others happened at work, in the media, by the police and the government. For the sake of brevity, I will focus on these two examples here but will include others when dealing with the effects such incidents have on Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.

One prominent example in the public debate was about a school in Rotterdam that set pupils an exam that included questions on various cultures (see below).

Source: ("Zijn Alle Marokkaanse Jongens Crimineel?" 2014)

Particularly the fourth question, entitled "Manhood, from the age of ten" [in Dutch: *Man vanaf je tiende*] caused lots of commotion in the media. Part A begins: "You often hear about criminal Moroccan boys" and then it asks the open question "Are all

Moroccan boys criminals?" As we see in the example, the correct answer is "Of course not." The second part asks "Why do some boys become criminals?" for which the correct answers were "They often argue with their parents" and "They skip school and hang around on the streets." The wrong answers were "They are not bright enough to finish school" and "It is in their nature to be a criminal." On social media, people argued that such questions confirm stereotypes rather than question them (see for example Meester Bart, 2014; Van Den Bogaerdt, 2014).

The second case refers to political discrimination. Respondents mentioned they experienced discrimination from Dutch politicians, and most often they referred to Dutch politician Geert Wilders whose Freedom Party was described as "anti-Islam." On March 19, 2014 Wilders held an election meeting in Grand Café De Tijd in The Hague (see "Minder Marokkanen"- Uitspraak Wilders Nu onder Loep van Gerechtshof", 2017; "PVV Aanhang Scandeert: Minder Marokkanen", 2014; Rechtbank Den Haag, 2016). He asked his followers if they wanted more or fewer Moroccans in the Netherlands. When they shouted "fewer, fewer, fewer," he said that he would arrange it ["*dan gaan we dat regelen*"] ("'Minder Marokkanen'– Uitspraak Wilders Nu onder Loep van Gerechtshof", 2017; "PVV Aanhang Scandeert: Minder Marokkanen", 2014; Rechtbank Den Haag, 2016). Witnesses at the trial stated that Wilders had discussed his speech with them beforehand and had instructed the crowd to respond with "fewer, fewer, fewer" (Rechtbank Den Haag, 2016). Wilders was convicted for group insult [in Dutch: *groepsbelediging*] and incitement to discrimination of a minority group because of race ("'Minder Marokkanen'- Uitspraak Wilders Nu onder Loep van Gerechtshof", 2017; Rechtbank Den Haag, 2016).

Muslim respondents said that such expressions made them feel excluded. Halil, a Muslim youth leader of a Milli Görüş mosque in Amsterdam described how he felt about Wilders, his party and his followers when he received discriminatory online messages:

> "It [receiving discriminatory messages online from strangers] is dangerous, but you know what's far more dangerous? Besides all that, you have someone in Parliament [Wilders] who got so many votes and is so anti-Islamic and can say that kind of stuff. If I did – I'm not doing it and don't want to – but if I started an anti-Jewish party then I'd be arrested straight off and there'd be a public outcry. Same with Christians. But if you say something about Islam they'd say, 'just let him talk, let him give his opinion' and then they'd say it's freedom of speech. I think it's very dangerous that there even is an anti-Islam

party (…) I think it's really bad and think about it a lot. That a percentage of Dutch people are against your religion [like this]. It really hurts."

Effects on the Individual Lives of Jews and Muslims

As is visible in Halil's narrative, these forms of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia had their effects on the individual lives of Muslims and Jews. Some Muslims and Jews I interviewed relativized anti-Semitism and Islamophobia or tried to ignore the incidents in order to not get too frustrated. Najim, a Muslim man active in cooperation projects, for example, relativized the incidents between Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam:

"Yes, but I've never heard of incidents taking place in Amsterdam, allegedly. Or any of that friction that's supposed to be in Amsterdam. I say 'allegedly', because I always find it's really not that bad. How many incidents have you really had? Yes, I heard of [one]… Well, if there is someone and this person tells it to a hundred people, it will sound like there are a hundred incidents."

However, other Jews and Muslims experienced anti-Semitism and Islamophobia differently than Najim. These incidents caused fear. Both Jews and Muslims mentioned the ongoing polarization in Dutch society, which worried them. The speech by Geert Wilders, for example, made Muslims feel afraid that polarization would increase. In some cases both Muslims and Jews became so afraid that they retreated from public space. For example, in Amsterdam, the bike racks are often *very* full. It takes real trouble to squeeze your bike between all the other bikes and sometimes it can be very handy to have a helping hand to make space or to get your bike out of the rack. Omer, quoted in Chapter 5, told me he once helped a woman with her bike but doubted if he would do it again, because he felt people were getting so scared of Muslims – especially of Muslim men – that he thought she might have been frightened of him or was scared he would try seducing her.

Some Jews referred to history repeating itself. They struggled with this idea or explained that other Jews felt anxious because of their (intergenerational) trauma. Jaap, a liberal Jew, stated:

"When you are second or third generation [post-World War II] you are always affected by your upbringing and the things that happened. We feel that daily. You see people afraid, they react differently, they… well (…) take precautions. At a certain moment, people who've reached retirement age, who actually went through the war, they think of moving to Israel because

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they no longer feel safe here. For me, the Netherlands is a country where we should be able to live safely. And it's slowly falling apart."

Yentl, a young Jewish woman gave a speech at a meeting where Jews were discussing the turbulent summer of 2014. She said how she had asked her grandmother if she thought history could repeat itself. Her grandmother replied that it could indeed. Yentl then ended her speech with: "Yes, grandma, history repeats itself." She then added that we should not be alarmed too soon and not be too hasty in connecting the developments of the summer to the Second World War.

As Jaap described, in some cases, Muslims and Jews became so frustrated and afraid that they wanted to immigrate to other countries because they no longer felt safe in the Netherlands. At an interreligious meeting Hans, a Jewish leader, addressed the group and specifically Abdul, one of the imams. Hans said that he knew a group of Jewish entrepreneurs who wanted to leave the Netherlands because they did not feel safe. At a pro-Palestine demonstration he had seen protesters waving ISIS flags and performing the Hitler salute, both actions forbidden by the local government. He added that he did not believe in the power of educating each other any longer. He asked Abdul what he could say to make these entrepreneurs stay. The imam answered that we should look for a total solution, which included condemning anti-Semitism, condemning violence and talking about these topics with younger people.

In other cases, Muslims were the ones who wanted to emigrate, because they felt excluded from Dutch society. Aysel, a Muslim woman who frequented a Milli Görüş mosque, told me that her father advised her to go to Turkey to see if she could find a job and start a life there, because he did not believe Muslims would be welcome in the Netherlands in the future. Aysel herself was a bit more optimistic, but was also worried about so many people voting for Geert Wilders and that some utterances made against Muslims that would have been considered discrimination ten years ago, were now considered normal.

Fear, however, was not the only reaction; others became frustrated by their vulnerability and felt pressured to fight it. The son of Levana, who was bullied and physically humiliated at school, went to the gym when he grew up to become physically strong. He chose to vote for Geert Wilders, because his views on Muslims had drastically changed. Levi, called names in secondary school, formed a group of friends who beat up people who called them names. He said that they did this often to defend themselves and that now his children also "don't let people mess with them" [in Dutch: *over zich heen laten lopen*]. Anger was not only expressed physically, but

also verbally. Eray, a Muslim youth leader in a Milli Görüş mosque, explained why his young friends with a Moroccan migration background would be fans of someone like Rachid El Ghazaoui – better known as Appa, a Dutch hip-hop artist – who had expressed anti-Semitic statements (see Chapter 4):

> "I'm not Moroccan myself, but when I hear what my Moroccan friends have to say, they feel more discriminated against than I do. I know someone at an accountancy bureau and he tried to recommend a young Moroccan for a vacancy. But then this guy received an e-mail saying that 'she' didn't fit the profile. But [he] wasn't even a woman! He was a man! So [the HR-officer] didn't even read the résumé, because [he has quite a masculine name]. You hear of these kind of things, so you see the discrimination. I think Moroccans suffer more [than people with Turkish migration backgrounds]. Moroccans have more problems with generalizations [and stereotypes] (…). Turks are united. We have more institutions, more togetherness, we're not five separate fingers, more like a fist. (…) Another problem is that Moroccans start acting like their image. When everyone in the Netherlands sees you as a fuckin' Moroccan [in Dutch: "*kut Marokkaan*"] then very soon you act like one, I think. When you go to a café, want to sit somewhere and they refuse to serve you, then you're between cultures. At home they don't understand you and the outside world doesn't either. You're really in between."

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Finally, there were Jews and Muslims who became politically active, feeling they had to work together to fight anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, to start projects, educate others and deconstruct stereotypes. In Part 3, I will come back to this group in depth.

For this chapter, it is important to note that these feelings are based on various experiences of discrimination, of being made to feel unwelcome, excluded or threatened, and therefore the responses can differ. While some might be able to ignore, relativize and work together, it is not so easy for others. Four reasons can influence how Jews and Muslims individually respond to anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. First, for Jews, as we have seen in the narratives of Jaap and Yentle, the experience of the Holocaust, sometimes passed down by their parents or grandparents, influenced how they perceived and recognized current-day discrimination.

Second, visibly identifiable Muslims or Jews were more likely to be targeted and so more likely to be affected. Omer, a Muslim whose mosque was sent a stink bomb and a pig's head, said:

"I've had it as well. At one time in my life I wore a beard, and it was really different. When I'm clean shaven I don't look much like a Turk, so then it's different. I've noticed it and I know that [if you have a beard] people just laugh in your face and many people think 'don't you come near me, I don't like you'."

Muslim women wearing a headscarf or Jewish men wearing a kippah were also described as targeted more often. Jaeda, who was active in an organization that registers Islamophobia, told me that 95% of the reported incidents they had were from women wearing a headscarf, although she added that men are probably also targeted, but might not report it as often. My research confirms this finding, because in the interviews men who were recognizably Jews or Muslim also reported verbal abuse or tried to prevent abuse by not looking Jewish or Muslim, such as Omer. Jewish men, such as Gideon, reported that sometimes they did not dare to wear their kippahs in public, because they felt it would trigger violence.

Related to visibility, a third factor that can influence the various reactions to anti-Semitism and Islamophobia is the difference between experiencing either one first or second hand. Noam, a Jewish man, who addressed religious and ethnic tensions in his art work, explained:

"Well, the weird thing is, from a personal point of view, if you ask me, 'How's it going in the city?' I'll answer, 'Just fine'. I've never had anything unpleasant directed at me. I've got many Turkish friends, Muslims as well. It's not an issue. So if you ask me, my personal thing, it's going well. But if I have to believe CIDI or when I see things on television, I don't know what's true. Of course it's not news to say 'a Jew and a Muslim ate ice-cream together in such-and-such a place.' That's not news. But this happens too. That's definitely true, only I don't know how it relates to the rest. So, on a personal level, my answer would be: Fine thanks. There are incidents, of course, that's true as well. But I'm sure I get influenced by the media and the choices they make in their messages."

Noam's story shows that it is important to distinguish between first-hand experiences in daily life and those reported in the news, expressed on social media or in (second-hand) accounts of others. This is not to say that Islamophobic or anti-Semitic utterances reported in the Dutch (social) media mean less to those affected than being cursed at on the streets, but as we have seen, direct personal experiences can cause a different response than less direct experiences.

Aysel, a Muslim woman who was active in an educational project, mentioned visibility but also added a fourth factor: repetition. She said:

"You see it affect the daily lives of lots of girls, especially ones wearing a headscarf. They get something like (...) if I do something people won't say, Aysel did that, they'll say a Muslim did that. So those girls put in extra effort to show that it's not true. They're more friendly to people, they work extra hard so they can prove they are [not a bad person]. But the danger is that if you prove you're not like that, [people] still think: Oh Aysel is [not like the rest] and their image of Muslim women stays the same. It's like, you're not the standard Turk, you're different. Then I think: more people are like me, but you only know me so you think... The hard thing is that when you get this image, it's hard to change it as an individual, because the idea of the individual changes, not the image of the group. And it's vice versa. If one person does something and the media frame it, then it's not one person who's done it, the whole group [gets the blame]. That's the problem. (…) For a long time I tried, I've been very active. At the university I've engaged in lots of diverse groups, so not just Muslim, Turkish or immigrant groups. I did it on purpose, because lots of people will change, partly. But then you notice it is just about me [the personal image changes, but not the image of the group]. So then I get a bit tired of proving them wrong and always trying to giving a good example."

So, intergenerational trauma, visibility, direct/indirect experiences and repetition can be factors that helpt to explain why some individual Jews and Muslims feel that they need to work together. Some others might feel dismayed by anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents and become more angry or fearful than others. On a group level, however, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents had other effects on Jewish-Muslim relations.

Effects on Jewish-Muslim Relations

As with the effects on individual lives, not all incidents influenced Jewish-Muslim relations in the same way. In Part 3, I will discuss how the various incidents influenced the Muslim and Jewish respondents' decision to work together. But here I focus on how anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents caused tension in the relations between

Muslims and Jews – including their cooperation projects on occasion.[133] The divisive effects can be classified in three categories. First, Muslims were sometimes seen as the perpetrators of 'new' anti-Semitism. Second, Muslims sometimes felt their communities were treated unequally, compared to Jewish communities. Finally, on a few occasions I observed a certain competition that emerged between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.

Muslims as Perpetrators of 'New' Anti-Semitism
The first kind of tension resulted from actual conflict or differing ideas of what is sometimes called 'new' anti-Semitism (see Bunzl, 2007: 27; Gans, 2017a: 499-544; 2017b: 49; Wieviorka, 2014: 104-107). Sometimes Jews were discriminated against by persons they identified as Muslims. I have already discussed Levana's narrative about her bullied son. Other incidents were mentioned, such as the tension felt in some Jewish communities – made visible by the presence of synagogues, schools and other buildings – with Muslim neighbors or Muslim children going to school in the same neighborhood.

The anti-Semitic incidents where Muslims were described as the perpetrators had several aspects. First, Jewish communities struggled with their *experience* of anti-Semitism by those whom they identified as Muslims.[134] Such experiences hurt, as Gideon explained:

> "I went to the beach last summer with a friend, when the [Israeli-Palestinian] conflict was going on and um... there were a few um... Arabic-looking guys, about twenty to twenty-five years old. They lay down next to us on the beach, about a meter away. Then suddenly, one of the Arab-looking guys started in on a Dutch guy who was with them. (…) All of a sudden he pulled out a knife and said: 'If you were a Jew I'd have stabbed you'."

These and other incidents made Gideon feel unsafe and were factors in his plan to immigrate to another country. In some cases these incidents damaged relations between Jews and Muslims. This happened to Marike (see Chapter 5), who lost friends because of the threats she received when she mentioned she had been on holiday in Israel.

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133   Muslims and Jews who worked together or participated in cooperation or educational projects often met anti-Semitism or Islamophobia and were thus also affected by first- or second-hand experiences. However, this does not mean that those working on cooperation projects always felt these tensions, nor does it mean that they did not feel any tension at all. So, in these sections I rely on the narratives of ALL my respondents, not just the narratives of the respondents who did not engage in cooperation.
134   Sometimes referred to as 'Moroccans' or 'Arabs'.

Secondly, Jewish communities struggled to *interpret* anti-Semitism by perpetrators they identified as Muslims, especially in discussions about the overall role of Muslims in anti-Semitism and how to relate to Muslims in general. Jewish respondents held widely different opinions. For example, some Jews did not know who the perpetrators of anti-Semitic incidents were, while others argued that the perpetrators are a mixed bunch of individuals from different groups and thus they did not focus solely on the role of Muslims in anti-Semitism. When I asked Barbara, a non-religious Jewish woman, why she thought anti-Semitism had worsened in recent years, she said she mainly saw it in relation to the pro-Palestine demonstrations. She read anti-Semitic comments on Facebook by people she identified as Muslims that said: "Death to Israel, all the Jews have to die." However, when she answered my question she did not identify Muslims alone as the perpetrators:

> "Well, because of the [pro-Palestine] demonstrations. And well, Moroccans especially identify with the Palestinians and [believe] you can say whatever you want [about Jews, because] they use freedom of speech. They do that with enormous power. Fierce. (…) But it's not just that angle. It's the left-wing groups too. They connect with each other now. The really left-wing groups of the past, so to speak. And then there's the old group that has always been anti-Semitic, always maligned: the right-wing radicals, so to speak. [All] find each other in this, apparently, so they reinforce each other."

Thus, she saw anti-Semitism in the pro-Palestinian movements arising from several groups coming together, not just as something Muslims were responsible for. Other respondents like Barbara also pointed to several groups of perpetrators of anti-Semitism. Rivka, a young Jewish woman, for example, said that non-Muslims made anti-Semitic statements but, she added:

> "The hard thing is… that only a bit comes from Muslims. It wouldn't be fair if I didn't say so."

Some Jews – and non-Jewish respondents – emphasized Muslims as the perpetrators of anti-Semitism. Some respondents felt that Jewish men should not wear their kippahs on the streets in neighborhoods where many Muslims live. Jaap, a liberal Jewish man, for example, said:

> "During the holidays I wanted to go to the synagogue. In the car I wanted to put on my kippah because otherwise I might have forgotten it. And my girlfriend said: I wouldn't do that, because many Muslims live here."

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Yair, an orthodox religious leader confirmed that in some Jewish communities there is a certain fear for Muslims, because they are in general seen as perpetrators of anti-Semitism:

> "Well, one time we were at Bos and Lommer market [in the west of Amsterdam]. Well, there were [women in] burkas and… it's very diverse. We were [wearing our kippahs] but no one said a thing. (…) So, incidents happen, but is it as bad as the image in our heads? (…) Also the [extremist] attacks still happen, like just now in Brussels, but still, the frequency [of attacks on Jewish targets] of the past are gone. But the fences are still there, (…) the patrollers are still there. Who are you securing yourself against? Well, yes, against the Middle East, and they're Muslims. So, here there's an image that Muslims can be a threat, because they're Muslim."[135]

Jewish and non-Jewish respondents emphasizing the role of Muslims as perpetrators of anti-Semitism thus could create problems for Jewish-Muslim relations. First, it might contribute to the stereotyping of Muslims, as we have seen in a few cases when Jews spoke of Muslims as inhuman or in regard to remarks about Eurabia. Clear cases of stereotyping did not occur often, but they did occur. They happened along with less clear cases, such as feeling suspicious of Muslims – what Sheridan calls implicit racism. Second, in a few cases respondents mentioned that emphasizing Muslim's role in anti-Semitism puts Muslims who are *not* involved in anti-Semitism in an apologetic role. Najim described this tendency in the Jewish-Moroccan Network Amsterdam, the interreligious and intercommunal network described elsewhere, which no longer exists today:

> "The problem is, there is the frame that creates a perpetrator and a victim. I mean, wreaths were destroyed and Jewish people couldn't walk [freely] in Amsterdam-West. So, there's victim and perpetrator. That's not conducive to dialog. Especially when some people from Moroccan origin said, 'Well, it's funny, but if we want to talk about perpetrators and victims, fine, but then let's also talk about Israel and Palestine. There you also have a victim and a perpetrator'. And before you know it, it escalates. And maybe the Moroccans aren't perpetrators, but more like victims of society and what happens there. So, who started it? Who's the worst? Who's gone through the most? Parallels were drawn and that made it very complex."

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135   For a discussion about the security measures taken to protect Jewish communities see Chapter 5.

These dynamics were sometimes strengthened because Jews were the least of the concerns of Muslims in their narratives about Islamophobia. Whenever I asked Muslims about Islamophobia or discrimination the conversations often turned to what Muslims considered the extreme right or the majority population, but not often to Jews.[136] When I asked Khalid, a Muslim respondent, if there were educational projects which taught Jews about Islamophobia he seemed surprised:

> "Something definitely needs to be done! I've never… it was mostly youngsters at the dialog meeting… but you never read about it. The funny thing is, the public wants Muslim youth to contribute to such things, but it's never the other way around. People automatically think 'Well, Jewish youth don't engage in criminality, they don't have issues, they'll be okay, they think well of Muslims.' And those assumptions are automatic, but it's not always like that. They're just … youngsters, so they of course think 'we're different'. Yes, I would welcome that, [it would be] truly great. But I have never seen… I can't think of a thing, no."

In other interviews respondents pointed out other tensions that they did not put under the heading of Islamophobia or did not mention Jews at all. This might have to do with three factors. First, it might be argued that the lack of reporting indicates that Jewish communities do not discriminate against Muslims all that often. However, in my interviews I noticed some Jews made denigrating remarks or felt a certain distrust toward Muslims, as described above. Islamophobia was thus not absent in Jewish communities. A second explanation might lie in the fact that Muslims reported Islamophobic incidents mainly in regard to the majority population and extreme right-wing groups. As we have seen above, Bunzl (2007: 37) says that since the 1990s excluding and discriminating against migrants in Europe narrowed down to the Muslims. My Muslim respondents were also quite worried at times, said Islamophobic incidents happened frequently and felt that Islamophobia was embedded in Dutch society. Therefore Islamophobia in Jewish communities might go unnoticed. Finally, Jewish communities in the Netherlands are small and so the chance of being discriminated against by a Jew is a lot smaller than being discriminated by someone who can be considered as belonging to the majority population. Forms of Islamophobia among Jews might thus go unnoticed.

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136   A few Muslims mentioned that Jews had made Islamophobic remarks to them. For example, Janneke, a Muslim woman I met in a mosque that primarily caters to converts, told me that a Jewish man had once called her 'retarded' because she identifies as a Muslim.

Inequality

Now we have seen how the focus on Muslims as the new perpetrators of anti-Semitism influences Jewish-Muslim relations, I will turn to the second consequence of anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents in Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam: inequality. With regard to Islamophobic incidents, Muslim respondents felt that as a minority they were treated unequally by the local and national government in comparison to both the majority population and the Jewish minority, especially in terms of the registration of discrimination and rhetoric in the public debate.

First, respondents said that while anti-Semitism was registered as a separate form of discrimination, this was not the case for Islamophobia (see "Gemeente Wil Moslimdiscriminatie Apart Laten Registreren", 2015; Tierolf et al., 2014). Not being treated separately made it harder to monitor Muslim discrimination, they argued.[137] Muslim respondents therefore felt that they were less protected against discrimination than Jews. Some of my Muslims respondents argued that they should have their own registration or that there should be no difference at all. Yunus, a Muslim who did not call himself a non-political Salafi, but said that his ideas came close to what can be called non-political Salafism,[138] said:

> "My idea would be to have one name that counts for everyone, instead of making up a name for everything. (…) Maybe [it] has to do with Judaism and guilt? Well, I think so, the Second World War, we all know that we persecuted [and betrayed] Jews for a few guilders (…). As Dutch people we contributed to what happened to them. [In all the rest of Europe too], from here to Spain. And that kind of guilt, the Jewish community knows how to play into it. I think that's why we're so focused on it."

Yunus's statement shows that some Muslims felt that Jewish communities were favored disproportionately, and Muslims were not being treated equally. In 2015, the local government of Amsterdam decided to register what they called Muslim discrimination (see "Gemeente Wil Moslimdiscriminatie Apart Laten Registreren", 2015). Yunus tried to find the explanation in general feelings of guilt toward Jewish communities, while others focused on inequality and spoke out against it in the public debate.

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137 Some registration points already registered Muslim discrimination as a separate form of discrimination.
138 Slootman & Tillie (2006: 20) define apolitical Salafis as Muslims with a strong religious orientation who remain aloof from politics. They live quiet lives that revolve around their religion. They believe that starting a violent jihad or an Islamic State on their own is forbidden and respect the democratic system.

A different case of inequality, regarded as particularly contentious in the public debate, was a report published in April 2015 by the Verwey-Jonker Institute, an independent social science research institute in the Netherlands. The report concluded that Muslim pupils often thought more negatively of Jews than other population groups – 12% of Muslim pupils had a negative image of Jews, while this was under 3% for other population groups. The report, however, also mentioned that Christian and non-religious youth do not think positively about other ethnic or religious groups, such as Muslims. For example, 45% of Christians and 36% non-religious youth are said to have an unfavorable image of "Moroccans" and 34% of Christians and 27% of non-religious youth have an unfavorable image of Muslims in general (Van Wonderen & Wagenaar, 2015: 29). The authors showed this in the following chart:

Figuur 4.1. Houdingen gelovigen en niet-gelovigen tegenover bevolkingsgroepen in Nederland.
Hoe denk je over de volgende bevolkingsgroepen in Nederland? Weergegeven is % 'niet zo positief'

(Source: Van Wonderen & Wagenaar, 2015: 29)

The results were leaked before the researchers had completed the report (see "Asscher: Geschokt over Antisemitisme Jongeren", 2015). Media coverage focused on the outcome of 12% of the Muslim youth with the unfavorable image of Jews, which is more than average (see for example; "Antisemitisme-Rapport Toch Openbaar", 2015; "Asscher: Geschokt over Antisemitisme Jongeren", 2015; Dijkstra, 2015; Regenjas, K., 2015; Van Der Galien, 2015; "Verwarrend Rapport over Antisemitisme Moslim-Jongeren", 2015).[139] This image, shared online, exemplifies the outrage caused by this one-dimensional depiction of the report in the media:

139   Some authors questioned this focus, such as an article by De Vries (2015, 18 June) in De Volkskrant.

Figuur 4.1. Houdingen gelovigen en niet-gelovigen tegenover bevolkingsgroepen in Nederland.
Hoe denk je over de volgende bevolkingsgroepen in Nederland? Weergegeven is % 'niet zo positief'

Source: Grutjes! (2015)

The text in red says: "So, this is the problem… but this is not?!?" highlighting that the public debate focuses on the 12% of Muslim youth with an unfavorable image of Jews, ignoring the fact that far larger percentages of non-religious and Christian youth have unfavorable images of Muslims.

Muslims also experienced inequality compared to their Jewish counterparts in the way the media framed other conflicts. For example, in regard to the freedom of speech, Muslims argued that when someone says something discriminating against Muslims, it supposedly falls under freedom of speech, but if Muslims used the same terminology about Jews, it would count as discrimination. Najim said that if people said the same things about Jews that they said about Muslims, the world would be too small. According to him, the sense of inequality engendered by these differences creates an "almost unconscious jealousy" among Muslims. It makes it extra hard, he said, because Jews and Muslims have so much in common, yet Muslims are treated differently than Jews.

These experienced inequalities caused anger and distrust toward the national government, and local government in Amsterdam. Muslims felt like second-class citizens, because of the experienced unequal treatment of minorities in general and in comparison toward Jewish communities. In a few cases my respondents explained or I observed that these feelings caused tension, such as suspicion toward Jewish communities, feelings of jealousy as described by Najim and feelings of inequality. During a training session on Islamophobia, one participant said that if a Muslim goes

to the police he will not be taken seriously, but if a Jew goes to the police he will get taken seriously, even without providing evidence. This caused tension with another one of the participants on the course. Robert, a rabbi, shouted at him: "Stop saying such nonsense!" The organizers tried to calm them both down, succeeding only after Robert had explained why this is not true.

Especially a lack of knowledge about the situation of the Other could prompt distrust. Take Hilel, a Muslim youth worker of Moroccan descent, who had a positive attitude toward Jews, but thought it very strange that mosques were not protected while synagogues were:

> "Some mosques have been sprayed with blood and pork stuff and then people ask why aren't they protected? I can't answer that. You see [arguments] go back and forth. So, that is why I'd say, if you [the government] does something, don't make a difference. (…) Like Charlie Hebdo, when [cartoonists] were shot and… he [one cartoonist] wasn't a Jew, he was Christian, you know? But suddenly the Jews… the Jewish institutes were protected after that. Why is that? Where does it come from? Is it because someone, you know? [The cartoonist] ridiculed The Prophet and that's why he was murdered. People died. What has that got to do with Jewish synagogues? It's just, I find that… I'm curious about that of course, but I find it so… funny that I get asked questions like that sometimes [from youth] and then I think I don't have the answers."

What Hilel does not refer to is that at the time of the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, there was an attack on a kosher supermarket as well and there had been attacks on Jewish targets before, such as the extremist attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels in 2014. Because Hilel does not seem to know about this and because he felt the protection measures were unequal, we can see why he has become suspicious (see Chapter 5 for the in-depth discussion of security measures).

So, although anger about unequal treatment was often directed at the government or expressed as a general feeling of frustration, it sometimes made Muslims perceive Jews with a mixture of distrust, envy and in some cases admiration.

Competition between Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia
The last issue triggered by anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents to influence Jewish-Muslim relations is the comparison of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Femke,

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for example, one of the organizers of an educational project that involved Muslims and Jews, described her experience as a non-Muslim and non-Jew:

> "They're both such relatively small groups, with their own traumas and history and wishes and desires. It makes them vulnerable (…) to discrimination and exclusion, of course, but the relations between them are emotionally charged. People are of course very careful not to draw similarities between [forms of] exclusion. But when they do, then it's really unfair for one or the other party. You're not really allowed to compare things to each other. And that brings with it a huge amount of fear, [which] I think is actually the biggest factor in why people can't find their way here. It goes both ways. On the one hand, the fear of being the smallest and left out, to not get the opportunity. On the other hand, the fear of the majority population, who say things like, 'Wow, what are those people doing here? What do they believe and what are their plans?' Of course, that's happening now in extreme form to Islam. But I've also seen (…) that the Jewish community doesn't want to get swept aside either. It's like: Hello, anti-Semitism also plays a role alongside Islamophobia."

During meetings of activists who wanted to fight all forms of racism, I also sometimes observed competition between different forms of exclusion and discrimination (see also Van Weezel, 2017: 220-233 for similar observations). At one meeting, it became clear that the search for a focus for their activities caused several forms of discrimination to compete with each other. Some activists, like Soufyan, a representative of a religious organization of Muslims of Moroccan descent, argued that the focus should be on all sorts of discrimination, otherwise you would "discriminate between different discriminations." The main organizer, a non-religious man of Moroccan descent, argued that Islamophobia should be the main concern. Activists who fought anti-black racism, however, argued that the focus should be on what they called 'Afrophobia', because that had not received much attention in the Netherlands. When the question came up if anti-Semitism should be added to the equation, they debated whether it should be the focus or part of the general message that they were against all kinds of racism and exclusion. It took quite some debate, but in the end, they decided to highlight Islamophobia.

The outcome of a comparison of and competition between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia seems to contribute to the feeling that one or the other form is taken less taken seriously and could potentially harm Jewish-Muslim relations.

CONCLUSION

We have seen that the concepts of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are contested and have various meanings in different contexts. For this study, I chose to define anti-Semitism as exclusionary or discriminatory statements and practices against Jews, because they are perceived as Jewish. Islamophobia is defined in a similar vein as exclusionary or discriminatory statements and practices against Muslims, because they are perceived as Muslim (see also Vellenga, 2018: 177-178). Although I did not exclude comparison beforehand, at the end of the chapter we saw how problematic comparison can become in the practices of Jewish-Muslim relations. As we will see in the next part, Muslims and Jews have found ways to speak about these thorny topics, often though not always without adding extra tension to the relations. Comparison, here, can also be a strategy to create empathy for the other (see Chapter 8).

In this chapter, we also saw that individual Jews and Muslims often experienced verbal and institutional forms of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in their daily lives. Physical forms of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia also occurred, but less often. Muslims and Jews reacted differently to these experiences. Some felt frustrated, while others became afraid and others again relativized their experience. Their different reactions can partly be explained by different experiences of anti-Semitic or Islamophobic incidents, their visibility, direct or indirect experiences and how often they experience incidents. Further research should be done to examine these differences in more depth.

Finally, we have seen that anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents also influence Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. First, ideas about 'new' anti-Semitism sometimes hurt the relations. Then, actual experience of anti-Semitism by Muslims sometimes hurt the relations between Muslims and Jews quite directly. A generalized idea of Islamic anti-Semitism, strengthened by a lack of attention to Jewish Islamophobia, sometimes contributed to the stereotyping of Muslims.[140] Second, the experience of inequality between Jews and Muslims sometimes contributed to the prejudice against Jews. Finally, competition between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia could also potentially hurt relations, because both Jewish and Muslim groups want recognition for their form of discrimination and exclusion. In the next part, we will see how Muslims and Jews together tried to solve these and the other issues mentioned in Chapters 4 and 5.

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140   As noted above, Gans (2017a: 533) also argues that the focus on Islamic anti-Semitism obscures anti-Semitism by the majority population.

PART 3

Cooperation in Times of Turmoil

Interreligious Market Dam Square
Photo by the author

INTRODUCTION

During my study, I observed many cooperation projects that ranged from dialog meetings to an interreligious market (as shown above).[141] The event organizers had to manage all the practical conditions that all volunteers have to deal with when putting on an event, such as financing and mobilization. However, they also had to deal with issues such as discrimination, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and tensions surrounding extremist attacks, as described in the previous chapters. Constructive cooperation is thus not easy. It demands a lot of time and energy and requires certain structural conditions, expertise and craftsmanship (see also Sennett, 2012).

Still, this does not mean that the relations between all Jews and Muslims were always under pressure or strain. That quite a few Jews and Muslims were in these projects indicates the potential of Jewish-Muslim cooperation. In the interviews I conducted it became clear that Jews and Muslims wanted to get to know each other and some even made friends. What is more, I found over forty cooperation projects between 1990 and 2015, which was more than I expected.[142]

Studying cooperation next to conflict is important, because it provides opportunities to learn from best practices – or attempts thereto – and to gain important insights into how conflict is managed. In this chapter, I first take two cases to show what cooperation projects look like in practice: a dialog meeting and an educational project. Second, I address the other kinds of cooperation projects organized in Amsterdam.[143] Finally, I describe the organizers and discuss the conditions needed for Jewish-Muslim cooperation projects.

The next two chapters describe how Jewish and Muslim religious and community leaders, as well as the project participants, try to establish bonds between Muslims and Jews. Chapter 8 deals with the strategies used to change ideas about the other or to counter prejudice. Social identity theory will be used here to interpret the empirical

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141   In this part 'mapping cooperation projects' and Chapter 8 are based on an earlier publication called 'Cooperation in Turbulent Times: Strategies of Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam' published in the journal Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations (Roggeveen, Vellenga & Wiegers, 2017).

142   I counted the groups of cooperating people but not all their different projects. Sometimes, the people in one group also participated in another group. In this case, the groups were counted as separate unless two groups contained exactly the same people.

143   Two initiatives that could be counted as cooperation are not included in the analysis. The first is cooperation between Jews, Muslims and others in the pro-Palestine movement working or standing together at demonstrations. The second is when activists cooperated to organize the Day Against Racism which takes place every year around March 21, the International Day Against Racism. These initiatives are forms of cooperation, but both are very activist with a different dynamic than the other cooperation projects. However, their initiatives are discussed in Chapter 4.

findings. Chapter 9 discusses the strategies used to manage emotions. Here emotion management theory is used to shed light on the ways Jewish and Muslim religious and community leaders – and sometimes participants – encourage or discourage emotions in their cooperation. Together, these chapters provide insights into what cooperation in Jewish-Muslim relations looks like, how the cooperation projects work and what techniques are used to create bonds between Muslims and Jews.

CHAPTER
7

Cooperation Projects between Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam

COOPERATION PROJECTS IN PRACTICE

Jewish-Muslim cooperation can take many forms. Examples are the cooperation between the Jewish and Moroccan gay pride boats at the annual Canal Parade in Amsterdam, the celebration of International Women's Day by Jewish and Muslim women and a Jewish-Muslim art exhibition (see Appendix 4 for a list of initiatives between 1990 and 2015). Although there are many forms of cooperation, some forms occur more often than others. Three of the main forms are dialog meetings, educational projects and interreligious/intercommunal activities.[144] In this section, to gain a sense of what Jewish-Muslim cooperation looks like in practice, I will discuss two examples of these main forms. First, a dialog meeting between (young) Jews and Muslims in a community center in the east of Amsterdam and, second, an educational project in which Jewish, Muslim and homosexual peer-educators challenge stereotypes. However, the interreligious/intercommunal activities differ considerably from each other, so choosing just one to illustrate all of these activities would give the wrong impression. This is why I will not give an example here, as I do for other forms of cooperation, but will extensively describe them in Chapters 8 and 9, when I report on interreligious/intercommunal forms of cooperation in depth.

To begin with the first, the dialog meeting for Jews and Muslims was organized in Amsterdam-East by religious and community leaders and two youth work organizations. It took place on a summer evening in 2014. There had been tension in the neighborhood, linked to the Israeli and Palestinian flags hanging from balconies (see Chapter 4 for a description of the conflict). The organizers aimed to bring young Muslims and Jews together.[145] That evening approximately 60 Muslims, Jews, youth workers, government employees and someone who called himself 'the city's storyteller' attended. About 20 were young Jews and Muslims, roughly three-quarters Muslims and almost all men. The few others were Jewish, among them one young woman.

The evening took place in a community center constructed in the early 70s, gray building, blue window frames and yellow staircases. Inside, the dialog meeting is held in the community gym. On each side of the gym hang flags of the city of Amsterdam. On arriving, the participants receive a card with the name of an Amsterdam neighborhood on it. Once the participants have gathered, one of the

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144   By interreligious/intercommunal activity I mean all cases in which Jews, Muslims and others do not go to a dialog meeting, but perform an activity together, such as going on a walk, visiting an exhibition or organizing an interreligious market.
145   Approximately aged between 12 and 25.

Muslim organizers calls for attention. Two other organizers – an imam and a rabbi – are invited to give speeches. Each courteously suggests that the other be the first to speak; as a result, the rabbi starts his speech. He addresses the Jewish history of Amsterdam-East. He explains that he does not live there, which might strike one as odd, because this event is organized for Muslims and Jews living in the neighborhood. However, he clarifies, it is not that odd because on May 4 – Dutch Remembrance Day – residents in this neighborhood put up white flags: one for every Jew deported from this neighborhood in World War II. So there is a connection. When the rabbi finishes, the imam starts his speech. His focus is on condemning violence. He finds violence and Islam irreconcilable – in line with arguments described in Chapter 5.

After the imam and the rabbi, an official of the council for Amsterdam-East explains why Amsterdam flags are hanging in the gym. He says that problems emerged in the borough when people put up Israeli and Palestinian flags. That is why he put up the two Amsterdam flags. He hopes that they will unite those in the room and make everyone feel like an Amsterdammer.[146]

After the speeches, and in the same line of thought, everyone has to form groups, according to the name of the neighborhood on their cards. Mine is 'Bos en Lommer', a neighborhood in Amsterdam West. My group has nine participants and a discussion leader. Six are (young) Muslim men, three are adults – Esam, Badi and Jalil. One is in his twenties – Hilel – and two are secondary school pupils – Hisham and Naim. Two others identify as Jewish, both women, one adult – Levona – and one just turned 18 – Rivka. The last one in our group is Anna, a youth worker.

At the start of the dialog, the discussion leader asks everyone to introduce themselves. Rivka tells the others that she plays soccer on a relatively high level. She has cancelled her soccer practice for this dialog. The men and boys in the group think this is great and ask her about her soccer experience. Clearly the discussion leader, Martin, wants them to talk about what it means to be an Amsterdammer. He asks them to describe a part of Amsterdam of which they are proud, to tell an anecdote about their neighbors and to come up with a plan to improve the city. The participants, however, talk mainly about soccer, sharing their experiences of being discriminated against and a plan for Jews and Muslims to meet each other at their schools. Most participants in the group engage enthusiastically, except for Naim, one of the younger Muslim boys,

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146   This can be seen as continuing "WijAmsterdammers", discussed in the Introduction of this book, a policy developed to provide a local identity for everyone in the city after the murder of Theo van Gogh (see also; Maussen, 2006: 71-74).

and Levona, one of the Jewish women. Naim pays no attention, while Levona listens attentively but does not say much.

After the discussion, all the groups present their plans for the city of Amsterdam. Most indicate that they want to increase respect for others, arrange further dialog meetings and organize a follow-up meeting for this evening. One group suggests that their group, Waterloo Square – in the city center – should be rebranded 'Empathy Square'. At the table beside us, Nadim and Badr, two young boys with a Moroccan background, slump in their chairs. Mira, a Jewish organizer at their table urges them: "Come on, boys!" They respond to her encouragement, present their plans and get a big round of applause. The boys laugh, both embarrassed and proud. Mira compliments them on their success. 'Our' Bos en Lommer table is represented by Rivka and Hilel, who present the plan to invite Islamic schools or schools with many Muslim pupils to Jewish schools and vice versa. Afterwards they also get enthusiastic applause and lots of compliments.

After every group has presented their plans, it is time for a buffet dinner in the community center. One section is reserved for halal food, another for kosher food and the rest of the tables have vegetarian food. The participants mainly sit with the people who were in their dialog groups and talk amiably. Hilel, for example, says that Rivka is the first young Jew he has ever met. He admits to Rivka that in the past he had thought negatively about Jews, but then he met one of the Jewish organizers at this dialog meeting and that changed his mind, because that organizer is such a great man. Others talk about the food and dietary laws. The dialog meeting ends after dinner and the participants go home.

This dialog is exemplary for Jewish-Muslim relations, because of the aims, the participants, the structure and the topics the meeting dealt with. Usually there is an official part for speeches by religious and community leaders, then dialog in smaller groups and some informal contact during dinner or drinks. Many dialog meetings also include just coming together to meet new people as well as tackling social tensions. Some objectives were achieved in this case, but others – such as bonding over Amsterdam as a shared local identity – did not in the group I observed. However, other forms of dialog are also applied to bring Muslims and Jews closer together.

The second main form of cooperation I found during my fieldwork were educational projects. These were very different from each other in that they were structured in various ways. One educational project invited (Muslim) pupils to their synagogue, while in another peer-educators visited primary schools and another one created a

project for (Muslim) pupils to send letters to Jewish survivors of World War II. Even if the projects target different schools – primary, secondary school and vocational – and are structured differently, they share some of the same aims and strategies. They often aim to provide knowledge about religion, ethnicity, diversity and histories of minority groups to pupils of various ages and explain why Jews, Muslims and others do not fit certain prejudices, trying to reduce stereotyping and prejudice.[147] Here I describe an example of an educational project that featured some of the shared aims and methods of dealing with discrimination.[148] This case is part of an educational project that gives peer education to primary school pupils on differences and prejudice, and which I observed multiple times. Three peer-educators attended each school visit, one identified as Jewish, one identified as Muslim and one identified as homosexual.[149] The project chose peers with these three identities because the local government had noticed that children in these minorities are most often discriminated against in schools.

Their project lasted four days spread over four weeks. On the first day the pupils learn about the concepts of bullying and discrimination, the differences between fact, opinion and arguments and learn to work with the ASR model, which stands for *aanwijzen, samenvatten en reageren,* which means to point out, summarize and respond. This model is used to guide the responses of other pupils in the classroom discussion. Because pupils have to name to whom they are responding and have to summarize that person's argument, this model can create a moment to think about the other person's argument before responding (I will come back to this method in Chapter 9).

On the first day, the peer-educators do not tell the pupils they are Muslim, Jewish or homosexual, but introduce themselves by name, get to know the pupils, explain the main concepts and set an exercise with photos and statements that the pupils have to match. On the second day, the peer-educators submit statements and the pupils have to guess which statement belongs to which peer-educator. They still do not know their identities. Afterwards, the peer-educators reveal their identities and the pupils hear their personal experiences of discrimination. In one classroom I observed, Suherman, a Muslim peer-educator who told the pupils that he had experienced prejudice when

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147 Strictly speaking, two of the educational projects I studied were not organized jointly by Jews and Muslims, but only by Jews. Therefore, Muslims and Jews did not cooperate in organizational terms in these projects. However, in these projects the Jewish hosts tried to cooperate with young Muslims and so they were counted as part of the cooperation projects.

148 The strategies of educational projects are discussed in detail in Chapter 8. Here they are given as examples of how educational projects work in practice.

149 The organization calls them peer-educators because they were young students or young professionals in their twenties; so they were older than the primary school pupils.

he was out with his friends. He explained that as a running joke he always greeted men who looked like him. So, when he was out dancing with his friends he said hi to a man in a club. This time, however, the man picked a fight with Suherman. He and his friends and the other men were all kicked out of the club and the police turned up to investigate what was going on. They separated the men into several groups. Suherman said that he was put in the group with the men who had started the fight because they all looked 'Asian'. He told the police that he did not belong to this group, but they did not believe him and so kept him separate from his friends. He had to spend an hour standing with the men with whom he just had been in a fight, which, he explained, was very annoying if people assume that you belong with them.

On the third day, the peer-educators delve deeper into discrimination, discuss instances of being discriminated against themselves, as well as when they have discriminated against someone else at some point in their lives. They ask if the pupils have ever had prejudices. In one class I observed they discussed prejudice on the basis of language or dialect and on the basis of ethnicity. One girl, for example, said that she had lost her ball and then saw "people with a dark skin color" playing soccer with it. Her first thought was that they had stolen it. She asked them if she could have her ball back and then she discovered that they did not actually know it was her ball. She added that if they had been white she would not have thought that these people had stolen her ball. After discussing other examples as well, the peer-educators turned to the reasons why people start to have prejudices or discriminate against others. They pointed out how important it is to recognize when you are expressing a prejudice. Then they showed the pupils a movie, followed by a role playing game, in which the students had to act what they would do if someone is bullied.

On the last day, the pupils have to participate in a debate with the other classes at their school who have also received the peer education. In this debate, they have to defend or challenge certain propositions or they are part of a group of judges the others need to convince. These three roles rotate and at the end of the day the jury (teachers and peer-educators) awards prizes.

This educational project has a specific structure that other educational projects do not have. Other projects do not work with peer-educators or include homosexuality often in their discussions. What they all have in common, however, is that they apply strategies to counter prejudice. For example, they create trust, explain what is considered prejudice and counter certain negative attitudes, all strategies applied in other educational projects (see Chapter 8). However, before going on to discuss

these strategies, I will discuss other forms of cooperation found in Amsterdam as well as the conditions required to organize cooperation projects.

Mapping Cooperation Projects[150]

As early as 1986, religious leaders in the Netherlands were arguing that a dialog between Jews, Christians and Muslims would be desirable ("CIDI Wil Gesprek Joden en Moslims", 1986). In Amsterdam, cooperation projects between Muslims and Jews can be traced back to the early 1990s, when a dialog meeting between Jews and Muslims took place in the Red Hat [In Dutch: *de Rode Hoed*] in the center of Amsterdam.[151] Between 1990 and 2000, religious leaders created informal networks, organized a number of dialogs and started some formal organizations, such as the in 1997 established Council for the Philosophies of Life and Religion Amsterdam [In Dutch: *Raad voor Levensbeschouwingen en Religies Amsterdam*] and Maïmon Foundation [In Dutch: *Stichting Maïmon*] in 2000 ("OJEC-Dag over Spirituele Zijde Dialoog", 1992; "Raad voor Religie en Levensbeschouwing in Amsterdam", 1997; Raad voor Levensbeschouwingen en Religies Amsterdam, 2015; "Sami Kaspi Ridder in de Orde van Oranje-Nassau", 2007; Stichting Maïmon, 2011).

Respondents interviewed for this study said that contact intensified after the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers, when citizens of Amsterdam became increasingly worried about growing tensions in the city. Initiatives to bring the inhabitants together were instigated by both local government and concerned citizens. For example, a joint initiative by Jews and Muslims was the '*West Interreligieus Netwerk*' (West Interreligious Network, WIN) that I encountered during my fieldwork. Initiated by a meeting organized by the local government, in this network Jews, Muslims, Christians and non-religious locals came together to talk about problems in their neighborhood.

Between 2003 and 2006, some incidents happened that inspired Jews and Muslims to work together. The Netherlands commemorates the victims of World War II on May 4 each year, laying down ceremonial wreaths at the monument on Dam square and in several neighborhoods in Amsterdam. In 2003 and 2006, commemorations were disturbed by youngsters yelling anti-Semitic slogans. Young men of Moroccan descent, but also youngsters described as "native Dutch boys" played football with commemorative wreaths in the west of Amsterdam (see "Herdenkingskransen Vernield

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150   Both this and the following sections are based on my interviews with and observations in the field, interview data and the media sources listed in Appendix 4.
151   Before 1990, there have been a few dialogues as well, not always framed as Jewish-Muslim dialogue, but as dialogue between Jews and migrants (see Van Weezel, 2017: 220-221). However, from the early 1990s onwards Jewish-Muslim dialogue became more established in Amsterdam.

in Amsterdam", 2006; Ensel & Stremmelaar, 2013: 156). According to my respondents, this was one of the main reasons to start the Jewish-Moroccan Network Amsterdam (JMNA) [*Joods-Marokkaans Netwerk Amsterdam*] in 2006. The JMNA was followed by other initiatives and at least seven projects, including one called Preaching in Amsterdam [*Preken in Mokum*], in which religious leaders preached in each other's houses of worship. After the journalist and documentary-maker Theo van Gogh was murdered in Amsterdam in 2004, respondents said that several other initiatives were launched to bring the inhabitants of the city together, general projects such as We, Amsterdammers [*WijAmsterdammers*], but sometimes specifically organized by Jews and Muslims.

A few years later, in 2011, the Dutch Second Chamber debated a legislative proposal by the Animal Party to forbid ritual slaughter without stunning the animal first. The bill was accepted by 116 to 30 votes (see Vellenga, 2014: 357-358). In 2011 and 2012, this was a reason for Jewish and Muslim organizations, including a representative body for Muslims, *Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid*' (CMO) and an umbrella organization of orthodox Jewish organizations, '*Nederlands Israëlitisch Kerkgenootschap*' (NIK), to work together.[152]

From the data I gathered in the field, it became clear that tensions arising in 2014 and 2015 from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the extremist attacks in Brussels (2014), Paris (2015) and Copenhagen (2015) encouraged Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam to revive or intensify their bonds. New initiatives emerged, including an interreligious neighborhood network in the southern parts of Amsterdam, and Salaam-Shalom, a network of Jews and Muslims that attracted almost 3,000 people to like their Facebook page.

All in all, between 1990 and 2015, I found 40 initiatives organized in Amsterdam, in which Jews and Muslims organized or participated (see Appendix 4). Some projects were explicitly interreligious, like the interreligious market pictured above, but others could be described as intercommunal, or both interreligious and intercommunal. A few initiatives were formalized into organizations, like the JMNA, but most were informal networks of people who occasionally organized dialog or interreligious or intercommunal meetings. The exception were the educational projects, which were

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152   A few months later the bill was rejected in the First Chamber. In 2012, as an alternative, the CMO, NIK and Association of Slaughterhouses and Meat Processing Plants [de Vereniging van Slachterijen en Vleesverwerkende Bedrijven] agreed on a covenant, which stated that every animal to be slaughtered without initial stunning may be conscious for only 40 seconds (see Vellenga, 2014: 357-358).

more often developed and executed by established organizations, instead of in interreligious or intercommunal networks.

Twelve cooperation projects were newly founded in 2014 and 2015, eight of which intended to organize more than one activity while four created once-only events, such as a one-off dialog. Of the 28 groups founded before 2014, 17 still existed in 2015. Some cooperative groups became less active over time; others revived their bonds when they felt it was needed because of incidents happening in Amsterdam, the Netherlands and other countries. An example of the latter is the WIN. Four of the projects organized before 2014, were projects that were one-off projects. Six cooperation projects have since ceased altogether, including the JMNA. According to respondents, the JMNA ended because of tensions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, tensions caused by debates about anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, disagreements about subsidies and personal conflicts. I do not know if one cooperation project – the informal network of Jewish and Muslim artists – still exists because I could not reach them. They do not have a website and have not been mentioned by media sources that I could find.

As described above, the data makes clear that, in 2014 and 2015, the most common forms of cooperation are dialog meetings, educational projects or interreligious/intercommunal activities. In these projects Jews and Muslims discuss problems such as anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents as well as religious and cultural commonalities such as fasting or their culinary traditions. At least six educational projects focus at least partly on Jews and Muslims. For example, an annual dialog day for a Christian school, a school with many Muslim pupils, and a Jewish school. Other forms of cooperation are young leadership projects, women's groups and informal contacts between individual Jews and Muslims.

As we have seen above, many projects originated in times of conflict. From a Bourdieusian perspective, this data can be interpreted as a signal that Jewish and Muslim communities tried to protect their own position in society by cooperation or began to cooperate after they experienced a shared problem. While this is correct for some cases, the data also suggests other reasons for cooperation. Some Jews and Muslims were curious about the other and their curiosity spurred them on to participate in cooperation projects. Others were asked to participate in a project by friends or the local government, which is also one of the main reasons why people engage in other forms of voluntary cooperation (see Van Bochove & Verhoeven, 2014). Pupils usually did not have a clear reason for taking part in a cooperation or educational project, because their schools incorporated it in their curriculum. One

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group just wanted to do something good for society. Finally, over time some Jews and Muslims created lasting bonds; they stood up for each other and supported each other when the other needed it. Their motives for maintaining these bonds had less to do with protecting their own group and more to do with their ideals about friendship.

Social and Economic Capital

In the previous sections we have seen what cooperation projects look like in practice, but before they are implemented they need to be organized, which demands certain practical conditions to be fulfilled. In this section I describe the leadership and resources used for the projects – in other words the social and economic capital used to organize cooperation projects (see Wacquant, 2006: 7). I will also discuss the mobilization of participants for the cooperation projects.

To start with social capital. All the described cooperation projects had to have religious and community leaders willing to organize them. A substantial group of religious or community leaders organize these projects. Some leaders are what Visser-Vogel et al. (2012: 118) call 'identity agents'. They are crucial to acquire cooperation, because identity agents have attained a certain degree of authority that can help change the minds of their adherents. This is not to say that *all* organizers are identity agents for everyone or in all situations. Some religious or community leaders, for example, were accused by one of the other religious leaders of not having enough constituency in the neighborhoods and were called 'the elite'. Other identity agents, such as peer-educators, sometimes lacked authority in noisy classrooms and benefited tremendously in regard to their authority if they were supported by the teacher in the classroom.

The religious and community leaders of all of these projects were either liberal or (modern) orthodox Jews or Sunni Muslims, the latter usually with a Turkish or Moroccan migration background. These leaders were sometimes imams and rabbis, but more often they were active members of self-identified ethnic or religious communities, such as members of a dialog commission or the board of a mosque. Christian religious and community leaders were often involved, especially because many cooperation projects included participants who identified as Christian. Besides religious and community leaders, the local government also played a role in project organization. As Chapter 3 described, the local government used a bottom-up approach, meaning that Jews, Muslims and others with an idea for a cooperation project could ask the local government for help. In practice, however, the local government also gathered

key persons from all over the city to sit together and come up with plans and even started projects themselves.

Most organizers of cooperation projects were not paid for their efforts. So, for many organizers, these projects were a form of volunteering. Religious or community leaders were keen to volunteer and were often very passionate about their projects. However, in a society where the government asks citizens to volunteer in many aspects of life – in caring for neighbors, relatives and others in need – project organizers felt they were sometimes asked too often to organize or participate in cooperation projects (see Chapter 3; see Kampen, Verhoeven & Verplanke, 2013). Marike, a Jewish organizer of an active interreligious network, for example, said:

> "Everyone has their own jobs and they do this as an extra. I'm quite busy. I work four days a week – it was five days a week. At home I'm the breadwinner, and it takes a lot of my time."

This is especially difficult for Jews, because, as said in Chapter 3, Jewish communities are relatively small in the Netherlands. So people willing to organize and actively engage in cooperation projects – a minority within small communities – were often asked again to organize or participate in new projects. Koen, a member of the liberal Jewish community, put it as follows:

> "Well, say there are 50,000 Jews and 700,000 Muslims in the Netherlands. Then all Jews have to visit schools five times a week to reach them. Just because of the numbers, it won't work. And then you have a small number of what I call progressive Jews, who want to do it, who want to do dialog and will give their time to this cause. It's very complicated."

Although five times a week is an exaggeration, it is true that there are more Muslims than Jews who can organize these projects. Approximately 950,000 Muslims and 52,000 Jews live in the Netherlands, so there are about 18 times fewer Jews than Muslims. These figures are a bit different for Amsterdam, because about 13% of Muslims and 47% of Jews live in Amsterdam, but even then there are still five times as many Muslims than Jews in the city (see Berg & Wallet, 2010: 12; FORUM, 2012: 8; Onderzoek & Statistiek, 2013; Van Solinge & Van Praag, 2009: 32).

Therefore, the Jews active in cooperation projects were often asked to participate time and again. Rivka, a young Jewish woman, for example, took part in the dialog meeting described above, where she was a first-time participant. When I met her again

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for an interview six months later she had already been asked for two new cooperation projects, not just as a participant, but also to speak about her experiences. Local and national governments sometimes reinforced the over-asking of these Jews and Muslims, because – at least during my fieldwork – they often invited the same individuals to speak with them about tensions and opportunities in Jewish-Muslim relations.

A second condition for cooperation projects is the mobilization of participants. Religious and community leaders promoted their projects by word-of-mouth, using their own networks, spreading the news in other cooperation projects and trying to attract people on the street. They also used social media, and the networks of youth leaders, community workers and schools. This was slightly different for the educational projects because here schools, not individuals, had to be mobilized.

What often seemed important to successful mobilization was living near others and having large networks (social capital). To start with the first, living in close proximity could help attract Muslims and Jews to the projects. It can be a problem for cooperation projects when Jews and Muslims do not live close by, as Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson (2016: 220-221) say about their fieldwork in a segregated city.[153] When Jews and Muslims are spatially segregated it is difficult for them to develop or sustain friendships, because they have to travel between neighborhoods. As we saw in Chapter 3, Amsterdam is not as strongly segregated as some other European countries, but we do see clusters of Jewish communities living in the inner city, in the south, and surrounding towns of Amstelveen, Badhoevedorp and sometimes in the east of city. Clusters of Muslim communities live and have their meeting places in the (far) west, east or north of the city. This created problems for some groups. For example, Merve, a Muslim woman from a mosque in Amsterdam North said that her mosque was very active in interreligious dialog with neighboring churches. However, they did not cooperate with Jews that much. They would have liked to cooperate with Jews too, but they did not because most synagogues are in the south of the city, then either a half-hour bicycle ride or forty minutes away by public transport to reach the nearest synagogue.[154]

Although the spatial segregation of Muslims and Jews clusters made meeting up difficult, religious and community leaders successfully attracted people to

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153   Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson do not mention in which city they conducted their fieldwork for reasons of anonymity.
154   Nowadays, the travel time between Amsterdam-North and Amsterdam-South is ten minutes faster because of the new subway line that opened in 2018.

their projects. From observations, I estimate that the dialog and interreligious/ intercommunal meetings generally attracted between thirty to several hundred people, while the meetings between leaders were usually smaller. Project participants came from mosques and synagogues all over the city, from all kinds of ethnicities and religious backgrounds. There were, for example, members of a mosque which caters to Muslims of Moroccan descent in Amsterdam-East, others from a mixed mosque in Amsterdam West, and from Milli Görüs or Diyanet mosques in the west and south parts of the city. Projects that were most advertised on social media attracted participants from other Dutch cities as well. Some had participated in previous projects, while others attended for the first time.

Despite the distance, the leaders were still able to attract participants because some cooperation projects took place in the city center or were organized first in a neighborhood where relatively many Jews live and then in a neighborhood where many Muslims live. Secondly, religious and community leaders often had a lot of social capital. They knew many people in their own communities, and encouraged them to come to the events. They reached out to others through social media. They also knew or were themselves youth workers and encouraged people to come to the meetings through these professional networks. Some religious or community leaders knew people in high positions, such as journalists and politicians. The vice-premier and minister of Social Affairs at the time Lodewijk Asscher, for example, visited two of the events organized during my fieldwork and the mayor of Amsterdam Eberhart van der Laan visited three. The presence of politicians and the reports in the media helped to trigger Muslims and Jews to go to these events. One event, organized just after the attacks on Charlie Hebdo, for example, attracted more than 200 people, including the mayor of Amsterdam as well as a minister. Rashid, a Muslim identity agent and religious/community leader of Moroccan descent, said quite cynically that attendance was quite high because people turn up if the mayor and the minister come to the event.

Organizing cooperation projects required Muslim and Jewish community and religious leaders not just to acquire social capital, but also to seek funding – or to use Bourdieu's terminology, economic capital – for their projects (see Wacquant, 2006: 7). Some small projects were held in living rooms, so did not need financing. However, many projects wanted to create more understanding for each other in bigger parts of society and therefore they needed to reach out to more Jews, Muslims and people who identify as Christians or non-religious. They needed economic capital to let others know that a dialog meeting or an educational project was taking place, especially if projects tried to engage harder-to-reach groups. When more people needed to

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be reached, they also needed to rent a space bigger than a living room. Thus these project leaders had to book a room where they could talk with the participants and also supply beverages or cater for a meal.

A meal might seem like something that is not directly necessary, but considering that most people attend an event in their free time, after work, the offer of a free meal might make it easier to come. Moreover, for Jews, Muslims and Christians it is difficult to attend in the weekend, because Muslims might want to go to a mosque on Friday, Sabbath is from sundown Friday till Saturday night, and Sunday is a day of rest in the Christian tradition. Thus it might be easier to attract participants on evenings of the week.

Economic capital was, however, often quite scarce. Religious or community leaders were occasionally allowed to use money from their own communities to organize meetings, but these projects had to compete with needs of the own community, which made it harder to spend funds on interreligious/intercommunal projects. Some projects were financially supported by either the local government or private companies, but quite a few project leaders reported that funding was hard to get. Rashid, for example, told me that his organization organized dialogs and arranged projects in mosques for Muslim communities. In the past it was financed by national and local government, which meant he could hire two people to help him organize dialogs on several levels; between Jews, Muslims and others, and to discuss anti-Semitism in several mosques with Muslims. But the national government subsidies stopped. He had to fire his employees and organize the dialogs on his own. He could not do all this by himself, so some activities had to stop. He was afraid that local government financing would also stop and then he would have to downscale even further. Stephanie, who worked on an European project against discrimination, said that she had to pay her own travel expenses. This was inconvenient, but did not influence her participation – although it could influence the participation of others. She mentioned that in other countries where the organizers have little money, participation is a problem if travel expenses are not compensated. Younes, a Muslim who organized interreligious/intercommunal dialogs, and Yair, a rabbi who organized dialogs, also noted how hard it was to get funding, especially on a structural basis. This lack could become a problem, because as Pettigrew (1998: 76-77) shows, building on Allport's intergroup contact theory, one of the conditions to decrease stereotyping is to repeatedly spend time with each other. Religious and community leaders sometimes mentioned that you need time to get to know each other and generate trust.

The lack of financing may be due to a hesitance toward financing religious organizations (see Chapter 3), because of the principle of separation of religion and state in the Netherlands. The idea is that the government should not interfere with internal religious affairs, such as the appointment of clerics, nor should religious specialists interfere with the internal affairs of the government (see Nickolson, 2012: 23; Van Bijsterveld, 2015: 125).[155] Although the Dutch Constitution does not forbid the financing of religious organizations, policy makers and politicians who were interviewed for my study were often – though not always – hesitant to do this, even if they provided different nuances on this topic. When I asked Iris, a local politician for a liberal party who had 'diversity' in her portfolio, if she was in touch with religious groups in the city, she said she was 'very careful' in maintaining contact. She added that religion is something people should do at home and had no place in her portfolio, although she did work on the 'emancipation of minorities', which sometimes could be Muslims.

Marouan, a Muslim policy maker, said that when they were financing religious organizations, his borough financed only "activity, not carpets" [*Activiteit, geen tapijt*].[156] He meant that financing community activities was "worth considering" if the goal was bringing people together, but that the government should not finance material used for religious practices. Interreligious dialog was worth considering, but they also hesitated at providing money to mosques and preferred to have a non-profit foundation between local government and the religious organization organizing the dialog. However, he also explained, there were gray areas. For example, the local government had supported a mosque when they organized open houses, so that people in the area could meet each other. After an election a few years later, new politicians ruled that this support was not in line with the separation of religion and state and stopped the financing. According to Marouan, open houses are less visited now, because the mosque does not have as much expertise in communication or as many economic resources as the local government. Jennifer, a policy maker in Amsterdam-East, said that permission for financing interreligious dialog depended heavily on the local borough council. Although, now, with her new council, she was not sure how they felt about the separation of religion and state and she had issued subsidies to religious groups for their community projects. Finally, Diane, a policy maker from the city center, said that it is possible to finance religious groups who want to meet each other, but not if it would be a substantive dialog about religion or religious differences.

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155   See Chapter 3 for a detailed description of the meaning of the separation of religion and the state and the exceptions to this principle.
156   Referring here to the carpets on the floors of mosques.

These findings are in line with Maussen's (2006: 63-65) and Nickolson's (2012, 30) findings. Maussen (2006: 63-65) says that in 2006 the local government of Amsterdam did finance projects that brought diverse groups together, following the diversity policy, but did not finance projects that focused solely on religion. Nickolson describes how, in Amsterdam in 2010, policy makers in several parts of the city differed in their interpretations of this principle. Although some policy makers did not finance religious organizations, in other parts of the city they financed in practice both youth work by a Christian organization and Qur'an lessons. For Jews and Muslims this inconsistency makes it hard to tell if and how they can obtain subsidies for their projects.

Another explanation for the lack of financing might be the shift from funding diversity projects to projects that aim at ensuring public order and security. One academic expert I interviewed said that after the murder of Theo van Gogh, a lot of money was available for working on social cohesion, but now there was a shift from dialog to paying more attention to preventing radicalization. When we look at the financing of the diversity departments we see that their budget did indeed shrink from 8.2 million euro to 3.2 million euro in 2016, although the budget for radicalization did not change much over the years (see Gemeente Amsterdam, 2018b).[157]

Although quite a few religious and community leaders mentioned the scarcity of economic resources, I did come across some exceptions. A group of organizers of an interreligious network, for example, decided that they did not want money from the government and Robert, a rabbi who cooperated with Muslims, also advised against financing. Robert had had a bad experience with the local government who – in his experience – took over his project. After this, he no longer wanted to depend on them. The interreligious network did not want to be funded because there had been money issues in a previous network. They wanted to decide for themselves what activities they were going to organize without local government interference. This worked out in these two cases, because the organizers of the interreligious network and the rabbi had large social networks that had taken years to build. So they had access to free meeting spaces and always knew someone who would be willing to speak, perform or help out. That said, the interreligious network sometimes had to invest their own money in the projects or had to charge money for their activities sometimes, which made these activities less open to all groups and it was not possible for them to organize their projects on a structural basis.

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157   This is based on an analysis of policy documents found on https://www.amsterdam.nl/bestuur-organ-isatie/financien/.

CONCLUSION

As we saw in Chapter 3, Jewish-Muslim relations do not take place in one cohesive religious field. The groups who participate in cooperation projects come from various (self-identified) ethnic and religious groups and do not always have experience in interacting with each other. Therefore, I would argue that cooperation occurs at the *overlap* of several parts of Jewish and Muslim fields (see Bourdieu, 1991: 6-8; Wacquant, 2006: 8). Other fields are also involved because politicians, civil servants, Christians and people from other religions participate in cooperation projects and networks. Moreover, as we have seen above, political fields influence the cooperation and thus the overlap of Jewish and Muslim fields, because local and national governments could help to facilitate Jewish-Muslim cooperation.

What stands out is an apparent difference in how 'active' this overlap between Jewish and Muslims fields has been over time. It seems as if it is more active in times of crisis, reacting to the part of the fields in which conflict occurs, although individual motives to join in cooperation projects are more varied. Another distinguishing characteristic of the overlap of these fields is that, with a few exceptions, there are many social networks but the cooperation is not always institutionalized. For example, I found only one formal, interreligious organization in Amsterdam that includes Jews and Muslims. The remaining cooperation is carried out through networks or by religious organizations which make contact with others, without formalizing themselves in interreligious organizations.

This might have to do with the lack of economic capital, because being an organization can be more expensive than a network. An organization might imply having people available to answer the phone or respond to e-mail, and that activities should be organized more often, while a network can be organized more ad hoc. It also might have to do with the limited time religious and community leaders have to organize projects, as well as already being asked to organize projects too often. Again, an organization might imply that there should be structure, while there is only time for ad hoc activities.

These dynamics make the spaces in which these fields come together flexible, but also leaves them vulnerable because, if a Jewish or Muslim leader decides to stop cooperating, their positions might be difficult to fill (see also; Van Bochove & Verhoeven, 2014 for a similar argument).

The lack of financial support by local and national government is also making the part where Jewish and Muslim fields overlap vulnerable. In other words; the cooperation between Muslims and Jews is vulnerable because the lack of financing and few opportunities to hire volunteers to provide more stability to organized projects. In the next chapter, I provide in-depth insights into how religious and community leaders and the participants worked together in these groups.

7

Cooperation Strategies:
Changing Ideas and Prejudices

INTRODUCTION

In Amsterdam, Jewish-Muslim cooperation projects are spaces where unacquainted Muslims and Jews can get to know each other and where those who already know each other try to strengthen their bonds. Religious and community leaders attempt to create safe spaces where relations can flourish. Their goals are to create friendship between Jews and Muslims, bind communities together, counter stereotypes, and reduce tensions arising from the international factors described in Chapters 4 and 5 or from local conflicts as described in Chapter 6. They have to deal with participants who, in their everyday lives, come from various fields structured by different rules and logics.

However, creating connections between communities and trying to solve problems between groups and individuals is not always easy. It requires skill (see Sennett, 2012: 6). From the data it became clear that religious and community leaders, as well as participants in cooperation projects, used strategies to lighten the atmosphere, create bonds and tackle some of the problems. For example, they made jokes about themselves to ease the atmosphere or exchanged different forms of capital. However, three specific social identity strategies are most widely used; 'searching for similarities', 'decategorization' and 'avoidance' (see Brown, 2000). I analyze these strategies to understand if and how connections are made and problems get solved in Jewish-Muslim relations.

It is important to study the strategic aspects of cooperation, because they have the potential to bridge differences between fields. Since in Bourdieusian theory strategies function as ways to transfer capital from one field to another field and are thus the bridges between fields (see Bourdieu, 1979), potentially they can also help to bridge the differences between fields.

This chapter tries to answer if the cooperation strategies used by Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam do just that. It begins with the theory, describing a Bourdieusian perspective and social identity theories. It then goes on to three empirical sections, each dedicated to one main strategy. These sections show the forms and usages of these strategies and when and why they seemed to work. The conclusion shows how these strategies interact with the fields they are used in.

Bourdieusian Strategies and Social Identity Theory

Strategic behavior between groups is studied both in the social sciences and in the humanities (see Bekerman 2003; Bourdieu 1979; Wimmer 2008a, 2008b). Bourdieu describes how groups use strategies in order to gain power or to maintain the status quo (Lamaison and Bourdieu 1986, 116). In *Distinction* (1979), he describes, for example, how cultural elites may exchange cultural resources in their pursuit of economic power by trading cultural capital for economic goods. Dominated groups may use strategies to achieve social mobility (Bourdieu, 1979: 384–386). Bourdieu mentions a strategy where dominated groups demonstrate to more powerful groups that their capital is worthwhile and another where dominated groups imitate the goods of dominant classes in order to fit in.

As described in Chapter 1, Bourdieu suggests important strategies in relation to inequality and power differences. However, he misses others that are very important for Jewish-Muslim relations as well because, as we will see, the strategies that Muslims and Jews use on each other are often related to ideas of inequality and power, but also highlight identity. This is not to say that identity strategy does not contain decisions on inequality and power; it does put identity at the center of strategic behavior.

Attempts have been made to capture the wide range of identity strategies that individuals or groups use in relation to each other (Baumann 1996; Wimmer 2008b). The main idea of social identity theory is that groups and societies separate 'us' from 'them'. It forms the basis of their groups and the boundaries between their own and other groups (see Barth 1969; Castells 2010; Nagel 1994). Boundaries are based on categories that signify who belongs to the group, for example being Muslim or Jewish, male or female, straight or gay. The group boundaries are created by norms or structures that prescribe how individuals should act if they want to be considered a member of a certain group (see Nagel 1994; Wimmer 2008a: 975).[158] Social identity theory describes how people strategically try to belong to a group, to include people from other groups, to exclude others or to switch between these identities in different situations (see also Baumann, 1996).[159]

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[158] Although social identity theory puts identity constructions at the center of human behavior, many of its underpinnings resemble Bourdieusian theories. The idea that groups are formed on the basis of boundaries and categories that are based on norms and structures comes close to Bourdieu's ideas of symbolic power.

[159] It is important to note here that although people are sometimes aware of their strategies, in other situations or cases they are not (see Barth 1969, 33; Brown 2000, 767; Douglas 1983; Lamaison and Bourdieu 1986).This means that despite the fact that social identity strategies may benefit their own group(s), people who belong to the group may not always use them deliberately.

In his review article, Brown (2000: 752) argues that social identity theory is often used to explain exclusion and so it focuses on the conflictive aspects of intergroup relations. However, he also explains that some attempts have been made to explain the role of social identity strategies in cooperation between groups. Brown (2000) points out that Brewer & Miller developed their 'decategorization model', in which they show that people try to deconstruct an ascribed identity by highlighting aspects that are not associated with stereotypes (see also Pettigrew, 1998: 74, for a similar strategy). A second strategy Brown describes is the creation of a broader identity to fit in two groups.

Other scholars have pinpointed different social identity strategies as well (Baumann 1996; Wimmer 2008b). Wimmer (2008b) distinguishes five boundary strategies that minorities use in relation to a majority population. These are expansion, contraction, transvaluation, blurring and positional moves. Expansion means that an individual or a group stretches the boundaries of one of their social identities to include more people. Contraction is the opposite and means that boundaries are made more exclusionary. Transvaluation means that people try to contest power structures by explaining why their own social identity is more valuable than those of the dominant group. Blurring is a strategy that highlights parts of the identity other than those challenged or dismissed as less valuable. Finally, positional moves are strategies that do not challenge the dominant norms. An example is trying to pass oneself off as a member of the dominant class.[160]

From the data in this study, it became clear that both Jews and Muslims use Bourdieu's strategies, but as stated before, use specific social identity strategies more often to create connections between each other and try to solve some of the problems discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. The next section starts with 'searching for similarities', exploring which similarities Muslims and Jews experience with each other. This is followed by a section on 'decategorization' where the deconstruction of stereotypes is central. Finally I discuss the strategy of 'avoidance'. But before going on to the usage of three of the main strategies, it is important to note that in regard to religion the interpretation of religious texts in the everyday realities of Muslims and Jews is studied here and thus the described interpretations might differ (slightly) from official religious doctrines, scriptures or official historiography.

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160   These latter two strategies come close to Bourdieu's strategies of trying to convince others that your capital is valuable and trying to imitate valued capital.

Searching for Similarities

Jews and Muslims come from different religious and ethnic fields in the Netherlands (see Chapter 3). To bring these fields closer, Jews and Muslims most often use a strategy that I call 'searching for similarities'.[161] It comes closest to creating a new group identity into which both groups can fit, as described by Brown (2000, 752). An example of creating a new group identity is that instead of identifying as either 'Muslim' or 'Jewish', people say they are part of one group of Abrahamic religions. However, the Jews and Muslims involved in this study usually did not go so far as to create a whole new group.[162] What they did more often is search for aspects of their identities that they felt comfortable to allow each other in. They sought and found similarities in what they felt were shared religious practices and traditions, their minority status and cultural elements, including ritual slaughter, male circumcision, fasting, donating to charity (*zakāt/zedakah*), shared cuisine, shared histories and experiences of being excluded by what they perceived as the majority population (see also Frishman, 2009; Frishman & Ryad, 2016). This is what I call 'searching for similarities'.

Religious Similarities
Experienced religious similarities were used in three main ways. First, they were sometimes used to emphasize similarities. Since some Jews and Muslims already knew of shared practices, such as ritual slaughter, in this case the strategy worked as a counter-narrative against dividing discourses to emphasize binding aspects. Dialogs, for example, were sometimes organized around religious themes, such as fasting, or religious holidays that fell on the same days and religious leaders emphasized religious elements in front of the participants. For example, two religious and community leaders – Yair and Rashid – explained to an audience of Muslim and Jewish participants that Judaism and Islam have a lot in common, such as fasting and donating to charity (*zakāt/zedakah*). For some of the participants this came as no surprise, considering that they had a lot of experience with cooperation projects. Hence, for them, it did not function as an eye-opener, but as an emphasis of their bond.[163]

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161   I use 'searching' here, because often these parts of the identity were searched for in conversations between Muslims and Jews. They were looking for what connected them together and then were sometimes surprised to find their commonalities. In other cases, however, the reader should keep in mind that it was more like emphasizing similarities. For example, when religious or community leaders told the participants in the projects about the similarities between Muslims and Jews.

162   In a few instances, people did use either 'Abrahamic religions' or 'People of the Book' to describe Jews and Muslims. However, searching for similarities occurred more frequently than the creation of a new group.

163   For the participants new to Jewish-Muslim cooperation, the same narrative might have functioned as an eye-opener. I will come back to this below.

Second, in educational projects, Jewish and Muslim educators explained similarities to pupils, to make a situation less strange for them. One educational project invited pupils to visit a synagogue. Before they entered the synagogue, Mathilde, one of the guides, said that men had to wear a kippah or other headgear. She explained this by comparing Jewish and Muslim practices: "It's the same as women wearing headscarves or removing your shoes when you enter a mosque. It's a sign of respect."

Finally, they actively sought such similarities. During events and dialog meetings, the organizers told stories about religious similarities, using them as counter-narratives against stereotypes or in tense debates, hoping it would help those involved see commonalities instead of differences. Marike, a Jewish organizer of an informal interreligious network, said, for example:

> "We're trying to find similarities. (…) Our goal is to bring Jews and Muslims together through our cultural and religious backgrounds. (…) There are obvious similarities, like circumcision for boys and eating halal or kosher food."

Some participants in the cooperation projects were genuinely surprised to learn about this kind of similarity. For example, Younes, a Muslim man of Moroccan descent said that in the first dialogs he organized, he and others searched for and learned about religious similarities from each other, which surprised the participants. He thought it helped lessen their prejudice. Similarly, Hassnae, a Muslim girl in one of the educational projects said that she learned from her visit to the Anne Frank house that Islam and Judaism were not so very different. And Patrick, her teacher, who takes his class to visit a synagogue every year, said that prejudice was decreasing in his school because of this project as well.

Nevertheless, as Kessler (2010, 62) argues in his work on Jewish-Muslim-Christian dialog and Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson (2016: 218-219) argue in their work on a Jewish-Muslim cricket project, religious similarities can bind, but they can also divide. Kessler says that although the figure of Abraham is often seen as a shared aspect in Jewish, Muslim and Christian traditions, different interpretations can cause controversy. No disputes about Abraham were found during the fieldwork for this research. However, on an interreligious walk Marcus, a Jewish man, and Ibtissame, a Muslim woman, spoke enthusiastically about references to Jews they interpreted as positive and ascribed to the Qur'an. Marcus said that negative narratives about Judaism, which he also ascribed to the Qur'an, were probably written by Jewish converts to Islam, and not by true Muslims. Ibtissame was very interested. However,

the conversation grew tense when Marcus said that they would probably disagree about the Prophet Muhammad. Ibtissame laughed nervously and Marcus understood he had made a mistake. He hastened to say that he agreed with what the Prophet Muhammad said about the unity of God. She accepted this, but this example shows how, in newly established relationships, a conversation that begins with similarities can become tense when differences are discussed.

Another problem that may occur when people connect through the religious aspects of their identities is that what may be a religious similarity for some, is not for others. For example, when an Orthodox synagogue organized visits to several places of worship, a Jewish organizer mentioned that women and men sit separately in their synagogue. In the mosque they were visiting, the men and the women were also separated. In his eyes, this presented an example of a similarity between Islam and Judaism. However, in some Liberal Jewish and Muslim communities, men and women may sit next to each other and they would not regard the separation of men and women as a shared religious similarity. Moreover, Katz (2015: 317-318) argues that focusing too much on ethno-religious identities in cooperation projects might not help to find similarities in them, but highlight that Jews and Muslims are very different. Although this sentiment was not often shared in my fieldwork, it was mentioned in a duo interview with Noam, a Jewish man, and Owen, who had an Arabic background. Owen referred to himself as spiritual, but not as a member of one religion:[164]

> "Noam: It's so obvious. You're going to say [in these kind of projects], well, we're so different, let's see if we can find some similarities. While, that's not true at all. In essence there are way more similarities than differences between those groups."

> "Owen: If you're talking about a neighborhood, for example, the inhabitants, then you're not talking about two groups. They start a barbecue and everyone has dinner together. That's fine. You're talking about the neighborhood and you involve everyone in society. You're not talking about groups then."

Finally, Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson (2016: 218-219) observed that in the cricket project with young Muslims and Jews, religious similarities were used to create connections between them. However, although the young Muslims believed in God, some of the Jews in the project did not. The young Muslims found this was difficult

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164   I interviewed them because they addressed ideas about Judaism, Islam and the Middle East in their art.

to understand. So, what was assumed to be a shared religious aspect turned out to be not so shared after all. And instead of creating understanding it created tension. Also in my study, not every Jew or Muslim identified themselves as religious, either. Therefore, searching for religious similarities was not always considered a binding mechanism. In the course of the interviews, two non-observant Jews, for example, said that they did not want to engage in activities classified as interreligious, because they were not observant.

Cultural Similarities
Sometimes, bonding did not derive from shared aspects of religious identities, but from shared aspects of cultural identities. This was common among both non-religious and religious Jews and Muslims. They talked about similarities in Jewish and Moroccan/Turkish cuisine, music and family norms (see also Bahloul, 2013). However, the most common similarity arose from a narrative about Morocco that again was used as a counter-narrative to discourses that separate Jews and Muslims. Although this shared narrative did vary, broadly speaking Muslims and Jews told each other that in Morocco, Jews and Muslims had lived together in peace for ages. Moreover, they reminded each other that, during World War II, Moroccan Jews were protected by Sultan Mohammad V. This narrative was usually supported by personal reminiscences or memories handed down by the speaker's parents.

During a dialog organized to celebrate International Women's Day, Salima, a Muslim woman of Moroccan origin and organizer of a cooperation project, and Alida, a Jewish woman, discussed the role of the Moroccan king during World War II. They shared the idea that Jewish and Muslim youth sometimes do not get along, without knowing that both parties lived peacefully together in Morocco. Salima said that everyone in Morocco is considered a Moroccan and a Jew or a Muslim only in the second place. Alida confirmed that and added that she had visited Rabat lately and bought a mezuzah in a market stall run by Muslims who considered it ordinary merchandize. This showed her how normal it is for Jews and Muslims to live together there. And in an interview, Marouan, a man of Moroccan origin spoke about his father's fond memories of watching soccer on television in their Jewish neighbor's home in Morocco:

> "My dad grew up with a Jewish neighbor. My dad had no TV at home, but his neighbor did, so he watched the World Championships of 1962 there. So nice to hear! He was a real soccer addict. These kinds of stories are truly genuine."

Religious and community leaders also used this strategy to demonstrate that Muslims and Jews had something in common with each other. For example, Aliyah, a Muslim woman of Moroccan descent, very active in cooperation projects, had to give a speech at a dialog meeting. She told her audience about her family in Morocco. She joked that her Muslim family and their Jewish neighbors shared everything, except husbands. Showing the participants a necklace her mother had given her, which wove Jewish, Muslim and Berber elements together, she mentioned that she had been raised with positive stories about Jews and Muslims, and valued the bonds between members of both religions.

Interestingly, many participants in the cooperation projects knew the history of Jewish-Muslim relations in Morocco and hence the function of this narrative was more to emphasize common knowledge, rather than surprise people. This might have to do with the many Muslims in cooperation projects having a Moroccan background. While most Jewish respondents did not have a Moroccan background, many knew the stories about Sultan Mohammed V, King Hassan II and the shared history of Jews and Muslims in Morocco. This may have to do with Jews having been on holiday in Morocco, where they visited the old Jewish neighborhoods, the active role that a few Jews with Moroccan backgrounds play in Jewish-Muslim cooperation projects in Amsterdam, and the narratives that some religious and community leaders took home from a trip they had made together to Morocco.

It may also be due to the efforts of the Jewish community in Morocco to preserve this history (Ben-Layashi and Maddy-Weitzman, 2010: 90, 100). Ben-Layashi & Maddy-Weitzman (2010, 90, 100), for example, note that narratives about peaceful cohabitation are part of Moroccan Jewish and Muslim collective memories; they draw on oral traditions and are retold frequently. The authors add that these narratives have been used politically by King Hassan II and his son, Mohammed VI in peace-building attempts and therefore this might also be why many Muslims and Jews are aware of this narrative (see also Ensel, 2017: 195-196).[165]

Another explanation can be found in Katz's study (2015: 324) on Jewish-Muslim relations in France. He observes that his Jewish and Muslim respondents used harmonious memories of the past to make sense of a fractured present and explain why relations became problematic. In this sense, the narrative about Morocco can be seen as a frame that is not just used to create a bond with the Other, but also to

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165   See also Kenbib (2014) for a history of the relations between Muslims and Jews between the late 1930s and 1942.

make sense of the world. The case of Alida and Salima is interesting here because they ascribe some of the problems between young Jews and Muslims to the idea that they no longer know these stories.

Remembering positive encounters between Jews and Muslims can be a powerful strategy, especially because these narratives are not just told by religious leaders, but are part of the participants' immediate environment because their parents or political actors pass on their accounts and it can function as a frame to make sense of the world. Some Jews and Muslims mentioned that if Muslims and Jews could live together peacefully in Morocco, it should also be possible for them to get along in the Netherlands. Younes, a Muslim of Moroccan descent, for example, concluded from the Moroccan narrative that "we cannot be archenemies."

However, as Ben-Layashi and Maddy-Weitzman (2010: 100) argue, this strategy becomes vulnerable as memories fade. The Jewish community in Morocco has decreased sharply and communities abroad might not remember the stories beyond a few generations – a fear shared by Salima and Alida. Therefore, bonding over religious similarities may be more stable, because it is grounded in textual rather than oral traditions. However, Bahloul (2013: 1058-1060) shows that collective food memories that function as a binding mechanism in France and the Mediterranean world are being made future-proof, because they are shared on online platforms. This way old recipes are shared and preserved for a younger generation – a strategy that might also work for the 'Moroccan narrative'.[166]

Another disadvantage of this strategy, however, is that while the Moroccan narrative brings together Jews and Muslims with a Moroccan background, Muslims of Turkish descent might feel left out. Although this possibility exists, it was not observed empirically.

Minority Status
The last form of identity that Jews and Muslims used to search for similarities is their minority status in Dutch society. Again, this position was used to emphasize or create a bond. For example, Najim told me that he stayed friends with a Jewish man because they shared an 'otherness' that they could express to each other. They could not do this with their contacts in 'the majority'. He did not experience this as a problem and

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166   Studying social media or online platforms is beyond the scope of this research, but it would be an interesting topic for future research to see how these kinds of narratives are discussed online and to see if they are effective in decreasing stereotypes and creating online networks between Muslims and Jews.

was happy he could express it with his friend. Others, however, felt excluded. For example, Achraf, a Muslim of Moroccan descent, explained what made him and his Jewish friend Gideon connect:

> "Well, it might sound crazy but [it's] the lack of warmth in this society, like not feeling at home, or feeling that society is falling apart. (…) Gideon no longer feels Dutch either he feels that he doesn't belong in this society."

As with similarities in religious and cultural identities, religious or community leaders used experienced similarities in their minority status to show pupils that Jews and Muslims are not so very different. For example, I witnessed a conversation in a synagogue between Lieke, a pupil, and a Jewish guide (Chaya). Lieke asked: "Why did Hitler hate the Jews?" Chaya answered that the reason was quite unclear, but it might have had to do with the idea that in the past the Jews were the only non-Christian minority: "If you are a part of a minority, you are often blamed for all kinds of things, just like Muslims are now being blamed for all kinds of things as well."

The difference between bonding over religious/cultural similarities and bonding over minority status is that the latter is based on experienced exclusion. The shared minority position sometimes made Jews and Muslims feel that they had to stick together because as minorities their existence might be threatened by what they perceived to be the secular majority population. As described above, the NIK and the CMO, for example, worked together to prevent that ritual slaughter without first stunning the animal would be forbidden (see also Vellenga 2014: 357-358). In the interviews for this study, respondents said that as minorities who saw their religious freedom under threat, they decided to work together. Doing this, they could benefit from each other's skills. Onur, a Muslim man, said that the Jews had lived in the Netherlands for longer so their institutions were more suited to deal with the Dutch government. On the other hand, Robert, a Sephardic Jew, said:

> "The Jewish community can also share a bit of experience with non-Jewish key figures in the Moroccan community. Knowledge and experience are things you can share. It puts them in a bit of a stronger position, like realizing or maintaining their facilities through the government or… you name it. But also maintaining Jewish facilities. Ritual slaughter would have been abolished a long time ago if there were no Muslims [in the Netherlands]."

He explained that Jewish communities were not always protected by the national government anymore, because no one took the history of World War II seriously

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anymore. Robert felt that being such a small minority made the religious rights of Jewish communities vulnerable and having Muslims also defending ritual slaughter helped Jewish communities maintain their religious freedom. In other words, in this case, although Dutch Muslims were believed to own more social capital, Jews were believed to have acquired more expertise in dealing with the political system (cultural capital) (see Bourdieu 1979; Wacquant 2006).[167]

Thus, the realization that they were in a shared minority position and perceived certain qualities in each other helped Jews and Muslims work together.[168] As Kateb, a Muslim respondent of Palestinian descent, commented on the political leader of the Animal Party who introduced the bill on ritual slaughter: "Marianne Thieme will turn us into great comrades!"[169]

Nevertheless, the strategy might become a problem if an entire group is accused of being the wrongdoer. For instance, during a dialog meeting between Jews, Muslims and Christians, Jesse, a young member of the Apostolic Society, was exploring whether or not he wanted to be religious. He told the group that he had gone to a dialog meeting in the past and felt excluded because they had said they were 'against the seculars'. As someone who identified to some extent as non-religious, he felt very unwelcome because he was seen as the wrongdoer.

In conclusion, we have seen that religious and community leaders used searching for similarities as a strategy to seek aspects that they had in common, provide counter-narratives and reveal similarities to Jews and Muslims who did not normally have contact with each other in the hope of reducing prejudice, countering tense debates and creating lasting bonds. For people unacquainted with the Other, similarities in religious, cultural and minority identities sometimes came as a surprise, were sought in an attempt to bond with the Other and sometimes influenced how they thought about each other. Similarities were not only used as bonding mechanisms, they also worked to emphasize the shared knowledge of both leaders and participants and make previously created bonds last. Finally, in a few cases, seeing someone as similar

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167 Interestingly, in regard to the debates about male circumcision, Westerduin, Jansen & Neutel (2014: 40) show that it was also argued that Muslims needed Jewish communities. The authors argue that the controversies about male circumcision and ritual slaughter are conceived as a European positioning toward Islam. However, these practices are also part of Jewish traditions and thus linked to the position between Jews and European majorities and hence to the history of anti-Semitism in Europe. This is why the Jewish critic Michel Chaouli argued that if Muslims were the only minority, the practice of male circumcision would already have been abolished.

168 This is not to say that there were no problems in their cooperation. Niels, an orthodox Jew, told me it that it was hard to organize their cooperation at times.

169 An earlier version said that this respondent was of Turkish descent. That mistake is corrected here.

influenced the ability to mobilize against a threat from the outside, a case in point being the debate on ritual slaughter.

However, as we have seen above, there were also difficulties. It is hard to bring together groups coming from various fields, especially when the differences in the internal logics of the Jewish and Muslim fields are not addressed constructively and become more important than the common ground. Examples are the discussion between Marcus and Ibtissame who talked about the Prophet Muhammad, and the more ambiguous example of the discussions on the effect of the interreligious network that went to Morocco. Moreover, when only one group, such as Muslims of Moroccan origin, is included others may feel excluded and bonding over being a minority introduces the additional complication of how to deal with the (secular) majority population and other religious groups with yet other fields and logics. It might be argued that these social identities can be broadened to try and fit in all participants. In some cases, this might work, for example, by searching for similarities that appeal to the groups present among the participants. However, if there are Jews, Muslims, Christians and non-religious people, from all kinds of ethnic backgrounds, present during a cooperation project, uniting them under one category might be equally difficult. Searching for similarities is therefore a powerful strategy, but it is also a strategy where it is crucial to understand the context in which it is used.

Decategorizing

The second strategy often used is decategorization, particularly in educational projects. One of the main goals of educational projects is to learn about the Other. Religious and community leaders claimed that pupils knew little about each other's religious or cultural practices. When observing education projects I also noticed this lack of knowledge; the Muslim pupils I encountered did not always know much about Judaism while some of the Jewish pupils knew little about Islam.[170] The organizers of educational projects reported that besides lacking knowledge, these pupils had negative assumptions about each other, which the organizers believed they had gained from media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the extremist attacks in Brussels (2014), Paris (2015) and Copenhagen (2015).

To challenge negative assumptions and lack of knowledge, religious leaders and peer-educators use a 'decategorization model' (Brewer and Miller cited in Brown

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170   Not only Jewish and Muslim pupils expressed prejudices and lack of knowledge, but also pupils from other backgrounds. Other youngsters (Jewish, Muslim or other) were more knowledgeable and less prejudiced However, in the visited classrooms, the lack of knowledge was greater than expected.

(2000)). In this strategy, positive aspects of identities that do not match prejudices and stereotypes are discussed.[171] Karin, one of the Jewish organizers of an educational project in a synagogue explained:

> "When we ask the pupils what they think of when they hear the word 'Jew', many pupils draw associations with Anne Frank, the Second World War, and Hitler, and some children draw swastikas. (…) We want to project that we are modern Jews. We show that there are differences in Judaism. My colleague eats kosher and I don't and that's okay. We just think about this differently. If the pupils understand these differences, the project is a success."

In practice, this kind of deconstruction also happened in the classrooms I observed:

> "Mathilde (one of the Jewish hosts) asks the pupils if they had expected that she and the other host (Lotte) would be Jewish. A Muslim boy of Moroccan descent (Farid) says he had, because Mathilde and Lotte are the hosts in a synagogue, so the conclusion is obvious. Mathilde laughs. She asks the pupils if they would have thought they were Jewish if they were walking on the street. Farid and his friend of Surinamese descent say that they would not have guessed. The latter says that Mathilde and the other host do not look Jewish. Lotte asks him what 'looking Jewish' is. He says: 'Hooked noses'. Mathilde says: 'All right, what else?' Farid says that Jews wear long, black clothes. Other pupils say 'curls' and 'mustaches'. After the laughter dies down, Mathilde explains that not all Jews have hooked noses and that the people who wear black are Orthodox Jews. Liberal Jews do not wear that kind of clothing."

When another class visited the synagogue, appearance alone helped to put assumptions into perspective. The Jewish educators asked the pupils to write down what they associated with the word 'Jew'. I sat beside Fatima and Najoua, two Muslim girls, Sandra, a non-religious girl; and Patrick, a teacher.[172] The girls did not know what to write. After the teacher encouraged them they tried. Najoua put down 'braids'. She looked at the teacher and added, "And beards, right…?" Sandra agreed, but then looked at the Jewish educator, who did not have a beard and wondered, "But he does not have a beard…" Najoua still wrote down "beards", but the others did not.

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171   In decategorization, religion, ethnicity and culture are difficult to separate, because the stereotypes they counter also use various social identities. Therefore, I do not separate these categories as I did in the previous section.

172   Najoua explained to me that she would rather be a humanist than a Muslim, but her parents are very strict so she has to stay a Muslim.

Not matching the girls' expectations helped to deconstruct this stereotype, at least for some of the girls.

In another educational project, Muslim, Jewish and homosexual peer-educators played with a combination of appearance and conversation to decategorize stereotypes. In one lesson, the peer-educators listed several propositions on the blackboard, such as: 'I am Jewish', 'My brother has blond hair and blue eyes' and 'I have a Surinamese family'. At one of the primary schools visited in this project, the pupils all chose either the blue-eyed Jewish or the blond gay peer-educator when asked whose brother had blond hair and blue eyes. They were surprised that the Muslim peer-educator, who had darker skin and brown eyes, was the one with a brother with blue eyes. He explained to the children that his brother is actually a stepbrother and therefore they do not have the same parents. Later, the peer-educators discussed the proposition 'I have a Surinamese family'. One of the boys in the classroom said he chose the Muslim peer-educator, but then he hesitated and said: "Maybe they are related by marriage, so it could also be the other two."

Sometimes this strategy was used outside educational projects. For example, in some cases religious leaders spoke up for each other in public, to show that Jews and Muslims were not each other's enemies, but could cooperate. Some cooperation projects also tried to attract the press or public spokespersons to their projects to spread the word and change the imagery that Muslims and Jews do not get along. Speaking up for each other and explaining that portraying Jews and Muslims as enemies does not fit their realities also functioned as a form of decategorization.

Decategorization was sometimes used to discuss delicate topics. As we saw in Chapter 4, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was often seen as the most contentious conflict between Jews and Muslims. Discussing this topic was therefore often avoided. There were, however, some exceptions. In the educational projects, some Jewish and Muslim (peer) educators try to ease the tension surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict either by deconstructing the view that all Jews support Israel and all Muslims support the Palestinians or by trying to explain the more complex opinions in this debate. In doing so, they have had to disentangle political, ethnic and religious identities. For example, in the educational project in the synagogue, described above, one of the Jewish educators explained to a group of pupils that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is primarily about land. She explained some Arabs live in Israel and some Jews live in Arab countries so, she concluded, the conflict is not necessarily religious or a conflict between Jews and Muslims.

Another example can be found in an informal interreligious network in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seemed to have become a problem. When misunderstandings arose about her presence, Aliyah, a Muslim woman who had attended a pro-Palestine protest, explained her reasons for doing so in front of the group. She defended her presence by emphasizing the human struggles of civilians and stating that she did not approve of violence. Thirza, a Jewish woman was also asked to share why she was at a pro-Israel demonstration and in her answer she used the same kind of terminology. The organizers said that they did not have to agree on every aspect of life to be friends and the interreligious network remained intact. This form of decategorization strives to explain positions by providing the other with more information so that they can understand these views, while also providing an option to agree to disagree.

As we have seen, decategorizing deals with assumptions about Jews and Muslims. The examples above show that religious and community leaders, such as Jewish and Muslim (peer) educators, use this strategy often and deliberately in their programs. This strategy was also found in dialog meetings, because the participants often have to explain their positions. Decategorizing can help attain the goal of dismantling stereotypes, as shown in the example of the peer-educators, whose pupils applied what they had just learned to the next proposition. It can also be useful in order to explain certain positions that may reduce tensions, as in the example of the interreligious network.

The latter examples show the often successful deconstruction of stereotypes. However, when discussing delicate topics, decategorization was sometimes harder. The problem with this strategy is that particularly in discussions about Israel and the Palestinians, it may not increase trust, but rather result in distrust. In these circumstances, tensions can prove difficult to temper. In an interview, Azize, a Muslim woman, explained that a heated debate had emerged in her interreligious women's group when a woman who identified as Christian, tried to explain her position. She said that the international community was not listening to the Palestinians and she could understand that eventually this forced them to use violence to gain a hearing. A Jewish woman argued that this was a violation of Israel. This conversation led to an intense discussion between the people who identified as Christians and the Jews in this group. Azize, who preferred not to get involved, said she was caught in the middle, because both parties had phoned her to talk about each other. She wanted to avoid the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the first place, but the dispute in her women's group made her even more anxious about attempting to open a discussion about the topic.

As we saw in Chapter 4, a vast number of respondents concluded that it was better not to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at all, a decision influenced by the pervasive frame that emerged. That is why, in many cooperation projects, organizers as well as participants, used the last main strategy found in Jewish-Muslim cooperation projects in Amsterdam.[173]

Avoidance

Chapter 4 describes in detail the impact of avoiding any talk of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and using an avoidance strategy in Jewish-Muslim relations. To recap briefly: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was deemed 'too complicated' or 'too delicate' and so was often not discussed. Some organizations, such as the women's group mentioned above, decided to talk about religious or cultural issues, but not the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Jewish and Muslim leaders actively warned against talking about this problem, because it would 'import' the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to Amsterdam. They tried to avoid the topic in their cooperation projects and advised other religious and community leaders to do the same – although there were some exceptions. Avoidance had the consequence that at times both Muslims and Jews underestimated the opinions of their cooperation partners, and more often thought the other had very different opinions than themselves. A pervasive frame – emerging from a pull inside the communities, polarizing discussions in the media and the symbolic power used in demonstrations – triggered and maintained this idea.

In cooperation projects the strategy avoidance was thus used quite often in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which resulted in some cooperation project not being able to reduce tensions surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Amsterdam. However, as described above, in some cases, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was discussed and also then it could also lead to tensions.

There might, however, be some solutions to this paradox, since there were also some instances when talking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did work. Interestingly, in their study about a Jewish-Muslim cricket project, Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson (2016: 217) found a form of decategorization that can be seen as a combination of decategorization and avoidance. In this project, the organizers let young Jews and Muslims talk about similarities and differences, but also gave them space to just 'hang out' or talk about other shared aspects that did not have much to do with being Jewish

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173   For an interesting study on the quantitative effects of an educational project in Amsterdam, see Van der Heijden & De Wit (2014).

or Muslim. For example, they let them talk about areas in their city and let them play cricket together, instead of only discussing topics that were in these cases considered sensitive. This temporarily placed the participants out of their own religious or ethnic groups. This shift in talking, from delicate topics to other shared experiences and identities, might be helpful to build trust.

In the cooperation projects I studied, Muslims and Jews also found solutions to talk about delicate topics – not just the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also violent extremism and discrimination. One solution also involved providing various spaces to 'hang out', while discussing lighter topics and searching for similarities. In the dialog meeting discussed in Chapter 7, for example, the participants talked about lighter topics such as sport and the neighborhood, which gave the air needed to enable them to discuss complicated topics such as violent extremism and discrimination. After the dialog there was time for a dinner, which provided a light-hearted atmosphere. Other projects also provided different 'spaces', such as having dinner somewhere after a dialog or setting a spot for taking group photos together. However, the cricket project described by Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson (2016) had more time for 'hanging around' because it happened on multiple occasions and the participants also went on a weekend trip together, whereas many projects in Amsterdam happened organized just once or several times, but with different groups.

Salima, a Muslim woman of Moroccan origin and organizer of a cooperation project found yet another form of combining strategies. She mentioned that if the first encounter between Jews and Muslims is about conflicts and ends in heated debate, first impressions are likely to be negative. She argued that it is best not to begin by discussing Israel and the Palestinians but, once trust has been established, it might be possible to raise the subject. Initial avoidance works here when combined with decategorization later on. Merve found yet another solution. She said she thought it depended on the situation. At the religious market she helped organize, the aim was to show that religions can coexist. She thought it was not a suitable context to discuss Israel and the Palestinians, because at moments like these you want to show others what unites. However, for small groups in religious institutions that have cooperated together for a long time and have established trust, it might be possible to discuss this theme.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen above, in the designated period, Jewish and Muslim religious and community leaders tried to unravel stereotypes, resolve local conflicts, create bonds and reduce tensions arising from the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and the extremist attacks in Brussels (2014), Copenhagen (2015) and Paris (2015). In their cooperation projects, Jewish and Muslim leaders, as well as participants, mainly used three social identity strategies to reach these goals: 'searching for similarities', 'decategorizing' and 'avoidance'. Searching for similarities provides participants with counter-narratives that focus on shared aspects of religious, cultural and minority identities. It also emphasizes similarities that participants already see as shared. Decategorization is applied in order to counter stereotypes and explain why Jews and Muslims have certain standpoints. Finally, Jews and Muslims use avoidance to prevent relations from becoming tense.

These strategies helped Jewish and Muslim leaders to reach some of the goals set in the scope of these projects. Some Jews and Muslims mentioned that they had learned about the similarities between their religions and some pupils in educational projects began thinking more about prejudice. In achieving this, the attempts might decrease some of the tension and succeed in bringing parts of religious fields together. Initial avoidance also ensures that the political field that is dealing with Palestinian–Israeli conflicts is kept well outside these projects.

However, these strategies also have their limits. As we have seen, some similarities included some groups of Jews and Muslims, but excluded others or were overshadowed by differences. Decategorization was felt too hard to achieve in discussions about the conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians and, finally, avoidance may cause problems in the long run, if aspects of political identities are not discussed, but are still questioned in the public debate.

It is interesting to see that 'searching for similarities' has commonalities with 'creating a new group identity', but differs from the latter in its use and content (see Brown, 2000). This divergence may stem from the position groups occupy in a societal field. In social identity theory, many studies focus on majority–minority relations and the pressure on minorities to assimilate into the majority group. The creation of a new group in majority-minority relations is then described as a strategy used by minorities as a way to become part of the majority population. As both Jews and Muslims are numerical minorities in the Netherlands, they feel no pressure to assimilate with each other's group. Therefore, their strategies differ in the sense that they do not

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try to become part of each other's group, but let each other in on a part of their own identities instead.

Decategorizing and avoidance were also applied differently from the switching described in Baumann's study and the decategorization strategy explained by Brown (see Baumann, 1996; Brown, 2000). For example, at the beginning of the fieldwork in 2014, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians had just begun to escalate into the Gaza War (see Chapter 4). This political field became more prominent in the media and in the overlap of fields in which Jewish-Muslim relations take place. Hence, avoidance was a way to cope with this conflict. In less turbulent times, decategorization might be easier because, when media attention fades, it may become easier to talk about this subject.

In conclusion, when studying Jewish-Muslim relations we have seen strategies that introduce change, because in using them Jewish and Muslim fields come together and structures of these fields are therefore questioned and are becoming more fluid. This provides Muslims and Jews with the space to create change. However, it is also important to see that their cooperation, conflict and strategies emerged from specific power relations at the crossroads of ethno-religious and political fields. This finding contributes to our understanding of the contextualization of the strategies Jews and Muslims use and the change their strategies might provide to ethno-religious and political fields.

CHAPTER

9

Emotion Management in Jewish-Muslim Cooperation

INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, I described how Jews and Muslims tried to form bonds with each other through the use of cooperation strategies. These strategies all tried to change stereotypical or negative ideas about the Other. Although these strategies sometimes helped to forge bonds, changing ideas alone might not be enough. We have already seen that emotions play an important role in Jewish-Muslim relations. In Part 2, we saw how Najim described some Muslims as having an "almost unconscious jealousy" of Jewish communities and how Emma said that she was scared of Muslims, because of what she had seen in the media. In this chapter, I will show how religious and community leaders tried to manage these emotions, not just to change the ideas but also the feelings about the Other.

Jealousy and fear, however, were not the only emotions that Muslims and Jews spoke of or that I observed. In the cooperation projects, I also came across lots of laughter and warmth – as described in the example of the warm summer evening in the Introduction of this book. Muslim and Jewish religious and community leaders encouraged these emotions and, as we will see below, they used enhancing techniques and humor to do so.[174]

Their use of these techniques points to the importance of studying the emotional dimensions of relations between Muslims and Jews. Using techniques to manage emotions in cooperation projects could influence how Muslims and Jews feel about the Other and thus help to counter stereotypes. It is also important because studies on intergroup emotion theory suggest that emotions structure attitudes in relations between social groups (see Yablon, 2006: 217). This implies that if cooperation projects try to challenge stereotypes about the Other, challenging the emotions connected to stereotypes might be a crucial element in finding solutions.

The next section discusses emotion management theory to interpret the findings (see Harlow, 2003; Harvey Wingfield, 2010; Hochschild, 1979; 1993). After this theoretical section, I show how religious and community leaders dealt with anger, frustration and fear in their cooperation projects. Then I discuss how the leaders tried to enhance joy and the role humor played in Jewish-Muslim cooperation projects in Amsterdam.

174　Much emotion management was applied in the cooperation projects. However, it was also used out-side projects to de-escalate situations involving Jews and Muslims. Organizers of demonstrations and (local) government used these strategies to reduce tensions. This chapter focuses on cooperation projects, but occasionally includes examples from other contexts, such as demonstrations, daily life or meetings between activists.

Finally, I discuss if and how these emotional strategies 'work' and relate them to the strategies described in the Chapter 8.

Emotions in Theory

Bourdieu's theories do not provide very suitable tools to understand the emotional aspects of Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam, because Bourdieu largely ignores emotions in his work (see Chapter 1 and Lizardo, 2004: 394).[175] Some empirical studies on contemporary and historical Jewish-Muslim relations in Western Europe do mention emotions but do not study them in-depth. Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson (2016: 216-220), for example, state that in the Jewish-Muslim cricket project they studied, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict caused "irritation" between Muslims and Jews and extremist attacks can cause fear. They also say that diverging ideas about religion can make Muslims and Jews feel uncomfortable. A professional mediator resolved this by providing room to express feelings and structure the conversation through dialog. Mandel (2010: 174-175), mentions that during the First Gulf War, French Muslims started to *feel* like 'second-class citizens' in France. Nonetheless, these studies do not describe in any detail how emotions are steered, discussed and performed in cooperation projects. An exception can be found in Reedijk's (2015) study which shows that participating in each other's ritual or creating a new ritual affects emotions. I will elaborate on her findings later on in this chapter.

To be able to interpret the findings of my study, Hochschild's (1979: 566) theory on emotion management provides an interesting perspective to understand emotions in Jewish-Muslim cooperation. Hochschild uses the concepts of framing rules, feeling rules, emotion work and emotion management to understand emotions (see Chapter 1). Framing rules prescribe how meaning should be given to a certain situation (see Verhoeven & Tonkens, 2013: 416-417). Examples are political ideologies and worldviews. Next to these framing rules, feeling rules prescribe how people should *feel* about a situation. Hochschild defines 'feeling rules' as the rules that prescribe how people should and should not feel (see Verhoeven & Tonkens, 2013: 416-417). She (1979: 552) refers to weddings and parties, where you are supposed to feel happy, and funerals where it is expected you feel sad. These framing and feeling rules are being formed and expressed through emotion work, emotion management and emotional labor.

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175   Although, as stated in Chapter 1, his tools do have implications for emotions.

Emotion management and emotion work are used interchangeably and denote: "the act of trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling." Hochschild (1979: 561) distinguishes two forms of emotion management that people use to manage emotions: evocative and suppressive. The first is an attempt to evoke feelings that are not there initially. The second implies that people experience emotions that are deemed undesirable and are therefore suppressed. These forms, however, are not just forced upon subjects. As Hochschild describes them, they are evoked, managed, and shaped as well as suppressed.

To evoke or suppress emotions Hochschild (1979: 562) describes three strategies.[176] First, she distinguishes a "cognitive" strategy – geared toward emotions – in which acts and behavior are changed in order to change the feelings corresponding with the behavior. In my understanding of her text, it is a reframing or re-ordering of the situation, in other words a different way of interpreting a situation to change the feelings associated with an initial interpretation. Think, for example, of being angry at someone because that person hurt your feelings. However, when you think the situation through you may understand why that person behaved the way they did. This might lessen your anger at the Other.[177] The second strategy Hochschild discusses is a "bodily" strategy, in which the physical symptoms of emotions, such as frowning when angry, are changed to control the emotion. For example, when people feel anxious they breathe slowly to calm down. The third strategy is "expressive" emotion management in which changing expressive gestures is used to change inner feelings. For example, trying to smile to feel better.[178] As we will see below, Jews and Muslims also use some of these emotion management strategies in their cooperation projects.

In Hochschild's 1993 study on the working conditions of flight attendants she introduces the concept of emotional labor. This is a form of emotion management used to align emotions to the corporate rules for feeling set by the company people work for. She shows how these feeling rules can become very oppressive for the people working in service industries, because they ask employees to smile and be polite even when customers are very rude or when work pressure puts a strain on the quality of service provided. What is more, emotional labor has its limits and people can reach a 'breaking point'. This happens when inside emotions do not match the situation and

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176   These techniques can be applied to the self, by the self upon others and by others upon the self. However, this chapter is about emotion management by religious and community leaders, so I focus on the last.

177   This is not to say that one should never be angry, nor does it imply that this strategy is always appropriate for the given situation. It does imply that Hochschild found that her respondents used these strategies in their day-to-day lives to evoke or suppress emotions.

178   Hochschild (1979) mentions that these strategies can be divided analytically, but are often used at the same time.

people cry or get angry and their stress response is deemed inappropriate in the situational context (Hochschild, 1993: 333-334).

In 1979 Hochschild (1979: 572) encouraged researchers to analyze the feeling rules present in several different groups to discover how different contexts influence how people feel. Many researchers have responded to this call (see e.g. Bolton, 2005; Harlow, 2003; Harvey Wingfield, 2010; Robinson, 2018). Bolton (2005), for example, writes about emotion management in the workplace, Harlow (2003) writes on the effect of student's social and cultural expectations on their professors' emotion management, and Robinson (2018) writes on the effect of digital inequality on emotion management. Hochschild developed her theories over the years as well (see Hochschild, 1993; Hochschild, 2011; Willig, 2017). It would go too far to discuss all of this work, but I will mention a few insights from these studies that might be helpful when trying to understand emotion management in cooperation projects between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam.

Many studies on emotion management deal with emotion management in the workplace. This is no coincidence because much of Hochschild's work was set in the workplace as well, such as the 1993 study described above. There is scant literature available on emotion management in interreligious relations in Western Europe.[179] There are, however, a few studies that discuss emotion management in relations between majority populations and groups defined as ethnic or racial (see Harlow, 2003; Harvey Wingfield, 2010). These studies are situated in the workplace, but also show the dynamics of minority-majority relations. These studies will not teach us how Muslims and Jews use emotion management, but we do gain some insight into the kind of emotion management used in minority-majority relations by way of comparison.

Harlow (2003) and Harvey Wingfield (2010) show that emotion management in the workplace is often more difficult for ethnic minorities, as well as women, because framing and feeling rules have different consequences for minority groups, are implied differently or are altogether different for these groups. Harlow (2003: 357), for example, shows how people she describes as black, female professors, struggled with being taken less seriously by their students in comparison to their white peers. In addition, they also had to deal with stereotypes, being regarded as either 'motherly' or 'angry black woman'. Being stereotyped made these women use far more emotional labor than their white peers. Harvey Wingfield (2010: 257) reveals that the feeling

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179   For an interesting study outside Western Europe see Yablon (2006).

rule of acting nice and friendly to colleagues was harder for black professionals in many different occupations, because they encountered more racism on the work floor. Harvey Wingfield shows that when people are faced with demeaning utterances at work, being nice to others is a lot harder than it is for peers who do not experience such utterances.

These studies show how ethnic or racial groups develop strategies to enable them to work together in environments where they are often in the minority. Harlow (2003: 357-362), for example, describes how black professors, encountering challenges to their knowledge and professionalism, tried to prove to their students that they are capable teachers by working extra hard or giving 'perfect' lessons. Instead of proving their students wrong, other professors ignored or distanced themselves from demeaning remarks and tried to obtain self-worth from within or from positive encounters with students who did not question their abilities. Obtaining self-worth from within, however, required extensive emotion management. Harvey Wingfield (2003: 256-263) again shows that black professionals often followed feeling rules that indicated they had to be pleasant and suppressed their anger at racist remarks to avoid the negative consequences – such as being fired. Sometimes they downplayed racial remarks, humbled themselves, or discussed their feelings afterwards with co-workers who understood their struggle. Some black women did express their anger at racist remarks. Harvey Wingfield (2010: 263) explains this might have to do with the position of women and the different stereotypes applied to black men and women.

My study of how Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam use emotion management to enable mutual cooperation adds to these insights. Interestingly, as we will see below, Jewish and Muslim leaders have to deal with sometimes different feeling rules in their communities coming together in Jewish-Muslim cooperation. However, because the feeling rules of two fields become more fluid together, they have the space to shape and adjust these rules – as we saw in the strategies developed to change ideas in Chapter 8. In both instances, Jewish and Muslim religious and community leaders play a central role in Jewish-Muslim cooperation and apply emotion management strategies. Looking at their emotion management in cooperation projects can provide insights into how they manage these projects, how they handle conflict and in the way cooperative strategies can succeed or fail to bind Jews and Muslims together. I will address three forms of emotion management: dealing with anger, fear and frustration; enhancing joy; and using humor. The next section introduces the three forms and the strategies involved in them.

Emotions in Practice

Dealing with Anger, Fear or Frustration
In cooperation projects, educational projects and other settings Muslims, Jews and other participants sometimes expressed anger, fear and frustrations. Religious and community leaders tried to diminish these emotions by structuring feelings either before starting their cooperation or educational projects or during interactions between the participants. The first strategy was often in the form of rules or models thought out before a project started and implemented at the beginning of the meeting. The second form are strategies used on the spot when a situation is getting out of hand. These provide more space for improvisation.

An example of the first type of strategy is found in the educational project described in Chapters 7 and 8, where Jewish, Muslim and homosexual peer-educators taught pupils about discrimination. In this project, they worked with the ASR model (*aanwijzen, samenvatten en reageren,* meaning to point out, summarize and respond) described in Chapter 7. In practice this means that during the lessons pupils had to raise their hand, say to whom they wanted to respond to, summarize the argument of that person and only then provide their response. This intended to make the pupils listen to one another. They had to try to understand the other person's argument and only after reflection were they allowed to respond. Peer-educators in this project explained that this strategy helps to listen to each other, to make sure you are talking about the same thing and that it shows respect to the person you are talking with. The advantage of this model is that feelings cannot be expressed immediately, which might lessen an emotional response.

In other words, the peer-educators applied an emotional strategy that Hochschild would call both suppressive and cognitive. Suppressive in the sense that it tries to diminish anger, sadness or frustration, and cognitive in the sense of trying to let pupils behave in a certain way – follow the ASR model – to change how they feel. This strategy somewhat helped to structure the classroom discussions. In one session I observed, pupils from three different classes had to debate each other and it was clear that the children had learned how to apply this model; it structured the discussion. In another classroom, however, it helped only slightly. The class was busy, which overwhelmed the peer-educators and the teacher did not help by giving them the necessary authority.

Related to working with a model, other strategies also implemented rules beforehand and explained to participants in cooperation projects how to act. But instead of a model, these feeling rules were expressed as important norms and values. For

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example, many dialog meetings started with speeches, often given by religious or community leaders or speakers they had selected, such as refugees or artists. The speakers often made statements like 'treat each other with respect' or 'treat others the way you would like to be treated yourself'. Sometimes these norms were also connected to ideas about self-reflection, juridical categories like human rights and religious norms and values. At a meeting of religious leaders, for example, a rabbi, reverend, imam and a professor each gave a speech. The rabbi said:

> "You can also look at it in a humanitarian way and start by not misusing words yourself. That means that you are a conscious, respectful citizen and use the right of free speech in such a way that other Dutch people who think differently are not ridiculed. Because, in the end, citizens should be protected collectively. (…) Summarized this means: treat others the way you would like to be treated yourself [*Wat gij niet wilt, dat u geschiedt, doe dat ook aan een ander niet*]."[180]

Such norms were not meant as explicit rules for the dialog, but giving this kind of speech before participants engaged in dialog with each other gave direction to the following discussion. So these feeling rules functioned as 'rules of the game', trying to guide emotions toward such goals as cooperation, respecting differences and thinking before acting.

The second form of emotion management was implemented as an intervention during the day if participants became angry, sad or frustrated. I will discuss these 'on-the-spot' strategies by zooming in on one dialog meetings that featured a variety of them. The dialog meeting was organized by local social workers from Moroccan descent. I estimated about a hundred people were in the audience. The mayor of Amsterdam was invited to be the keynote speaker, but he was late, so they went on to the debate, involving the whole audience. The debate grew heated after two orthodox Jews – Tzemach and Eli – said that a lot of Muslims felt hate against Jews, and accused Muslims of being anti-Semitic. They added that the exclusion of Muslims was not the Jews' fault. A young Muslim, Hasim, responded that in Islam there is no hate for Jews, because according to the Qur'an people of the book are protected.[181] He pointed

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180 I was at this meeting, but complemented my notes with the speeches published on the website of the Raad van Kerken in Nederland (see Raad van Kerken in Nederland, 2014).

181 As in Chapter 8, it is important to note that this chapter places the interpretation of texts in the everyday realities of Muslims and Jews central and thus might (slightly) differ from official religious doctrines, scriptures or official historiography. In this context it is important that Hasim uses this particular interpretation to show that not all Muslims hate Jews. For an in-depth analysis of these kind of interpretations see Chapter 5 and Van Es (2018).

out that things often get called anti-Semitism, even when it is not, although some youngsters can express anti-Semitism if they do not know enough about Judaism yet. As an example, he said that he is "against the terror state Israel", but would not ask Tzemach and Eli to take a stance against Israel.

The discussion went on for a while and then Tzemach asked if anyone in the audience "hated Jews." People in the room began to laugh, thinking he was joking, but Tzemach was serious. Someone responded that the people who hated Jews were probably not at a voluntary meeting between Muslims and Jews. After the moderator said that this might be true, he added that people in the audience will have different opinions and that these differences could be painful. Describing Israel as "terror state Israel", for example, might hurt some. He asked the audience if they knew how you can address these different opinions. A Christian woman, Heleen, stood up and said that she knew it was not the fault of any Jews here, but she also gets angry when she sees atrocities of the Israeli state on television. The moderator responded that he understood, but that they were looking for solutions.

Again, Tzemach stood up and asked if the people in the audience had friends who hate Jews. It remained quiet. The moderator reflected that it would be better to talk about people actually present in the audience. Two people regarded as both community and religious leaders then stood up. The first was Mathilde, a Jewish woman with lots of experience in interreligious dialog. She began telling a personal story (described in Chapter 4) about her own standpoints. She told the audience that it hurts her when people say that Israel does not have the right to exist. She explained that for her, Israel is the place she shares a history with. Moreover, she said that in the Netherlands, as a Jew, she is always part of a minority, and Israel is the only country where she belongs to the majority population. However, she also said that she feels the pain of the Palestinians, and does not always agree with the Israeli government. Her story got a big applause. Mo, a Muslim community leader, added that "as religious people" we should cooperate and look at what binds us together.

In this example, we see a lot of emotion management. First, the moderator let Tzemach and Hasim discuss the topic, but when the situation deteriorated and the audience became restless because of Tzemach's questions, he intervened and tried to work toward a more positive conversation. Again, he intervened when Heleen gave an emotional statement, instead of answering his question. Finally, when Tzemach restarted the topic the moderator steered the conversation away from his question, with the support of the religious and community leaders. Mathilde steered the

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conversation to personal experience, while Mo referred to group identities that many participants in the audience shared.

Interruption, steering to a different context or changing the subject were improvised strategies I witnessed several times in practice to deal with emotions, to interrupt someone who was emotional or who might provoke an emotional response. Afterward the dialog often continued with other participants. This strategy was also used the other way around. When participants were already angry or sad, then Jews and Muslims decided it was better not to discuss sensitive issues, but come back to the issue when people had calmed down. This is similar to avoidance strategy (see Chapter 8), but it differs in the sense that there is at least the intention to work through the problems later on. It is a suppressive strategy, but allows for some expression of anger, sadness or frustration in first instance, and subduing these feelings only when they seem to take over the mood of the group.

Another strategy in this elaborate example was when Mathilde told the audience her personal story. Other religious and community leaders also applied this strategy. Emma, a Jewish community leader, for example, met many elderly Jewish people through her work. She told me her elderly clients were often unsure how to cope when people made comments they felt were hurtful. Emma wanted to give them training in being able to respond without creating tension. Of a woman who had experienced hurtful comments from her neighbor, she said:

> "Well, I'd advise her to be honest and tell her neighbor: 'What you say hurts me.' When you put it like that you create a level [playing field]. I can imagine that the neighbor doesn't understand how hurtful a comment like that can be. [Saying] it hurts or it pains me or I find it hard when you say so-and-so… doesn't create an us-them position, but a we-together position."

Religious and community leaders in my interviews and observations argued that introducing a personal story or explaining the personal consequences of a remark was less likely to evoke emotional responses in the Other, because whole groups would not be involved in the story. Speaking from a personal perspective, this technique avoided the use of group identities. However, as we see in both of the above examples, group identities return after a personal story is told. We see Mo saying that religious people should cooperate and Emma saying that making it personal creates a "we-together" position. This might help reconnect the participants within the group. Mo's example seemed to please the group, although Chapter 8 showed that group identities work only if participants actually share this aspect of the group identity.

Many other strategies were mentioned and observed as well, such as standing up for each other when a participant is hurt, acknowledging the feelings people express during dialogs, and providing people with a safe space to be vulnerable. I also noticed that sadness was expressed through body language – in Hochschild's words, a form of expressive emotion management. This form was used on an interreligious walk when Muslims and Jews moved together from 'Jewish' to 'Muslim' spaces in Amsterdam. Along the way they stopped and speakers told about their associations with these spaces. One Jewish organizer told about her family history. She related her fond youth memories, but then talked about what happened to her family in World War II, that some family members had died in Sobibor. One Muslim organizer seemed sad and made an effort to look all the participants in the eye, as if to say: "you too should feel sad." These strategies were used less often. Interestingly they are not necessarily evocative, but definitely less suppressive than the others.

It is hard to say if the strategies dealing with anger, fear and frustration worked, because they are less tangible than strategies that deal with changing ideas. However, I found some cues about their effect. Working with a model, like the ASR model, sometimes helped to structure classroom lessons and let primary school children listen to each other. However, doing that alone was not enough because, as stated above, I also witnessed a very busy classroom which overwhelmed the peer-educators, partly because the teacher that was supposed to help them did not intervene. Informal rules, expressed in speeches, could also work. During observations, for example, I heard participants state that people should respect each other and each other's differences in cooperation projects, but from the utterances alone it cannot be established if the project participants already wanted to express these values or were reminded of these values, because of the speech. Strategies implemented on the spot, such as steering the conversation away from anger, postponing difficult conversations after the heated moment and inserting a personal story or a shared group identity seemed to calm down the group.

With this last strategy it is important to keep in mind that it might work to keep both the group calm as a whole and the conversation going and not hurt an entire group.[182] However, it might not work for the upset individual. Think of Tzemach, Hasim, and Heleen who were not allowed to finish their thoughts. Although the interruptions – slightly – contributed to the mood of the group, Tzemach, Hasim and Heleen were not able to fully explain their positions. Suppressive emotion management can thus

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182 Although, as we saw with Tzemach and Hasim, the moderator and religious and community leaders did get the subject to change, they did not prevent another heated debate starting later on.

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potentially help cooperation and create a safe space for the group majority. But as Hochschild (1983) shows when she talks about emotional labor, suppressive emotion management might also have negative sides in which problems are not solved, but suppressed. A solution found in the practice of cooperation projects is to provide room for discussion in smaller groups after the plenary discussion. The smaller group can then deal with anger and frustration, instead of letting it dominate the whole conversation.[183] A solution might also lie in less suppressive strategies, as we will see in the next section.

Evoking and Enhancing Joy

Participants sometimes experienced tension, but cooperation projects also involved many moments of joy, appreciation and recognition. Merve, a Muslim woman who helped organize a project where they had to build an artwork in public space with other religious groups, described the experience as follows:

> "Well, the day started (…) at eight in the morning (…) and the reactions were actually lots of fun. We were sitting together with the Jews and the Christians and the Chinese, it was so cozy [in Dutch: *gezellig*].[184] We were already building and onlookers were taking photos, asking about the project and they were very positive."

In other projects Jews and Muslims showed appreciation for each other by their enthusiastic applause for the speeches of religious and community leaders, warm laughter or such statements as: "Oh, what a nice story!" In some educational projects as well, it was noticeable that as time progressed the pupils began asking more questions and became livelier.

Religious and community leaders did not suppress these positive emotions, but often enhanced and evoked them, especially feelings of joy, appreciation and recognition. Changing ideas about the Other – as described in Chapter 8 – could lead to changes in feelings toward the Other, but the leaders also used several emotion management strategies to enhance or evoke joy. Here I focus on two most common forms: the use of rituals or sharing in each other's religious practices; and creating feelings of festiveness.

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183 Tzemach, Hasim and Heleen might have discussed their differences in smaller groups after the plenary session as well. I had to leave for another fieldwork appointment because the meeting had exceeded its allotted time and I could not find out afterwards if this happened.

184 The Dutch gezellig is very difficult to translate but comes close to 'cozy' or 'convivial'.

In regard to rituals, Reedijk (2015: 185-189) observed in her study on Jewish-Christian-Muslim interreligious cooperation in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and France that respondents had positive experiences with both existing and newly established rituals. Eating together, experiencing an interreligious funeral and celebrating rituals were mentioned as moving and beautiful.

However, Reedijk also says that participating in existing religious rituals might not be the easiest strategy and might cause some Muslims and Jews to feel uncomfortable, like an outsider or stop them from coming to the event at all. Some of her respondents mentioned that they felt they were not at all allowed to be involved in the religious ritual of the Other because it would lead to adoption of religious elements in the own practices and could threaten the own truth. Others mentioned that their own community would feel uncomfortable if they participated in religious rituals and that it would cross religious boundaries. This was also true for newly invented rituals, such as lighting or passing candles, because some respondents felt it was artificial, against their beliefs or "way too Catholic." A solution to these problems can be to apply other emotion management strategies. Reedijk suggests actively acknowledging the party of person who is a guest in the ritual is and that the organizers take the sensibilities around the ritual into account, sometimes calling the event by a different name or by explaining what they are doing. The second strategy Reedijk calls 'participating without participation' by witnessing the ritual, but not actively engaging in it, for example.

In my study, I also came across this duality in sharing or shared rituals.[185] On the one hand some respondents did not mind visiting each other's houses of worship or witnessing each other's prayers. However, as Reedijk (2015) says, some religious individuals found it hard to participate in religious rituals that belong to only one of the religions or in shared religious rituals.

To start with the latter, these respondents felt that they had to do something they did not believe in or should not participate in, because they felt their religion would not allow it. Once, for example, I witnessed Mustafa, a young Muslim pupil, who did not want to enter the synagogue because, he claimed, as a Muslim he was not allowed in. Also Levi, an orthodox Jewish respondent, said he would not object to witnessing

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185   Sharing an existing ritual is when people of other religions and walks of life are invited to take part in an established ritual, while a shared ritual is a newly designed or combination of rituals.

Muslim prayers, but would not join in and if he were in a church, he would not accept the wafer. [186]

Another example was found at an interreligious meeting between Jews, Muslims and Christians. Gladys, a Dominican woman, and Chamilla, a Muslim woman, were chatting to each other after the dialog meeting. After a while, Gladys asked Chamilla if it would be possible for her as a Christian to pray in Chamilla's mosque. Chamilla replied that she did not know, but she did know that as a Muslim she felt her religion would not allow her to light a candle in a church. Gladys was surprised to hear that. Chamilla then told her that she enjoys discussing religious art with her Christian friend and talking about religious issues with people from other religions. Here, Gladys and Chamilla both experienced religious boundaries which were not entirely clear, but still prevented them from sharing their religious rituals.

We see in these examples some unease about participating in each other's religious rituals. This has to do with experienced religious differences – an observation Reedijk (2015) also mentions. But as we will see, it also has to do with the way cooperation project are organized. In Hochschild's words: both the framing rules – the workings of the ritual – and the feeling rules – am I allowed to participate or am I then doing something wrong? – mattered.

Some Muslims and Jews did enjoy shared participation in rituals – or each other's religion – a lot. This might have to do with different interpretations of religious doctrines and scriptures, but it might also have to do with the organizers making it easier for Jews and Muslims who found it difficult to participate in each other's rituals or religious practices. First, I noticed some groups clearly explained their religious rituals or practices. In the educational project in the synagogue, for example, Jewish educators told the pupils that they needed to wear a *kippah* inside, but that doing this would not make them Jewish. This made it clear to the pupils how they should act and also provided a clear boundary, which made these practices less tense. Religious leaders of mosques also used this strategy. Sometimes they politely asked visitors to remove their shoes, as a sign of respect.

Second, because of the perceived religious boundaries Jews and Muslims came up with an adjusted religious ritual to bind themselves together. For example, Masja, a Jewish woman active in cooperation projects, told me that *Eid al Fitr* and Passover

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186   Again, this concerns interpretations of official religious doctrines and scriptures, which not all Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam share.

were on the same day. She said it would be hard to perform *Eid al Fitr* on Jewish grounds, so they decided to not call it by name but just announce that they would have dinner together. By changing the name and thus the religious connotation they all came together that evening and enjoyed a dinner Masja found very pleasant. In another cooperation project between an orthodox synagogue, several churches and two mosques that cater to Muslims of Moroccan respectively Pakistani origin, the organizers decided to hold an interreligious walk to all of their houses of worship. As a ritual they included a symbol present in all of the religions that could be a gift. They decided to bring bottles of water, give them to the leaders of the houses of worship they visited and then told the crowd something about the meaning of water in their religion. Creating a ritual from elements shared by all religions also functioned to bridge differences and ensured that perceived religious boundaries acting as barriers to sharing in the ritual of the Other did not have to hinder participation.[187]

Thirdly, the more common approach to avoid making Jews or Muslims uncomfortable about religious boundaries was to implement secular rituals. By secular I do not mean devoid of religious ideas and practices, because if not connected to a specific religion, the rituals were not always without religious or spiritual elements.[188] However, these rituals were not explicitly linked to one specific religion. One of the interreligious networks I observed, for example, often performed small rituals to create a bond between the participants, such as taking photos to conclude the day, making a peace sign, watching the sunset together or repeating a slogan together. Usually they lasted a few minutes, but they could also be more elaborate.

One sunny day in the fall of 2015, for example, an interreligious market took place. To turn it into an event, instead of just a market, performers sang or carried out traditional dances. At the start of the day, an actress encouraged the public to participate in small rituals. During one of the speeches she stood beside the mayor of Amsterdam and encouraged the crowd:

> "Probably, if you look around you, you'll see all kinds of talented people with unique talents. I think that everyone is breathing here and I also think that everyone has a heart, [and everyone] has their fears and dreams. Sometimes

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187 The ritual did not exclude any participant present that day, but it could be argued it would be hard for people to join who did not want to enter each other's building.

188 As described in Chapter 3, spiritual can mean a range of different things to different people, such as belonging to new spiritual groups, being a yoga practitioner or people who say they believe in an undetermined transcendent reality, but do not feel they belong to a religious movement. Here I mean elements that are often found in movements that believe in a transcendent being, without considering themselves to be part of an official religion.

[they] feel like they don't know what to do and would like to be loved. I invite you all to find a neighbor and look them in the eyes. If you can't find a partner, look at me. But, actually, I'd really like to look the mayor in the eye, sorry ha-ha! But you can look at one of the other organizers ha-ha. I've waited for this moment for a long time ha-ha. So, look at your neighbor. (…) These days we'd much prefer to take a selfie, but try to look each other in the eye. Try to find a partner [the crowd laughs]. Try to look at each other in silence, try to think of something nice to say to each other, a gift really. [She and the mayor exchange compliments.] Did everyone give each other a compliment? Yes? There can be hugs as well. Yes, there can be hugs. (…) May be we can end this session with lots of laughter. I have some tricks for that. I have some tricks to find your primal strength [in Dutch: *oerkracht*]. Put on a fake smile, some people won't need this, but [if you do] believe me [it works], very good! And I want everyone to make a pregnant belly or a beer belly, if you already have one: wonderful! Then your primal power will come out, and I will blow you away! Five, six, seven eight! [Participants and actress make a blowing sound] Everyone! Five, six, seven eight! [All blow again] Very good! And don't forget to laugh! Ha-ha [public mimics the actress]. And keep on laughing! Applaud yourself! Give yourself a hug. Good that you came here! And if you don't love yourself you know what'll happen! Have a nice day! I think we opened it very well! [Public cheers]."

To my own surprise, I saw many people hugging, laughing and getting into the exercise. These 'secular' rituals of laughing, breathing, complimenting each other and hugging seemed to provide the needed hilarity to make strangers connect. It was not possible to talk to all the participants to check if everyone liked the exercise, hugging a stranger might have felt awkward or come across as unnecessary peer pressure in regard to personal, cultural and religious boundaries. Either way, afterwards people chatted with the person they had hugged or given a compliment.

Other rituals, like taking a photo and yelling a slogan or just the act of standing together or holding hands brought a new element to the cooperation projects I observed. Sometimes this was done solely by religious or community leaders, who gave each other a hand or put their arms around each other's shoulders in front of the audience, providing an image of unity. Other times the whole group was involved. These moments can contribute to feelings of togetherness. Merve, for example, said that taking a photo during their interreligious project contributed to the idea that Muslims, Christians and Jews are not always in conflict with each other. She said:

"… it's also to show that we are not in constant conflict, like in the Middle East. So it's a shared interest, to show everyone, like, it's not like that. That's why you unite a bit even if you're on the other side of the spectrum in the Middle East. Here we want to show our story, that it's quite similar, not so different."

Yelling the slogan of an organization and smiling for a photograph changed the rhythm of a dialog meeting for a moment and often brought the whole group together – instead of sitting in separate little groups – creating small moments of collective effervescence (see Durkheim, 1995: 208).

Participating in each other's religious practices and/or rituals was often combined with other emotion management strategies. One such strategy was to make a dialog or an educational project 'festive' and create an attractive event. This was done by inviting guest speakers, such as mayors, ministers or inviting Muslims and Jews from other countries to the event. Other elements that enhanced the festiveness were sharing a meal and holding the meeting at interesting locations – like a city beach or a concert hall. Often during the dinner the atmosphere became more informal and Muslims, Jews and others conversed easily about the food, made jokes or chatted informally about the dialog they had just shared. Sometimes musicians or artists were present, not randomly chosen, but often selected to present a linking element between groups. At the opening of an exhibition of Jewish and Muslim art, for example, the artists told the audience that they felt that art could be a connective element between different groups. At another cooperation project two singers sang in Arabic and Hebrew representing the connection between the two languages.

Although these rituals and festiveness could not sway everyone, because the framing or feeling rules were not explained properly, or because of the experienced religious boundaries, these strategies often added to the atmosphere. This was noticeable in the enthusiastic laughter or applause after events, the change of mood, and because I did not often hear Jews, Muslims or others criticize the rituals or festiveness. Interestingly, Muslim and Jewish religious and community leaders did evoke these emotions here, especially if the rituals were planned beforehand or when musicians were booked. However, it would stretch too far to say that they were just evocative strategies. In some cases, these strategies enhanced emotions that were already there. If Muslims and Jews met acquaintances or old friends at the cooperation projects they were often already enthusiastic. Emotion management then did not just evoke, but enhanced the enthusiasm of Jewish and Muslim participants.

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Humor

Humor is the last emotion management strategy. It was used to decrease anger, sadness and frustration, but also to enhance and create feelings of joy.[189] This is a delicate form of emotion management, though, because what some might see as a joke, might be offensive to others and depends on the context and relation the joker and the receiver have (see also Ensel & Stremmelaar, 2013: 163). However, some participants, religious and community leaders did know how to use humor. There were three main ways of expressing humor in cooperation projects in Amsterdam: self-deprecation, playing with stereotypes and addressing religious and ethnic identities positively or not at all.

Yair, a rabbi who organized cooperation projects often applied the first form. At an interreligious walk, which despite the rain still attracted about 50 to 60 people, Petra, a Jewish woman told the group she had a rabbi in her family and that they were proud of having him in their family. Yair then said: "Phew, at least there are still people left who are proud of a rabbi!" This drew laughter from the group. Others made jokes about themselves or their own religious traditions as well. Joran, an orthodox Jewish man who organizes cooperation projects for Jews, Muslims and Christians, showed his fellow organizers the *loelav*, an ornament consisting of twigs from the palm tree, myrtle bush and willow and an *etrog* –a citrus fruit. This ornament is used during *Sukkoth* – the Jewish feast of Tabernacles – by waving it in six directions. His fellow organizers, both Christians, could also hold and wave it. When they did that, Joran joked: "Unfortunately it only works for Jews", which made him and his fellow organizers laugh. During the iftar with Jews, Muslims and a few Christians mentioned in the Introduction, the Christian organizer said that Muslims were allowed to start eating at 21.50 hours. One very hungry Muslim participant, Marouan, promptly commented: "No, 21.49!" The whole group laughed at his spontaneous reply. Because self-mockery does not actively include the Other and was used to reach out to the Other, this kind of humor often worked. As Ensel & Stremmelaar (2013: 163) argue, these jokes could be experienced as uncalled for when others expressed them or when used in different situations.

A second way of creating a bond through humor is when organizers or speakers turned stereotypes on their head. For example, at a dialog between Jews and Muslims, Nassim, a young man, was invited to speak. He explained that he could be seen as a

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189   The humor used here might be funny to some, but not so much to others. In this chapter I therefore consider humor to be a language construction in which elements that usually do not fit together are presented, in which semantic alienation could emerge and which is send by an arguer through an argument towards an audience (see Weaver, 2012: 484-487).

"secular, Shi'a Muslim." The participants laughed at what sounded like a contradiction. Nassim then explained that he went to Israel to play music and when he was there he was interviewed by a journalist from a newspaper. The newspaper wanted to make clear that this was a music event for different people to come together and because he was not Jewish, the newspaper looked for a way to define him. So, because his family members are Shi'a Muslims and he identified as secular, they decided to call him a "secular, Shi'a Muslim". Now, Nassim used this description to break the ice in the cooperation project. Another example is when a Jewish religious leader was invited to talk with Jews, Muslims and Christians at an interreligious meeting. After the introduction the religious leader said he grew up "in the Far East." After a pause he added, "I mean Enschede [a city in the east of the Netherlands]." The audience laughed.

Interestingly, these forms of humor decategorize stereotypes but now instead of changing ideas, emotions are changed. This differs from the decategorization described in Chapter 8, because this kind of humor does not address the Other in the audience *directly*. The humor of self-mockery does not involve the Other and by providing a case *outside* the audience or addressing people *indirectly* lets the audience reflect on the remark themselves. Moreover, making a joke takes away the severity of the conversation, while still showing that certain categories do not fit the person telling the story.

Besides self-mockery and jokes that turned stereotypes around, other jokes also functioned as emotion management strategies. For example, Mathilde, an organizer of an educational project told me that she deliberately tries to make small jokes to create a convivial atmosphere for the pupils, because this will influence how they will remember the meeting and talk about it afterwards. I often witnessed this usage of humor in their project, with the other educators as well. One time a pupil asked the Jewish educators if they were married to each other. Kevin explained that they were not. With a smile he said: "We don't go that far, hey, Chaya?" Another time, a pupil said that the first thing he thought of when thinking about Jews was "nice dances", because he had once seen a Jewish dance. The educators (Mathilde and Boaz) laughed at this association and at the end of the meeting came back to discuss the nice dances. Boaz and the pupils tried to get Mathilde to do a little dance, which in the end she did. In another educational project, humor sometimes broke the ice. In this project pupils exchanged e-mails with Jews who had survived World War II. After swapping three e-mails they met, under the guidance of teachers and Jewish community leaders. I observed one class when they first met, when the Jewish participants introduced

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themselves. One told the pupils that he had been with his wife for over 58 years. In reply, some pupils wolf whistled, which made the group laugh and broke the ice.

Sometimes, participants or organizers made jokes that actively involved the Other. For example, I spoke to an artist duo: Noam identified as Jewish and Owen, with an Arabic background, referred to himself as spiritual, but not as a member of one religion. The pair were sending each other up during our interview. They explained that humor was their way of making their cooperation and friendship work. Owen even referred to it as their "secret" to successful cooperation. However, he added:

> "… sure we can hurt each other, but you have to earn that. You can't [make these kinds of jokes] lightly. For example, we [pointing at himself and the researcher] may have sent each other a few e-mails but I only know you for twenty minutes. If you joked about Arabs now, I wouldn't like it. Then I'd think: hello, you have to earn it first, then you can make the joke."

As Owen explains, when people do not know each other very well there is a fine line between joking and stereotyping. With regard to discrimination and exclusion (see Chapter 6), Hilel told me about his brother's workplace where co-workers made jokes about sheep and the Prophet Mohammed. Here the co-workers crossed a line for Hilel's brother. In the wider public debate in the Netherlands, there also have been heated debates about cartoons, such as the Danish cartoons about the Prophet Mohammed.

In the cooperation projects, however, I did not often observe humor going wrong. This might have to do with the religious and community leaders who were skilled in using humor as a tool and often very experienced in interreligious and intercommunal dialog. I did not often encounter less experienced leaders using this strategy. It may also have to do with the nature of the humor, which often does not directly involve the Other. The first kind of humor addresses the self or the own traditions. If the same jokes are expressed by an (unknown) Other they might be more problematic. As Owen said, you can make a joke about the Other if there is a lot of trust in the relationship, but not in the first twenty minutes you get to know someone. The second form of humor that played with stereotypes did not *directly* involve anyone in the room and the last form of humor did not involve stereotypes or sensitive topics at all. As evocative emotion management, humor was not threatening and could be effective when used to bond groups. In doing so, it provided laughter in group conversations that otherwise had become quite serious. When used considerately in the right time and the right place, humor can thus be an effective strategy to break the ice, deconstruct

stereotypes lightly or to connect groups. But when used in the wrong context it can also be very hurtful to the participants of a group.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that Muslim and Jewish community and religious leaders are quite inventive in using emotion management to help Jewish and Muslim participants in their projects bond. The emotion management performed is both suppressive – as when dealing with anger, fear and frustration – and evocative – when trying to provoke joy, sometimes through humor (see Hochschild, 1979: 561). Interestingly, joy was not just evoked, but also enhanced, when basic relations were already established. Emotions such as anger, sadness and frustration were structured: through models and on-the-spot interventions, while laughter and joy were encouraged: in rituals, through festive elements and humor.

We have also seen all kinds of strategies used in suppressive, evocative and enhancing emotion management. Strategies are both bodily and expressive, involving gestures and expressions of the body, such as shaking or holding hands, smiling or looking sad. Cognitive emotion management was also performed, as with the ASR model. It could be argued that in some cases the strategies described in Chapter 8 overlap with cognitive emotion management, when changing ideas also involves changing feelings. In my fieldwork, I thus found Hochschild's (1979: 561) emotion management strategies.

However, Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam show other kinds of emotion management that do not fit Hochschild's typology and are not necessarily bodily, expressive or focused on cognition. Some rituals, for example, that do not focus on the cognitive are not always bodily – although sometimes they are. They focus primarily on achieving a group feeling of togetherness and function as what Durkheim (1995: 208) called 'collective effervescence', which involves feelings of collective group behavior. Also, humor is a slightly different form of emotion management – often with bodily, cognitive and emotional aspects – aimed at providing a break with the ordinary or lightening the mood.

In regard to the strategies described by Harlow (2003) and Harvey Wingfield (2010), I found some similarities as well. At times emotion management was used to suppress anger as well as to avoid certain topics. However, my findings differ from the findings of Harlow (2003) and Harvey Wingfield (2010), because in their studies the respondents perform emotion management in reaction to experienced racism by a

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majority population, while in Jewish-Muslim cooperation in Amsterdam two *minorities* try to work together. In theory, this might create more equal opportunities to manage emotions together and sometimes in practice this was the case. Think, for example, of the creative use of humor or about the togetherness of performing a 'secular' shared ritual. However, it was not always the case, because in some cooperation projects more Muslims than Jews showed up or because of power differences that have to do with experienced inequalities within society or educational levels (see Chapters 5 and 6).

The question whether emotion management 'works' is harder to answer than the question if strategies that aim to change ideas work, because changes in attitudes are often more apparent than changes in emotions. However, my findings suggest that these strategies can be successful in Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. As we have seen, participants often responded positively to enhancing or evoking joyous feelings and humor.

However, as we have also seen, these strategies might not convince everyone and if humor is not applied carefully it could also hurt the relations between Muslims and Jews. The effectiveness of emotional strategies not only depends on the strategy itself, but also on the skills of the religious and community leaders and their experience with interreligious and intercommunal cooperation, not just with humor but in finding ways around experienced religious boundaries in developing rituals as well.

The effectiveness of emotion management also depends on the context. A clear example is that if experienced religious traditions prevent people from participating in religious rituals, such a ritual will not work to bind groups together. However, the effect of the strategies is not solely dependent on experienced religious context, but also on broader contexts. As we saw in Part 2, the extremist attacks in Western Europe in 2014 and 2015 and local incidents of discrimination and exclusion caused both fear and insecurity in Jewish and Muslim communities, which sometimes fueled stereotyping or essentialism that influenced their relations. To tackle these stereotypes, we have seen that strategies that challenge ideas as well as strategies that manage emotions can help mend the bonds between Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam.

However, we have also seen that other groups, such as the people who are regarded as the majority population, influence the relations between Jews and Muslims, that structural inequalities lie beneath the emergence of discrimination and that there is not much economic capital to implement in the cooperation projects on a larger scale. This is not to say that cooperation projects are ineffective. It is clear from the

cases described here that they often do change how people think and feel about the Other. However, to tackle exclusionary mechanisms, such as the discrimination and polarization lying beneath the fear and anger that some Muslims, Jews and others feel, it needs more than changing ideas or emotions and the commitment of Jewish and Muslim communities to organize cooperation projects.

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CONCLUSION

Multi-Layered Structures and Dynamic Relations

MAIN FINDINGS

In this book I studied the factors influencing Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. Six main factors were identified: the influence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the extremist attacks in 2014 and 2015 in Europe; local incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia; the economic and social capital used in cooperation projects; strategies to change ideas and prejudices; and emotion management strategies. The first three factors mainly created tensions in Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam, while the last three mostly influenced cooperation between Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam.

These six main factors influenced Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam in several, often complex ways. Chapter 4 showed how influential international factors were reshaped in the local context: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, specifically the Gaza War of 2014 and the local government's idea to twin Amsterdam with Tel Aviv and Ramallah. Jewish, Muslim and other respondents called the Israeli-Palestinian conflict a problem key to Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. In this process, a frame emerged that described the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a central, delicate topic that should not be talked about in direct contact with the Other.[190] However, when studying the actual involvement of Jews and Muslims at pro-Israel, pro-Palestine, pro-town twinning and anti-town twinning demonstrations in Amsterdam, I found that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not just a problem for Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam. Both parties were involved in these demonstrations and this led to tension. However, they were not the only ones involved. Left-wing activists, right-wing activists and Christian parties were also present at the demonstrations. Moreover, not every Muslim and Jew in Amsterdam went to these demonstrations. Additionally, when studying what Jews and Muslims actually thought about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I found Muslims and Jews who did indeed disagree on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They disagreed about historical events, such as the existence of the Palestinians as a people, and about contemporary events as well, such as the various interpretations of the violence that the Israeli state used in the 2014 Gaza War. However, there were also Muslims and Jews with more compatible opinions, agreeing on some but not all aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, who either did not have the time or did not want to get involved. Finally, a group worked together at the pro-Palestine demonstrations. Here again, we see discrepancies between the frame that puts the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the heart of Jewish-Muslim relations and what Muslims and Jews actually think

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190   As said in Chapter 4, the media discussed this topic, but when respondents met with the Other – such as in cooperation projects or day to day contact – they said that they often avoided the topic.

of this conflict. This is problematic, because the frame ignores these discrepancies and this produces problems of its own, such as overestimating the differences in opinion. The question that remains: how could this frame emerge? As we saw in Chapter 4, it derived from actual conflict, the pull from within communities, certain media sources and sometimes the role of civil servants and symbolic capital used in the demonstrations.

Chapter 5 discussed a second international factor: the influence of the extremist attacks of 2014 and 2015 in Brussels, Paris and Copenhagen. It focused on two effects that were renegotiated in the national and local context of the Netherlands and Amsterdam. The first effect on Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam had to do with fear stemming from the attacks and counter-terrorism and protective measures that the city took in response to the extremist attacks. The second had to do with asking Muslims and Jews to denounce both violent extremism (Muslims) and violence conducted by the Israeli state (Jews).

Considering the first effect, we saw that Jewish responses to the extremist attacks and the security measures differed. Jews who expressed their fear to me were anxious after the extremist attacks on Jewish targets in Brussels, Paris and Copenhagen, in the name of Islam, and feared that their lives could be on the line in Amsterdam as well. This is not to say that some feelings were inappropriate, considering that many of the extremist attacks did target Jews and Jewish buildings. Moreover, the visibility of Jews seemed to be a factor in their chance of being harassed in public. Some Jews, however, felt distrust of Muslims in general, and this, however, can hinder the relations between Jews and Muslims and create a threshold to joining cooperation projects, as such feelings could enhance the stereotype of Muslims as the violent Other. Muslims felt unsafe because they felt unprotected by local government, especially when they compared their situation with the measures taken to protect Jewish communities. This created distrust of the local government in the first place, but sometimes of Jewish communities as well, which negatively influenced Jewish-Muslim relations.

The second effect of the extremist attacks of 2014 and 2015 was the distancing debate in Dutch society that asked Muslims especially to take a stance against violent extremism. At times it also asked Jews to distance themselves from the violence conducted by the Israeli state. The question of denouncing violence could cause tension, because sometimes feeling secure with the Other requires asking how that person thinks about violence, while the question itself can make the one asked feel as if he or she is being held accountable. Some Muslims and Jews invented pragmatic, reclaiming and decategorizing strategies to possibly help overcome these

tensions. However, as we have also seen, not just Muslims and Jews were involved in the distancing debates. They were also influenced by structures and actors in both national and local contexts and the solutions for the problems might also be found in their involvement.

Chapter 6 zoomed in on local incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. This chapter started by exploring the central concepts and defined anti-Semitism as exclusionary or discriminatory statements and practices against Jews, because they are perceived as Jews. It defined Islamophobia as exclusionary or discriminatory statements and practices against Muslims, because they are perceived as Muslim (see also Vellenga, 2018: 177-178). Furthermore it showed that on the individual level both Jews and Muslims experienced verbal discrimination in Amsterdam during my fieldwork period. They met physical discrimination, but less often than verbal discrimination. In regard to institutional discrimination or exclusion, Muslims were named the victims more often than Jews. These discriminatory incidents influenced how they thought about each other, but were mediated by factors such as generational trauma, visibility, direct/indirect experiences and repetition. These influential factors help to explain why some individual Jews and Muslims might be able to work together and others might become disheartened by anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents and therefore become more angry or fearful than others.

On a group level, however, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents had other effects on Jewish-Muslim relations. First, acts of anti-Semitism by Muslims sometimes hurt relations between Muslims and Jews quite directly, because they made Jews afraid of Muslims. On the other hand, a generalized idea of Islamic anti-Semitism, strengthened by a lack of attention for Islamophobia in Jewish communities, sometimes contributed to the stereotyping of Muslims. Second, feelings and experiences of inequalities between how anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents were treated by institutions sometimes contributed to the prejudice against Jews. Finally, competition between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia could also potentially hurt relations between Muslims and Jews, because both groups want their form of discrimination and exclusion to be acknowledged.

These three chapters (4–6) reveal the tensions in Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict produced complex tensions through actual conflict and the frame that put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the heart of Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. The extremist attacks of 2014 and 2015 and their reshaping in the Dutch context triggered feelings of fear, produced experienced inequalities and asked Muslims as well as Jews to take a stance in regard to violence happening

abroad. Finally, local incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia sometimes brought about the view that Muslims were perpetrators of a 'new' anti-Semitism, feelings of inequality toward Jewish communities among Muslims and competition between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia.

However, besides the turbulence of these tensions, some Muslims and Jews tried to work together in cooperation projects. Chapter 7 showed what these cooperation projects look like in practice by describing two case studies; a dialog meeting and an educational project. These two cases were not the only forms of cooperation that I found. Between 1990 and 2015 I found 40 initiatives that involved cooperation between Muslims and Jews. These initiatives vary widely, from an art exhibition, dialog between young Muslims and Jews, to a shared iftar and many more activities. The main forms of cooperation are dialog meetings, educational projects and interreligious/intercommunal activities.

The organizers of these projects are religious and community leaders, either liberal or (modern) orthodox Jews or Sunni Muslims, the latter usually with a Turkish or Moroccan migration background. Christian religious and community leaders are also involved, as well as the local government. These parties have several goals for the cooperation projects: they try to bring communities together, create friendship between Jews and Muslims, reduce stereotyping and prejudice, reduce tensions arising from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the extremist attacks in Brussels (2014), Paris (2015) and Copenhagen (2015) and resolve local conflicts taking concrete form in threats made against synagogues or mosques in the neighborhood.

The cooperation projects attracted a wide range of participants, from about 30 to several hundred people, while the meetings between leaders were usually smaller. Participants came from all over the city and from different (self-identified) ethnic and religious communities. Sometimes they knew each other, but it is a misconception to think that cooperation projects *only* attracted Jewish and Muslim participants who already knew each other, since many Muslims and Jews participants did not know each other beforehand.

Aside from what cooperation projects look like in practice, Chapter 7 also described the forms of capital cooperation projects needed to attain their goals. Jewish and Muslim religious and community leaders often acquired large amounts of social capital to be able to attract participants to their projects and have access to spaces where they could organize their projects or find volunteers who wanted to speak, perform or help out. Although their social capital was usually quite large, economic

capital was considered rather scarce. With some exceptions, many cooperation projects relied on decreasing economic funds and the willingness of volunteers to help. This might be explained by the hesitance of local government to subsidize these projects and the reduced funding for diversity projects. As a result structural projects were hard to establish and the cooperation projects that were organized relied on volunteers. Some volunteers felt that too much was asked of them. Although Jewish and Muslim organizers still showed initiative, the place where Jewish and Muslim fields overlapped was not just vulnerable because of the tensions, but also quite vulnerable when Muslims and Jews cooperated.

Although vulnerable, this does not mean that Jewish-Muslim cooperation had no impact. Chapter 8 focused on what happened in cooperation projects and the strategies that Muslim and Jewish religious and community leaders used to change stereotypical ideas about the Other, reduce tensions and create bonds and friendships between their project participants. This is important, because these strategies can solve tensions and create bonds between the participants in cooperation projects. In using these strategies social identities were negotiated through three main strategies: 'searching for similarities', 'decategorization' and 'avoidance'.

The strategy 'searching for similarities' involves a negotiation of religious, cultural and minority identities. Jews and Muslims in cooperation projects used aspects of these identities that they perceived as similar to be able to connect. As we have seen, for example, sharing narratives about peaceful relations between Muslims and Jews in Morocco sometimes functioned as a bridge between Muslims with a Moroccan migration background and Jews. Decategorization means that Muslims and Jews explained what they considered to be positive aspects of identities that do not match prejudices and stereotypes. They explained their identities to each other to counter stereotypes and showed why Jews and Muslims have certain opinions and create more understanding toward each other. This strategy was often applied in classrooms and there I found some evidence that it changed how pupils thought about each other, for example, when peer-educators wrote a number of propositions down and let the pupils guess which one belonged to which group. Avoidance was applied when delicate topics came to the table and was used to not harm new relations and to establish trust.

As Chapter 8 pointed out, searching for similarities and decategorization were often successful strategies, but had their limits. For example, what some may consider a similarity, others may not. This came to light in the example when an orthodox synagogue organized visits to several places of worship. A Jewish organizer mentioned

that women and men sit separately in their synagogue. In the mosque they were visiting, the men and the women were also seated separately. In the organizer's eyes, this represented an example of a similarity between Islam and Judaism, but for liberal Muslim and Jewish communities it did not. Decategorization helps to deconstruct stereotypes, but can also be unsuccessful when topics are deemed too sensitive to talk about. Finally, avoidance led to the situation described in Chapter 4, where the emerging frame put the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the heart of Jewish-Muslim relations.

In Chapter 9, to strengthen the bonds between Muslims and Jews, we saw respondents using strategies aimed not only at changing ideas but also at changing emotions toward the Other. Religious and community leaders use emotion management strategies to challenge stereotypes, to create a safe space for the group and to lighten the atmosphere (see Hochschild, 1979). The performed emotion management is both suppressive – as when dealing with anger, fear and frustration – as well as evocative – when trying to provoke joy, sometimes through humor (see Hochschild, 1979: 561).

This kind of emotion management happened through strategies such as working with a set of moral rules that were expressed and learned before starting a dialog or by stating sets of moral rules in speeches before the dialogs started. Ad hoc strategies were also used, such as interruption, steering the conversation toward another topic, using personal stories and positively evaluating group identities. Not just anger, fear and frustration were managed. Muslim and Jewish religious and community leaders also used strategies to evoke and enhance joy applying three main strategies: the use of (secular) rituals, creating a festive atmosphere and the use of humor.

Compared to strategies that try to change ideas, it is harder to establish if emotion management strategies work to improve Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam because changes in attitudes are often easier to explain by respondents and observe in practice than changes in emotions. However, this study shows some starting points to establish what works. First, this chapter showed that suppressive strategies in regard to anger, fear and frustration might help to establish a safe space for the group of participants of a cooperation project. However, for those feeling these emotions, suppression might not solve the problems. Solutions might lie within suppressing emotions to remain a convivial atmosphere during a plenary sessions and discussing the emotions in smaller groups. Solutions might also be found in the other strategies.

Evoking and enhancing joy through festiveness and (secular) rituals might work, as respondents often enjoyed celebrating (religious) festivities together or participating

in small 'secular' rituals such as taking photographs together.[191] However, experienced religious boundaries might hinder celebration, as in Masja's example: she explained that it would be hard to celebrate Passover and Eid al Fitr in a place considered to be Jewish grounds. Solutions were found in clear explanations of what was going to happen, focusing on shared elements or creating a 'secular' ritual.

Humor as a strategy was used in three forms: ridiculing the self, playing with stereotypes and addressing religious and ethnic identities positively or not at all. These strategies often did not actively involve the Other and were usually used by experienced religious and community leaders. Actively involving the Other in the humor was used less often because the humor needed trust to work.

Changing emotions, however, not only relies on the quality of and experience with emotion management strategies of Jewish and Muslim religious and community leaders. It also relies on actual threat, such as the extremist attacks and local incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Stereotypes that emerge from these threats can be challenged, but the feelings that stem from actually being threatened cannot be challenged as easily and require societal changes that go beyond Jewish-Muslim relations. Moreover, the attitudes and actions of the majority population, structural inequalities that lie beneath the emergence of discrimination and the apparent lack of economic capital to implement in cooperation projects on a larger scale also influence the emotions in Jewish-Muslim relations. These elements require a more structural approach.

Interrelated Factors

These six chapters all helped answer the question of how the main identified factors influence Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. However, what they do not reveal are the interrelationships between these factors. In the everyday lives of Jews and Muslims the factors described as cooperation and tension were often interrelated. As we saw in Chapter 7, cooperation projects often originated from conflict. Jewish and Muslim organizations tried to work together to prevent the forbidding of ritual slaughter without stunning the animal first. And in 2014 and 2015, when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the extremist attacks created tension, Jews and Muslims were urged to work together. Cooperation also emerged between Jews and Muslims at a location that others described as a source of tension: the pro-Palestine demonstrations. Here,

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191   By secular I do not intend to imply it is devoid of religious ideas and practices, because although unconnected to a specific religion, they were not always without religious elements. It does mean, however, that a ritual is not directly connected to religious rituals or practices.

Jews and Muslims who supported the Palestinians demonstrated together. Besides cooperation stemming from tension, tension can also emerge in cooperation projects, as happened in the Jewish-Moroccan Network Amsterdam that no longer exists, and in the example given in Chapter 9, when Tzemach asked if anyone in the audience "hated Jews."

As Katz (2015: 2) says about Jewish-Muslim relations in France, this is an important finding, because Jewish-Muslim relations are often portrayed as "strictly separated, if not violently opposed due to the impact of the Israeli-Arab conflict." Katz's study and my own study show that the everyday lives of Jews and Muslims do not easily fit into these binary divisions. In the next section I will show how these main factors further interrelate. In doing so, I will also show that these relations are influenced by previously described secondary factors, such as the influence of (local) government and by interreligious similarities and differences.

The interrelatedness of all these factors is most apparent when we look at them through the theoretical lenses presented in Chapter 1: a Bourdieusian framework, social identity theory, emotion management and insights from empirical studies on contemporary and historical Jewish-Muslim relations in Europe (see e.g. Bourdieu, 1979; Brown, 2000; Egorova & Ahmed, 2017; Hochschild, 1979). Doing so will provide four levels – or layers – of interrelatedness: the interrelations between international, national and local dimensions; the connections between structures and agency; the identity angle; and finally the links between ideas and emotional dimensions of Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. This section will show that Jewish-Muslim relations are multi-layered, contextually defined and creatively negotiated.

The Interrelatedness of International, National and Local Dimensions
Beginning with the first form of interrelatedness, derived from both the literature on contemporary and historical Jewish-Muslim relations and the results of this study, international events, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the extremist attacks influence Jewish-Muslim relations in Europe. These international events are, however, also shaped by national and local contexts (see Bahloul, 2013; Egorova & Ahmed, 2017; Katz, 2015; Mandel, 2010; 2014; Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson, 2016).

Comparing my findings with the findings of other empirical studies on Jewish-Muslim relations in various contexts, it is striking to see how many similarities I found with other cases in Europe. Egorova & Ahmed (2017: 290-293) researching Jewish-Muslim relations in the United Kingdom, for example, found mechanisms in their study regarding anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents that are quite similar to my findings.

On the one hand, stereotypical presentations of Muslims in the media contribute to negative perceptions of Muslims among Jews. On the other hand, say the authors, feeling less protected against violence increased the negative imagery of Jews among Muslims. In my research, negative imagery in the media influenced the way some Jews viewed Muslims as well, as we saw in Chapter 5, where Ruth, a Jewish girl, mentioned that the first word she thought of on hearing 'Muslim' was 'fear', because of the media imagery of Muslims. In Chapters 5 and 6, we saw how some Muslims came to envy Jews, because of experienced inequalities in Dutch society.

We can also see similarities with regard to the study by Mandel in Marseille, how a war – in this case the First Gulf War – in one geographical area caused tension between Muslims and Jews in another (local) context. Both Mandel's and my own study show a variation in what Jews and Muslims think about the conflict – in communities and at different times – and both studies note the emergence of frames of fear, that the 'war would come home' or the conflict would be 'imported'. In both our cases, media sources and the government played a role in the emergence of these frames. Mayblin, Valentine & Andersson also suggest that both the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the extremist attacks create and reinforce tensions between Muslims and Jews and, as in my case in Amsterdam. Katz (2015: 325-327) and Egorova & Ahmed (2017: 283) also see a frame emerging that puts the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the center of relations between Muslims and Jews in France and the United Kingdom.

These observations suggest a similarity within West-European contexts. One reason for these similarities can be found in the intensification of international networks. As Chapter 4 showed, literature on the delocalization of international conflict suggests that the emergence of social media and rising migration change the ways in which conflicts in other geographical regions can become 'delocalized' (see Demmers, 2014: 85). Migrants keep in touch with their relatives abroad and increasingly use social media and that might bring conflicts closer to home. As we have seen in Chapter 4, Jews would support Israel because their relatives live there and although Muslims did not often give this motive, they did say a few times that a kind of 'religious brotherhood' influenced their motives. However, as also noted in Chapter 4, many respondents in this study were born and raised in the Netherlands and do not always consider themselves migrants. Moreover, people without a migration background can also maintain contact with others abroad.

International networks were thus not the only reasons for similarities in the tensions between Jews and Muslims in various Western-European countries. Nevertheless, the role of social media remains, as we have seen that one reason for supporting Israel

or the Palestinians was the messages Muslims, Jews and others saw in the news or online. Chapter 4, for example, mentions the influence of European ideas of Otherness (see Modood, 2003: 113-114; Tufail, 2016). In many European countries polarizing public debates emerged in recent decades (see Egorova & Ahmed, 2017: 296). In the Netherlands, often portrayed as a tolerant country, various discourses emphasized national values and particularly targeted Muslims (see Kurth & Glasbergen, 2015: 414) or both Muslims and Jews, as was the case in the debates on ritual slaughter, which involved both Muslim and Jewish communities (see Kurth & Glasbergen, 2015; Vellenga, 2014; Zoethout, 2013). As noted in Chapter 4, the media or their own communities sometimes asked Jews and Muslims to take sides in the public debate. Moreover, as noted in Chapters 5 and 6, with the tensions emerging from the extremist attacks in 2014 and 2015, people considered to be the majority population asked Muslims and Jews to distance themselves from these extremist attacks and the violence committed by the Israeli state. In a cultural climate not specific to the Netherlands but more widespread in Western Europe, both left-wing and right-wing politicians, actors in the public debate and journalists often connect religious and ethnic groups to conflicts overseas, which may also create tension between Muslim and Jewish minorities (see also Modood, 2003: 113-114; Tufail, 2016).

However, the relations between Jews and Muslims are influenced not just by international events and European discourses of Otherness prevalent in the public debate, politics and media but they are also shaped and formed within national and local contexts. To provide a few examples, Chapter 4 showed how local usages of symbolic power connected Jews and Muslims to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, contributing to a pervasive frame. Chapter 5 revealed how two responses to extremist attacks – the implementation of security measures and the distancing debate – shaped the influence of these attacks on Jewish-Muslim relations in both national and local responses.[192] And Chapter 8 and 9 showed how Muslim and Jewish religious and community leaders tried negotiating to decrease tension and create bonds between the participants in cooperation projects using social identity strategies and emotion management strategies, such as working with a structuring model, evoking joy through 'secular' rituals and using self-deprecating humor.

One may conclude from all this that there are many interrelations between international events, and national and local reconfigurations which cannot be understood without seeing them in relation to each other. Therefore, in order to understand Jewish-Muslim

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192   Although it might be argued that the distancing debate is also influenced by European ideas of Oth-
       erness.

relations in Amsterdam, and elsewhere, we should study not just one level but try to incorporate all three levels to gain insight into the dynamics of Jewish-Muslim relations.

Connections between Structure and Agency

A second, related layer in Jewish-Muslim relations can be seen when we look through a Bourdieusian lens. Specifically, Bourdieu's conceptual tools of 'field', 'capital' and 'habitus' provide opportunities to study relational aspects between Jews and Muslims and the structures and agentic behavior influencing Jewish-Muslim relations (Bourdieu, 1979; Bourdieu 2001: 41; translated by Thielmann, 2013: 204; Lizardo, 2004: 379; 394; Rey, 2007: 47; Wacquant, 2006: 7-8). The field concept has provided a tool to show how a Jewish and a Muslim field emerged in Amsterdam, how these fields interact with a political field and how Jewish-Muslim relations take place at the overlap of these fields (see Chapters 3). In Chapter 7, we saw how the amount of economic and social capital influences the level of cooperation. Although Muslim and Jewish religious and community leaders often have social capital that helps them organize their projects, Jewish-Muslim cooperation is quite vulnerable due to the lack of economic capital.

In my study, I did not use the concept of habitus to analyze Jewish-Muslim relations, because it requires a comparative analysis of the studied groups, while this study focuses on the relations between multiple groups. However, this is not to say that the whole concept of habitus is useless for studying group dynamics; quite the contrary. I used the ideas surrounding habitus, such as structure and agency, to study Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. These concepts are particularly useful as this study aims to find out what kind of factors influence Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam.

As we have seen throughout this book, Jewish-Muslim relations are influenced by all kinds of structures. In Chapter 4, for example, we learned that a pervasive frame brought about a practice of not talking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Jewish/Muslim cooperation projects and sometimes in their daily lives. Structural elements that formed this discourse are some Dutch media sources and the general public asking Muslims and Jews to take a stance. In some cases the local government contributed to this frame in the form of civil servants describing the tensions arising from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a delicate problem especially for Jews and Muslims, or by actively discouraging talk about this conflict. Finally, the symbolic power used in pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian demonstrations also contributed to this frame.

Chapters 5 and 6 revealed structures that influence Jewish-Muslim relations; the discourse surrounding Muslims as the new perpetrators of anti-Semitism and the structural inequalities regarding security measures. They influenced the relations in the sense that some Muslims looked at Jewish communities with envy, while some Jews became fearful of Muslims. Structural factors also influenced cooperation projects in the sense that many forms of cooperation depend on financing from the local or national government and their existence is under threat because of the lack of economic capital. At the same time, structural factors did not always cause problems for Jews and Muslims. We have also seen that structural factors helped Jewish-Muslim cooperation in the sense that both local government and national government tried to organize cooperation, brought parties together and solidified the networks between Muslims and Jews in Amsterdam.

As defined in Chapter 1, agentic behavior used by Muslims and Jews in cooperation projects is visible in regard to the described tensions, but most visible in creative strategies where they try to negotiate the tensions emerging in their relations, such as 'searching for similarities', 'decategorization', 'avoidance' and all the different emotion management strategies. Jewish and Muslim religious and community leaders used and developed these strategies with each other or developed them on the spot. And not just religious and community leaders developed these strategies. Sometimes they were the result of interaction between participants.

These strategies are, however, not just developed in the vacuum of agentic behavior. Some also depend on structural developments. To provide two examples: there would have been no need for avoidance had the Israeli-Palestinian conflict not flared up in 2014 and emotion management would not have been needed if Jews and Muslims had not experienced the insecurity caused by extremist attacks in Brussels, Paris and Copenhagen (see Chapters 4, 5, 8 and 9). However, strategies were also made up on the spot, because Muslims and Jews had to improvise in delicate situations and also needed a certain degree of improvisation and creativity. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Bourdieu (1989: 112-113) states:

> "The good player, who is as it were the embodiment of the game, is continually doing what needs to be done, what the game demands and requires. This presupposes a constant invention, an improvisation that is absolutely necessary in order for one to adapt to situations that are infinitely varied."

This is exactly what happens in Jewish-Muslim cooperation. Jewish and Muslim religious and community leaders had to be highly skilled and knowledgeable to be able to adjust to varying situations and apply learned and improvised strategies. However, these strategies were not always successful. It sometimes had to do with the skills of the leaders or with a miscalculation of the situation, as is often the case with avoidance when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not discussed, even when Jews and Muslims hold more compatible opinions, or when religious differences are addressed too soon in newly formed relations. Again, structural factors play a role here. Think, for example, about a lack of economic capital to organize cooperation, the fact that clusters of Jewish and Muslim communities live in different neighborhoods, the pervasive frame that prevents Jews and Muslims from talking about delicate issues and the government's unequal treatment that created tensions in Jewish-Muslim relations. What we see here, again, is that not just one factor is the cause of tension or cooperation within Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam; several factors interact with each other.

Social Identity Strategies to Change Ideas and Emotion Management to Change Emotions
However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Bourdieu's theories are not enough to understand Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. Nor is it sufficient to just combine these theories with empirical studies of historical and contemporary Jewish-Muslim relations. To study Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam we need to look through the third theoretical lens as well: the social identity angle (see Brown, 2000).

For analytical reasons I presented these strategies separately, but in reality they were used in combination with one another and – interestingly – some of the most creative solutions for the tensions lie in these combinations. As shown in Chapter 8, for example, the combination of talking about sensitive topics in dialog groups and then eating together while searching for similarities might have helped reduce the tension felt from discussing sensitive topics. As Salima and Merve pointed out, it can be wise to avoid discussing a sensitive topic in newly formed relations or in big groups until after the Muslim and Jewish participants have gotten to know each other or when smaller groups allow for more in-depth discussion.

Interestingly, the social identity strategies were not just combined with one another, but also with emotion management strategies (see Harlow, 2003; Harvey Wingfield, 2010; Hochschild, 1979; 1983). Emotion management is "the act of trying to change in degree or quality an emotion or feeling" (Hochschild, 1979: 566) and it can come in many shapes and forms. A few examples are suppressing emotions to remain calm

or evoking emotions to be professional – think of not expressing anger or putting on a brave face at work (Harlow, 2003; Harvey Wingfield, 2010; Hochschild, 1979). As shown in Chapter 9 and above, religious and community leaders used suppression of anger, fear and frustration by working with structuring models; evoking and creating joy through 'secular' rituals; and self-deprecating humor.

It makes sense to combine these strategies in Jewish-Muslim cooperation projects, because changing ideas could affect how people feel about each other and changing emotions can have an effect on the opinion someone has about the other. Think, for example, of Hilel's narrative in Chapter 7, when he admitted to Rivka that he had not thought much about Jews in the past, but when he met one of the Jewish organizers of cooperation projects he changed his opinion, because he saw him as a great man.

Again, we see how factors that influence Jewish-Muslim relations are interrelated. These three examples of interrelatedness show that it is important to study factors in relation to each other. It helps us better understand how Jewish-Muslim relations work. Not only that, but realizing how problems arise and solutions are created is also to understand how to resolve tensions.

Future Research

This study has shown which main factors have had an influence on Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam; the influence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the extremist attacks in 2014 and 2015 in Europe; local incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia; the economic and social capital used in cooperation projects; strategies to change ideas and prejudices; and emotion management strategies. I have also shown how and what kind of problems emerge in Jewish-Muslim relations because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, extremist attacks and local incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia, such as how fearing the opinion of the Other can lead to avoidance strategies and feelings of inequality can fuel prejudice. These factors create distrust, prejudice, fear and envy, but sometimes paradoxically also lead to more cooperation to try and solve these problems.

Although these factors influence most Muslims and Jews, they do not always influence all Muslims and Jews in the same way. The previous chapters have shown that Jews and Muslims have differing and similar opinions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have differing and similar views on being asked to take a stance against violent extremism, have different experiences with anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents and differ in their willingness to join or organize cooperation projects.

We have also seen that these experiences create different attitudes in regard to the relations with the Other. Take, for example, being asked to denounce violent extremism and taking a stance against the violence committed by the Israeli state. In some cases, taking a stance against either violent extremism or state violence helped to reassure the Other, but being asked to take a stance could also meet resistance.

In some cases, I found explanations for these differences in experiences and in regard to the Other. For cooperation, we noticed that networks that established relations between Muslims and Jews in the past were re-established when tensions emerged. For previously active Muslims and Jews, it is easier to set up cooperation projects in turbulent times, because they tended to have more social capital to be able to start cooperation projects than those who had not been in the old network. Some might have hesitated to start a project, because of past tensions in the network and setting up a project also depended on the availability of economic capital provided by governments or present in communities themselves.

As for the tensions, for example, I explained in Chapter 6 how intergenerational trauma, visibility, direct/indirect experiences of discrimination and repetition can be factors that explain why some individual Jews and Muslims become angry at each other or afraid of each other and others try to cooperate. I also got the impression, but note that it is an impression, that the position and perception of Jews and Muslims as ethnic and religious minorities and political preferences are more important predictors of tension than internal dividing lines within those communities. This impression derives from the observation that not only ultra-orthodox Jews were present at the pro-Israel movements, but also orthodox and liberal Jews. And Muslims from all kinds of denominations were present at the pro-Palestinian demonstrations, as well as left-wing Jews. Moreover, the opinions about the conflict and about each other in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were not evenly distributed over the different religious and ethnic groups in the Jewish and Muslim field. Political preferences did seem to matter, because at the pro-Palestine demonstrations I encountered more left-wing supporters and at the pro-Israel demonstrations more right-wing supporters. Also in regard to opinions of the Other – that were influenced by the extremist attacks and the anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents – the differences could not be accurately explained by religious or ethnic divides. Although religious visibility did seem to influence – in quite a complex way – the opinion about the Other sometimes (see Chapter 5 and 6). To explain more of these differences, additional quantitative research on the background characteristics and opinions of the Other would help us to establish a greater degree of accuracy in this matter, while additional qualitative research could help to explain why these differences occur.

More broadly, research is needed to determine the role of World War II and the Holocaust commemorations in Jewish-Muslim relations. Chapter 6 showed that anti-Semitic incidents make references to the decimation of Jews and the *Kristallnacht* commemoration is contested in Amsterdam, because of references speakers made in regard to Israel – as described in Chapter 4. It would, however, be interesting to deepen research on this topic (see Wiegers & Vellenga, forthcoming).

Finally, the findings of this study also provide insights for future research in terms of comparing Jewish-Muslim relations in other times and contexts. As I have shown in comparison with other European contexts, political changes in Europe might have a crucial influence on Jewish-Muslim relations, as well as international developments in regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and extremist attacks in and outside of Europe. Comparing to a greater number of cases could contribute to our understanding of European as well as local influences. Besides that, as I mentioned at the start of this concluding chapter, Jewish-Muslim relations might change in relation to societal changes. The migration of groups of refugees to the Netherlands might change the dynamics within Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. It will be interesting to see how these and other new challenges and opportunities shape Jewish-Muslim relations in the future.

In conclusion, the entanglement of cooperation and tensions, as well as the entanglement between different Jewish, Muslim and other groups shows that there are multiple problems, multiple forms of cooperation and multiple strategies that can be applied to solve problems in Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. There is no 'one-size-fits-all' solution to the problems I found. This is not to say that there are no patterns, no groups or group processes, but these are complex and several groups and group processes interact with one another, creating a wide spectrum of opportunities and problems for Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. It also means that problems cannot be boiled down to a clear case of Jews versus Muslims or Muslims versus Jews, but that more factors and groups are involved. Therefore, to fully comprehend Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam – and elsewhere – we need to study the influence of complex, multi-layered structures, the influence of various applied strategies, their interrelations and understand them as the dynamic relations that they are.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Author Contributions

Parts of this dissertation are based on an earlier publication called 'Cooperation in Turbulent Times: Strategies of Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam' published in the journal *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* (Roggeveen, Vellenga & Wiegers, 2017). Part of the theoretical and methodology chapters, the basis for ideas in Chapter 4, parts of the secondary data used in Chapter 3, the 'mapping cooperation projects' section in Chapter 7 and a large part of Chapter 8 are based on this article. The data collection, analysis of the data and writing were done by the first author. The second and third authors contributed by giving substantial input from their fields of expertise, respectively Sociology of Religion and Comparative Religious Studies and Islamic Studies. In addition, they provided extensive feedback in multiple rounds on the ideas, concepts and the analysis applied. All authors agreed, after review, to the final article.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1 – Interview Guide

1. Algemeen:

Introductie project: onderzoek naar relaties tussen joden en moslims. Ik doe het onderzoek in Amsterdam, mijn collega in Londen. Uiteindelijk worden deze steden met elkaar vergeleken. Universiteit van Amsterdam. Anonimiteit.

Wilt u iets over uzelf vertellen?
- Kwam u voordat u aan het samenwerkingsproject begon joden-moslims tegen in Amsterdam? In uw wijk? Op uw werk? Op andere plaatsen? (op tv?)
- Kende u al joden-moslims voordat u aan dit project begon?
- Hoe dacht u over hen?
- Had u positieve ervaringen met moslims/joden?
- Had u negatieve ervaringen met moslims/joden?
- Hoe is dat nu?

2. Start project en samenwerking (als er samenwerking is)
- Wanneer is het project begonnen?
- Vraag naar de naam van het project (bijvoorbeeld als het een religieuze naam is)
- Welke partijen waren er bij betrokken?
- Was u betrokken bij de start van het project?
- Zo niet, kunt u zich de dag herinneren dat u betrokken raakte/dat het project werd opgericht?
- Heeft iemand u gevraagd?
- Waar bestaat het project uit?
- Wat doet u samen met anderen?
- Wat zijn uw taken?
- Hoe verliep de samenwerking?
- Wat ging er goed? Wat waren de uitdagingen?
- Waren er wel eens spanningen?
- Wie spelen daar een rol in?
- Hoe gaat dat nu?
- Zijn die spanningen opgelost?
- Wat vindt u van het project?

Zijn er bepaalde zaken die de samenwerking bevorderen?
Voorbeelden: religieuze overeenkomsten, belangen

Zijn er bepaalde zaken die de samenwerking bemoeilijken?

Voorbeelden: religieuze verschillen, educatie, netwerk, beeldvorming, inkomen, leeftijd

- Is het een succes/mislukking/geen van beiden?
- Wat maakt het een succes/mislukking/iets anders?
- Ziet u jullie als een groep of als twee groepen die samen werken?
- Wat vindt u nu van moslims/joden?
- Heeft het project effect? Zo ja waar zie je dat aan? Zo nee, waar ligt dat aan?

3. Start van het conflict (als er conflict is)

- Wanneer begon voor u deze situatie?
- Wat is de oorzaak van het conflict?
- Wat is er gebeurd?
- Wie waren er bij betrokken?
- Wie is het conflict gestart?
- Waarom doen zij (of u) dat?
- Hebt u er op gereageerd?
- Wat hebt u gedaan?
- Praat u er wel eens over met andere mensen?
- Wat zijn de effecten van dit conflict voor u?
- Heeft het nog bredere effecten?
- Hebben er meer mensen last van dit conflict? Wie? Waarom?

- Is er in de tussentijd iets verandert in het conflict?
- Zo ja, wat dan? En hoe komt dat?
- Zo nee, waarom duurt het nog steeds voort?

Is het conflict opgelost?

- Zo ja, wie heeft het opgelost? En hoe? Waarom werkte dat?
- Zo nee, waarom duurt het nog steeds voort? Hoe zou het opgelost kunnen worden?
- Wat heeft daarbij geholpen?
- Waren er moeilijke dingen bij het oplossen?
- Is er iets goeds uit voort gekomen?

- Hebt u op een andere manier contact met joden/moslims?
- Hoe verloopt dat?
- Beïnvloed het conflict uw contact met andere joden/moslims?

4. Strategie, doelen, macht, uitwisseling van kapitaal

- Hebt u bepaalde doelen met de samenwerking/conflict?
- Hoe probeert u die na te streven?
- Heeft de organisatie bepaalde doelen?
- Hoe proberen jullie dat in de praktijk uit te voeren?
- Zijn de doelen bereikt?
- Zijn het dezelfde als uw eigen doelen?
- Hebben de joden/moslims dezelfde doelen?
- Botsen de doelen wel eens?
- Of de manier van uitdragen?

5. Rol van de derde partij

- Welke andere organisaties zijn er betrokken bij de samenwerking/het conflict/ verhoudingen?
- Voorbeelden: gemeente, christelijke organisaties, dialoogorganisaties, organisaties gericht op diversiteit, landelijke partijen
- Wat is hun functie?
- Hoe vindt u het dat deze partijen betrokken zijn?
- Zijn er zaken die lastiger worden doordat deze partijen betrokken zijn?
- Zijn er zaken die makkelijker worden doordat deze partijen betrokken zijn?
- Bij welke activiteiten doen zij mee?
- En bij welke niet?
- Zijn ze er altijd bij?
- Verstrekken ze subsidie?
- Mobiliseren ze andere mensen die jullie niet kunnen bereiken?
- Zijn er knelpunten in de samenwerking?
- Hebben zij dezelfde of andere doelen dan jullie?
- Waren er mensen, groepen of organisaties die niet mee wilden werken?

- Heeft de media invloed op samenwerking/conflict/verhoudingen?
- Zo ja, hoe zie je dat?
- Zo nee, zijn jullie zichtbaar in de media?
- Publiceren jullie zelf wel eens iets in de krant?
- Zetten jullie zelf berichten op sociale media?

6. Leiderschap

- Hebben jullie iemand of meerdere mensen die het voortouw nemen in de groep/ in de verhoudingen?
- Wie zijn dat?

- Als er problemen zijn wie lost dat dan op?
- Hebt u daar een concreet voorbeeld van?
- Afhankelijk of iemand een voortrekker is of niet:
- Waarom hebt u het voortouw genomen?
- Wat is uw rol als voortrekker?

- Waarom wijst u hen als voortrekkers aan?
- Hoe doen zij het in uw ogen?

- Van wie zijn zij de voortrekkers?
- Afhankelijk van het antwoord naar of ze een groep zijn en of ze gedeelde of verschillende leiders hebben: Wie draagt de doelen het meest uit naar de ander (joden moslims)? Wie draagt de doelen het meest uit naar buiten? (de media, de overheid)
- Hoe doet diegene dat?
- Zou u het ook zo doen?

- Hoe groot is het bereik van jullie groep?
- Spreken jullie ook andere mensen aan?
- Wie zijn dat dan?
- Zijn er mensen die soortgelijke initiatieven opzetten naar aanleiding van jullie initiatief?
- Is er tegenstand in uw achterban?

7. Israël en Palestina en andere (inter)nationale ontwikkelingen

- Zijn er internationale ontwikkelingen die van invloed zijn op hoe u over joden/ moslims denkt?
- Zijn deze ontwikkelingen van invloed op jullie samenwerking?
- Voorbeelden: Israël-Palestina, demonstraties in Europa, aanslag in Brussel, situatie in andere landen, in het verleden andere oorlogen (zoals de Golfoorlog)

- Zijn er nationale ontwikkelingen die van invloed zijn op hoe u over joden/moslims denkt?
- Zijn deze ontwikkelingen van invloed op de samenwerking?
- Voorbeelden: ritueel slachten, jongensbesnijdenis, antisemitisme, Islamofobie

8. Sociale identiteit

- Gedraagt u zich op dezelfde manier of anders in het bijzijn van moslims/joden? In dit project/conflict?

- Zijn er gedeelten van uzelf die u meer laat zien in bijzijn van moslims/joden? Bijvoorbeeld religie, seksualiteit, gender, etniciteit, politieke voorkeur.
- Zijn er gedeelten van uzelf die u minder laat zien in bijzijn van moslims/joden?

9. Afronding

- Is er iets over de samenwerking of de moeilijkheden daar in wat u graag kwijt wil?

Achtergrondkenmerken:

- Leeftijd
- Geslacht
- Land van herkomst
- Opleidingsniveau
- Religieuze identificatie
- Baan (aantal uur en occupatie)
- In welke buurt woont u

Bedankt voor uw tijd!

Appendix 2 – List of Interviews and Observations

Interview number	Pseudonym	Location of the interview
1	Mark	Amsterdam
2	Cherif	Amsterdam
3	Diane	Amsterdam
4	Cindy	Amsterdam
5	Yair	Amsterdam
6	Leila	Amsterdam
7	Emma	Amsterdam
8	Barbara	Amsterdam
9	Duo-interview Ilse & Thomas	Amsterdam
10	Duo-interview Colin & Hassan	Amsterdam
11	Milou	Amsterdam
12	Levana	Amsterdam
13	Onur	Amsterdam
14	Yair (second interview)	Amsterdam
15	Alexander	Amsterdam
16	Thirza	Amsterdam
17	Keyan	Amsterdam
18	Salim	Amsterdam
19	Joran	Amsterdam
20	Tivon	Amsterdam
21	Duo-interview Ronald & Joey	The Hague
22	Marike	Badhoevedorp
23	Younes	Amsterdam
24	Karin	Amsterdam
25	Matthijs	Amsterdam
26	Marouan	Amsterdam
27	Kerem	Amsterdam
28	Kevin	Amsterdam
29	Meryam	Amsterdam
30	Robert	Amsterdam
31	Taoufik	Amsterdam
32	Aysel	Utrecht
33	Hilel	Amsterdam

34	Rashid	Amsterdam
35	Achraf	Amsterdam
36	Josefine	Amsterdam
37	Gideon	Amsterdam
38	Femke	Amsterdam
39	Rivka	Amsterdam
40	Jaeda	Amsterdam
41	Lea	Near Leiden (for reasons of anonymity the exact location is not provided)
42	Azize	Amsterdam
43	Ozan	Rotterdam
44	Mounira	Amsterdam
45	Sophia	Amsterdam
46	Masja	Amsterdam
47	Khalid	Amsterdam
48	Halil	Amsterdam
49	Jaap	Amsterdam
50	Koen	Amsterdam
51	Bram	Bussum
52	Eray	Amsterdam
53	Najim	The Hague
54	Arslan	Amsterdam
55	Omer	Amsterdam
56	Levi	Amsterdam
57	Jennifer	Amsterdam
58	Alyssa	Amsterdam
59	Isaac	Amsterdam
60	Fleur	Amsterdam
61	Tariq	Amsterdam
62	Stephanie	Amsterdam
63	Abraham	Amsterdam
64	Merve	Amsterdam
65	Mo	Amsterdam
66	Mona	Near Gouda (for reasons of anonymity the exact location is not provided)

67	Yunus	Amsterdam
68	Sharif	Amsterdam
69	Niels	Amsterdam
70	Duo-interview Noam & Owen	Amsterdam
71	Albert	Amsterdam
72	Lianne	Amsterdam
73	Samuel	Amsterdam

Focus groups

Focus group number	Pseudonyms	Location of the focus group
1	Ruth, Naomi, Carmela, Penina, Aliza, Daniël, Pieter, Joël, Joshua, Nathan and Aaron	Amsterdam
2	Reuven, Zarah, Wessel, Mandy and Anton	Amsterdam

Observations

Observation number	Pseudonyms[193]	Location of the observation
1		Amsterdam
2	Aliyah, Nassim	Amsterdam
3		Amsterdam
4	Ismail, Marouan, Sarai, David, Aliyah, Thirza	Amsterdam
5		Amsterdam
6		Amsterdam
7	Petra	Amsterdam
8		Amsterdam
9	Yentle	Amsterdam
10	Hans	Amsterdam

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193   At many observations there were more than 20 people present, sometimes even more than 100 and at a pro-Palestinian demonstration even approximately 3000 people at the site. Providing these people all with pseudonyms would result in an unreadable table. Therefore, I only listed the respondents that are mentioned by their pseudonym in the book. Second, some of the interviewed respondents were not just interviewed, but were also present during observations. If I cited their pseudonyms in regard to an observation in the book, I also added their names to the list of observations. Finally, respondents who were present during multiple observations and were mentioned multiple times in the book, were also mentioned multiple times in the table with observations.

11	Esam, Badi, Jalil, Hisham, Naim, Levona, Anna, Martin, Mira, Nadim, Badr	Amsterdam
12		Amsterdam
13		Amsterdam
14		Amsterdam
15		Amsterdam
16		Amsterdam
17	Jesse	Amsterdam
18		Amsterdam
19	Julia	Amsterdam
20	Mathilde, Boaz	Amsterdam
21	Rafik, Mathea	The Hague
22	Tzemach, Eli, Hasim, Heleen, Benjamin, Mathilde	Amsterdam
23		Amsterdam
24	Farid, Lotte, Mathilde	Amsterdam
25		Amsterdam
26		Amsterdam
27	Soufyan	Amsterdam
28		Amsterdam
29		Amsterdam
30	Sara	Amsterdam
31	Janneke	Amsterdam
32	Salima, Alida	Amsterdam
33		Amsterdam
34	Chaya, Hassnae, Fatima, Kevin, Najoua, Sandra, Patrick, Mustafa, Lieke	Amsterdam
35		Amsterdam
36		Amsterdam
37		Amsterdam
38	Marcus, Ibtissame	Amsterdam
39	Suherman	Amsterdam
40		Amsterdam
41		Amsterdam

42	Els, Aydin, Eser, Abdul, Gladys, Chamilla	Amsterdam
43		Amsterdam
44	Kateb	Amsterdam
45		Amsterdam
46		Amsterdam
47		Amsterdam
48		Amsterdam
49		Amsterdam
50	Aïcha, Suhayr, Kim	Amsterdam

Appendix 3 – List of Organizations and Speakers Participating in Demon-strations in Amsterdam194

Pro-Israel demonstrations and pro-town twinning demonstrations in Amsterdam:

- Centre of Information and Documentation on Israel (CIDI)
- Christians for Israel
- Informal/online networks of Jews and Christians (for example Holland4Israel and Time to Stand Up for Israel)
- Right-wing activists
- Joel Voordewind (Christian Union)
- Frits Bolkestein (the People´s Party for Freedom and Democracy)
- Frits Barend (journalist)
- Haim Davon (Israeli ambassador)
- David Pinto
- Ruud van Ginkel
- Joram van Klaveren (For the Netherlands, political party)

Pro-Palestine demonstrations and anti-town twinning demonstrations in Amsterdam:

- DocP
- Youth for Palestine
- Back to Palestine
- Students for Justice in Palestine
- Stand Up for Palestine
- International Socialists

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194   This list is based on observations made during the demonstrations and supplemented by the media sources listed below and sources mentioned in the article.

Extra Politie-Inzet bij Pro-Gaza Demonstratie in Den Haag. (2014, July 25). RTL Nieuws. Retrieved from: http://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/binnenland/extra-politie-inzet-bij-pro-gaza-demonstratie-rotterdam
Jans, S. (2014, August 26). Solidariteit met Ferguson. Socialisme.nu. Retrieved from: http://socialisme.nu/blog/nieuws/42598/solidariteit-met-ferguson/
Paar Honderd Betogers voor Palestina op de Dam. (2014, August 23). Nu.nl. Retrieved from: http://www.nu.nl/midden-oostenconflict/3859286/paar-honderd-betogers-palestina-dam.html
Pro-Israëlfeestje Kleurt Dam Blauw: "Tijd voor een Solidariteitsgebaar". (2015, March 2). Evangelische Omroep. Retrieved from: http://www.eo.nl/geloven/nieuws/item/pro-israel-feestje-kleurt-dam-blauw/
Pro-Palestina Betoging Rustig Verlopen. (2014, August 23). NOS. Retrieved from: http://nos.nl/video/690038-pro-palestina-betoging-rustig-verlopen.html
Ridderhof, R. (2014, July 17). #IsraelopdeDam. Retrieved from: https://christenenvoorisrael.nl/2014/07/israelopdedam/
Veel 'Bible Belt' bij Pro-Israël Demonstratie op de Dam. (2015, March 1). At5. Retrieved from: http://www.at5.nl/artikelen/140783/veel_bible_belt_bij_pro-isral_demonstratie_op_de_dam
Wie Zijn Wij. (2015). Retrieved from: http://www.amsterdamvoorpalestina.nl/about-2/

- Palestina Komitee (Palestina Committee)
- Palestine Link
- The International League of Peoples' Struggle
- R4bia
- Sharenl.org
- Vrouweninhetzwart.nl (womeninblack.nl)
- Gate48
- Een Ander Joods Geluid (An Alternative Jewish Voice)
- Abvakabo FNV (Labor union)
- De Rode Morgen (The Red Morning)
- Mad Mothers
- Derek Otte (Poët)
- Hiphop artist Appa
- Dyab Abou Jahjah (activist)
- Abulkasim al-Jaberi (activist)
- Mitchell Esajas (New Urban Collective)
- Members of the aforementioned organizations
- Members of the Socialist Party (although the party itself did not officially participate in the demonstrations)
- Informal LGBT group
- Informal networks of Jewish, Muslim and non-religious groups

Amsterdam for Palestine

- Aknarij
- Al Awda Network Palestina
- Back to Palestine
- Breed Platform Palestina Haarlem
- Burgerinitiatief Sloop de Muur
- Collectief tegen Islamofobie en Discriminatie
- Diensten Onderzoek Centrum Palestina – DocP
- Emcemo
- Grenzeloos / Borderless
- HTIB
- Internationale Socialisten
- International Solidarity Movement Nederland – ISMNL
- Komittee Marokkaanse Arbeiders Nederland – KMAN
- Landelijk Beraad Marokkanen
- Nederlands Palestina Komitee – NPK
- Netwerk van Marokkaanse Organisaties Amsterdam
- NIDA Rotterdam
- Palestijnse Filmdag Hilversum
- Palestijnse Gemeenschap Nederland
- Palestine Link
- Propal
- Staat van Beleg
- Stichting Palestijnse Vrouwen in Nederland
- Stichting Palestina
- Stop Racisme en Uitsluiting
- Studenten voor Rechtvaardigheid Palestina – SRP
- University of Colour
- Vrienden van Sabeel Nederland
- Vrouwen in het zwart
- Werkgroep Pa-Is
- Youth for Palestine

Appendix 4 – List of Cooperation Projects in Amsterdam 195

Cooperation projects founded in:

1990-2000

Early 1990s: Dialoog in de Rode Hoed
(Dialog in debate center the Rode Hoed)

1992: Dialoog in de Mozes & Aaronkerk
(Moses & Aaronchurch dialog)

1997: Raad voor Levensbeschouwingen en Religies Amsterdam
(Council for the Philosophies of Life and Religion Amsterdam)

2000: Stichting Maïmon
(Foundation Maïmon)

(year unknown): Project kindermonument[196]
(Children's monument project)

2001-2010

From +/- 2001 to today: Informele netwerken tussen sleutelfiguren vanuit moskeeën en synagogen
(Informal networks between key persons from mosques and synagogues in Amsterdam)

+/- 2001: West Interreligieus Netwerk met projecten zoals het 'Marokkaans-joods' voetbaltoernooi
(Interreligious Network in the West of Amsterdam, which organizes projects such as the 'Morrocan-Jewish' soccer tournament)

2003-2004: Diversion: project 'Gelijk = Gelijk' en project 'Tweedewereldoorlog in perspectief' (Diversion: projects on discrimination and the Second World War)

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195   This list is based on information gathered from respondents in interviews and observations and the sources listed below.
196   The children's monument project was founded in 1982. In this project pupils get educated about the Second World War. Nowadays, this often involves Muslim pupils, but this might not always have been the case.

2005: Breed Interreligieus Netwerk Oost
(Broad Interreligious Network in the East of Amsterdam)

+/- 2004: Informele relaties tussen de liberaal joodse gemeente en individuen/ groepen uit de Gülen beweging en Milli Görüş, buurthuis Argan, Al Kabir moskee en de Fatih moskee (Informal relations between the liberal Jewish community and individuals/groups from the Gülen movement, Milli Görüş, community centre Argan, the Al Kabir mosque and the Fatih mosque)

2005: Het Ramadan Festival nodigde de liberaal joodse gemeenschap en sjoel West uit voor hun iftars
(The Ramadan Festival invited the liberal Jewish community and a synagogue in the West of Amsterdam to their iftars)

2005: Classroom of Difference op scholen in Amsterdam en in andere steden in Nederland (Classroom of Difference Project on schools in Amsterdam, and other cities in the Netherlands as well)

2005: Raad voor Levensbeschouwingen en Religies Amsterdam: vrouwengroep. De vrouwengroep bestond al in 1998, maar in 2005 kwamen er joodse en islamitische vrouwen bij.
(Council for the Philosophies of Life and Religion Amsterdam: women's group. This women's group was founded in 1998, but in 2005 Jewish and Muslim women joined.)

2005: M-Zine, FORUM en Centrum Informatie en Documentatie over Israël organiseerden reizen naar Westerbork en Auschwitz met joodse en islamitische jongeren uit Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, Den Haag en Den Bosch.
(M-Zine, FORUM and Centre of Information and Documentation on Israel organized trips to Westerbork & Auschwitz with young Muslims and Jews from Amsterdam, Utrecht, Rotterdam, The Hague and Den Bosch)

2005: Brievenproject 'Niet van Gisteren'
(Sending-letters project – pupils correspond with Jewish survivors of the Second World War)

2006: Dialoog Diamantbuurt
(Dialog in the Diamond-neighbourhood)

2006: Rap Project in jeugdcentra in Amsterdam
(Rap Project in youth centers in Amsterdam)

2006: Joods-Marokkaans Netwerk Amsterdam
(Jewish-Moroccan Network Amsterdam)

2010: Samenwerkingsprojecten tussen een islamitische jeugdwerker en een rabbijn
(Cooperation projects organized by a Muslim youthworker and a rabbi)

2011-2015
2010: Artiesten die theater maken over spanningen in het Midden-Oosten, tussen etnische en religieuze groepen en vriendschap
(Artist duo who make theater about friendship, tensions between different ethnic and religious groups and the Middle East)

2011: Leer je buren kennen, educatieproject[197]
(Get to know your neighbours, educational project)

2011: Stichting Dialoog in Actie: dialoogtafels waar soms joden en moslims aan meededen
(Foundation Dialogue in Action: dialogue tables in which Jews and Muslims sometimes participated)

2011: Gerard Douplein bijeenkomst tussen een synagogue, een kerk en een moskee
(Gerard Dousquare gathering between a synagogue, a church and a mosque)

2012: Preken in Mokum
(Preaching in Amsterdam)

+/- 2012: Jaarlijkse dialoog tussen een christelijke school, een joodse school en een school met veel islamitische leerlingen
(Annual dialog between a Christian school, a Jewish school and a school with many Muslim pupils)

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197   There were some educational projects in mosques. However, these projects were usually visited by non-confessional schools and not necessarily by Jewish schools.

2012: Veiligheidspact tegen discriminatie ondertekend door verschillende joodse en islamitische organisaties
(Safety pact against discrimination, signed by several Jewish and Muslim organizations)

2011-2012: Samenwerking tussen Nederlands Israëlitisch Kerkgenootschap en Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid, vanwege het mogelijke verbod op onverdoofd ritueel slachten
(Cooperation between an umbrella organization for orthodox Jewish organizations and a representative body of umbrella Muslim organisations, because of the legislative proposal to forbid ritual slaughtering without stunning the animal first)

+/- 2013: Informeel netwerk van joodse en islamitische kunstenaars
(Informal Network Jewish and Muslim artists)

2014: Dialoogtafel joden en moslims met de burgemeester
(Dialog group Jews and Muslims with the mayor of Amsterdam)

2014: Dialoog in de Jeruzalemkerk
(Dialog Jerusalemchurch)

2014: Tentoonstelling 'Het Andere Verhaal'
(The exhibition 'A Different Story')

2014: Salaam-Shalom
(Salaam-Shalom network)

2014: Samenwerking tussen de joodse en de Marokkaanse gay pride boten
(Cooperation between the Jewish and the Moroccan gay pride boats)

2014: Mo & Moos jong leiderschapsproject
(Mo & Moos youth leadership project)

2013-2015: (de ontwikkeling van) Tentoonstelling 'I Believe I am Gay'
(Development and Exhibition I Believe I am Gay)

2014: No Hate Speech the Netherlands[198]
(No Hate Speech the Netherlands)

2015: Interreligieus Netwerk Zuid
(Interreligious Network in the South of Amsterdam)

2015: Samen Één Amsterdam netwerk
(Together United Amsterdam Network)

2015: Zangeressenduo dat in het Hebreeuws en Arabisch zingt, Noam & Teema
(Two female singers who sing in Hebrew and Arabic, Noam & Teema)

2015: Liberale joodse gemeente brengt bezoek aan vluchtelingen in de Havenstraat
(Liberal Jewish community visits refugees in the Havenstraat)

Sources used for this list

Interviews and observations conducted for this research and the following media sources:

Anne Frank Stichting. (2015, November 5). *Anne Frank Stichting en KNVB Slaan Handen Ineen*. Retrieved from: http://www.annefrank.org/nl/Nieuws/Nieuwsberichten/2015/November/Studiedag-diversiteit-bij-voetbal/
Bijbels Museum. (2015). *I Believe I Am Gay*. Retrieved from: http://www.bijbelsmuseum.nl/i-believe-i-am-gay
Christenen, Joden, Moslims Gaan Praten over Tolerantie. (1992, March 18), *Trouw*, pp. 11
CIDI Wil Gesprek Joden en Moslims (1986, February 28). *Reformatorisch Dagblad*, Kerkelijk Leven, pp. 2
Humanistisch Verbond. (2007). *Uitnodiging ter Gelegenheid van de Dag van de Rechten van de Mens*. Retrieved from: http://humanistischverbond.nl/doc/lynsey/uitnodiging%20dag%20van%20mensenrechten%2011-12-07.pdf
Joden, Moslims en Christenen Hand in Hand in Amsterdam. (2011, March 7). *Het Parool*. Retrieved from: http://www.parool.nl/parool/nl/4041/AMSTERDAM-ZUID/article/detail/1856786/2011/03/07/Joden-moslims-en-christenen-hand-in-hand-in-

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198   The organizers of this project fight hate speech against all minorities in the Netherlands and work with all kinds of people who are victims of hate speech or who are involved in hate speech themselves.

Amsterdam.dhtml

Joods Maatschappelijk Werk. (n.d.). *Tussen Culturen en Generaties*. Retrieved from: http://www.joodswelzijn.nl/Joodse-activiteiten-Tsavta/Tussen-culturen-en-generaties.aspx

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SUMMARY

Jewish-Muslim Relations in Amsterdam:

Cooperation and Tension in Times of Turmoil

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Jewish-Muslim Relations in Amsterdam: Cooperation and Tension in Times of Turmoil

In this book I study the factors influencing Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. In European societies, where majority populations often call the position of Muslim and Jewish minorities into question, discussion of diversity in the public arena often becomes tense. Tension also occurs between minorities, so it is vital to understand where it comes from as well as to know how Jews, Muslims and others try to solve some of these problems (see Gans, 2013: 85; Vasta, 2007: 714; Van Es, 2018: 146-147).

My study contributes insights into the dynamics between minorities in contemporary societies. It deepens our understanding of the underlying mechanisms that structure Jewish-Muslim relations, describes their strategies in regard to these structures and broadens our view on their relations with each other. It aims to add insights into societal problems and their solutions. At the same time it tries to contribute theoretical insights into the study of relations between minorities that are often seen or identify as ethno-religious groups through the lens of Bourdieusian theories complemented by social identity theory, emotion management theories and in comparison to the empirical studies on Jewish-Muslim relations (see Brown, 2000; Bourdieu, 1979; 1989; 1990; 1991; 1999; Hochschild, 1979; Rey, 2007; Verter, 2003).

This study answers **three main questions**. First, the context in which Jewish-Muslim relations take place; *what* does that look like in Amsterdam? Second, *which* factors influence the relations between Jews and Muslims in Amsterdam? And finally, *how* do these factors influence these relations?

The three parts of this book are devoted to answering the research questions. **Part 1** (Chapters 1–3) answers the first by describing the theoretical framework used to analyze contemporary relations, the methodology, and the context in which Jewish-Muslim relations take place. **Part 2** (Chapters 4–6) and **Part 3** (Chapters 7–9) deal with the six main factors found to influence Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam, thus answering the second and third questions. Each subsequent chapter focuses on one influential factor in turn: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the extremist attacks in 2014 and 2015 in Europe; local incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia; the economic and social capital used in cooperation projects; strategies to change ideas and prejudices; and emotion management strategies.

Chapter 1 *introduces* the theories used to understand Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. It shows how Bourdieusian theories, social identity theory and emotion management theory are helpful to disentangle Jewish-Muslim relations and that combining these theories can enhance our understanding of these relations (see Bourdieu, 1979, 1990, 1991, 1999, Brown, 2000, Hochschild, 1979). It also argues that empirical studies on Jewish-Muslim relations help to put Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam in an international perspective.

Chapter 2 describes my methodology. Between June 2014 and December 2015, I conducted fieldwork on Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam. For 18 months I observed, talked with, interviewed and listened to Muslims, Jews and others involved. I visited a variety of places of worship, schools and people's homes, and attended demonstrations and activist meetings. The chapter explains how my qualitative data collection methods, such as interviews and observations, capture vital aspects of Jewish-Muslim relations, as well as my sampling techniques and how I analyzed my dataset.

Chapter 3 presents the histories of various Jewish and Muslims groups in the Netherlands to understand 'who is who'. Here I also provide a contextual overview of Jewish-Muslim relations, focusing on the political and ethno-religious landscapes in both the Netherlands and Amsterdam. I argue that there is not just one ethno-religious field in the Netherlands at large, but two distinct Jewish and Muslim fields, and those in Amsterdam are (important) subfields of the national fields. Jewish-Muslim relations happen at the overlap of these fields.

Chapter 4 shows how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, specifically the Gaza War of 2014 and the local government's idea to twin Amsterdam with Tel Aviv and Ramallah, shaped Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam in multiple, complex ways. It reveals the frame that defines the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a central, delicate topic that should not be talked about in direct contact with the Other. However, when studying the actual involvement of Jews and Muslims at pro-Israel, pro-Palestine, pro-town twinning and anti-town twinning demonstrations in Amsterdam, I found that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was not merely a problem for Muslims and Jews. While both sides were involved in these demonstrations, they were not the only parties involved. Left-wing activists, right-wing activists and Christian parties were also present at the demonstrations. Additionally, when studying what Jews and Muslims actually thought of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I found Muslims and Jews who disagreed about historical events, such as the existence of the Palestinians as a people, and about contemporary events as well, such as the various interpretations of the violence that

the Israeli state used in the 2014 Gaza War. However, there were also Muslims and Jews with more compatible opinions, agreeing on some but not all aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, who either did not have the time or did not want to get involved. Here again, we see discrepancies between the frame that puts the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the heart of Jewish-Muslim relations and what Muslims and Jews actually think of this conflict. This is problematic, because the frame ignores these discrepancies and produces problems of its own, such as overestimating the differences in opinion, leading to additional tensions in cooperation projects and direct contact with the Other.

Chapter 5 discusses the influence of the extremist attacks of 2014 and 2015 in Brussels, Paris and Copenhagen. It focuses on two effects of these international events that were renegotiated in the national and local context of the Netherlands and Amsterdam. The first effect on Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam has to do with fear stemming from the attacks and counter-terrorism and protective measures that the city took in response to the extremist attacks. The second has to do with asking Muslims and Jews to denounce both violent extremism (Muslims) and violence conducted by the Israeli state (Jews). The chapter shows, among other findings, that fear these attacks evoked could, on the one hand, sometimes lead Jews to distrust not just Muslim extremists, but Muslims in general. This could hinder positive relations between Jews and Muslims, creating a threshold to joining cooperation projects, and could enhance the stereotype of Muslims as the violent Other. On the other hand, Muslims felt unsafe and unprotected, especially when they compared their situation with the measures local government took to protect Jewish communities. This created distrust of the local government in the first place, but sometimes of Jewish communities as well, which negatively influenced Jewish-Muslim relations.

Chapter 6 zooms in on local incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. The chapter starts by exploring the central concepts of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. It shows that on the *individual* level both Jews and Muslims experience physical, verbal and institutional discrimination. These discriminatory incidents influenced how they thought about each other, but were mediated by such factors as generational trauma, visibility, direct/indirect experiences and repetition. These help to explain why some individual Jews and Muslims were able to work together, while some who were disheartened by anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents become more angry or fearful than others. On a group level, anti-Semitic and Islamophobic incidents had other effects on Jewish-Muslim relations. In some cases Muslims were seen as the "new perpetrators" of anti-Semitism. Acts of anti-Semitism by Muslims, for example, sometimes hurt relations between Muslims and Jews quite directly, because they

made Jews afraid of Muslims. On the other hand, a generalized idea of Islamic anti-Semitism, strengthened by a lack of attention for Islamophobia in Jewish communities, sometimes contributed to the stereotyping of Muslims. Competition between anti-Semitism and Islamophobia could also potentially hurt relations between Muslims and Jews, because both groups want their form of discrimination and exclusion to be acknowledged.

Chapter 7 turns to the question of how Muslims and Jews try to solve their problems in cooperation projects. It describes two case studies – a dialog meeting and an educational project – and provides an overview of the cooperation projects I found between 1990 and 2015. It shows that many cooperation projects rely on decreasing economic funds and the willingness of volunteers to help. This might be explained by the hesitance of local government to subsidize these projects and the reduced funding for diversity projects. This makes structural projects hard to establish and cooperation projects must rely on volunteers, some of whom feel overburdened. Although Jewish and Muslim organizers still show initiative, the place where Jewish and Muslim fields overlap is vulnerable not just because of the tensions, but also quite vulnerable when Muslims and Jews cooperate.

Although vulnerable, this does not mean that Jewish-Muslim cooperation has no impact. **Chapter 8** focuses on the strategies that Muslim and Jewish religious and community leaders use to change stereotypical ideas about the Other, reduce tensions and create friendship between their project participants. This is important, because these strategies can solve tension and create bonds between the participants in cooperation projects. Social identities are negotiated through three main strategies: 'searching for similarities', 'decategorization' and 'avoidance'. The chapter argues that these strategies sometimes succeed in changing ideas about the Other and in doing so draw Jewish and Muslim fields together. The structures of their fields are questioned and therefore become more fluid, which provides the space to introduce change. However, the chapter also shows that their cooperation, conflict and strategies emerge from specific power relations at the crossroads of ethno-religious and political fields and therefore strategies also have their limits.

Chapter 9 shows another kind of strategy used to strengthen the bonds between Muslims and Jews. Religious and community leaders aim to change not only the attitude but also the feelings toward the Other. They use emotion management strategies to challenge stereotypes, to create a safe space for the group and to lighten the atmosphere (see Hochschild, 1979). The performed emotion management is both suppressive – as when dealing with anger, fear and frustration – and evocative – as

when trying to provoke joy, sometimes through humor (see Hochschild, 1979: 561). The chapter argues that emotion management can succeed when religious and community use it carefully in a context-sensitive way. Strategies such as a structuration model and the use of rituals and humor often enhanced the atmosphere in the studied cooperation projects. Changing feelings with emotion management strategies, however, relies not only on the experience and quality of the skills of the Jewish and Muslim religious and community leaders. It also relies on actual threat, such as the extremist attacks and local incidents of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Stereotypes that emerge from these threats can be challenged, but the feelings that stem from actually being threatened cannot be challenged as easily and require societal changes that go beyond Jewish-Muslim relations. Moreover, the attitudes and actions of the majority population, the structural inequalities that lie beneath the emergence of discrimination and the apparent lack of economic capital to implement cooperation projects on a larger scale also influence the emotions in Jewish-Muslim relations. These elements require a more structural approach.

Finally, the **Conclusion** analyzes my empirical findings and places the interrelationships between the six main factors and additional factors – such as the role of the local government – into four theoretical perspectives: Bourdieusian theories, social identity theory, emotion management theory and a comparative perspective. This analysis highlights the complexity of tensions within Jewish-Muslim relations and the variety of solutions that can be applied, depending on the given local, national and international contexts. It concludes that to fully understand Jewish-Muslim relations in Amsterdam and elsewhere we need to study the influence of complex, multi-layered structures, the influence of various applied strategies, their interrelations and understand them as the dynamic relations that they are.

SAMENVATTING

Joods-islamtische relaties in Amsterdam:

samenwerking en spanning in onrustige tijden

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Joods-islamtische relaties in Amsterdam: samenwerking en spanning in onrustige tijden

De laatste jaren lopen de discussies over diversiteit in verschillende Europese landen hoog op. Meerderheden trekken vaak de posities van minderheden in twijfel en er ontstaan ook spanningen *tussen* minderheden. Het is daarom van belang om te bestuderen waar deze spanningen vandaan komen en hoe meerderheden en minderheden proberen deze problemen op te lossen. Het bestuderen van hedendaagse joods-islamitische relaties in Amsterdam draagt daar aan bij.

In dit proefschrift bestudeer ik daarom een aantal factoren die van invloed zijn op verhoudingen tussen joden en moslims in Amsterdam. De studie probeert de onderliggende mechanismen te duiden die joods-islamitische relaties vormgeven, beschrijft de strategieën die joden en moslims gebruiken in relatie tot deze structuren en analyseert de relaties die zij met elkaar aangaan. Daarnaast geeft het inzicht in bredere maatschappelijke problemen en de oplossingen die daarvoor bedacht worden. Naast maatschappelijke relevantie poogt deze studie bij te dragen aan theoretische ideeën over groepen die zichzelf identificeren of geïdentificeerd worden als etnisch-religieuze groepen. Dit gebeurt aan de hand van Bourdieusiaanse theorieën, sociale identiteitstheorie, emotie management theorie en door joods-islamitische verhoudingen in Amsterdam te vergelijken met empirische studies over deze relaties in andere Europese landen (zie Brown, 2000; Bourdieu, 1979; 1989; 1990; 1991; 1999; Hochschild, 1979; Rey, 2007; Verter, 2003).

Drie hoofdvragen worden beantwoord. Allereerst bestudeer ik de context waarin joods-islamitische relaties plaatsvinden. De eerste vraag die in dit boek aan de orde wordt gesteld, is dan ook: hoe ziet de context van joods-islamitische relaties in Nederland en Amsterdam eruit? De tweede vraag stelt: welke factoren zijn van invloed op joods-islamitische relaties in Amsterdam? En tot slot: hoe beïnvloeden de gevonden factoren deze relaties?

Het boek is opgedeeld in drie delen. **Deel 1** (hoofdstuk 1 t/m 3) beantwoordt de eerste onderzoeksvraag en beschrijft het theoretisch kader dat gebruikt wordt om joods-islamitische relaties te duiden, de methodologie die gebruikt is om deze relaties empirisch te onderzoeken en de context waarin de onderzochte joods-islamitische relaties plaatsvinden. **Deel 2** (hoofdstuk 4 t/m 6) en **deel 3** (hoofdstuk 7 t/m 9) gaan over de zes belangrijkste factoren die ik gevonden heb die de onderzochte

joods-islamitische relaties in Amsterdam beïnvloeden. Daarmee beantwoorden deze hoofdstukken de tweede en de derde hoofdvraag. Elk hoofdstuk focust op een belangrijke factor: het Israëlisch-Palestijns conflict; de extremistische aanslagen die in Europa plaatsvonden in 2014 en 2015; lokale antisemitische en islamofobische incidenten; het economisch en sociaal kapitaal dat gebruikt wordt in samenwerkingsprojecten; strategieën die joden en moslims gebruiken om bepaalde ideeën en vooroordelen tegen te gaan; en emotie management strategieën die toegepast worden in samenwerkingsprojecten om niet alleen ideeën maar ook gevoelens te veranderen.

Hoofdstuk 1 introduceert de theorieën die in dit proefschrift worden gebruikt om joods-islamitische relaties in Amsterdam te begrijpen. Het laat zien hoe Bourdieusiaanse theorieën, sociale identiteitstheorie en emotie management theorie kunnen helpen om de verschillende aspecten van joods-islamitische relaties analytisch van elkaar te onderscheiden. Daarnaast beargumenteert het dat het combineren van deze theorieën meer bijdraagt aan ons begrip van joods-islamitische relaties dan wanneer slechts een van deze theorieën wordt gebruikt (zie Bourdieu, 1979, 1990, 1991, 1999; Brown, 2000; Hochschild, 1979). Het hoofdstuk laat ook zien dat de vergelijking met empirische studies over joods-islamitische relaties de internationale component van deze relaties beter belicht.

Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft de methodologie die ik heb gebruikt voor dit onderzoek. Het beschrijft hoe ik tussen juni 2014 en december 2015 mijn veldwerk heb uitgevoerd. Gedurende achttien maanden interviewde en observeerde ik mensen die zich identificeerden als joden of moslims. Daarnaast sprak ik andere respondenten die betrokken waren bij joods-islamitische relaties. Zo bezocht ik bijvoorbeeld gebedshuizen, scholen, demonstraties, bijeenkomsten van activisten en de huizen van respondenten. Het hoofdstuk beschrijft het design van het onderzoek, de kwalitatieve methoden, selectiemethode en manier van analyseren.

Waar hoofdstuk 1 en 2 de context van het onderzoek schetsen, laat **hoofdstuk 3** zien hoe de context van joods-islamitische relaties eruitziet. Het beschrijft de geschiedenissen van verschillende joodse en islamitische groepen in Nederland en schetst tevens de politieke en etnisch-religieuze context in Nederland en Amsterdam. Ik beargumenteer in dit hoofdstuk dat er niet slechts een etnisch-religieus zogeheten 'veld' is in Nederland, maar dat er twee verschillende joodse en islamitische velden zijn, waarbinnen de Amsterdamse velden belangrijke subvelden zijn. Joods-islamitische relaties vinden plaats wanneer die joodse en islamitische velden overlappen.

Hoofdstuk 4 is het eerste empirische hoofdstuk en laat zien hoe joods-islamitische relaties in Amsterdam op een complexe manier beïnvloed worden door het Israëlisch-Palestijns conflict – en specifieker door de Gaza-oorlog van 2014 en het idee van de gemeente Amsterdam om een stedenband aan te gaan met Tel Aviv en Ramallah. Het laat zien hoe een frame ontstaat dat het Israëlisch-Palestijns conflict definieert als een centraal, delicaat onderwerp waar men niet over zou moeten praten met de ander. Echter, toen ik de betrokkenheid van joden en moslims op pro-Israël, pro-Palestina, pro-stedenband of anti-stedenband demonstraties in Amsterdam bestudeerde, stelde ik vast dat de spanningen die deze demonstraties gaven niet alleen voortkwamen uit verhoudingen tussen joden en moslims. Hoewel zowel joden als moslims betrokken waren bij de demonstraties, waren zij niet de enige partijen die een rol speelden. Linkse en rechtse activisten en christelijke partijen waren bijvoorbeeld ook aanwezig bij deze demonstraties. Daarbij kwam dat er joden en moslims waren (die al dan niet betrokken waren bij de demonstraties) die het oneens waren met elkaar over het Israëlisch-Palestijns conflict, maar waren er ook joden en moslims met deels overeenkomende meningen. Zo waren er joden en moslims die het op bepaalde aspecten best met elkaar eens waren, groepen die geen tijd hadden om naar demonstraties te gaan of mensen die niet betrokken wilden worden bij deze demonstraties. Deze resultaten laten dus zien dat er een aantal discrepanties bestaat tussen het frame dat het Israëlisch-Palestijns conflict afschildert als een centraal, delicaat en onbespreekbaar probleem en hetgeen joden en moslims in de praktijk doen en denken. Dit is problematisch, omdat deze manier van framen ervoor zorgt dat de verschillen tussen opinies van joden en moslims soms overschat worden en dit tot extra problemen kan leiden in samenwerkingsprojecten of direct contact met de ander.

Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft de effecten van de extremistische aanslagen in Brussel (2014), Parijs (2015) en Kopenhagen (2015). Het hoofdstuk focust op twee effecten die specifiek belangrijk zijn voor joods-islamitische relaties in Amsterdam. Ten eerste leidden de Europese aanslagen ertoe dat ook in Amsterdam angst voor een aanslag ontstond en dat voorzorgsmaatregelen werden genomen om deze te voorkomen. Het tweede effect waar dit hoofdstuk op focust is het zogeheten 'afstand nemen'-debat, waarin moslims werd gevraagd afstand te nemen van de aanslagen. Ook joden werd soms gevraagd afstand te nemen, niet van de aanslagen in Europa, maar van het geweld dat gebruikt werd door de Israëlische overheid ten tijde van de Gaza-oorlog in 2014. Deze ontwikkelingen hadden invloed op joods-islamitische relaties. Als het gaat om die relaties vond ik, naast andere bevindingen, dat er na de aanslagen ook angst ontstond in joodse gemeenschappen. Soms leidde dat tot angst voor niet alleen islamitische extremisten, maar voor moslims in het algemeen. Dit kon ertoe

leiden dat positieve relaties niet werden gevormd, samenwerkingsverbanden niet werden aangegaan en het kon ertoe leiden dat stereotypen over moslims als de 'gevaarlijke ander' werden versterkt. Het leidde er ook toe dat moslims zich onveilig voelden, zeker wanneer zij hun situatie vergeleken met de veiligheidsmaatregelen die werden genomen om joodse gemeenschappen te beveiligen. Dit zorgde voor wantrouwen jegens de gemeente, maar ook soms tot wantrouwen richting joodse gemeenschappen. Ook dit hinderde joods-islamitische relaties in Amsterdam.

Hoofdstuk 6 zoomt in op lokale antisemitische en islamofobische incidenten. Het hoofdstuk begint met een uiteenzetting van de concepten 'antisemitisme' en 'islamofobie' en beschrijft hoe joden en moslims dit ervaren in hun dagelijks leven. Het laat zien dat veel respondenten zowel fysieke, verbale als institutionele discriminatie ervaren. Deze discriminerende incidenten hebben invloed op de wijze waarop individuele joden en moslims over elkaar denken, maar zij worden ook beïnvloed door andere factoren, zoals intergenerationeel trauma, zichtbaarheid, herhaling en het hebben van directe of indirecte ervaringen met discriminatie. Deze factoren helpen te verklaren waarom sommige joden en moslims, ondanks het ervaren van antisemitisme of islamofobie, wel met elkaar kunnen samenwerken, terwijl anderen ontmoedigd, boos of angstig raken door deze incidenten. Op collectief niveau hebben deze incidenten andere effecten op joods-islamitische relaties. In sommige gevallen worden moslims gezien als de 'nieuwe' daders van antisemitisme, en dit heeft een aantal effecten op joods-islamitische relaties. Ten eerste zijn er soms incidenten waarbij moslims zich antisemitisch uitlaten en dit maakt joden soms bang voor moslims. Aan de andere kant versterkt een generaliserend beeld over islamitisch antisemitisme samen met een gebrek aan aandacht voor islamofobie in joodse gemeenschappen stereotype beelden over moslims. Ook kan competitie tussen antisemitisme en islamofobie leiden tot spanningen tussen moslims en joden, omdat beide groepen proberen erkenning te krijgen voor hun eigen vorm van discriminatie.

In **hoofdstuk 7** wordt beschreven hoe moslims en joden proberen problemen in joods-islamitische relaties op te lossen. Het hoofdstuk biedt een overzicht van de gevonden samenwerkingsprojecten tussen 1990 en 2015 en daarnaast worden als voorbeelden twee casussen belicht: een dialoogproject en een educatieproject. Het laat zien dat veel samenwerkingsprojecten steeds minder uit economische hulpbronnen kunnen putten en afhankelijk zijn van de hulp van vrijwilligers. Dit kan onder andere verklaard worden uit de aarzeling van de gemeente om dit soort projecten te subsidiëren en het minder beschikbaar stellen van subsidie voor diversiteitsprojecten. Deze ontwikkelingen maken het moeilijk voor samenwerkingsverbanden om structurele projecten op te zetten en leidt soms voor overbelasting van vrijwilligers. Alhoewel

zowel joodse als islamitische organisatoren nog steeds initiatief tonen en projecten starten, zorgt dit er wel voor dat de plek waar joodse en islamitische velden overlappen een kwetsbare plek is, niet alleen vanwege de spanningen die daar spelen, maar ook omdat het lastig is structurele samenwerkingsprojecten op te zetten.

Ondanks de kwetsbaarheid, betekent het niet dat joods-islamitische samenwerking geen impact heeft.

Hoofdstuk 8 focust op de strategieën die joodse en islamitische religieuze en maatschappelijke leiders gebruiken om stereotypen te doorbreken, spanningen te verminderen en vriendschappen te bestendigen tussen de participanten in hun projecten. Het is belangrijk om daar inzicht in te krijgen, omdat deze strategieën potentiële oplossingsrichtingen bieden voor de ervaren spanningen en manieren laten zien om verbanden te smeden tussen participanten in samenwerkingsprojecten. Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat sociale identiteiten worden gevormd en hervormd door gebruik te maken van drie hoofdstrategieën: *searching for similarities*, *decategorization* en *avoidance*. Het hoofdstuk beargumenteert dat deze strategieën effectief kunnen zijn om ideeën over de ander te veranderen en daarmee de joodse en islamitische velden dichter bij elkaar te brengen. De structuren van deze velden worden door de strategieën bevraagd en worden daardoor meer fluïde, wat ervoor zorgt dat er ruimte komt voor verandering. Echter, dit hoofdstuk laat ook zien dat samenwerking, spanningen en strategieën ook voortkomen uit bepaalde machtsrelaties op de kruising van etnisch-religieuze en politieke velden, reden waarom er ook een limiet aan deze strategieën zit.

Hoofdstuk 9 gaat in op een ander soort strategieën om de banden tussen moslims en joden te verstevigen. Religieuze en maatschappelijke leiders proberen namelijk niet alleen de opinies over de ander te veranderen, maar ook de gevoelens en emoties die daarmee samenhangen. Deze leiders proberen emotiemanagementstrategieën toe te passen om stereotypen te veranderen, een veilige ruimte te creëren voor de groep en een prettige sfeer te behouden (zieHochschild, 1979). Het soort emotiemanagement dat ik observeerde was zowel repressief – wanneer men met boosheid, angst en frustratie moest omgaan – als evocatief – wanneer men probeerde blijheid op te roepen (zie Hochschild, 1979: 561). Het hoofdstuk beargumenteert dat emotiemanagement kan slagen wanneer religieuze en maatschappelijke leiders het op een voorzichtige manier gebruiken en de context in acht nemen. Strategieën zoals het gebruik van een structurerend model, rituelen of humor droegen vaak bij aan de sfeer in de bestudeerde samenwerkingsprojecten. Echter, het veranderen van gevoelens ten opzichte van de ander is niet alleen afhankelijk van de vaardigheden

en ervaring van islamitische en joodse religieuze en maatschappelijke leiders, maar ook van daadwerkelijke onveiligheid, zoals de extremistische aanslagen en lokale incidenten van antisemitisme en islamofobie. Stereotypen die voortkomen uit deze incidenten kunnen bestreden worden, maar de gevoelens die voortkomen uit daadwerkelijke bedreiging, zijn niet zo eenvoudig te bestrijden en vergen maatschappelijke veranderingen die verder gaan dan die in joods-islamitische relaties. Bovendien beïnvloeden de opinies en het gedrag van de meerderheidsbevolking, de structurele ongelijkheden die het ontstaan van discriminatie beïnvloeden, en het gebrek aan economisch kapitaal om op grote schaal samenwerkingsprojecten op te zetten, ook de emoties in joods-islamitische relaties. Deze elementen vragen om een meer structurele aanpak.

Tot slot worden in de **Conclusie** de zes belangrijkste factoren die de relaties tussen joden en moslims in Amsterdam beïnvloeden met elkaar en een aantal andere gevonden factoren in samenhang geanalyseerd. Dit gebeurt aan de hand van de vier theoretische perspectieven: Bourdieusiaanse theorieën, sociale identiteitstheorie, emotie management theorie en een empirisch vergelijkend perspectief. Deze analyse geeft de complexiteit van de spanningen in joods-islamitische relaties weer en belicht de verschillende oplossingen die toegepast kunnen worden, afhankelijk van de lokale, nationale en internationale contexten waarbinnen deze relaties plaatsvinden. Het boek concludeert daarom dat om joods-islamitische relaties in Amsterdam en in andere contexten goed te begrijpen, we de invloed van gelaagde structuren, verschillende soorten strategieën en de relaties daartussen moeten bestuderen, zodat we deze interacties begrijpen als de dynamische relaties die ze zijn.