Jews of the Former Soviet Union
Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

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Foreword

On June 29, 1996, one hundred and fifty people gathered at the Hotel Astoria in St. Petersburg, Russia, for the conference “Jews of the Former Soviet Union: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow.” The purpose of the conference, which brought together Jewish leaders from communities in all the states of the former Soviet Union, as well as Western participants, was to provide an opportunity to discuss the political, cultural, religious, and educational challenges facing Jewish life in the postcommunist era and to consider strategies for its future.

Though planned many months in advance, the conference took place at a time when one might well have questioned whether there would be a Jewish future to discuss. The Jewish Agency’s Russian activities were being curtailed by government authorities who had declined to renew its accreditation, and the Russian presidential elections, a cause for considerable anxiety and uncertainty, were only a few days away. In addition, David Harris, executive director of the American Jewish Committee, was denied a visa to travel to Russia to participate in the conference, reportedly because of his “past political activity.” To an outsider, the fears and concerns that had galvanized the Soviet Jewry movement in the 1970s and 1980s appeared still to be warranted. Was it wrong to assume that the “future” of these Jews could only be assured in Israel or America?

Evidently yes, if one were to judge by the majority of those in attendance. The debate was often heated and frequently divided, but most of the discussion focused on rebuilding life in the Jewish communities of the former Soviet Union and not moving them elsewhere. An assembly of Jewish leaders meeting freely in hotel conference rooms is not an unusual event in most places, but this was a first for St. Petersburg and for the group of people brought together. The conference opened with welcoming remarks from, among others, the Israeli ambassador and the American consul general and with a letter of greetings from the newly elected
governor of St. Petersburg. What had been unimaginable a decade earlier had become an almost "normal" event.

"Normal," too, were many of the problems being confronted by the newly revived communities. The local host of the conference, Petersburg Jewish University, began as a daring and illegal enterprise, a magnet drawing dissidents and refuseniks who were seeking to reconnect with their Jewish identity. It emerged a few years later to offer formal courses in Jewish studies and to organize research projects to uncover previously forbidden subjects of Russian Jewish history.

Today, it must compete for students—and for financial resources—with the state universities in Russia and with established Jewish institutions in America and Israel. Its future may always have been uncertain, but now it is for reasons sadly all too common and easily understood.

With the aid of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and other Western agencies, a network of social services is being offered in the former Soviet Union. Ironically, the success of aliyah has resulted in a sharp increase in the median age of the Jewish community, and a significant number of elderly Jews no longer have children nearby to care for them. Communities that only a short time ago were not free to organize are now quickly learning to provide services long offered in the West. They, too, must now confront the all too "normal" problems of too many demands and too few resources.

The subtitle of the Conference, "Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," may appear odd for an agenda designed to take stock of current problems and look toward the future. What need is there for "yesterday" in such an exercise? Yet only now can the Jewish past be freely examined, particularly the history under decades of communist rule. For many of those present, the search for Jewish identity today leads directly to recovering the past. Ukrainian Jews drew from the rich history of Jewish life and literature that once flourished. Russian Jews sought to build on the highly educated but secular experience of Soviet Jewry. Jews in Latvia and Estonia found themselves stepping carefully amid the histories and the conflicts between ethnic Russians and Baltic nationalists.

The workshops and plenaries of the three-day conference were grouped thematically and were intended to draw people from diverse locations into common discussion. (A program and participant list are appended to this publication.) Much of the discussion—in formal sessions and in the corridors—was clearly sparked by the opening presentations, which offered three different but complementary perspectives on the state of Jewish life in the former Soviet Union, and they are here presented in their entirety.

Professor Shlomo Avineri of Hebrew University examined the larger political environment in the former communist world, with particular emphasis on Russia. How Jewish people will come to see themselves in Russia, he maintained, will depend greatly on the development of civil society and the ways in which Russians
will define themselves.

Michael Chlenov, chairman of the Russian Va’ad, the umbrella organization of Russian Jewry, noted that the emigration of Soviet Jews has resulted in significant numbers of "Russians" in American Jewish communities and in Israel, but in Russia they remain only Jews. "It is impossible to be a ‘Russian Jew,’” he said, arguing that their fate and their future would be as a distinct ethnic community living alongside a Russian majority.

In a prepared paper delivered in his absence, Professor Zvi Gitelman of the University of Michigan analyzed the boundaries that have served to define Jews in the former Soviet Union and took note of the recent and dramatic demographic and political changes that have allowed for the reconstruction of Jewish culture and community even as the most committed and active Jews are drawn to emigrate. Despite this tension, he concluded, "For once, the choice of being Jewish, and defining its meaning, is in the hands of Jews themselves."

The conference was undertaken with the financial support and sponsorship of several international organizations. In addition to the American Jewish Committee and its London-based partner, the Institute for Jewish Policy Research, sponsors included the Moses Mendelssohn Zentrum of Postdam University (Germany), the European Council of Jewish Communities, and the National Conference on Soviet Jewry; Petersburg Jewish University served as the local sponsor and host.

Rabbi Andrew Baker

*Director of European Affairs*

*The American Jewish Committee*
Jews of the Former Soviet Union
Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow

Shlomo Avineri

Let me start, because I am a political scientist, by suggesting that serious
discussion about the future of Jewish life in the former Soviet Union cannot be
done only within a Jewish agenda. It can be done and should be done in the
general context of an understanding of the multiplicity of problems facing
postcommunist societies, in general, and post-Soviet societies, in particular.
One of the most important things we have to realize beyond wishful thinking
and beyond our hopes is that we are dealing here with societies in transition.
But let me suggest—and this may run contrary to what is sometimes consid-
ered to be conventional wisdom among Western political scientists—that when
we talk about transformations, we assume that we know what the transforma-
tion is about, that we know the end result, the telos, the last station—we’re
talking about transformations to democracy, to liberalism, to an open society,
to a market economy, and I hope that this is true. What certainly is true, is
that the history of the last few years in postcommunist societies in Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has suggested that there is not
one way of transformation, and that in a basic sense there is no guarantee that
we know what the end result is going to be.

Some societies have done relatively well. In Poland, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic, the transition to democracy, market economies, pluralism,
and an open society appears to be assured. In other countries, in Romania, for
example, the situation is more complicated. And certainly in the former
Yugoslavia, the situation is not only catastrophic and tragic in Bosnia, but also
problematic in the other republics. So we are dealing here with a transforma-
tion or series of transformations that is complicated. And while all of us have
our hopes, none of us can take out any insurance policies on the developments.
But we know the complicated nature of what is happening and has been
happening and may still happen in the next few days in this country, or what has happened just the other day in Ukraine, where a new constitution was finally adopted, which is, of course, the right decision. However, it has a number of issues, like the question of language, which will pose a future agenda for the non-Ukrainian population of Ukraine or the non-Ukrainian-speaking population of Ukraine—this includes ethnic Russians and it may include also many Jewish people.

Let me also suggest why the transformation in Russia and generally in the former Soviet Union, but specifically in Russia, is so much more complicated than in countries like Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary. All those countries are going through a number of simultaneous transformations. But it is only in Russia that a large and rich and complicated society has to go through four simultaneous transformations. And looking at the experiences in Western Europe, let us remember that it took countries like England and France 200 years to move toward democracy with ups and downs, or that countries like Germany and Italy had, in our own lifetime, to go through very difficult and horrible and murderous stages until they reached the present stage of democracy.

One has to understand the specific difficulty in the Russian case. That Russia has to proceed along the course of four simultaneous transformations complicates issues tremendously.

First of all, political democratization. This, in the case of Russia, is not only a heritage of seventy-five years of communist totalitarianism, but also a heritage of 400 years of a very specific autocratic czarist regime. It's not only seventy-five years that this country has to overcome.

Second, economic transformation, and the economic transformation in the former Soviet Union and Russia has to be much more radical than in countries like Poland and Hungary where private property existed, where an independent peasantry was not rooted out completely by violent collectivization, and where there has been, in the last twenty years, a great parallel sector in the economy—very little of this existed in Russia.

Third, in the case of Russia, the transformation is not only the end of the Soviet Union, it is also the end of an empire—and, again, not only of the Soviet Empire, but also of the Russian Empire. The war in Chechnya is just one example of this. The war in Chechnya is now in its second century and one has to realize this.

And finally, transformation in Russia also means the redefinition of the country, the emergence, for the first time, of a Russian nation-state. Poland after communism remained Poland. Hungary after communism remained Hungary. Czechoslovakia split into two nation-states. But in the case of Russia, there was the need to create a nation-state out of a history that was
always an imperial history, never that of a national state. I don’t have to tell you that you have two words for your identity and which of those (Rusky, Rossisky) elements will be dominant in the future. We deal here, basically, with a question of identity, and countries like Russia and Ukraine, let alone smaller countries like Belarus, have to define, for the first time, under extremely difficult political and economic and strategic conditions, their national identities.

It is not easy to imagine that this can be done, under the best of circumstances, in two or three or five years. And when society in general is going through a quest for identity, the issue appears also as a quest for Jewish identity. If society in general, be it Russian or Ukrainian or, for that matter, Estonian, is defining and redefining its identity, is drawing borders, not only territorial borders, but cultural borders, borders of inclusion and exclusion—Estonia, for example, where people are excluded for ethnic reasons because they are Russian or Russian-speaking and not ethnic Estonians—the question of the redefinition of Jewish identity and the question of community building and the building of institutions becomes so much more difficult also for the Jewish community or for the Jewish people.

Jewish people in the former Soviet Union could, in the very complicated Soviet reality, view themselves as being Homo sovieticus (with all the complexities and propaganda and lies that went along with that). You could say Homo sovieticus sum and it had a meaning for a Jewish person in the Soviet Union. But Homo ukrainus sum? Homo estonicus sum? Homo ruskius sum? Question mark. Not only an internal question mark, but also an external question mark. And the external question mark doesn’t have to be said or expressed in a negative or anti-Semitic way. There’s a legitimate question about how one views oneself and how one is viewed by one’s surrounding society. And the basic issue is, how do you build communities? How do Jewish people in Russia—and I am just asking questions because I do not have answers and it will take time until the answers will emerge—how do Jewish people in Russia define themselves? As Russians with a Jewish religious identity? As Russians with a Jewish national identity? As Russian-speaking Jews? And similar questions can be asked in the Ukrainian case. Those issues have been debated among Jews in the West, in Germany, England, and France, even in the United States, for generations, sometimes for centuries, and the answers were not always very easy or very obvious.

Is there one answer? I believe in pluralism. I believe, personally, in free choice. I do not think there is one answer. In a free society there cannot be one answer. But are we able to develop the plurality of those answers and still find something that is common? I suggest that we should. We—and here I am saying we, the Jews—we should realize that, in redefining one’s identity,
especially in a country or a set of countries where identities are defined in national and cultural terms, it is very important for Jewish people to realize that we are a people, that we are a nation, a people and a nation with a specific religious history. But the Jews are not only a religious community. Because if we define being Jewish just in terms of religion, we lose a lot of our Jewish people. Religion is historically, culturally, an element of the Jewish people—one may practice it, one may not practice it, one may and should have great reverence for it, because it is part of our heritage, part of our history, part of our present, but it is not the only content of Jewish life. It is not the only Jewish content in the West. It is not the only Jewish content in Israel and it cannot be the only Jewish content in a society like that of the postcommunist former Soviet Union. And this means that being Jewish, to my mind, means not only a belief and faith, if one has it, not only knowledge of texts, but also of contexts, of history, of literature, of Hebrew literature. Do I have to remind an audience here that most of the Hebrew literature that is being taught in Israeli schools was written here, in this region, in Odessa, in Vilna, in Warsaw? You can understand Shaul Tschemichovsky, when you read him in Hebrew, only if you understand that he is a Ukrainian poet writing in Hebrew. And this is part of our heritage. We have a language, a history, a tradition, a religious culture, and all of those elements are part of the Jewish identity and those are the building blocks with which one should build a Jewish identity wherever one lives.

Now, I do not want to answer a question to which I do not have an answer. How great are the chances of building up a vibrant Jewish community in this country—in these countries—that may be similar to what we have today in the West? But let me suggest two considerations that I think one has to take into account beyond one’s own personal beliefs and ideologies. Let me put it this way: It all depends if I could be sure that in Russia and Ukraine and in the Baltic States and Central Asia there is a guaranteed transition to a liberal, open, free society, similar to what is happening in the West. In other words, if I could say “Yes, within a few years, Russia will look like the United States, Ukraine will look like Norway,” then I would say “Yes, the same kinds of institutions and culture and pluralism and vitality that Jewish societies in the West now possess will also happen here.” Am I sure that those countries here will develop in this way? I hope. Am I sure? Are you sure? I think we do not know, and here I am coming to what I said in the beginning: Jewish developments in the countries of the former Soviet Union are inextricably connected with the democratic and economic and liberal and pluralistic development here, and we know that those developments are complicated.

And last but not least, wherever you have a rich Jewish communal life and it can be focused on religion or culture or national heritage, it is possible
to have that life only if you have, in countries like the United States, Britain, France, Germany, or Italy, a very strong civil society in general. Only if civil society in general is able to bring up voluntary associations where citizens are used, not only to voting once in four years, but also to organizing parties and trade unions and a multiplicity of church associations with hundreds and thousands of members—only then can there be a parallel, voluntary, vibrant Jewish life. If a society is weak as a civil society, if a society does not have a rich citizen participation in public life, with voluntary associations, if a society has a democracy without parties, or democratic elections without parties, which means civil society is weak, the participation of the citizens is weak. There you have a problem for the emergence of a strong Jewish community.

In the United States, Jews have dozens of nationwide organizations. Why is it possible to have that richness (which sometimes also means competition)? Because American society is imbued with civil association, with voluntary associations. Tocqueville was the first one, of course, who said it so clearly. And therefore, will it be possible in societies that are weak in their civil societal development at present to establish a richness of Jewish voluntary associations? I think those are questions that I know will be discussed during our two days here, and the only plea I'm making to ourselves is not to be ethnocentric in our analysis, by which I mean not to just look at ourselves, but to realize that, as the old Jewish saying goes, "The way things are done among the Gentiles, so they are done among the Jews." The Jewish world cannot be an island in a society that is very different and, therefore, the future depends very much on the developments here. I think all of us have our hopes. Some of us have our doubts. Some of us, I think you heard from the subtext of what I was saying, have more than one or two doubts.
Jewish Community and Identity in the Former Soviet Union

Michael Chlenov

It goes without saying that Jewish history does not exist in a vacuum; of course it is involved with the history of the larger community that we live in. However, please allow me—after the wonderful presentation of my colleague—to take an internal view of our current situation and to examine what our concerns are in the Jewish community itself.

I think that all who have assembled here, who live in the republics of the former Soviet Union, have, in the past ten years, lived a second—a Jewish—life, a life of pressure and anxiety, uncertainty, and overwhelming complexity. The leaders of the Jewish movement of the '70s and '80s are gone. They moved away, and new leaders have appeared, some of them having undergone extreme difficulties. All of this caused a strikingly dramatic situation, a situation of drama and stress. I am sure that the ten years we have just lived through was a time of striking historical significance for Jews. This was a time of a buildup and concentration of national strength in a people that did not seem to have a voice and indeed has changed, several times in recent years, its own self-definition, not to mention its numbers.

There are two main processes that have affected the life of Jews in the former Soviet Union during those years. The first is emigration, which, since the end of the '60s, has taken from the territory of the former Soviet Union more than a million Jews, of whom most settled in Israel but significant numbers in the United States, Germany, and other Western countries. This has led to the establishment of very noticeable—in quantity and quality—groups of Russian-speaking Jews in the Jewish communities of those countries.

Obviously, the absorption of our countrymen—as is always the case in these situations, but especially in the great contemporary Jewish migration—has been very difficult. We still see tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of
Soviet Jews seeking their place in the Jewish world.

Nevertheless, I should note that in a fantastically short period of time Russian Jews, or Russim, as we are called in Israel, have become an active political power in the Jewish state. The recent elections in Israel have produced a number of government officials, ministers, and parliamentarians from the newly established Israel b’Alia party, leaders in Likud—the governing coalition party—and so on. I would like to salute this new political force and to hope that it will be a wise and responsible one. Russian-speaking Jews are also becoming visible and influential in the United States and in Germany, despite their more modest presence there.

This is one process that is well known and discussed worldwide, in Jewish and non-Jewish circles alike. The resources of the Jewish world, of Israel and the Jewish diaspora, have been focused on this process throughout the years.

The second process, which is less well known but which you and I have, so to speak, carried on our backs, is the process of the internal organization of the Jews of the former Soviet Union.

In the beginning, in 1988 and 1989, Jewish groups appeared that just wanted to do something Jewish. The organizational starting point for this was the historic first assembly of Jews of the Soviet Union in December 1989, which created Va’ad, a confederation of Jewish organizations and communities of the USSR.

I won’t tire you with a history lecture, but I do want to go over the changes, or perhaps the growth in the priorities of the Jewish movement. Please recall that Jewish culture was the first priority. Little did anybody know what “Jewish culture” meant, but the very idea that one could openly talk about Jewish culture encouraged all of us, who knew nothing of this culture.

But the times were much more tumultuous than we suspected. In 1991, the second assembly of Va’ad, the Zionist assembly, advanced the priority of aliyah, and the Committee for Repatriation and other such organizations appeared. The priority of Jewish culture was reoriented toward collaboration on aliyah, and the Zionization of the movement was realized.

In one month, between December 1990 and January 1991, 35,000 Soviet Jews left the Soviet Union. Everyone expected a total exodus. In Israel and the Jewish diaspora people were saying, “This year 200,000 people will immigrate, 400,000 the next year, and a million the year after that and the problem will end.”

But the problem doesn’t seem to have ended. As early as 1992, a year after this, the next priority became communal organization. This term was familiar enough, but it lacked meaning. Even now, the meaning is not clear. People began to say that we must establish a Jewish community. What does this mean? Experience and living during this tumultuous time quickly provided clues.
Communal organization quickly proved to mean social welfare help within the context of a severe economic crisis. At that point, during the difficult years of '91 and '92, the Jewish content of this help became unimportant. Immediate help had to be given to those who remained under the threat of hunger and cold and to refugees from regions experiencing civil wars, massive unrest, and ethnic conflict.

At the same time, a different problem emerged for the Jews of the former Soviet Union—the problem of Western (former Soviet Union) Jewish communities. The Bukharski Jews, Mountain (Tat) Jews, and the Georgian Jews had, it became apparent, different images of their Jewishness and different necessities. It is these communities who were most susceptible to outside influences, although it seems that it should have happened the other way around. After all, it is they who retained the traditions.

As the economic recovery gets under way and the empty store shelves become full, a new, but also old, priority emerges. We begin to talk about Jewish education, about a serious religious life, and about the problem of a self-sustaining community. If we are to have a community, it must be able to sustain itself.

I must point out that every time, during all of these changes and challenges, we were, thank God, never alone. Representatives of world Jewry, our brothers, from Israel and the diaspora, were always with us. Even while restoring religious life, when it seemed like there were only two rabbis in this huge country, we saw how rabbis from other countries began to move here and to take up this difficult work.

Having given you this picture, I would like to touch on two moments that were significant for us. I will start from a political perspective, but not the one Shlomo discussed. He did a great job of giving us a picture of Jews within the larger world and political context. I would like to talk about politics within the Jewish context, about the relationship of Jewish communities with the Jewish world and with the government.

I already mentioned that world Jewry stood by us during the difficult process of communal organization. However, neither Israel nor the Jewish diaspora put together a coordinated plan for the political organization of the Jews of the former Soviet Union.

The prevailing view in their approach was that the problem would quickly disappear. They thought that they should concentrate all their efforts on the maximization of emigration and help those who were leaving. It was assumed in the West—and in many situations is still assumed now—that this community is in a state of flux toward its own disappearance: "Just a little bit longer, just a little more effort and they won't exist." As one famous Israeli official used to say, "In six or seven years we will no longer talk about aliyah, we will talk only about absorption."
This stereotype caused world Jewry to be unprepared for what started happening here. The absence of political sense severely weakened us. We seemed much weaker than we were. It was more difficult for us to resolve all our problems. The entire Jewish people was also weakened.

Beginning in 1992, the Jewish people entered a new and transitional period of development. New problems arose like the relationship between Israel and the diaspora, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and problems between religious and secular Jews. All of this overshadowed and hindered the complicated, painful—as well as joyous—process of organizing a community in the Soviet Union. It seems that this process is now changing little by little. Naturally, our interest in the development of a political plan is so that we can finally achieve, from Israel and the Jewish diaspora, a recognition and acknowledgment of us as an equal and independent member of the Jewish diaspora. This has not yet happened.

Speaking of the political aspect of relations between Jewish communities and former Soviet Union governments, I want to note the following. The relations are different and go on differently with each of these governments. On the whole, we can say that not one of the governments created by the dissolution of the Soviet Union has appeared to align itself on the side of nationalism and anti-Semitism. We are rid of government-sponsored anti-Semitism, although we have encountered a new form of community anti-Semitism that is prevalent in the West but previously unfamiliar to Soviet Jews. This anti-Semitism exists and it is dangerous. But I would say that it has ceased being the main factor in maintaining a Jewish identity, as it had been for many years.

Probably, the main aspect of our relationship with governments is the issue of the rights of Jewish communities. This question has been more or less settled with a number of governments of the former Soviet Union. In Russia, it was absolutely suspended in space until recently. A week ago the Russian Duma (parliament) passed a law on national cultural autonomy that at least establishes specific rights of minorities—including ours—in relation to the government.

I must say, in tandem with Professor Avineri, that the Jews of the former Soviet Union have demonstrated a surprising resiliency in various political systems, not just in tolerant, open, and friendly societies. We even outlived, with pride and dignity, the Soviet regime. We have different political systems in the territory of the former Soviet Union, from Turkmenistan to Estonia and from Moldova to Kirghizia. We see that in all these republics Jews are not merely existing but are also capable of community organizing.

A different question—again, one that Professor Avineri appropriately posed—is: What if Russia was the United States and if the Ukraine was
Norway? Then I would say that in Russia and the Ukraine we need the same forms of organization as in the United States. However, this is not the case. Russia will never be the United States and Ukraine will never be Norway. More than that, Russian Jews will never develop the same types of organizations as American Jews, and probably shouldn’t.

This is where we come to the second question. This is the question I’ve wanted to raise. This is the question of identity. Soon after we took up our communal organizing, and became a real part of the Jewish world, it became clear that Jews are very dissimilar in this way. There exist several different modes of Jewish identity in the world. One of the most interesting and pressing questions is to find our own identity in this context.

I would say that we can identify three types of identity. One is the national type, as is the case in Israel. Jews are a nation—the nation of Israel. This is a fairly new identity, one of which we are all proud. Israel is new and interesting, fresh and bright. However, as we all know, Israel is currently undergoing a crisis of its Jewish character. The discussions about how Jewish the government of Israel is and whether it can remain Jewish is more appropriate for debate in Jerusalem.

The second type of identity is the communal, which is characteristic of our brothers in the Western diaspora, in the United States and in Western Europe. Although I don’t want to lecture you, the specific point of view of Western Jews is that it is a big job to be a Jew. In order to be a Jew, the Jew must constantly circulate through communal structures, from the synagogue to the UJA, from participation in the program “Israel Experience” to other forms of involvement. The person who doesn’t do this can’t be a Jew. Perhaps nominally he is, but this is horrible. The issue of the crisis of continuity raised by Western Jews is, no doubt, based on this type of identification—the communal type. Let me highlight that in the United States it is completely possible to be an American and a Jew. It is not only normal but natural.

Finally, the third type is the one I would call the ethnic type of identification. This is probably our type. This is our fate. Of course, there are historical and ethnic factors on which our identity is based. Russian or Russian-speaking Jews see themselves in terms of a people. It is impossible to be a “Russian Jew.” Never in history have Jews said, “Well, yes, I am Russian and I am Jewish.” At one time, religious tolerance was very characteristic for Russian Jewry. I will remind you that in the ’60s groups appeared in the Zionist underground that said they were Judeo-Christian Zionists, that saw in this direction the Jewish evolution! This is directly the result of our specific identity.

But the Soviet Union collapsed and our means of identity collapsed with it. The basic assumptions of our national identity collapsed. It seems to me
that one of the most difficult tasks is not any one of the practical priorities that I mentioned; it is the search for this new identity. This is the very thing that Professor Avineri talked about when he talked about Russian-Jewish faiths, and so on.

We are often crowded into this label, “Russians.” We are called Russim in Israel and Russians in the United States. But here, in this ever-changing community, we remain Jews. What is the model of community that corresponds to our model of national identity, under the current political circumstances that Professor Avineri brilliantly explained and that I mentioned?

I think that the community developed so quickly and spontaneously—which is good—that it got established on two separate and independent tracks of development. The religious community was put together and exists separately. And the Jewish national-communal organizations were established and exist separately. Both profess that some kind of unity and cooperation is necessary. For now, these statements are not being realized. This is a complex and interesting problem. In any case, this kind of unity corresponds to the type of national identity that has been established for Soviet Jews. It corresponds, more or less, to the customary separation of the religious and the national that existed during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. Somehow, this is the form that has appeared, and for the most part—its complications and weaknesses notwithstanding—it has redeemed itself. How the two forms will come together, whether they will unite or not, and how this problem of national identity will be resolved, the future will show.

In conclusion, I wanted to say that it seems that the Soviet Union has lived through a revolution during the past ten years. That revolution has been one of the largest and most significant in its history. And, thank God, with all its dirt and blood, it has been one of the least bloody revolutions that Russia has ever known. This revolution has revealed to Jews two significant facts.

The first is that the Jews of the former Soviet Union haven’t disappeared but continue to live on the territory of these countries and will continue to live here for the foreseeable future. The second is that the Jews who live on the territory of the former Soviet Union have ceased to be absolutely disensfranchised and voiceless. They have established a foundation for the autonomous Jewish national existence that, I believe, will be and grow here for as long as Jews live here.
Choosing Jewish Identities, Constructing Jewish Communities

Zvi Gitelman

Post-Soviet Jews have been standing at a crossroads for about seven or eight years, and they will continue to occupy that challenging position for the foreseeable future. Like Gogol’s famous troika, and like Russia and other post-Soviet states, it is not clear where the Jews are going. The fundamental choice to make is who we are and what we are. Now that being Jewish is a choice and not something imposed by the state, though it remains an identity partly constructed by the surrounding society, Jews are free to pose and answer two basic questions: Should we be Jews or not? If we choose to be Jewish, what kinds of Jews should we be? If we retain identities inherited from our parents, imposed by the state, insisted upon by society, but rarely chosen by ourselves, then we must decide the content of that identity.

Ethnic groups are defined by both form and content. Form is established by boundaries that define who is in the group and who is not. Sometimes the group itself defines those boundaries (mi hu Yehudi?), sometimes external forces do so. Thus the Soviet state determined who was a Jew and Soviet society reinforced that by letting Jews know that they were Jews. Content is what group members share, aside from their being bounded by the same lines, that is, placed in the same category by others or themselves. Content generally includes (1) shared interests, (2) shared institutions, and (3) shared culture. Thus, at the end of the Soviet period, Jews had fairly well-defined boundaries, some shared interests, almost no shared institutions, and little left of tangible culture—language, customs, rituals. They had some attitudinal and behavioral residues of older Jewish culture—family relations and patterns of leisure time, for example—and some characteristics acquired in the Soviet period that Jews and others associated with Jews, namely, urbanity, education, and a desire to advance educationally and materially. But Soviet Jews had mostly lost their
Judaism, Yiddish and Hebrew languages, and cultures, customs, and practices, and even much of Jewish foods, art, and music. Jewishness organized little or none of the daily life and thought of Soviet Jews for whom their ethnicity had become largely symbolic and official, not a matter of participation in a community of understandings and interpretations that gave them a distinctive Weltanschauung and provided strategic and stylistic guides to action. There was some of that left, but it was not institutionalized—that is, there were no institutions, organizations, or, for the most part, even physical premises, where Jews could interact so as to “develop more substantial and distinctive common views of themselves, their relations with the rest of the world, and their emergent, collective past.” Therefore, common perceptions and understandings were not reinforced, nor were they efficiently transmitted to new generations.

Five years after the collapse of the USSR, the boundaries defining the Jews have blurred, shared interests have not emerged very clearly, shared institutions have been forming but their staying power is in question, and the tangible manifestations of shared culture are reappearing only among a small minority. Due largely to demographic and economic changes, the nontangible attributes of Jewish culture in most of the former Soviet Union are changing: Jews are beginning to be more associated with big business and less with academic pursuits.

In order to assess the prospects for Jewish communal life in the former Soviet Union, we must consider several dimensions:

1) Demographic: Almost all Ashkenazic communities in the former Soviet Union have low fertility, high mortality, high levels of intermarriage, and, of course, high emigration. Mark Tolts informs us that in the “micro-census” of February 1994, the number of declared Jews in Russia declined by 28 percent from the 1989 figure, to 409,000. Tolts argues that the increased longevity of even elderly Russian Jewish immigrants to Israel, as compared to their counterparts in Russia, is attributable not just to better conditions in Israel but to self-selection for emigration of the healthier elderly, so that Russia is left with the less healthy. Indeed, there are many elderly in Russia with no children—about a fifth of the women over sixty-five never had children.

As the marriage market continues to shrink, the prospects for Jews marrying Jews decline. For every 100 Jewish men, there are only 80 Jewish women in the same age group (30-34). If in 1988, 58 percent of the children born to Jewish women had non-Jewish fathers, in 1993 that proportion rose to 68 percent. The number of children born to Jewish mothers continues to decline. The ratio of deaths to births, therefore, continues to increase, to an astounding 11:1 in 1993. Already in 1994, Tolts concluded that “the demo-
graphic basis of (ex-)Soviet Jewry has been undermined, and it definitively
lacks the demographic focus required for self-renewal.” One may dispute the
conclusion and differ on the interpretation, but the facts cannot be disputed and
their implications must be confronted.

(2) Political and economic environments: These, of course, influence how
many stay and leave; how high a profile Jews qua Jews will adopt; whether
Jews can support institutions and culture. For the last few years, the successor
states of the Soviet Union have been debating whether they should be civic or
ethnic states. Russia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and several others have clearly
chosen the civic option, while Estonia, Latvia, and several Central Asian states
have favored the ethnic choice. Whether states will be basically civic or ethnic
will shape Jewish self-perception and their sense of place in society.

(3) Values and attitudes of former Soviet Union Jews: Some are genuine
cosmopolitans who truly believe in and hope for the Marxist-Leninist vision of a
world without nations; some are merely Jews by descent, a biological fact that
has no consequences for their behavior. Other Jews are not committed to
sustained Jewish activity but are interested in it and are occasional participants;
still others are religiously or culturally committed Jews.

(4) Internal factors: What kind of Jewish community will emerge, if it
does, depends in considerable measure on leadership capabilities and commit-
ment, and to what forms of Jewishness. This means, among other things, the
ability to reach Jews and establish a nexus which will enable people to identify
with each other even if they differ on important matters. I have in mind what
one scholar calls “cultural entrepreneurs,” people who devote themselves to
“thickening” identity by infusing it with cultural and/or religious content.

(5) External factors: These include the situation in Israel—both the
general economic, political, and military position of the Jewish state as well as
former Soviet Union Jews’ perceptions of how well their relatives and friends
are being “absorbed”—U.S. immigration policy, continued interest by world
Jewry and its organizations. Though Israeli and foreign Jewish organizations
pretend this is not the case, there is a clear tension and even contradiction
between ongoing Jewish emigration and the attempt to reconstruct community.
Precisely those most likely to be able to reconstruct both culture and communi-
ity—the young, ambitious, committed Jews—are also the ones who emigrate
disproportionately. Thus, in 1993-95, only one quarter of the men and one-
third of the women who immigrated to Israel from the former Soviet Union
were over 50, whereas half the Ashkenazi Jews remaining in the Russia are 56
and over.

The crux of the matter is this: How will both the successor states and the
Jews define themselves, and how will Jews and non-Jews view the place of the
Jews in these states? The former Soviet states are still choosing places along
the spectrum of ethnic and civic models. Obviously, Jews will be able to organize and assert themselves more easily in the civic state than in the ethnic one, though it should be noted that they are doing very well indeed in Latvia and Estonia, perhaps because of their small size and nonthreatening nature, compared with Slavs. We should remember that the “ethnic-civic” distinction is a spectrum, not mutually exclusive categories, and that states can move along that spectrum, changing from time to time. Similarly, ethnic groups change from time to time along the three dimensions I mentioned: interests, institutions, and cultures. At some times one or more of these factors is stronger, and at other times weaker.

Like the post-Soviet states, Jews may have to discard the Soviet notion of mutually exclusive ethnic categories. That is, whereas in the Soviet period, at least officially, one had to be either a Russian or a Jew, either a Ukrainian or a Jew, today the notions of “Russian” (Rossiyanin, not Russki) and “Ukrainian” are taking on, at least in some circles, a civic, not only ethnic, meaning. Thus, Rossiyanin has become what Sovetskii used to mean: a political and territorial designation, not an ethnic one. Jews have long known and felt that they are Jewish by descent and designation, but Russian by culture and even “mentality.” Thus, over half the 1,300 Jews surveyed by Vladimir Shapiro, Valery Chervyakov, and me in three Russian cities said their national self-consciousness (natsional’noe samosoznanie) was both Jewish and non-Jewish, and over half said there was much that was Russian in them. As one person put it, “The traditions of the Russian and Jewish peoples fused in such a way that they are neither Russian nor Jewish but some kind of a special hybrid people.”

In the post-Soviet period people can more easily define themselves as Russian Jews or Latvian Jews, when “Russian” or “Latvian” means the same as “American” in the phrase “American Jews.” That is, one can be at one and the same time Russian and Jewish, Latvian and Jewish, Ukrainian and Jewish, if by Russian, Latvian and Ukrainian one means citizenship, loyalty, place of residence, and culture. Then the challenge becomes to define the Jewish component of the identity. Jews are now free to fill the word “Jewish” with any meaning they wish: religious, biological, cultural, or none at all. As they make these choices, Jews in the former Soviet Union will be doing what Jews all over the Diaspora and even in Israel are doing, seeking to answer one question that is about 200 years old—who and what is a Jew?—and another that is about 4,000 years old—what does it mean to me to be a Jew and what behavioral consequences flow from that?

Historically, in modern Europe, Jews have defined their Jewishness in one of four basic modes:

1. Religion: Jewishness is Judaism. In Eastern Europe this has meant
predominantly Orthodoxy. Until the 1917 Revolution in the Russian Empire and until 1939 in Eastern Europe, and to this day in England, the United States, and other Western countries, this was the understanding of Judaism that had the greatest number of at least nominal adherents.

(2) Nationhood: Jews are a nation like other European nations, and, like them, they must have their own state, but it is outside of Europe in the historic homeland. Zionism was much more popular in the Russian Empire than in Western Europe, perhaps because the appeals of assimilationism were weaker.

(3) Ethnicity: Nationality but not necessarily nationhood, ethnicity as culture, particularly Yiddish culture: Chaim Zhitlovsky claimed that “The great significance of this Yiddish culture sphere is that it has succeeded in building a ‘spiritual-national home,’ purely secular, which can embrace all Jews throughout the world.” In fact, secular Yiddish culture has all but disappeared, in part because most of its adherents were murdered by the Nazis; in part because its Soviet, socialist, secular version was rejected by its largest potential social base; and in part because, in countries such as the United States, Canada, France, and Argentina, it proved unable to compete against the more attractive cultures of the dominant peoples.

(4) Accident: Jewishness as an unfortunate accident, a burden that should be gotten rid of as soon as possible. As one of our respondents put it, “A person should think of himself as an individual, and not as a member of a nation.”

All of these responses were available to Jews in the Russian Empire in the early part of this century. I suggest that today the Yiddishist option is, unfortunately, unavailable. The religious option is available but so remote from the experience of most post-Soviet Jews that only a few are attracted to it. In the study of Jewish identity that Shapiro, Chervyakov, and I did, in three Russian cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Ekaterinburg), only 18 percent said they believed in God, though another 24 percent said they were inclined to such belief. However, only a third designated Judaism as the religion most attractive to them and 13 percent named Christianity as most attractive, with 36 percent saying that no religion at all was attractive.

The Zionist option is also available, but in Russia, unlike in the United States, it implies aliyah and not giving money to enable others to go on aliyah. This means that exercising the Zionist option, rather than mobilizing the local Jewish community and strengthening it, as it did for a long time in the West, means leaving the community and weakening it. The paradox is that Zionist organizations are unlikely to be an important part of the communal structures in countries that send more olim to Israel than any others, whereas they continue to play communal roles, albeit reduced, in countries that produce few olim.
Ridding oneself of Jewishness was not an easy option in the Soviet period because of state designation of Jews as such, the “fifth paragraph.” Future historians will note, perhaps with some irony, that the state that advocated assimilation of all peoples (sliianie), the state founded by Lenin, who congratulated the Jews for being in the vanguard of assimilationists and urged them to complete the process, thereby solving what he and many others referred to as “the Jewish problem”—that very state preserved Jews qua Jews against their will and insured that a large number of people remained identified as Jews—that is, unassimilated—even if that identity had little positive content and the people designated as Jews were highly acculturated to Russian culture. They were acculturated to Russian culture, but not assimilated to the Russian people; part of the Sovetskiy narod but distinctly Jewish. We should also note the further irony that the state that was consistently anti-Zionist from its inception almost to its demise, that permitted no Zionist organization or activity, that allowed no Zionist emissaries (shlikhim), that consistently painted Israel in darkest colors, and that broke diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967—it was this very same state that exported more Jews to Israel than any other country. Since it broke relations with Israel, the USSR and its successor states allowed over 1.3 million Jews to emigrate, some 750,000 of them to Israel.

What, then, can be the content of Jewishness in Russia and other successor states? A people defined by boundaries alone and not by culture can, of course, exist, as Jews did in the Soviet Union, but that existence is based on a shared fate and identification of oneself by other, that is, external factors over which the individual has no control. We must acknowledge that “perceived interests are a less durable basis of identity than institutions or culture.” But now Jews seem able to determine the content and meaning of their Jewishness beyond being a group defined by others and beyond sharing a fate imposed on them by others. And so the question becomes what will be the shared culture and its institutional expressions that will redefine Jews from “invalids of the fifth category”?

First, it can be all of the things I have mentioned, and it undoubtedly will be. After all, do not all Diaspora communities, to one or another extent, encompass a multiplicity of Jewish expressions and self-understandings? The relative strength of each varies from one country to another, but most Diaspora communities are heterogeneous in ideologies and practice. In some countries, such as Great Britain, there is a highly developed mechanism that coordinates the communities and organizations, and in others, such as the United States, there is not. But Russia and the former Soviet Union present a special challenge: the organizations and ideologies are only just emerging, and rather than a coordinating mechanism perhaps there is room for an initiating one. The Va’ad tried to be a coordinating mechanism, but precisely because it
lacked the resources to initiate, it did not create loyalties and commitments to it that lasted beyond the breakup of the Soviet Union. Perhaps the Russian Jewish Congress, which seems to have the resources, at least in potential, to initiate and create, will do just that, but it remains to be seen whether it has the vision and program, the personnel and the commitment to do this.

Beyond coordination of exiting activities, there exists a potential for creating a distinct and uniquely Russian or Slavic Jewishness, based not on the usual markers of ethnicity—a distinct language, territory, religion, set of customs—but perhaps on certain demographic characteristics (high levels of urbanity and education), values, attitudes, and behaviors. It is too early to tell what these might be in the future and whether they will be distinct enough—even if not unique—not only to mark the Jews as a separate group (boundaries), but to be powerful and attractive enough to make people want to associate themselves with these supposedly Jewish values, attitudes, and patterns of behavior. Jews in the former Soviet Union possess all the ingredients for success: high levels of education, potential wealth, strong international support, substantial numbers, and deep and glorious traditions of Torah, religious culture, secular and religious Yiddish culture, Hebrew culture, and scholarship in Russian, Yiddish, and Hebrew. They also labor under some disadvantages: having to start nearly from scratch, a very weak demographic position, high levels of acculturation and even assimilation, traditions of factionalism and internal disputes and rivalries, and, of course, continuing, massive emigration.

If only for family reasons—leaving aside political and economic calculations—emigration will continue indefinitely, if the successor states permit it. Though this will strengthen the bonds of former Soviet Union Jews with those in Israel and America, the overall effect is to weaken the Jewish communities. But there will be a Jewish population in the former Soviet Union. The question is whether that population becomes a community or at least a group of communities, or remains a conscious, but unorganized collectivity. The answer to that question can and must be given primarily, though not exclusively, by the Jews in the successor states. If Jews will interact with each other more they will likely “develop more substantial and distinctive common views of themselves, their relations with the rest of the world, and their emergent, collective past.” What was once only a community of interests, a defensive group defined largely by outsiders, can become a community of culture. This is unlikely to happen quickly, and the combination of assimilation and emigration will complicate the process. But conscious attempts to create cultural and religious content in the shell of Jewishness inherited from the Soviet period can speed up the process. For once, the choice of being Jewish, and defining its meaning, is in the hands of Jews themselves.
Notes

2. Ibid., p. 276.
Program

June 30, 1996

Welcome and Acknowledgments  Rabbi Andrew Baker
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   American Jewish Committee

Greetings on Behalf of International Sponsors  Nicholas Lane
   Chair, International Relations Commission,
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      Rector, Petersburg Jewish University
Greetings
Evgeniya Lvova  
Chair, St. Petersburg Jewish Association  
Rabbi Menachem Mendel Pevzner  
St. Petersburg, Russia

6:00 PM
Opening Plenary Session
PERPECTIVES AND REALITIES OF JEWISH LIFE IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Themes: An overview of strengths and weaknesses of Jewish life throughout the FSU and the political and social forces with which it must contend.

Presentation:
Shlomo Avineri, Jerusalem  
Michael Chlenov, Moscow

July 1, 1996

8:30 AM
Plenary Session
THE STATUS OF JEWISH COMMUNITIES IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Themes: Can one speak of Jewish “communities” or “populations”? How does one engage in the reconstruction of Jewish life, Jewish culture and identity following decades of communism? What is the state of Jewish organization in these countries, and what practical measures can be taken to reach out to the Jewish majority?

Presentation:
Zvi Gitelman, Ann Arbor (paper read by Andrew Baker)

Panelists:
Grigory Krupnikov, Riga  
Leonid Levin, Minsk  
Alexander Osovtsov, Moscow  
Joseph Zissels, Kiev

Moderator:
Andrew Baker, Washington
11:00  
**Plenary Session**

**TAKING THEIR PLACE IN THE DIASPORA: JEWS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION**

*Themes:* What progress is being made in the independent development of Jewish communities in the FSU? What are the evolving relationships being developed between these communities and Western Jewry and the State of Israel?

**Panelist:**
- Ilya Dvorkin, *St. Petersburg*
- Leonid Finberg, *Kiev*
- Inovy Kogan, *Moscow*

**Moderator:**
- Eugeniya Lvova, *St. Petersburg*

2:30 PM  
**Concurrent Workshops (Session I)**

4:30 PM  
**Concurrent Workshops (Session II)**

**WORKSHOPS:**

1. **Community Building:** Practical resources, community relations, support from foreign organizations, developing local leadership.
   *Moderator: Amos Avgar*

2. **Enhancing Jewish Identity:** Examination of demographic data, assimilation, Jewish self-definitions, cultural identity, drawing in the unaffiliated.
   *Moderator: Mark Kupovetsky*

3. **Relationship with the State of Israel:** Present and future trends of aliyah, Zionism in the FSU, the place of Israel in the development of Diaspora Jewish life.
   *Moderator: Vladimir Glozman*

4. **History of Jewish Life in the Former Soviet Union:** Review of new Jewish scholarship, assessing the state of research.
   *Moderator: Dmitry Elyashevich*

5. **Development of Educational Institutions:** Practical developments in Jewish education, building and strengthening Jewish communities through schools and educational programs.
   *Moderator: Hana Rothman*

6. **Development of Religious Life:** Practical developments in Jewish religious life; synagogues and congregations as vehicles for building Jewish communities.
   *Moderator: Nate Geller*
July 2, 1996

8:30 AM  Combined Plenary Session

1. IN THE HOST SOCIETY: A MINORITY AMONG MINORITIES

*Themes:* How is the Jewish community affected by minority legislation governing cultural, religious, and linguistic rights? How should Jewish views be aired and Jewish concerns addressed in the political arena?

2. RACISM, XENOPHOBIA AND ANTISEMITISM: HOW DEEP IS THE INFECTION?

*Themes:* What is the nature of antisemitism in the postcommunist countries of the FSU? How should Jewish communities monitor and combat antisemitism, extremism, and prejudice? How serious are threats posed by fascist movements and political figures?

Panelists:  
David Raskin, *St. Petersburg*  
Roman Spector, *Moscow*  
Howard Spier, *London*  
Emanuelis Zingeris, *Vilnius*

Moderators:  
Vladimir Raskin, *Moscow*  
Julius Schoeps, *Potsdam*

2:30 PM  Plenary Session

DRAWING STRENGTH FROM JEWISH TEXTS AND SPIRITUALITY

Presentation:  
Adin Steinsaltz, *Jerusalem*

July 3, 1996

9:30 AM  Closing Plenary Session

REBUILDING JEWISH LIFE IN THE FSU: TOWARD THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Reports from the Workshops
Summary Remarks

Moderator: Antony Lerman, London
Participants

Djemal Adzhiazhvili, Tbilisi, Georgia
Simonas Alperavichus, Vilnius, Lithuania
Gideon Alroy, Jerusalem, Israel
Mark Arshinsky, Khabarovsk, Russia
Amos Avgar, Jerusalem, Israel
Simon Avgustevich, Saratov, Russia
Shlomo Avineri, Jerusalem, Israel
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3. Gordon, The Jewish Community of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic
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5. Gordon, The Jewish Community of Romania
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36. Examining the New Realities of Ukraine
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