

ANTISEMITIC PREJUDICES
IN EUROPE

SURVEY IN 16
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

VOLUME II
COUNTRY REPORTS

RESEARCH DESIGN & ANALYSIS:
ANDRÁS KOVÁCS & GYÖRGY FISCHER



IPSOS SA



INSPIRA LTD HUNGARY



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CONTENTS

1	Austria	8
1.1	Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	8
1.2	Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	11
1.3	Antisemitic hostility against Israel	12
1.4	Latent antisemitism	13
1.5	Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	14
1.6	Antisemitism and political orientation	16
1.7	Philosemitism	17
1.8	Causal explanation of antisemitism	18
2	Belgium	19
2.1	Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	19
2.2	Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	22
2.3	Antisemitic hostility against Israel	23
2.4	Latent antisemitism	24
2.5	Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	24
2.6	Antisemitism and political orientation	26
2.7	Philosemitism	28
2.8	Causal explanation of antisemitism	29
3	Czech Republic	30
3.1	Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	30
3.2	Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	33
3.3	Antisemitic hostility against Israel	34
3.4	Latent antisemitism	35
3.5	Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	35
3.6	Antisemitism and political orientation	37
3.7	Philosemitism	39
3.8	Causal explanation of antisemitism	40
4	France	42
4.1	Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	42
4.2	Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	44
4.3	Antisemitic hostility against Israel	45
4.4	Latent antisemitism	46
4.5	Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	47
4.6	Antisemitism and political orientation	49
4.7	Philosemitism	50
4.8	Causal explanation of antisemitism	51

5	Germany	52
5.1	Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	52
5.2	Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	54
5.3	Antisemitic hostility against Israel	55
5.4	Latent antisemitism	56
5.5	Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	57
5.6	Antisemitism and political orientation	59
5.7	Philosemitism	60
5.8	Causal explanation of antisemitism	61
6	Greece	63
6.1	Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	63
6.2	Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	66
6.3	Antisemitic hostility against Israel	67
6.4	Latent antisemitism	68
6.5	Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	68
6.6	Antisemitism and political orientation	70
6.7	Philosemitism	71
6.8	Causal explanation of antisemitism	72
7	Hungary	73
7.1	Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	73
7.2	Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	76
7.3	Antisemitic hostility against Israel	77
7.4	Latent antisemitism	78
7.5	Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	78
7.6	Antisemitism and political orientation	80
7.7	Philosemitism	81
7.8	Causal explanation of antisemitism	82
8	Italy	84
8.1	Primary antisemitism: traditional antisemitism	84
8.2	Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	86
8.3	Antisemitic hostility against Israel	87
8.4	Latent antisemitism	88
8.5	Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	88
8.6	Antisemitism and political orientation	90
8.7	Philosemitism	91
8.8	Causal explanation of antisemitism	92

9	Latvia	94
9.1	Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	94
9.2	Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	97
9.3	Antisemitic hostility against Israel	98
9.4	Latent antisemitism	99
9.5	Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	100
9.6	Antisemitism and political orientation	102
9.7	Philosemitism	103
9.8	Causal explanation of antisemitism	104
10	Netherlands	105
10.1	Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	105
10.2	Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	108
10.3	Antisemitic hostility against Israel	109
10.4	Latent antisemitism	110
10.5	Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	110
10.6	Antisemitism and political orientation	112
10.7	Philosemitism	113
10.8	Causal explanation of antisemitism	114
11	Poland	115
11.1	Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	115
11.2	Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	117
11.3	Antisemitic hostility against Israel	118
11.4	Latent antisemitism	119
11.5	Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	119
11.6	Antisemitism and political orientation	121
11.7	Philosemitism	122
11.8	Causal explanation of antisemitism	123
12	Romania	124
12.1	Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	124
12.2	Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	127
12.3	Antisemitic hostility against Israel	128
12.4	Latent antisemitism	129
12.5	Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	129
12.6	Antisemitism and political orientation	131
12.7	Philosemitism	132
12.8	Causal explanation of antisemitism	133


13 Slovakia	134
13.1 Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	134
13.2 Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	137
13.3 Antisemitic hostility against Israel	137
13.4 Latent antisemitism	138
13.5 Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	139
13.6 Antisemitism and political orientation	140
13.7 Philosemitism	141
13.8 Causal explanation of antisemitism	142
14 Spain	143
14.1 Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	143
14.2 Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	145
14.3 Antisemitic hostility against Israel	146
14.4 Latent antisemitism	147
14.5 Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	147
14.6 Antisemitism and political orientation	149
14.7 Philosemitism	150
14.8 Causal explanation of antisemitism	151
15 Sweden	152
15.1 Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	152
15.2 Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	155
15.3 Antisemitic hostility against Israel	155
15.4 Latent antisemitism	156
15.5 Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	157
15.6 Antisemitism and political orientation	158
15.7 Philosemitism	159
15.8 Causal explanation of antisemitism	160
16 United Kingdom	161
16.1 Primary antisemitism: traditional anti-Jewish prejudice	161
16.2 Secondary antisemitism: Holocaust relativization	163
16.3 Antisemitic hostility against Israel	164
16.4 Latent antisemitism	165
16.5 Antisemitism by demographic, economic and social status	165
16.6 Antisemitism and political orientation	167
16.7 Philosemitism	168
16.8 Causal explanation of antisemitism	169

1. AUSTRIA¹

1.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE

As presented in the Volume 1 chapter “Measuring antisemitic prejudice”, our study measured cognitive antisemitism with two separate sets of questions. Firstly, the content of antisemitic prejudices accepted by respondents and secondly, affective antisemitism, meaning the emotional intensity of prejudice.

Based on responses indicating cognitive antisemitism, 35% of Austrians between the age of 18 and 75 proved to be moderately antisemitic and 9% were strongly antisemitic. In terms of cognitive antisemitic prejudice, the Austrian sample proved to be the 6th most antisemitic out of the 16 surveyed country samples.



8

Within cognitive antisemitism, we distinguished also a conative component, indicating a willingness to act in accordance with prejudice. This component was measured by a set of opinions approving the emigration of Jews from the given country, agreeing to limit the number of Jews in certain occupations and handling Jews with suspicion in interactions.²

In terms of conative antisemitism, which measures the tendency to act in a biased

manner and to discriminate, 27% of Austrians aged 18-75 can be classified as moderately antisemitic and 9% as strongly antisemitic. In this dimension, the proportion of respondents who could not be classified according to their answers was quite high (17%). Relatively speaking many people in Austria did not answer these questions, which explicitly investigate open discrimination against Jews.³


1 The Austrian sample represented the entire population over the age of 18, with no upper age limit, while in most countries the sample was from the 18-75 age group. For the sake of comparability with other countries, we also present our results in Austria narrowed down to the 18-75 age group, in one case including the results measured among those over 75 years of age.

2 The three questions:

- It would be best if Jews left this country.
- It would be reasonable to limit the number of Jews in certain occupations.
- It's always better to be a little cautious with Jews.

The method of constructing an indicator of conative antisemitism is discussed in the chapter “Measuring antisemitic prejudice” in Volume 1.


3 There was no higher rate of non-response in any other country. Similar rates (15–17%) also occurred in the Czech Republic, Italy, Greece, Latvia, Romania and in the United Kingdom.



Our data show that about half of the non-respondents in Austria (49% of the 17% of non-respondents, i.e., 8% of the total sample) are indeed antisemitic. They probably refused to respond because they were aware that their views violate generally accepted social norms. The other half of Austrian non-respondents, on the other hand, seemed devoid of antisemitism.

In the affective dimension of antisemitism the Austrian sample is characterised by the 7th strongest affective antisemitism in the ranking of the surveyed countries. In terms of affective antisemitism within the Austrian population aged 18–75, 12% were moderately antisemitic and 22% were strongly antisemitic.

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


As the next step of our analysis, we merged the results measured in the cognitive and affective dimensions and created an aggregated indicator of manifest primary antisemitism.⁴

According to the aggregated antisemitism, which indicates the degree of mani-


fest primary antisemitism, 10% of Austrians were classified as moderately antisemitic, while 21% were classified as strongly antisemitic. However, more than two-thirds (69%) of Austrians aged 18–75 are non-antisemitic.

⁴ The method of constructing the aggregated primary antisemitism indicator is discussed in the chapter "Measuring antisemitic prejudice" in Volume 1.



Based on the aggregated indicator of manifest antisemitic respondents among manifest primary antisemitism the Austrian sample has the highest rate of primary, Western European countries.

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


1.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION

Secondary antisemitism, expressed in the denial or relativization of the Holocaust and the avoidance of responsibility for the persecution of Jews, was measured by seven questions.⁵

The measurement results show that secondary antisemitism characterizes 58% of the Austrian population aged 18–75, with

40% of respondents in the moderately and 18% in the strongly antisemitic group. If we compare these results with the results obtained in measuring traditional manifest antisemitism, we can conclude that the support for secondary antisemitism within the Austrian population is significantly higher than manifest antisemitism.



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
5 The questions that make up the secondary antisemitism that relativizes the Holocaust are presented in the chapter "European Overview" and the method of index formation is discussed in the chapter "Measuring antisemitic prejudice" in Volume 1. Questions used to develop the indicator:

- The number of Jewish victims of the Holocaust was much lower than is usually claimed.
- Jews are also to blame for the persecutions against them.
- Many of the atrocities of the Holocaust were often exaggerated by the Jews later.
- Jews exploit Holocaust victimhood for their own purposes.
- Jews still talk too much about the Holocaust.
- We must keep the memory of the persecution of the Jews alive.
- After so many decades have passed since the persecution of the Jews, the Holocaust should be taken off the public agenda.

1.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

Antisemitic hostility against Israel was measured by four statements. These statements were intentionally worded in such a way that they could not be regarded as legitimate and objective criticism of the Israel-

li government's policies. These statements extended the criticism of Israel to all Jews, or set a unique benchmark to criticize Israel rarely applied in the case of other countries.⁶



12

Antisemitic hostility against Israel was the highest in Austria among the 16 countries surveyed: 76% of Austrians aged 18-75 belonged to the group displaying antisemitic attitudes by supporting anti-Israeli views; 48% of this group proved to be moderate-

ly and 28% strongly antisemitic in this regard. The proportion of those who agree with statements of antisemitic hostility against Israel in Austria is much higher than the proportion of both traditional prejudices and secondary antisemites.

6 The question constituting antisemitic hostility against Israel were presented in the chapter "European Overview" and the method of compiling the index was discussed in the chapter "Measuring antisemitic prejudice" in Volume 1. Questions used to develop the indicator:

- Because of Israel's politics, I dislike Jews more and more.
- When I think of Israel's politics, I understand why some people hate the Jews.
- Israelis behave like Nazis towards the Palestinians.
- The Israeli policy towards the Palestinians justifies an international boycott of Israel.


1.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

The antisemitism indicators developed during the study make it possible to identify a group whose members could not be classified as antisemitic in measuring traditional, manifest antisemitism. However, based on their answers to questions about secondary antisemitism and antisemitic hostility against Israel, they are most likely to be latent antisemites.

This group consisted of those who were included in the group of antisemites based on both their views on the Holocaust and

antisemitic hostility against Israel – but they did not proved to be primary antisemitic. This group was called the group of latent antisemites.

The rate of latent antisemites in Austria is 25%, which is the highest rate among the 16 European countries surveyed. If manifest primary antisemites and latent antisemites are added together, Austria has the 4th highest proportion of antisemites out of the 16 countries surveyed (56%).



1.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

In the next step of the analysis, we examine which demographic and social groups are more prone to antisemitic prejudice and which are less prone.

The distribution of prejudice by gender does not show large differences, with the proportion of prejudices being slightly higher among men than among women. According to age, the proportion of manifest primary antisemites in older age groups increase. As mentioned, the Austrian sample also included those over 75 years of age. This age group was not considered in all the analyses presented so far and later, so that the Austrian data could be compared with the data of other countries. Here, however,


it is worth noting that the proportion of respondents over the age of 75 who nurture antisemitic prejudices is significantly higher than among other age groups.

At the same time, latent antisemitism is noticeably higher among young people than among older ones.

The smallest settlements have more antisemites than the larger settlements, but in Vienna the proportion of latent antisemites increases somewhat again.

As level of education increases, antisemitic prejudice clearly decreases, and the same is true for the so-called ESOMAR classification:⁷ the higher the status of someone, the less likely they are to be antisemitic.

⁷ In the classification of the ESOMAR (European Society of Opinion and Market Research Professionals) "ESOMAR A" means the highest social status, and "ESOMAR E" means the lowest social status




1.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

The proportion of antisemites in political camps was examined on the one hand by the party choice of the respondents and on the other hand by their self-classification on a left-right scale. In terms of party choice data, the most striking finding is that the proportion of manifest primary antisemites was exceptionally high (38%) among FPÖ voters. The proportion of latent antisemites is also the highest among the voters of this party. Overall, 83% of FPÖ voters can be considered antisemitic, the proportion of

those who nurture antisemitic prejudices among voters in the Greens and Liberals (NEOS) is significantly lower than the Austrian average.

The other clear trend indicated by our data is that there are significantly more primary and secondary antisemites among those who classify themselves as right-wing voters than among left-wing voters, but the proportion of latent antisemites is conspicuously high among those who place themselves in the middle of the left-right scale.⁸




⁷ Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: "Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation. On the scale, 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right."

1.7 PHILOSEMITISM

In our research, we measured not only the proportion of antisemites, but also the size of the group that can be called philosemites. This group on the one hand has a “sympathy for Jews”.⁹ On the other hand, it has a “sympathy for Israel”¹⁰ as well.

Based on the summary of the responses, 25% of the Austrian population aged 18–75 proved to be philosemitic. The philosemitic

group was smaller than the group of primary antisemites (31%), and significantly smaller than the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites (56%). In a European comparison, there were more philosemites in 12 countries than in Austria, and fewer only in 3 countries.



Philosemites are found in a higher proportion among young people, those with higher education, and those with higher social status and those who considered themselves as left-wing.

Overall, Austria, is the only Western-European country, which belongs to the group of countries that can be said to be characterised by an antisemitic rather than a philosemitic climate.

- 9 We used two statements to measure sympathy for Jews:
 "I think it is good for a country if many Jews live there."
 "Here in Europe, we should do everything we can to preserve Jewish religion and culture."
- 10 We used three statements to measure sympathy for Israel:
 "Israel is engaged in legitimate self-defence against its enemies."
 "Israel is the only democratic country in the Middle East."
 "Israel is an important ally in the fight against Islamic terrorism."

1.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in Austria

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ¹¹	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.376	1.255
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.212	0.732
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.029*	1.765
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.000*	11.113
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.203	1.478
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.331	1.224
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two non-deprived quintiles	0.813	0.938
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.032*	1.795
Age group	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.118	1.495
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.085	1.547
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.004*	2.824

Logistic regression modelling was used to investigate causal relationships. Manifest antisemitism was defined as a dependent, explained variable in the model.¹²

In Austria, antisemitism is most strongly determined by xenophobic attitudes. Those who have a general xenophobic attitude (not specifically about Jews) are 11.1 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who do not have such an attitudes.

Populism has a significant impact as well:

Populist-minded people are 1.8 times more likely to be antisemitic in Austria than those who don't display populist inclinations. Those who place themselves on the right side of the political spectrum are 2.8 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who consider themselves as more left-wing.

In Austria, people with ESOMAR social status "D" and "E" are 1.8 times more likely to be antisemitic than people with "A" and "B" social status.

¹¹ The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.

*Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.


¹² For detailed methodological explanation see the chapter "Method of causal explanation of antisemitism" in Volume 1.

2. BELGIUM

2.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE

Based on responses indicating cognitive antisemitism¹³ 31% of Belgians between the age of 18 and 75 proved to be moderately antisemitic and 5% were strongly antisemitic.


In terms of cognitive antisemitic prejudice, there are 8 countries that are more antisemitic than Belgium out of the 16 countries surveyed.



In terms of cognitive antisemitism, which measures the tendency to act in a biased manner and to discriminate, 26% of Bel-


gians can be classified as moderately antisemitic and 4% as strongly antisemitic.

¹³ The method of constructing an indicator of cognitive antisemitism is discussed in the chapter "Measuring antisemitic prejudice" in Volume 1.



In the affective dimension of antisemitism, that is measuring the emotional intensity of antisemitism, Belgium is the 10th among the 16 surveyed countries. Within

the Belgian population, 11% were moderately antisemitic and also 11% were strongly antisemitic in terms of affective dimension of antisemitism.




As the next step of our analysis, we merged the results measured in the cognitive and affective dimensions and created an aggregated indicator of primary antisemitism.¹⁴


According to the aggregated antisemitism indicator, which indicates the degree

of primary antisemitism, 9% of Belgians were classified as moderately antisemitic, while 10% were classified as strongly antisemitic. However, more than four-fifths (81%) of Belgians are non-antisemites.


¹⁴ The method of constructing the aggregated primary antisemitism indicator is discussed in the chapter "Measuring antisemitic prejudice" in Volume 1.



Overall, Belgium is one of the less anti-semitic countries in Europe, according to an indicator of the strength of primary anti-semitism.




We detected slightly higher antisemitism in the Flemish provinces than in the Wal-



2.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION

The results show that secondary anti-semitism affects 34% of the Belgian population, 31% of respondents in the moderately antisemitic group and 3% in the strongly antisemitic group. If we compare these results with the results obtained in measur-


ing traditional manifest antisemitism we can conclude that the support for secondary antisemitism within the Belgian population is significantly higher than manifest anti-semitism.



2.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL


Antisemitic hostility against Israel was the 4th highest in Belgium among the 16 countries surveyed, it characterizing 62% of Belgians. Meanwhile, 48% of the Belgian population aged 18–75 proved to be moderately and 14% strongly antisemitic in this

respect. The proportion of those who agree with antisemitic hostility against Israel in Belgium is much higher than the proportion of both traditional prejudices and secondary antisemites.



2.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

The proportion of latent antisemites in Belgium is 15%. If primary antisemites and latent antisemites are added together, Belgium ranks 8th among the 16 countries surveyed with its 34% share.



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
2.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

In the next step of the analysis, we examine which demographic and social groups are more characterised and which are less characterised by antisemitic prejudice in Belgium.

The gender distribution of prejudice does not show large differences, with the propor-

tion of prejudices is slightly higher among men than among women. According to age data, we did not find a clear trend.

The smallest settlements have a bigger share of antisemitic respondents than larger settlements; Brussels and its surrounding area have the lowest levels of antisemitism.



25

As education increases, antisemitic prejudice clearly decreases, and the same is true for the so-called ESOMAR classification¹⁵:

The higher the status of someone, the less likely they are to be antisemitic in Belgium.

¹⁵ In the classification of the ESOMAR (European Society of Opinion and Market Research Professionals) "ESOMAR A" means the highest social status, and "ESOMAR E" means the lowest social status.


2.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

The proportion of antisemites in political camps was examined on the one hand by the party choice of the respondents and on the other hand by their self-classification on a left-right scale. Looking at the data on voters of political parties, the most striking finding is that the proportion of primary antisemites in the Vlaams Belang voters was exceptionally high (44%) at the time of the survey. The data show that overall, 62% of Vlaams Belang voters are considered antisemitic. In contrast, the proportion of those who support antisemitic prejudice among the Greens, the Ecolo party and DéFI vot-

ers is significantly lower than the Belgian national average.

The other clear trend indicated by our data is that among those who classify themselves as left-wing, there is a significantly lower proportion of primary and latent antisemites than the national average. At the same time, among those who have classified themselves as on to the political right, there are more primary antisemites than the average. It is also striking that those who placed themselves in the middle of the left-right scale have a strikingly high proportion of latent antisemites.¹⁶


¹⁶ Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: "Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation: "Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation. On the scale 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation."



2.7 PHILOSEMITISM

Based on the summary of the answers, 38% of the Belgian population proved to be philosemitic. The philosemitic group is much larger than the group of primary antisemites (19%), but similar to the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites (34%).

Philosemites are found in a higher proportion than those over 40 years of age, and higher education, with higher social status, and those who consider themselves as left-wing.



28

Overall, Belgium belongs to the group of countries that can be said to have a moderately philosemitic public climate.

2.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in Belgium

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ¹⁷	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.047*	1.637
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.116	1.440
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.925	0.978
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.000*	9.694
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.011*	1.780
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.170	0.707
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.471	0.830
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.030*	1.747
Age groups	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.512	0.849
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.137	0.514
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.781	1.085

Logistic regression modelling was used to investigate causal relationships. Primary, manifest antisemitism was defined as a dependent, explained variable in the model.¹⁸

In Belgium, antisemitism is most strongly determined by xenophobic attitudes. Those who have a general xenophobic attitude (not specifically about Jews) are 9.7 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who do not have such an attitudes.

Law and order conservatism and nation-

alism have a significant effect on antisemitism as well. Law and order conservatives are 1.6 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who do not see the world in this way. Those who profess nationalist views are 1.8 times more likely to be antisemites in Belgium than those who do not express explicitly nationalist views. Those with "D" and "E" ESOMAR social status are also much more likely (1.7 times more likely) to be antisemitic than those with "A" and "B" social status.

¹⁷ The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.


* Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.

¹⁸ For detailed methodological explanation see the chapter "Method of causal explanation of antisemitism" in Volume 1.

3. CZECH REPUBLIC

3.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE


Based on responses indicating cognitive antisemitism 38% of Czechs proved to be moderately antisemitic and 6% strongly antisemitic. In terms of cognitive antisemitic prejudice, Czech Republic has the 7th highest antisemitic respondents' ratio out of the 16 surveyed countries.



30

In terms of cognitive antisemitism, which measures the tendency to act in a biased manner and to discriminate, 30% of Czechs can be classified as moderately antisemitic and 7% as strongly antisemitic. In this dimension, the proportion of respondents who could not be classified according to their answers was quite high (17%), namely relatively speaking many people in the Czech Republic did not answer these questions, which explicitly investigate open discrimination against Jews.¹⁹


¹⁹ There was no higher rate of non-response in any other country. Similar rates (15-17%) also occurred in Austria, Italy, Greece, Latvia, Romania and the United Kingdom.



Our data show that about a third of those who did not answer questions about the tendency to discriminate in the Czech Republic (34% of the 17% of non-respondents - 6% of the total sample) are indeed antisemitic. They probably refused to respond because they were aware that their opinion violated generally accepted social norms. However, two-thirds of Czech non-re-


spondents are free of antisemitism.

In the affective dimension of antisemitism when measuring the emotional intensity of antisemitism, the Czech Republic can be characterised by the 6th strongest antisemitic feeling in the ranking of the studied countries. Within the Czech population aged 18-75, 14% is moderately antisemitic and 26% were strongly antisemitic.




According to the aggregated antisemitism indicator, which indicates the degree of primary, manifest antisemitism, 13% of Czechs were classified as moderately antisemitic,

while 23% were classified as strongly antisemitic. However, almost two-thirds (64%) of Czechs aged 18-75 are non-antisemitic.




According to the indicator of the strength of primary antisemitism, the Czech Republic has the 6th highest proportion of those out of the 16 countries surveyed with a primary antisemitic attitude.



3.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION


The measurement results show that secondary antisemitism (in terms of Holocaust revitalization) characterizes 47% of the Czech population aged 18-75, with 41% of respondents in the moderately and 6% in the strongly antisemitic group.



3.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

Antisemitic hostility against Israel characterizes 46% of the Czech population aged 18-75: 38% proved to be moderately and 8% strongly antisemitic in this regard. Czechs are relatively less characterised by antisemitic hostility against Israel relative to the

extent of their primary antisemitism. While the Czech Republic is 6th in primary antisemitism, in the case of the proportion of those who agree with the statements of antisemitic hostility against Israel, it ranks only 11th out of the 16 studied countries.




3.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

The group of latent antisemites includes those who, based on both their views on the Holocaust and on Israel, appeared in the group of antisemites but were not characterized by primary antisemitism. This group was called the latent antisemites.

The rate of latent antisemites in the Czech

Republic is 10%, the 4th lowest rate among the 16 European countries surveyed. If primary antisemites and latent antisemites are added together, the Czech Republic has the 7th highest number of antisemites out of the 16 countries surveyed (46%).




35

3.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

The gender distribution of prejudice and age groups do not show significant differences. Antisemitism is lower in Prague than in the countryside. Especially in the cities with a population of 50,000-100,000, we found a significantly higher proportion of those who fell into the group of strongly antisemitic than the national average.

With an increase in education, antisemitic prejudice shows a decreasing trend. Most antisemites are among skilled workmen. Regarding the so-called ESOMAR classification,²⁰ it can be stated that antisemitism is lower among those with higher status than among those with lower status.

²⁰ In the classification of the ESOMAR (European Society of Opinion and Market Research Professionals) "ESOMAR A" means the highest social status, and "ESOMAR E" means the lowest social status



3.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

The proportion of antisemites in political camps was examined on the one hand by the party choice of the respondents and on the other hand by their self-classification on a left-right scale.

Looking at the data on voters of political parties, the most finding is that the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites (62%) was highest among SPD voters. The SPD is a left-wing party in the Czech Republic. Green parties have few antisemitic voters in other countries, while in the Czech Republic, 35% of Green Party voters are strongly antisemitic. Among the voters of two small parties STAN (Starostové


a nezávislí) and Trikolóra hnutí občanů,²¹ the proportion of those who nurture antisemitic prejudices is significantly lower than the Czech average.

An almost unprecedented phenomenon in Europe is that in the Czech Republic, antisemitism is significantly higher among those who consider themselves left-wing than among right-wing voters.²² Among those who place themselves on the left side of the political spectrum, the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites is 64%. The same ratio is significantly lower at the right edge of the spectrum: 48%.²³

21 in English: "Mayors and Independents" and "Tricolor Citizen Movement"

22 Of the studied countries, only Slovakia has this type of phenomenon

23 Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: "Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation. On the scale 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation."




3.7 PHILOSEMITISM

Based on the summary of the responses, 35% of the Czech population aged 18-75 proved to be philosemitic. The philosemitic group is slightly smaller than the group of primary antisemites (36%), but already significantly smaller than the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites (46%). In a European comparison,

there were more philosemites in 9 countries than in the Czech Republic, and fewer in 6 countries.

Philosemites are found in higher proportions among those with a higher education, and higher social status and those who considered themselves as right-wing.



Overall, the Czech Republic belongs to the group of countries that can be said to be characterised by an antisemitic rather than a philosemitic climate.

3.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in Czech Republic

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ²⁴	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.000*	2.644
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.002*	0.573
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.000*	2.066
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.000*	5.753
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.002*	0.519
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.036*	0.664
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.388	0.841
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.120	1.523
Age groups	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.284	0.796
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.106	1.438
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.439	0.822

24 The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.

* Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.

Logistic regression modelling was used to investigate causal relationships. Primary, manifest antisemitism was defined as a dependent, explained variable in the model.

In the Czech Republic, antisemitism is most strongly determined by xenophobic attitudes. Those who have a general xenophobic attitude are 5.8 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who do not have such an attitude. It is important to note that the Czech Republic proved to be the most xenophobic country out of the 16 studied countries.

Law and order conservatism, distrust in politics, populism, nationalism and religiosity also have a significant impact on anti-

semitism.


Law and order conservatives are 2.6 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who do not see the world in this way. Those who do not trust the current Czech governing political elite are half as likely to be antisemites as those who trust this leadership. Populist-minded people are twice as likely to be antisemitic than those who do not support populist views.

It is a peculiar Czech phenomenon that nationalist-minded and religious people are significantly less likely to belong to antisemites than those who do not profess nationalist views or are not religious.

4. FRANCE


4.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE

Based on responses indicating cognitive antisemitism 24% of French between the age of 18 and 75 proved to be moderately antisemitic and 6% were strongly antisemitic. In terms of cognitive antisemitic prejudices, 5 of the 16 countries surveyed are less antisemitic than the sample from France, while the samples from 10 countries shows stronger cognitive antisemitism than France.




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In terms of conative antisemitism, which measures the tendency to act in a biased manner and to discriminate, 17% of French can be classified as moderately antisemitic and 4% as strongly antisemitic.



In the affective dimension of antisemitism, that is the emotional intensity of antisemitism, France ranks 12th among the studied countries, thus it is one of the countries where affective antisemitism is rela-


tively low. Within the French population aged 18-75, 9% are moderately antisemitic and 8% were strongly antisemitic in terms of affective antisemitism.



According to the aggregated antisemitism indicator,²⁶ which indicates the degree of primary, manifest antisemitism, 6% of French were classified as moderately anti-

semitic, while 9% were classified as strongly antisemitic. However, more than four-fifths (85%) of French people aged 18-75 are non-antisemitic.


43



According to the indicator of the strength of primary antisemitism, France is not characterised by a remarkably high level of antisemitism compared to Central and Eastern

European countries, however, some Western European countries have much lower levels of antisemitism than France.

²⁶ The method of constructing the aggregated primary antisemitism indicator is discussed in the chapter "Measuring antisemitic prejudice" in Volume 1.




4.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION

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
The results show that secondary antisemitism affects 38% of the French population aged 18-75, with 34% of respondents were in the moderately and 4% in the strongly antisemitic group. If we compare these results with the results obtained in measuring traditional manifest antisemitism, we

can conclude that the support for secondary antisemitism within the French population is significantly higher than manifest antisemitism. This statement is true even if, as we see, the French are characterised by a more moderate form of secondary antisemitism.



4.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

Antisemitic hostility against Israel in France is much greater than other forms or aspects of antisemitism. 59% Of French people aged 18-75, 59% have an attitude of antisemitic hostility against Israel that negatively affects the whole Jewish population. 44% of French people proved to be moderately and 15% strongly antisemitic in this respect. The proportion of those who agree with statements of antisemitic hostility against Israel in France is higher than the proportion of both traditional prejudices and secondary antisemites.




4.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

The group of latent antisemites includes those who, based on both their views on the Holocaust and on Israel, appeared in the group of antisemites but were not characterised by primary antisemitism. The proportion of latent antisemites in France is 18%.

If primary antisemites and latent anti-

semities are added together, France belongs to the more antisemitic countries in Western Europe out of the 16 surveyed countries (33% of French are primary or latent antisemitic) however, French figures lag far behind the proportions measured in post-Soviet Eastern European countries.




4.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

The gender distribution of prejudice does not show large differences, although the proportion of prejudices is slightly higher among men than among women. Age data do not show a clear trend, but strong primary antisemitism is higher among those in their 30s, while latent antisemitism is somewhat more characteristic of those over 40 years of age.

Medium-sized French cities with a population of 50,000 to 100,000 appear to have higher rates of antisemitism than larger

and smaller settlements. As education level increases, antisemitic prejudice clearly and spectacularly decreases, and the same is true for the so-called ESOMAR status classification: the higher one's status, the less likely they are to be antisemitic.

Of Muslims living in France, 39% proved to be primary antisemites, two and a half times the population average (15%). Antisemitic hostility against Israel views characterizes 95% of Muslims living in France.




4.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

The proportion of antisemites in political camps was examined on the one hand by the party choice of the respondents and on the other hand by their self-classification on a left-right scale.

Looking at the data, it is striking that half and more than half of the voters in the MRC

and Rassemblement National, respectively openly or latently expressed antisemitic views.

There is a clear trend, as indicated by our data, that there are the most primary antisemites among those who clearly classify themselves as right-wing supporters.²⁷




²⁷ Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: "Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation: On the scale 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation."

4.7 PHILOSEMITISM

Based on the summary of the answers, half of the French population aged 18-75 (50%) proved to be philosemitic. The philosemitic group is significantly larger than the group of primary antisemitic (15%), but also far exceeds the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemitic (33%). In a European

comparison, there were more philosemites in 4 countries than in France and fewer in 11 countries.

Philosemites are found in higher proportions among women, those with higher education and higher social status, and those who considered themselves as left-wing.



50

Overall, France belongs to the group of countries that can be said to be characterised by a dominantly philosemitic climate.

4.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in France

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ²⁸	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.000*	7.142
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.451	0.835
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.010*	1.907
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.000*	2.620
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.959	1.016
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.118	0.686
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.260	1.325
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.189	1.425
Age groups	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.787	0.932
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.779	1.111
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.310	1.402

51

In France, antisemitism is most strongly defined by law and order conservatism. One who professes to be law and order conservative is 7.1 times more likely to be antisemitic than one who does not have such attitudes.

Xenophobia is also a strong determinant of antisemitism: those who share xenophobic views are 2.6 times more likely to be antise-

mitic than those who are not characterised by xenophobia.

Populism also has a significant effect on antisemitism. French respondents with populist attitudes are 1.9 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who do not support populist views.


²⁸ The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.

* Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.

5. GERMANY


5.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE

Based on responses indicating cognitive antisemitism, 22% of 18-75-year-olds are moderately antisemitic and 6% are highly antisemitic in Germany. In terms of cognitive antisemitic prejudice, only 4 countries were less antisemitic than the representative sample of Germany, while samples from 11 countries were more antisemitic.




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
In terms of cognitive antisemitism, which measures the tendency to act in a biased manner and to discriminate, 16% aged 18-75 can be classified as moderately antisemitic and 5% as strongly antisemitic in Germany.



In the affective dimension of antisemitism within the German population aged 18–75, 10% were moderately antisemitic and 12% were strongly antisemitic.




According to the aggregated antisemitism indicator²⁹, which indicates the degree of primary antisemitism, 7% of Germans were classified as moderately antisemitic, while 10% were classified as strongly antisemitic. However, more than four-fifths (82%) of Germans aged 18–75 are non-antisemitic.



In the ranking of the 16 countries examined, the inhabitants of 9 countries were more antisemitic than Germans, while in 6 countries, we detected fewer antisemitic attitudes than in Germany.

²⁹ The method of constructing the aggregated primary anti-Semitism indicator is discussed in the chapter “Measuring anti-Semitism prejudice” in Volume 1.




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5.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION

Results show that secondary antisemitism affects 36% of the German population aged 18-75, while 30% were in the moderately antisemitic group and 6% in the strongly antisemitic group. If we compare these results with those ob-


tained in measuring traditional manifest antisemitism, we can conclude that the support for secondary antisemitism within the German population is significantly higher than manifest antisemitism.



5.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

In a European comparison, views of antisemitic hostility against Israel are low in Germany by European standards: Only in 4 countries show a lower percentage of views that betray antisemitic hostility against Israel than in Germany, but it is higher in 11 countries. In Germany, 34% of the popu-


lation aged 18–75 proved to be moderately and 8% strongly antisemitic in this respect. At the same time, the proportion of those who agree with statements of antisemitic hostility against Israel in Germany is higher than the proportion of both traditional prejudices and secondary antisemitism.



5.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

The group of latent antisemites includes those who, based on both their views on the Holocaust and on Israel, appeared in the group of antisemites but were not characterised by primary antisemitism. This group was called latent antisemites.

The proportion of latent antisemites in Germany is 11%. If primary antisemites and latent antisemites are added together, Germany has the 4th lowest rate of antisemitism (28%) among the 16 countries surveyed.



5.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

Prejudice against Jews is significantly higher among men in Germany than among women. According to age data, the proportion of primary, manifest antisemites in older age groups is growing. There are also more antisemites in settlements with a population of less than 50,000 than in larger settlements.


Secondary school graduates and those with “B” ESOMAR status³⁰ are noticeably more antisemitic than other social groups in

Germany.

Of those living in the territory of the former GDR, 44% are primarily or latently antisemitic. The same proportion among those living in the territory of the former FRG is only 25%.

Of Muslims living in Germany, 54% proved to be primary antisemites, more than three times the population average (17%). Antisemitic hostility against Israel characterises 77% of Muslims living in Germany.

30 In the classification of the ESOMAR (European Society of Opinion and Market Research Professionals), “ESOMAR A” means the highest social status, and “ESOMAR E” means the lowest social status.




5.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

The proportion of antisemites in political camps was examined on the one hand by the party choice of the respondents and on the other hand by their self-classification on a left-right scale.

Looking at the data, the most striking find is that the proportion of primary antisemites was exceptionally high (32%) among AfD voters on the right-hand side of the po-

litical spectrum. However, the proportion of latent antisemites is highest among voters of the Die Linke party.

The other clear trend indicated by our data is that antisemites make up the majority of those who clearly consider themselves politically right-wing: 62% of them are strongly antisemitic in Germany.³¹




31 Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: "Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation. On the scale, 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation." Those who chose the two scale values on the right-hand side of the scale were considered clearly right-wing.

5.7 PHILOSEMITISM

Based on the summary of the answers, the majority of the German population aged 18-75 (54%) proved to be philosemitic. The philosemitic group is much larger than the group of primary antisemites (17%) but also significantly higher than the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites (28%). In a European comparison, there are more philosemites in 3 countries than in

Germany, and fewer in 12 countries.

Philosemites are found in higher proportions among women, those in their 30s, those with a master's degree, people with "A" ESOMAR status, and those who considered themselves left-wing. At the same time, there are significantly fewer philosemites than the average among those under 30 and those who consider themselves right-wing.



60

Overall, Germany belongs to the group of countries with a dominantly philosemitic climate.

5.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in Germany

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ³⁷	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.000*	2.671
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.037*	1.635
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.008*	1.943
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.000*	3.395
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.121	1.550
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.017*	0.603
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.452	1.225
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.049	0.545
Age groups	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.103	1.503
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.064	1.686
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.007*	2.653

Finally, we examine, using logistic regression analysis, which factors determine whether someone has antisemitic attitudes.

The strongest driver of antisemitism in Greece is the general (non-Jewish-specific) xenophobia. Those who share xenophobic views are 10.6 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who are not characterised by xenophobia.

Antisemitism is also strongly influenced

by populism and law and order conservatism. Those with populist views are 3.2 times more likely to be antisemitic than those with non-populist views. Those who profess to be law and order conservatives are 2.2 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who do not have such attitudes.

Residents of smaller settlements in Greece are 1.6 times more likely to be antisemitic than those in Athens or Thessaloniki.

³⁷ The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.

*Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.

Finally, we examine which factors determine whether someone has antisemitic attitudes, by logistic regression modelling.

In Germany, antisemitism is most strongly defined by xenophobia and law and order conservatism. Those who share general (non-Jewish-specific) xenophobic views are 3.4 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who are not characterised by xenophobia. Those who profess to be law and order conservatives are 2.7 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who do not have such attitudes.

Distrust of the political forces in power also has a significant effect on antisemitism. Those who are distrustful of the German political elite are 1.6 times more likely


to be antisemitic than those who are more characterised by trust. German respondents who can be described as having populist attitudes are 1.9 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who do not support populist views.

Germany belongs to the group of countries where religious people are less antisemitic than atheists or those who are non-religious. If someone is religious, they are 0.6 times less likely to be antisemitic than those who are not religious. Right-wing self-determination, on the other hand, increases the likelihood of being antisemitic by 2.7 times compared to those who call themselves left-wing.

6. GREECE


6.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE

Based on responses indicating cognitive antisemitism in Greece, 40% of 18-75-year-olds were moderately antisemitic and 26% were strongly antisemitic. In terms of cognitive antisemitic prejudice, sample of Greek population is the 2nd most antisemitic out of the samples of the 16 countries surveyed.



In terms of cognitive antisemitism, which measures the tendency to act in a biased manner and to discriminate, 36% of Greeks aged 18-75 are moderately antisemitic and 17% are highly antisemitic. In this dimension, the proportion of respondents who could not be classified on the basis of their answers was quite high (16%), so relatively speaking, many people in Greece did not answer these questions, which explicitly investigate open discrimination against Jews.³³

³³ Similar rates (15-17%) also occurred in the Czech Republic, Italy, Austria, Latvia, Romania and the United Kingdom.




Our data show that about a third of non-respondents in Greece (35% of the 16% of non-respondents, or 6% of the total sample) are indeed antisemitic. They probably refused to respond because they were aware that their opinion violated generally accepted social norms.

tism among the studied countries, Greece is characterised by the strongest affective antisemitism. Within the Greek population aged 18–75, 14% were moderately antisemitic and 35% were strongly antisemitic. The latter is a remarkably high proportion among the studied countries.

In the affective dimension of antisemi-


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
According to the aggregated antisemitism indicator³⁴, which indicates the degree of primary antisemitism, 13% of Greeks are moderately antisemitic, while 35% were

classified as strongly antisemitic. That is, almost half (48%) of the Greek population aged 18–75 are primary manifest antisemitic.

34 The method of constructing the aggregated primary anti-Semitism indicator is discussed in the chapter “Measuring anti-Semitic prejudice” in Volume 1.




According to an indicator of the strength of primary antisemitism, Greece has the highest proportion of 16 countries surveyed with a primary antisemitic attitude. With in this, the proportion of those who can be said to be strongly antisemitic is particularly high in Greece.




6.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION

The results show that secondary anti-semitism related to the Holocaust characterises a two-thirds majority (67%) of the Greek population aged 18–75, while 47% of respondents were in the moderately and 20% in the strongly antisemitic group. Secondary antisemitism was the 2nd strongest in Greece among the 16 studied countries.




6.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

Antisemitic hostility against Israel was aged 18-75. Meanwhile, 45% of Greeks the 3rd highest of the 16 countries surveyed proved to be moderately and 25% strongly in Greece, characterising 70% of Greeks antisemitic in this respect.



6.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

The proportion of latent antisemites in Greece is 16%. If primary antisemites and latent antisemites are added together, Greece has the 2nd highest number of antisemites out of the 16 countries surveyed (64%).



68

6.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

In the next step of the analysis, we examined which demographic and social groups are more prone to antisemitic prejudice and which are less prone.


Examining the gender distribution of prejudice, the proportion of strong antisemites is slightly higher among men than among women. According to age data, the rate of antisemitism in older age groups is growing. However, a significant difference is that latent antisemitism is much strong-

er among young people, while older people are more characterised by primary manifest antisemitism.

There are more antisemites in the settlements with a population of 50,000-100,000 than in the settlements that are smaller or larger. Athens is characterised by a lower degree of antisemitism than rural settlements.

As the level of education increases, the proportion of antisemites tends to decrease.

At the same time, those with higher education have a visibly higher latency. In connection with the so-called ESOMAR classification³⁵, we see a U-shaped curve. In terms of social hierarchy, higher antisemitism can be seen within “A” and “E” status groups than in groups “in the middle” of the hierarchy.




35 In the classification of the ESOMAR (European Society of Opinion and Market Research Professionals), “ESOMAR A” means the highest social status, and “ESOMAR E” means the lowest social status.

6.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Looking at the data on voters of political parties, the most striking find is that 95% of voters on the right-wing side of the Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή) party are openly or latently antisemitic and 71% are strongly antisemitic. The proportion of primary antisemites was also exceptionally high (79%) among voters of the Greek Solution (Ελληνική Λύση) party at the time of the survey. The relatively lowest antisemitism was in the left-wing SIRIZA (ΣΥΡΙΖΑ) and

MeRA25 (ΜεΡΑ25) parties, and among voters of KKE, the communist party in Greece.

The other clear trend indicated by our data is that antisemitism is highest among those who place themselves on the right side of the political spectrum and lowest among moderate left voters. However, among those who placed themselves on the left edge of the spectrum, we again detected higher antisemitism.³⁶




³⁶ Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: "Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation. On the scale 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation."

6.7 PHILOSEMITISM

Based on the summary of the responses, less than one-fifth (18%) of the Greek population aged 18-75 proved to be philosemitic. The philosemitic group is less than half of the primary antisemitic group (48%). In a European comparison, no country had fewer

philosemites than Greece.

Philosemites are found in greater proportions among women, young people, those with higher education, and those who considered themselves as left-wing.



Overall, antisemitism is exceptionally high in Greece. It clearly belongs to the group of countries with an antisemitic rather than a philosemitic climate.

6.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in Greece

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ³⁷	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.001*	2.181
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.160	0.735
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.000*	3.204
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.000*	10.570
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.550	1.207
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.612	0.891
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.160	1.348
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.492	0.829
Age groups	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.175	1.364
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.031*	1.642
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.352	1.283

Finally, we examine, using logistic regression analysis, whether someone has antisemitic attitudes, which factors determine


³⁷ The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.
*Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.

7. HUNGARY

7.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE


In Hungary, 42% of 18–75-year-olds were moderately antisemitic and 17% were strongly antisemitic. In comparison with the other surveyed countries regarding cognitive antisemitic prejudice, there was a bigger share

of antisemitic respondents in 2 other studied countries than in the Hungarian sample. However, in the samples from 13 countries, we found fewer cognitive antisemitic respondents than in Hungary.



In terms of cognitive antisemitism, which measures the tendency to act in a biased manner and to discriminate, 34% were mod-


erately antisemitic and 15% were strongly antisemitic within the Hungarian population aged 18–75.



Examining emotional antisemitism, 23% of the Hungarian population aged 18–75 was moderately antisemitic and 25% were strongly antisemitic. It means that almost half of the Hungarian population (48%) has


particularly negative feelings towards Jews. In a European comparison, out of the 16 countries studied, where the proportion of affectively antisemitic people was higher than in Hungary was only in Greece.

74




According to the aggregated antisemitism indicator, which indicates the degree of primary antisemitism, 18% of the Hungarians proved to be moderately antisemitic, while

24% of them are in the strongly antisemitic group. At the same time, the majority of Hungarians aged 18–75 (58%) are non-antisemitic.




In the ranking of the examined 16 countries, the population of only 2 countries were more antisemitic than the Hungarians, while in 13 countries, we found a lower degree of antisemitism than in Hungary.



7.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION


The results show that secondary antisemitism affects 63% of the Hungarian population aged 18–75, 46% of the respondents belong to the moderately and 17% to the strongly antisemitic group. If we compare these ratios with the results obtained dur-

ing the measurement of primary antisemitism, we can conclude that the secondary antisemitism related to the Holocaust in the Hungarian population is greater than the primary manifest antisemitism.



7.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

In Hungary, 40% of the population aged 18-75 proved to be moderately and 13% strongly antisemitic in this respect. The antisemitic hostility against Israel in Hungary can be said to be relatively moderate in a European comparison. Namely, there are 7 countries among the 16 countries surveyed (including quite a few Western European countries) where this type of antisemitism is higher than in Hungary.




7.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

The group of latent antisemites includes those who, based on both their views on the Holocaust and on Israel, appeared in the group of antisemites but were not characterised by primary antisemitism. The propor-

tion of latent antisemites in Hungary is 17%.

If primary antisemites and latent antisemites are added together, Hungary has the 3rd highest rate of antisemitism (59%) among the 16 countries surveyed.



78


7.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

Antisemitic prejudice is slightly higher among men than among women. Among those under 30, the proportion of strong antisemites is noticeably lower than the average. We detected stronger antisemitism in large cities in the countryside than in

Budapest or smaller settlements.

As level of education increases, antisemitic prejudice clearly decreases, and the same is true for the so-called ESOMAR classification³⁸: The higher the status of someone, the less likely they are to be antisemitic.

³⁸ In the classification of the ESOMAR (European Society of Opinion and Market Research Professionals), "ESOMAR A" indicates the highest social status, and "ESOMAR E" indicates the lowest social status.




7.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Examining the support among political parties, it is conspicuous that the highest proportion of antisemites were among voters of the Mi Hazánk Mozgalom and Jobbik party. However, the proportion of latent antisemites was highest among voters of the Momentum movement.

The other clear trend indicated by our data is that there are significantly more

primary and secondary antisemites among those who classify themselves as right-wingers than among those who classify themselves as left-wing in the political spectrum. On the other hand, those who have placed themselves among the moderately left-wingers or in the political centre have a higher proportion of latent antisemites.³⁹




39 Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: „Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation. On the scale 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation.”

7.7 PHILOSEMITISM

Based on the summary of the responses, less than a quarter (22%) of Hungarians aged 18–75 proved to be philosemitic. The philosemitic group is much smaller than the group of primary antisemites (42%), and less than half of the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites (59%). In a

European comparison, only 2 countries had fewer philosemites than Hungary, while 13 countries had more.

Philosemites are found in a higher proportion among those with higher education, those with higher social status, and those who identify as leftist.



Overall, Hungary belongs to the group of countries characterised by a more antisemitic than philosemitic climate.

7.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in Hungary

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ⁴⁰	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.001*	2.049
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.027*	0.643
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.000*	2.302
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.000*	14.200
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.148	1.332
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.839	0.963
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.038*	1.576
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.193	1.423
Age groups	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.183	0.743
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.719	1.089
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.002*	2.335

Finally, we examine, using logistic regression analysis, whether someone has antisemitic attitudes, which factors determine

⁴⁰ The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.
*Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.

In Hungary, antisemitism is most strongly defined by xenophobia and populism. Those who voiced non-Jewish-specific general xenophobia were 14.2 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who were not characterised by xenophobia. Those who profess populist views are 2.3 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who do not have populist attitudes.

Distrust of the political forces in power has a significant impact on antisemitism as well. Those who are distrustful of the political elite in power are 0.6 times less likely to be antisemitic than those who are


more likely to have confidence in that political leadership. Hungarian respondents who can be described as law and order conservatives are twice as likely to be antisemitic than those who don't display conservative attitudes.

In Hungary, those who consider themselves deprived are 1.6 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who consider themselves more successful in life. Right-wing self-determination increases the likelihood of being antisemitic by 2.3 times, compared to those who call themselves left-wing.

8. ITALY⁴¹


8.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE

Regarding cognitive antisemitic prejudice, 32% of Italians aged 18–75 were moderately antisemitic and 3% were strongly antisemitic. In terms of cognitive anti-semitism, Italy is one of the relatively less antisemitic countries: cognitive antisemitism is stronger in 9 countries and weaker in only 6 countries.




84

In terms of conative antisemitism, which measures prejudice and discrimination, 23% of Italians aged 18–75 were moderately antisemitic and 5% were strongly antisemitic.



⁴¹ The Italian sample represented the entire population over the age of 18, with no upper age limit, while in most countries the sample was from the 18–75 age group. For the sake of comparability with other countries, we also present our results in Italy narrowed down to the 18–75 age group, in one case including the results measured among those over 75 years of age.


In the affective dimension of antisemitism, that is, in measuring the emotional intensity of antisemitism, Italy has the 8th strongest affective antisemitism in the ranking of the countries studied. With- in the Italian population aged 18-75, 13% were moderately antisemitic and 10% were strongly antisemitic.



As the next step of our analysis, we merged the results measured in the cognitive and affective dimensions and created an aggregated indicator of primary antisemitism.⁴²


According to the aggregated antisemitism indicator, which indicates the degree of primary antisemitism, 9% of Italians were classified as moderately antisemitic, while 10% were classified as strongly antisemitic. However, more than four-fifths (81%) of Italians aged 18-75 are non-antisemitic.

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
According to the indicator specifying the strength of primary antisemitism, Italy is in the “middle” of the examined European countries: compared to Italy, primary antisemitism was stronger in 8 and weaker in 7 countries.

⁴² The method of constructing the aggregated primary anti-Semitism indicator is discussed in the chapter “Measuring anti-Semitic prejudice” in Volume 1.




8.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION

The results show that secondary antisemitism affects 35% of the Italian population aged 18-75, with 33% of respondents in the moderately and 2% in the strongly anti-semitic group. It can thus be concluded that secondary antisemitism within the Italian adult population is greater than primary manifest antisemitism.



8.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL


Antisemitic hostility against Israel characterises 45% of Italians aged 18–75, with 38% of Italians proving to be moderately and 7% strongly antisemitic in this respect. Italy is defined by relatively low anti-Israel antisemitism, an attitude that is stronger in 9 European countries studied.



8.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

The rate of latent antisemites in Italy is 12%, which is only the 11th highest rate among the 16 European countries surveyed. If primary antisemites and latent antisem-

ites are added together, Italy has the 5th lowest rate of antisemitism in Europe out of the 16 countries surveyed (31%).



88


8.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

The gender distribution of prejudice does not show many differences, but anti-Jewish prejudice is slightly higher among men than among women. According to age data, there is little difference between the 18–75 age groups. As mentioned, the Italian sample also included those over 75 years of age. This age group was not considered in all the analyses presented so far and later, so that the Italian data could be compared with the data of other countries. Here, however, it

is worth noting that the proportion of respondents over the age of 75 who share antisemitic prejudices is significantly higher than among other age groups.

In terms of the size of the settlements, a definite U-shaped curve can be observed: In cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants and in small settlements with less than 10,000 inhabitants, there are significantly more antisemites than in cities with between 10,000 and 100,000 inhabitants.

Strong antisemitism clearly declines as education increases, but there is a striking increase in latent antisemitism among those with a bachelor's degree. Regarding the ESOMAR classification⁴³, it can be stated that the higher the status of someone, the less likely they are to be antisemitic.




43 In the classification of the ESOMAR (European Society of Opinion and Market Research Professionals), "ESOMAR A" indicates the highest social status, and "ESOMAR E" indicates the lowest social status.

8.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

In terms of party support, the most striking find is that among the voters of Fratelli d'Italia, led by Giorgia Meloni, and the Eurosceptic Lega Nord, led by Matteo Salvini, the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites is exceptionally high (46% and 38%, respectively).

Left vs. right self-classification⁴⁴ shows an interesting picture in Italy. The proportion

of antisemites gradually decreases from the far-right to those who classify themselves as clearly right to the moderate left. On the other hand, among those who place themselves on the left side of the political spectrum, this proportion jumps again, reaching or even exceeding the level detected among the far right.




⁴⁴ Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: "Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation. On the scale 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation."

8.7 PHILOSEMITISM

Based on the summary of the answers, 40% of the Italian population aged 18–75 proved to be philosemitic. The philosemitic group is much larger than the group of primary antisemitic (19%) and even significantly higher than the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemitic group (31%). In a European comparison, there were more phi-

losemites in 6 countries than in Italy, and fewer in 9 countries.

Philosemites are found in a higher proportion of young people, those with higher education and higher social status, and those who considered themselves moderate left-wingers or centrists.



Overall, Italy belongs to the group of countries characterised by a moderate philosemitic climate.

8.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in Italy

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ⁴⁵	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.000*	3.882
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.000*	0.384
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.003*	0.458
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.000*	26.274
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.185	0.685
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.000*	0.383
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.990	0.997
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.000*	5.054
Age groups	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.212	1.433
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.135	0.624
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.399	1.354

Logistic regression modelling was used to investigate causal relationships. Primarily, manifest antisemitism was defined as a dependent, explained variable in the model.

40 The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.
*Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.

In Italy, antisemitism is most strongly defined by xenophobia. Those with general (non-Jewish-specific) xenophobic views in Italy are 26.3 times more likely to be antisemitic than those not characterised by xenophobia.

Law and order conservatism also has a strong impact: Those who profess to be law and order conservatives are 3.9 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who do not represent such views.

It is a particularly Italian phenomenon that those who profess populist views are less antisemitic than those who do not share the views of populism: Those who profess populist views are roughly half as likely to be antisemites as non-populists.

Distrust of the political forces in power also has a significant effect on antisemitism. Those who are distrustful of the political elite in power are 0.4 times less likely to be antisemitic than those who are more likely to have confidence in the existing political leadership.


Italy belongs to the group of countries where religious people are less antisemitic than atheists or non-religious. If someone is religious in Italy, then they are 0.4 times less likely to be antisemitic than someone who is not religious.

Low social status also increases the likelihood of antisemitism in Italy. People with “D” or “E” social status are five times more likely to be antisemitic than those who belong to one of the “A” or “B” status groups.

9. LATVIA

9.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE

Of those aged 18–75 in Latvia, 32% proved to be moderately antisemitic and 4% were strongly antisemitic. In terms of cognitive antisemitic prejudice, Latvia ranks in the “middle” of the ranking of the 16 countries: We encountered stronger antisemitic prejudice in 7 countries and weaker antisemitism in 8 countries than in Latvia.




94

In terms of cognitive antisemitism, which measures the tendency to act in a biased manner and to discriminate, in Latvia, 21% of 18–75-year-olds are moderately antisemitic and 4% are strongly antisemitic. In this dimension, the proportion of respondents who could not be classified according to their answers was quite high (17%). In Latvia, a relatively large number of people did not answer these questions, which explicitly

investigate manifest discrimination against Jews.⁴⁶


About a quarter (23%) of those who did not answer questions about the tendency to discriminate (4% of the total sample) were indeed antisemitic based on their answers to other questions. They probably refused to respond because they were aware that their opinion violated generally accepted social norms.

⁴⁶ There was no higher rate of non-response in any other country. Similar rates (15–17%) also occurred in the Czech Republic, Italy, Greece, Austria, Romania and the United Kingdom.




In the dimension of affective anti-semitism, which measures the emotional intensity of antisemitism, 11% of the Latvian population aged 18-75 are moderately antisemitic and 6% are strongly antisemitic. There were only 3 countries among the 16

countries surveyed where we found lower affective antisemitism than Latvia. Thus, people living in Latvia are characterised by a relatively low level of anti-Jewish feelings compared to Europe.




According to the aggregated antisemitism indicator, which indicates the degree of primary antisemitism, 9% of Latvians proved

to be moderately antisemitic, while 6% are in the strongly antisemitic group.



In the ranking of the 16 countries surveyed, only in 3 countries were there fewer antisemitic respondents than in Latvia. On the other hand, in 12 countries, the proportion of primary antisemites was higher than in Latvia.


96



9.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION

According to the results, 45% of respondents aged 18–75 in Latvia were moderately and 13% were strongly antisemitic. If we compare these ratios with the results obtained in measuring traditional antisemitic prejudice, primary antisemitism, we can conclude that secondary antisemitism related to the Holocaust in the Latvian pop-


ulation is much higher than primary manifest antisemitism. While Latvia is one of the least antisemitic countries in terms of primary antisemitism, in secondary antisemitic views on the Holocaust, it has the 5th highest rate among the 16 countries surveyed.



9.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL


In Latvia, 31% of the population aged 18-75 proved to be moderately and 5% strongly antisemitic in this respect. In a European comparison, antisemitic hostility against Israel is particularly low in Latvia, with only Sweden and the United Kingdom showing less hostility than Latvia. However, it is

worth noting that of all the countries surveyed, Latvia had the highest number of non-respondents. More than half (57%) of those who did not answer questions about Israel gave antisemitic answers about their relationship to the Holocaust.




9.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

If primary antisemites and latent antisemites are added together, Latvia falls back in the middle of the 16 countries. However, it is still the least antisemitic country in the former “Eastern bloc”.



Since there is a significant number of Russian-speaking minorities living in Latvia, we examined separately the extent of antisemitism among them. According to our data, both primary antisemitism and latent antisemitism are lower among Rus-

sians in Latvia than among Latvians. One of the main reasons for this is that a significant proportion of Russians in Latvia live in Riga and, as we will see, Riga is not characterised by antisemitic attitudes.




9.5. ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

In the next step of the analysis, we examined which demographic and social groups are more prone to antisemitic prejudice and which are less prone.

Antisemitism is somewhat more prevalent among men than among women. Among those under 40, the proportion of antisemites is noticeably lower than that of older people. In Riga, only 19% of the population

was primarily or latently antisemitic. In contrast, this proportion was already 46% in settlements with less than 10 inhabitants. As level of education increases, antisemitic prejudice in Latvia decreases. The same is true for the so-called ESOMAR classification⁴⁷: The higher the status of someone, the less likely they are to be antisemitic.


⁴⁷ In the classification of the ESOMAR (European Society of Opinion and Market Research Professionals), "ESOMAR A" indicates the highest social status, and "ESOMAR E" indicates the lowest social status.



9.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

In Latvia, there are three low-support political parties, nearly half of whose voters are primarily or latently antisemitic. Voters in other, more dominant political forces are significantly less characterised by antisemitism. There are more primary and secondary antisemites among those who classify themselves as right-wing voters than

among those who classify themselves as left-wing voters. Those who place themselves on the right edge of the political spectrum have a higher proportion of strong antisemites, while those approaching the middle of the spectrum have a higher proportion of latent antisemites.⁴⁸




48 Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: "Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation. On the scale 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation."

9.7 PHILOSEMITISM

41% of the Latvian population aged 18-75 proved to be philosemitic. The philosemitic group was slightly larger than the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites (34%). In a European comparison, 5 countries had fewer philosemites than Latvia,

and 10 countries had more than Latvia.

Philosemites are found in a higher proportion in Latvia among those with a higher level of education and higher social status and those who identify themselves leftist.



Overall, Latvia belongs to the group of countries with a moderate philosemitic climate.

9.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in Latvia

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ⁴⁹	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.950	1.017
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.444	1.203
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.592	1.143
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.000*	10.308
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.948	0.981
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.491	0.860
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.098	0.672
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.037*	1.761
Age groups	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.957	1.014
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.000*	3.177
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.832	1.101

Finally, we examine, using logistic regression analysis, which factors determine whether someone has antisemitic attitudes.

In Latvia, antisemitism is most strongly defined by xenophobia. Those who voiced general xenophobic views are 10.3 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who are not characterised by xenophobia.

In Latvia, antisemitism is a system of views that is specific to smaller settlements: Those living in settlements with less than 10,000 people are 3.2 times more likely to be primary antisemites than those living in Riga. Those in low-status ESOMAR groups "D" and "E" are 1.8 times more likely to be antisemites in Latvia than those in status groups "A" and "B".

⁴⁹ The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.


*Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.

10. NETHERLANDS

10.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE


Based on responses indicating cognitive antisemitism in the Netherlands, 7% of 18-75-year-olds are moderately antisemitic and 1% are strongly antisemitic. In terms of cognitive antisemitism, only the sample from Sweden had fewer antisemitic respon-

dents than the sample from Netherlands. In samples from the other 14 countries, however, we found more antisemitic respondents than in the sample from Netherlands.



In terms of conative antisemitism, which measures the tendency to act in a biased manner and to discriminate, in the Nether-


lands there are no strongly antisemitic respondents among 18-75-year-olds, and only 4% are moderately antisemitic.



In the affective dimension of antisemitism within the Dutch population aged 18-75, 4% are moderately antisemitic and 2% are strongly antisemitic. This means that 96% of the Dutch population does not have

negative feelings for Jews. In European comparison, the Netherlands has the lowest proportion of antisemitic emotions out of the 16 countries surveyed.


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
As the next step of our analysis, we merged the results measured in the cognitive and affective dimensions and created an aggregated indicator of primary antisemitism.

According to the aggregated antisemitism indicator, which indicates the degree

of primary antisemitism, 1% of those living in the Netherlands were classified as strongly antisemitic and 2% as moderately antisemitic. It means that, 97% of Dutch people aged 18-75 are non-antisemitic.



In the ranking of the 16 countries examined, the Netherlands proved to be the least antisemitic country in terms of primary antisemitism. In Greece, the proportion of those with antisemitism is 16 times higher; in Austria, 10 times higher; and in France, five times higher than in the Netherlands. In Greece, the proportion




10.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION

Secondary antisemitism is expressed in the denial or relativization of the Holocaust and the avoidance of responsibility for the persecution of Jews.


This type of secondary antisemitism characterises 13% of the Dutch population aged 18–75: 12% of respondents were in the moderately and 1% in the strongly antise-

mitic group. The results indicate that secondary antisemitism concerning the Holocaust is greater in the Dutch population than manifest antisemitism. However, with this result, the Netherlands became the second least antisemitic country among the 16 countries surveyed in terms of antisemitism related to the Holocaust.




10.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

In the Netherlands, 32% of the population aged 18–75 proved to be moderately and 4% strongly antisemitic in this respect. It is clear that antisemitic beliefs are most prevalent in antisemitic hostility against Israel in the Netherlands. Although antisemitic hostility against Israel is moderate in the Netherlands compared to Europe overall, its proportion is many times higher in the Netherlands than other types of antisemitism.



10.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

If primary antisemites and latent antisemites are added together, the Netherlands has the lowest rate of antisemitism among the 16 countries surveyed: only 8 percent of the population is primary or latent antisemitic.




110

10.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

In the Netherlands, the proportion of antisemites is very low in all social and demographic groups. Only those with a primary education have a slightly higher rate (18%).

Of Muslims living in the Netherlands, 18% proved to be primary antisemites, more


than double the population average. Antisemitic hostility against Israel characterizes 89% of Muslims living in the Netherlands. This is 2.5 times higher than the average of the total population.



10.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

The proportion of antisemites in political camps was examined on the one hand by the party choice of the respondents and on the other hand by their self-classification on a left-right scale. The Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid - PVV) has an above-average proportion of strongly antisemitic


voters. Nevertheless, 81% of Freedom Party voters were free of antisemitism. The proportion of antisemites among those who classified themselves to the left of the political spectrum was slightly lower than in the other groups but it did not rise above 10% in any of the self-classification groups.⁵⁰



50 Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: "Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation. On the scale 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation."

10.7 PHILOSEMITISM

Based on the summary of the responses, 58% of the Dutch population aged 18-75 proved to be philosemitic. The proportion of the philosemitic group is more than 7 times higher than the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites (8%). In a European comparison, only 2 countries had higher rates of philosemites than the Netherlands.



Overall, the Netherlands belongs to the group of countries with a distinctly philosemitic climate.

10.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in the Netherlands

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ⁵¹	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.006*	3.600
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.448	1.468
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.393	1.543
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.141	2.053
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.373	0.628
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.396	0.640
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.208	0.260
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.036*	3.439
Age groups	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.465	1.428
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.681	0.793
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.971	1.020

114

Logistic regression modelling was used to investigate causal relationships. Primary, manifest antisemitism was defined as a dependent, explained variable in the model.

In the Netherlands, antisemitism is most strongly defined by law and order conservatism. Dutch respondents who can be described as having law and order conservatism attitudes are 3.6 times more likely to be

antisemitic than those who do not see the world in this way.

Respondents with low social status (ESOMAR status groups "D" and "E") in the Netherlands are 3.4 times more likely to be antisemitic than those with higher social status (ESOMAR status groups "A" and "B").⁵²

⁵¹ The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.


*Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.

⁵² In the classification of the ESOMAR (European Society of Opinion and Market Research Professionals) "ESOMAR A" indicates the highest social status, and "ESOMAR E" indicates the lowest social status.


11. POLAND

11.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE


Based on responses indicating cognitive antisemitism in Poland, 54% of 18-75-year-olds were moderately antisemitic and 14% were strongly antisemitic. Overall, the Polish sample had the highest level of cognitive antisemitic prejudice among the 16 countries surveyed.



In terms of conative antisemitism, which measures the tendency to act in a biased manner and to discriminate, 50% of 18-75-year-olds are moderately antisemitic and 14% are strongly antisemitic in Poland. Poland was also the most antisemitic of the 16 countries surveyed in this respect.




In the affective dimension of antisemitism, 20% of the Polish population between the ages of 18 and 75 are moderately antisemitic and 25% are strongly antisemitic. This means that 45% of the Polish population has explicitly negative feelings against Jews. In a European comparison, only 3 of the 16 countries surveyed had higher rates.




Based on this aggregate indicator of primary antisemitism, 15% of Poles proved to be moderately antisemitic, while 27% are in the strongly antisemitic. The majority of Poles aged 18-75 (58%) are non-antisemitic.

116




In the ranking of the 16 countries examined, only the Greeks are more antisemitic than the Poles, while in 14 countries, we found a lower degree of antisemitism than in Poland.



11.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION


Holocaust-related secondary antisemitism affects 71% of the Polish population aged 18–75: 63% of Polish respondents were in the moderately and 8% in the strongly antisemitic group. Only 29% of Poles were free of antisemitic attitudes towards the

Holocaust, meaning that, overall, secondary antisemitism concerning to the Holocaust covers a wider social group of the Polish population than primary manifest antisemitism.



11.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

In this respect, 61% of the population aged 18–75 proved to be moderately and 13% strongly antisemitic in Poland. Antisemitic hostility against Israel is the 2nd strongest in Poland among the 16 countries surveyed⁵³.




53 The highest level of anti-Semitic hostility against Israel was in Austria

11.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

The proportion of latent antisemites in this sense is 24% in Poland, the 2nd highest rate among the countries studied.

If primary antisemites and latent antisemites are added together, Poland has the high-

est rate of antisemitism (66%) among the 16 countries surveyed. Although Greece has a higher proportion of primary manifest antisemites than Poland, Poland has a higher rate of latent antisemitism than Greece.




119

11.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

In Poland, Antisemitic prejudice is slightly higher among men than among women. Among those over 50, the proportion of strong antisemites is noticeably higher than the average. Warsaw has a slightly lower level of antisemitism than other settlements in the country. Although the proportion of all antisemites (primary and latent together)

decreases with increasing education, strong primary antisemitism is the highest among those with a higher level of education and in the ESOMAR social status group "A"⁵⁴. Poland is thus a society where manifest antisemitism is the highest in opinion-forming groups with a high level of education and with a high social status.

⁵⁴ In the classification of the ESOMAR (European Society of Opinion and Market Research Professionals) "ESOMAR A" indicates the highest social status, and "ESOMAR E" indicates the lowest social status.




11.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

The proportion of antisemites in political camps was examined on the one hand by the party choice of the respondents and on the other hand by their self-classification on a left-right scale.

In terms of party support, it is conspicuous that most antisemites are among voters in the Law and Justice (Prawo i sprawiedliwość) party: 80% of voters in this party are

primarily or latently antisemitic.

The other clear trend indicated by our data is the gradual increase in antisemitism as we move from clearly left-wingers to clearly right-wingers.⁵⁵ Among those who clearly say they are right-wing voters in Poland, 43% are strongly antisemitic and only 26% are free of antisemitism.



121


⁵⁵ Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: "Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation. On the scale 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation."

11.7 PHILOSEMITISM

Based on the summary of the answers, just less than one-fifth (19%) of Poles aged 18–75 proved to be philosemitic. This means that the philosemitic group is less than half the size of the group of primary antisemites (42%) and less than a third of the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites (66%). In a European comparison, only

Greece had fewer philosemites than Poland, while 14 countries had more than the Polish proportion.

Philosemites have a higher-than-average proportion of women, those under the age of 30, people with an “A” social status, and those who identify themselves as leftist.



Overall, Poland belongs to the group of countries with a more antisemitic than philosemitic climate.

11.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in Poland

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ⁵⁶	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.068	1.475
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.020*	0.652
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.590	1.108
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.000*	12.574
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.004*	1.735
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.010*	1.814
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.198	0.721
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.278	1.313
Age groups	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.411	1.189
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.112	0.715
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.026*	1.984

123

Finally, we examine, using logistic regression analysis, which factors determine whether someone has antisemitic attitudes.

In Poland, antisemitism is most strongly defined by xenophobia and nationalism. Those who voiced general xenophobic views are 12.6 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who are not characterised by xenophobia. Those who express explicitly nationalist views in Poland are 1.7 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who do not have nationalist attitudes.

Distrust of the political forces in power also has a significant effect on antisemitism. Those who are distrustful of the political elite in power in Poland are 0.7 times less likely to be antisemitic than those who are more likely to have confidence in that political leadership. Religious people in Poland are 1.8 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who are not religious.

In Poland, right-wing self-determination doubles the likelihood of being antisemitic, compared to those who call themselves left-wing voters.


⁵⁶ The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.

*Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.

12. ROMANIA


12.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE

Based on responses indicating cognitive antisemitism in Romania, 44% of the population aged 18–75 proved to be moderately and 11% strongly antisemitic. Of the 16 countries surveyed, the Romanian sample had the 4th highest level of cognitive anti-semitism.




124

In terms of cognitive antisemitism, which measures the tendency to act in a biased manner and to discriminate, 36% of the population aged 18–75 are moderately anti-semitic and 11% are strongly antisemitic in this regard in Romania. Romania was also the 4th most antisemitic country of the 16 countries surveyed.



In the affective dimension of antisemitism 25% of the Romanian population aged 18-75 are moderately and 17% are strongly antisemitic. Thus, in Romania,


42% of the population has particularly negative feelings towards Jews. In a European comparison, only 4 of the 16 countries⁵⁷ surveyed had higher rates.




As the next step of our analysis, we merged the results measured in the cognitive and affective dimensions and created an aggregated indicator of primary antisemitism. According to the aggregated

antisemitism indicator, which indicates the degree of primary antisemitism, 19% of the Romanian population proved to be moderately antisemitic, while 19% also fell into the strongly antisemitic group.

57 Greece, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.




In the ranking of the 16 countries examined, only 4 countries are more antisemitic than the Romanian population, but in 11



12.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION

Holocaust-related secondary antisemitism affects 63% of the Romanian population aged 18–75: 51% of respondents were moderately antisemitic and 12% were strongly antisemitic in relation to secondary antisemitism. Only 31% of the Romanian population is free of antisemitic attitudes


towards the Holocaust. Holocaust-related secondary antisemitism thus affects a wider range of social strata in Romania than primary manifest antisemitism. Of the 16 countries surveyed, Romania has the 3rd strongest secondary antisemitism related to the Holocaust.



12.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

In this respect, 40% of the Romanian population aged 18–75 is moderately and 9% are strongly antisemitic. Antisemitic hostility against Israel is only the 9th strongest in Romania among the 16 countries surveyed⁵⁸. It


is worth noting that, as we have seen, Romania is much higher in the rankings in other respects, but antisemitic hostility against Israel is relatively less characteristic of the Romanian population.



58 The highest level of anti-Semitic hostility against Israel is in Austria.

12.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

The proportion of latent antisemites in Romania is 15%. If primary antisemites and latent antisemites are added together, Romania, with its 53% share, ranks 5th of the 16 countries surveyed.



129

12.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS


Antisemitism is noticeably higher among men than among women. Bucharest and cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants have slightly higher levels of antisemitism than other settlements in the country. In terms of educational background, those with a vocational education and high school graduates are characterised by the highest degree of antisemitism.

As social status increases, the proportion of antisemites in Romania tends to decrease. The proportion of primary antisemites is the lowest in ESOMAR⁵⁹ status group

“A” and the highest in status group “E”.

It is worth looking at the results for the largest ethnic minority in Romania, the Hungarians. While 38% of the total population in Romania was primarily antisemitic, this proportion was only 22% among Hungarians in Romania. The proportion of latent antisemites is also lower among Hungarians in Romania (7%) than the population average (15%). Overall, while 47% of the Romanian population was not antisemitic, this proportion reaches 71% among Hungarians in Romania.

⁵⁹ In the classification of the ESOMAR (European Society of Opinion and Market Research Professionals), “ESOMAR A” indicates the highest social status, and “ESOMAR E” indicates the lowest social status.




12.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

In terms of party support, it is striking how high the proportion of latent antisemites is among the voters of the rather low-supported centre-right People’s Movement Party (Partidul Mişcarea Populară, PMP). At the same time, there are several primary antisemites among voters in the Social Democratic PSD, the Liberal Conservative PNL, and the 2020 USR-PLUS

party alliance, which advocates an anti-corruption program.

In Romania, those who place themselves on the left side of the political spectrum are as antisemitic as those who position themselves on the right side of the spectrum.⁶⁰ The lowest levels of antisemitism in Romania characterise those who define themselves as moderate left-wing voters.




60 Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: “Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation. On the scale 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation.”

12.7 PHILOSEMITISM

Based on the summary of the answers, just slightly over a quarter (28%) of 18-75-year-olds in Romania are philosemites, meaning that, the philosemitic group is significantly smaller than the group of primary antisemites (38%) and the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites (53%). In a European comparison, only 4 countries have fewer philosemites than Romania, while 10

countries have more. The proportion of philosemites in Slovakia is the same as in Romania.

Philosemites are found in higher proportions than average in 40-50-year-olds, those with a high level of education and a higher social status, and those who place politically in the centre-left or centre.



Overall, Romania belongs to the group of countries with a more antisemitic than a philosemitic climate.

12.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in Romania

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ⁶¹	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.765	1.059
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.003*	0.583
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.748	0.941
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.000*	5.295
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.890	0.971
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.564	1.186
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.016*	0.646
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.001*	2.405
Age groups	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.596	0.905
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.486	0.852
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.343	1.236

133

Finally, we examine, using logistic regression analysis, which factors determine whether someone has antisemitic attitudes.

In Romania, antisemitism is most strongly defined by xenophobia. Those who voiced general xenophobic views are 5.3 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who are not characterised by xenophobia.

Distrust of the political forces in power also has a strong effect on antisemitism. Those who are distrustful of the political elite in power in Romania are 0.6 times less likely to be antisemitic than those who are

more likely to have confidence in the existing political leadership.

In Romania, those who consider themselves deprived are 0.6 times less likely to be antisemitic than those who prefer to classify themselves as successful in life. At the same time, low social status also increases the likelihood of the emergence of antisemitism in Romania. People with "D" and "E" social status are 2.4 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who belong to the "A" or "B" status groups.


⁶¹ The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.

*Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.


13. SLOVAKIA

13.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE

In Slovakia, 54% of the population aged 18–75 proved to be antisemitic in terms of cognitive antisemitism: 42% of the population can be considered moderately and 12% strongly antisemitic in this dimension. Of the 16 countries surveyed, the Slovak sample had the 5th highest proportion of cognitive antisemitic respondents.




Within cognitive antisemitism, a conative component can also be distinguished, indicating a willingness to act in accordance with prejudice. In terms of conative antisemitism, which measures the tendency to act in a biased manner and to discriminate, 35% of the population aged 18–75 in Slovakia are moderately and 10% are strongly antisemitic. In this respect, too, Slovakia is the 5th most antisemitic country out of the 16 countries surveyed.




In the affective dimension of antisemitism 17% of the Slovak population aged 18-75 are moderately and 28% are strongly antisemitic. In Slovakia, thus 45% of the population

has markedly negative feelings about Jews. In a European comparison, only 2 of the 16 countries surveyed have higher rates than Slovakia.




According to the aggregated antisemitism indicator, which indicates the degree of primary antisemitism, 15% of the Slovak

population proved to be moderately antisemitic, while 24% are in the strongly antisemitic group.




In the ranking of the 16 countries examined, only 3 countries had more primary antisemitism than Slovakia, while in 12 countries, we detected a lower level of antisemitism than in Slovakia.



13.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION


Holocaust-related secondary antisemitism affects 53% of the Slovak population aged 18–75. Thus, a slight majority of the Slovak population is characterised by antisemitic attitudes towards the Holocaust: 42% of respondents are moderately and 11% strongly antisemitic in relation to secondary antisemitism.



137


13.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

Of the Slovak population aged 18–75, 46% proved to be moderately and 12% strongly antisemitic in terms of antisemitic hostility against Israel. Antisemitic hostility against Israel is only the 6th strongest in Slovakia among the 16 countries studied



13.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM


The proportion of latent antisemites in Slovakia is 13%. If primary antisemites and latent antisemites are added together, Slovakia ranks 6th of the 16 countries surveyed with a share of 52%.



13.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

There is a noticeably greater degree of strong antisemitism among men than among women. In Slovakia, younger age groups are less antisemitic than older ones. Bratislava has a significantly higher level of antisemitism than other settlements in

the country. In terms of educational background, those with a bachelor's degree are the most antisemitic in Slovakia. However, it is difficult to establish a clear trend in terms of social status.




13.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Looking at the party-support data, we see that most antisemites are voters in the far-right People’s Party - Our Slovakia (Ľudová strana - Naše Slovensko - LSNS) and Smer - sociálna demokracia, named after Robert Fico, but antisemitism is also quite high among voters of the Most-Híd party, which addresses Hungarian voters in Slovakia.

Among the 16 countries surveyed, Slovakia and the Czech Republic are those

with a much higher proportion of respondents who placed themselves on the left side of the political spectrum than on the right side.⁶² In Slovakia, the proportion of primary or latent antisemites is 73% among those who professed to be clearly left. In contrast, only 39% of those who classified themselves as clearly right can be described as primary or latent antisemites.




62 Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: “Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation. On the scale 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation.”

13.7 PHILOSEMITISM

In Slovakia, over a quarter (28%) of 18-75-year-olds are philosemitic. This means that the philosemitic group is significantly smaller than the group of primary antisemites (40%) and almost half of the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites (54%). In a European comparison, only 4 countries had fewer philosemites than Slovakia, while in 10 countries, we

found more philosemites than the Slovak proportion. The proportion of philosemites is the same as in Romania.

The share of philosemites is higher than average among women, those in their 40s, people with a higher social status, and those who place themselves on the right side of the political spectrum.



Overall, Slovakia belongs to the group of countries with a more antisemitic than philosemitic climate.

13.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in Slovakia

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ⁶³	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.000*	2.473
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.816	1.044
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.093	1.400
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.000*	14.861
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.640	0.901
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.858	0.969
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.338	0.839
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.654	1.116
Age groups	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.954	1.013
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.041*	0.537
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.024*	0.538

Finally, we examine, using logistic regression analysis, which factors determine whether someone has antisemitic attitudes.

In Slovakia, antisemitism is most strongly defined by xenophobia. Those who voiced general xenophobic views are 14.9 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who are not characterised by xenophobia.

Law and order conservatism also has a significant impact on antisemitism. Those who profess to be law and order conservatives are 2.5 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who do not share such views.

Slovakia is one of the rare exceptions where those who consider themselves left-wing are significantly more likely to be antisemitic than those who claim to be right-wing.⁶⁴ Those who place themselves on the right side of the political spectrum are half as likely to be antisemites than those who classify themselves on the left.

Another specific Slovak phenomenon is that antisemitism is much more widespread in Bratislava than in small settlements in Slovakia. Those living in small settlements are half as likely to be antisemitic than a resident of Bratislava.

63 The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.


*Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.

64 Outside of Slovakia, this phenomenon can also be observed in the Czech Republic.

14. SPAIN


11.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE

Based on responses indicating cognitive antisemitism, 24% of Spanish aged 18-75 proved to be moderately antisemitic and 2% are strongly antisemitic. Regarding cognitive antisemitic prejudices, we detected the 4th lowest rate in the sample from Spain out of the 16 countries surveyed.




143

In terms of conative antisemitism, which measures prejudice and discrimination, 22% of 18-75-year-olds in Spain are moderately antisemitic and 3% are strongly antisemitic.




In the affective dimension of antisemitism, 8% of the Spanish population aged 18-75 are moderately and 12% are strongly antisemitic, while 80% are non-antisemitic.




As the next step of our analysis, we merged the results measured in the cognitive and affective dimensions and created an aggregated indicator of primary antisemitism. According to the aggregated antisemitism indicator, which indicates the degree of primary antisemitism, 6% of the Spanish population is moderately antisemitic, while 10% are strongly antisemitic. However, 84% of 18-75-year-olds in Spain are non-antisemitic.

144




According to the indicator of the strength of primary antisemitism, Spain can be classified as one of the least antisemitic countries, as there are only 5 countries with a lower rate of primary antisemitism, while 10 countries have a higher proportion than Spain.




14.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION

Secondary antisemitism characterises 38% of the Spanish population aged 18-75, with 32% in the moderately and 6% in the strongly antisemitic group. We can therefore conclude that the extent of secondary antisemitism related to the Holocaust in Spain is significantly greater than the primary manifest antisemitic prejudice.




14.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

Antisemitic hostility against Israel affects 55% of Spanish adults aged 18–75: 42% are moderately and 13% strongly antisemitic in this respect. The proportion of those who agree with statements of antisemitic hostility against Israel is higher in Spain than the proportion of both traditional prejudices (primary antisemitism) and secondary antisemitism.



14.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

The proportion of latent antisemites is 17% 33% in Spain, meaning it has the 6th lowest in Spain. The combined proportion of primary antisemitism among the countries surveyed. primary antisemites and latent antisemites is




147

14.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

According to the gender distribution of prejudice, the proportion of antisemites is slightly higher among men than among women. According to age data, those in their 30s are the most latent antisemitic in Spain. People living in settlements with a population of between 50,000 and 100,000 are characterised by higher-than-average latent antisemitism.

As education level increases, antisemitic prejudice clearly decreases, and the same is true for the so-called ESOMAR classification⁶⁵: The higher the status of someone, the less likely they are to be antisemitic.

⁶⁵ In the classification of the ESOMAR (European Society of Opinion and Market Research Professionals), "ESOMAR A" indicates the highest social status, and "ESOMAR E" indicates the lowest social status.




14.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Looking at the party-support data, the most striking find is that the highest level of antisemitism characterizes voters in two small Basque parties, EH Bildu and EAJ/PNV. Among the major national parties, right-wing populist VOX voters were the most Antisemitic at the time of the survey.

There is no clear trend according to self-classification on the political left-right scale.⁶⁶ Among those who clearly identify

themselves as politically right, the proportion of strong antisemites is higher than average, but the same is true among those who consider themselves clearly left-wing voters. Those who consider themselves to belong to the political centre are characterised by above-average latent antisemitism. The least Antisemitic can be found among centre-right voters in Spain.




⁶⁶ Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: „Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation.” On the scale 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation.

14.7 PHILOSEMITISM

Of the Spanish population aged 18-75, 40% proved to be philosemitic, meaning that the philosemitic group is 2.5 times larger than the group of primary antisemites (16%); furthermore, it also significantly exceeds the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites (33%). In a European compari-

son, there are more philosemites in 7 countries than in Spain, and fewer in 8 countries. Philosemites are found in higher proportions among women, young people, those with higher education and those with higher social status.



Overall, Spain belongs to the group of countries with a moderate philosemitic climate.

14.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in Spain

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ⁶⁷	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.245	1.346
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.037*	0.613
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.109	1.495
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.000*	6.308
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.685	1.118
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.086	1.537
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.068	0.600
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.031*	2.160
Age groups	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.500	1.190
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.944	0.978
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.069	0.827

Finally, we examine, using logistic regression analysis, which factors determine whether someone has antisemitic attitudes.

In Spain, antisemitism is most strongly defined by xenophobia. Those who voiced general xenophobic views are 6.3 times more likely to be Antisemitic than those who are not characterised by xenophobia.

In Spain, low social status also increases the likelihood of the emergence of antisemitism. People with "D" and "E" social status

are 2.2 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who belong to the "A" or "B" status groups.

Distrust of the political forces in power also has a significant effect on antisemitism. Those who are distrustful of the political elite in power are 0.6 times less likely to be antisemitic than those who are more likely to have confidence in the existing political leadership.


⁶⁷ The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.

*Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.

15. SWEDEN

15.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE


Cognitive antisemitism in Sweden affects only 7% of the population aged 18–75. We did not encounter a strong form of cognitive antisemitism in the sample from Sweden. Of the 16 countries surveyed, Sweden had the lowest level of cognitive antisemitism.



152


In terms of conative antisemitism, which measures the tendency to act in a biased manner and to discriminate, in Sweden, 5% of respondents are moderately antisemitic and there was no strong antisemitic respondent in the sample representing the Swedish population aged 18–75. The Swedish sample had the second lowest number of antisemitic respondents in this regard out of the 16 countries surveyed.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ In the Netherlands, the rate of conative antisemitism was 1 percentage lower.




In the affective dimension of antisemitism, which measures the emotional intensity of antisemitism, 6% of the Swedish population aged 18–75 were moderately antisemitic and 3% strongly antisemitic. Thus,

in Sweden, 9% of the population has negative feelings towards Jews. In a European comparison, only 2 of the 16 countries surveyed had lower rates than Sweden.




According to the aggregated antisemitism indicator, which indicates the degree of primary antisemitism, 4% of the Swedish

population proved to be moderately antisemitic, while 2% belonged to the strongly antisemitic group.




In the ranking of the 16 countries examined, only the Netherlands had a lower portion of primary antisemites than Sweden.



15.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION


Secondary antisemitism related to the Holocaust characterizes 11% of Swedes aged 18-75: 10% of respondents were moderately antisemitic and 1% were strongly antisemitic. In terms of secondary antisemitism. Of the 16 countries surveyed, Sweden had the lowest level of Holocaust-related secondary antisemitism.



155

15.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL


In this respect, 29% of the Swedish population aged 18-75 were moderately and 7% strongly antisemitic. It is clear that in Sweden antisemitic attitudes are much higher in relation to Israel than in any other respect. Although antisemitic hostility against Israel is moderate in Sweden in a European comparison, its proportion is many times higher than other types of antisemitism.



15.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

The group of latent antisemites includes those who, based both on their views on the Holocaust and on Israel, appeared in the group of antisemites but were not characterised by primary antisemitism. The proportion of latent antisemites in Sweden was 4%.


This is the lowest rate among the 16 European countries surveyed. If primary antisemites and latent antisemites are added together, Sweden has the 2nd lowest percentage of antisemites out of the 16 countries surveyed (6%).



15.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS

Due to low levels of antisemitism, there are few clear differences between social groups in Sweden. At the same time, there is a slightly bigger share of antisemitic respondents among men than among women. Respondents with only basic education and with particularly low social status are characterised by a somewhat higher degree of


antisemitism. Of Muslims in Sweden, 43% proved to be primary antisemites, more than 7 times the population average. Antisemitic hostility against Israel characterises 57% of Muslims living in Sweden. This is more than 1.5 times higher than the population average.



15.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

In terms of party support, voters in the populist Sverigedemokraterna party are markedly more antisemitic than supporters of other parties. However, even 80% of Sverigedemokraterna voters are free of both manifest and latent forms of antisemitism.

In Sweden, there is a slightly higher proportion of antisemites who place themselves on the left or right side of the political spectrum than among those who place themselves in the political centre.⁶⁹




158

69 Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: "Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation. On the scale 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation."

15.7 PHILOSEMITISM

Based on the summary of the responses, 60% of 18-75-year-olds in Sweden were philosemitic. The philosemitic group is 6 times larger than the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites (10%). In a European comparison, only the UK has more philosemites than Sweden.

Philosemites have a higher proportion than average among women, the middle-aged, those with a high level of education, people with a higher social status and those who place themselves in the political centre.



Overall, Sweden belongs to the group of countries with a clear philosemitic climate.

15.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in Sweden

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ⁷⁰	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.289	1.496
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.911	1.047
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.026*	3.133
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.000*	19.726
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.110	1.921
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.927	1.034
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.086	1.913
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.669	1.172
Age groups	55–75 years old compared to 18–35 years old	0.170	0.589
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.802	1.161
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.287	1.181

Finally, we examine, using logistic regression analysis, which factors determine whether someone has antisemitic attitudes.

In Sweden, antisemitism is highly defined by xenophobia. Respondents who share general xenophobic views (not specific to Jews) are 19.7 times more likely to be

antisemitic, compared to those who are not characterised by such attitudes.

Populism has a powerful effect on antisemitism as well. Those who have populist views are 3.1 times more likely to be Antisemitic than those who are not characterised by populist attitude.


⁷⁰ The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.

*Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.


16. UNITED KINGDOM

16.1 PRIMARY ANTISEMITISM: TRADITIONAL ANTI-JEWISH PREJUDICE

In the UK, 14% of the population aged 18-75 were moderately and 1% strongly antisemitic. Of the 16 countries surveyed, only the samples from the Netherlands and Sweden had lower levels of cognitive antisemitism than the sample from the United Kingdom.




In terms of conative antisemitism, which measures the tendency to act in a biased manner and to discriminate, in the UK, 11% were moderately antisemitic and 1% strongly antisemitic. The United Kingdom was the 3rd least antisemitic country in this respect among the 16 countries surveyed.⁷¹



71 In the Netherlands, the rate of conative antisemitism was 1% lower.

In the affective dimension of antisemitism, that is, in measuring the emotional intensity of antisemitism, 5% of the UK population aged 18-75 are moderately antisemitic and 3% are strongly antisemitic. So, in the UK, 8% of the population has negative


feelings about Jews. In a European comparison, out of the 16 countries surveyed, only the Netherlands had a lower ratio, by 1 percentage point, than in the United Kingdom, while 14 countries had higher values.



162


According to the aggregated antisemitism indicator, which indicates the degree of primary antisemitism, 3% of the UK pop-

ulation are moderately antisemitic, while 3% are also strongly antisemitic.




In the ranking of the 16 countries examined, only the Netherlands had a lower pro-

portion of primary antisemites than in the United Kingdom.



16.2 SECONDARY ANTISEMITISM: HOLOCAUST RELATIVIZATION


Secondary antisemitism related to the Holocaust can be attributed to 18% of respondents in the UK: 17% of UK citizens were moderate antisemitic and 1% strongly antisemitic in relation to secondary antisemitism.



Of the 16 countries surveyed, the United Kingdom had the 3rd lowest rate of Holocaust-related secondary antisemitism.


16.3 ANTISEMITIC HOSTILITY AGAINST ISRAEL

In this respect, 27% and 4% of the UK population aged 18–75 belong to the group of strong antisemites. There is no doubt that antisemitic attitudes in the UK are much more prevalent in relation to Israel than in any other respect. Its proportion is a multiple of primary antisemitism. Nevertheless, the UK had the lowest level of antisemitic hostility against Israel among the 16 surveyed European countries.



16.4 LATENT ANTISEMITISM

The group of latent antisemites includes those who, based both on their views on the Holocaust and on Israel, appeared in the group of antisemites but were not characterised by primary antisemitism. The proportion of latent antisemites in the UK was 10%.



165

16.5 ANTISEMITISM BY DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STATUS


In the UK, respondents over the age of 50 are characterised by a lower level of antisemitism than younger ones. Scotland has a slightly higher proportion of antisemites than the rest of the UK.⁷²

In the UK, those with a lower level of education and those with a lower social status have a slightly higher degree of antisemitism than those with a higher level of edu-

cation or those with a higher status.

Of Muslims in the UK, 23% proved to be primary antisemites, almost 4 times higher than the population average. Antisemitic hostility against Israel characterises 84% of Muslims living in the UK. This is more than 2.5 times higher than the population average.


⁷² Compared to Scotland and countries outside the UK, antisemitism in Scotland is also markedly low compared to most European countries.



16.6 ANTISEMITISM AND POLITICAL ORIENTATION

Looking at the party-support data, we see that there were slightly more antisemites among Labour voters than among Conservative voters, but the difference is not dramatic.

According to self-classification on the left-right political spectrum, we do not see any clear trends regarding antisemitism.⁷³




⁷³ Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a 9-point scale along the left-right political orientation: „Please, position yourself on a left-right scale indicating political orientation. On the scale 1 means the clearly left and 9 means the clearly right orientation.”

16.7 PHILOSEMITISM

Based on the summary of responses, 64% of 18-75-year-olds in the UK were philosemitic. The philosemitic group was 4 times larger than the combined proportion of primary and latent antisemites (16%). In a European comparison, the United Kingdom had the

highest rate of philosemitism among the 16 countries studied.

Philosemites are higher than the average among those over the age of 50 and those with higher education.



Overall, the UK belongs to the group of countries with a clear philosemitic climate.

16.8 CAUSAL EXPLANATION OF ANTISEMITISM

Results of Logistic regression model in the United Kingdom

	Nagelkerke R square=0.372	Significance ⁷⁴	Odds ratio (exp. Beta)
Law and order conservatism	the two conservative quintiles compared to the two non-conservative quintiles	0.375	1.457
Distrust in politics	the two distrustful quintiles compared to the two non-distrustful quintiles	0.152	0.580
Populism	the two populist quintiles compared to the two non-populist quintiles	0.000*	5.984
Xenophobia	the two xenophobe quintiles compared to the two non-xenophobe quintiles	0.001*	8.670
Nationalism	the two nationalist quintiles compared to the two non-nationalist quintiles	0.330	0.669
Religiosity	the two religious quintiles compared to the two non-religious quintiles	0.320	1.408
Subjective deprivation	the two deprived quintiles compared to the two not deprived quintiles	0.427	0.672
Social status (ESOMAR)	Esomar "D" & "E" status compared to Esomar "A" & "B" status	0.448	1.369
Age groups	55-75 years old compared to 18-35 years old	0.728	0.870
Size of settlement	settlement size below 10,000 compared to settlement size over 300,000	0.209	2.550
Left-right political self-classification	right self-classification compared to left self-classification	0.349	0.959

169

Logistic regression modelling was used to investigate causal relationships. Primary, manifest antisemitism was defined as a dependent, explained variable in the model.

In the UK, antisemitism is most strongly defined by xenophobia and populism. Those who have general xenophobic views

(not specifically about Jews) are 8.7 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who are not characterised by such attitudes.

And those with a populist view are 6 times more likely to be antisemitic than those who are not characterised by a populist attitude.

⁷⁴ The closer the significance is to 0, the greater the probability that the certain observed odds ratio is a real fact.

* Significance below 0.05 means that there is a greater than 95% probability that the observed interrelation exists in reality.