Jews from the former Soviet Union (FSU) dramatically exacerbated the already unfavorable population
dynamics. During this period, emigration became the main reason for the rapid demographic decline of FSU
Jewry. Most of this movement was directed toward Israel, a very unusual north-to-south geographical
direction, whereas the rest was divided mostly between the US and Germany. Based on the statistics of FSU
countries, as well as statistics of countries of destination, we can develop a rather detailed pic ture of the
Jewish recent mass emigration and population decline.
By way of illustration, the article presents some of the preliminary demographic and historical results of the study, which challenge conventional wisdom. Among other things, the study reveals the migrant and transitory nature of the Jewish population in the nineteenth century and documents its stabilisation and eventual decrease in the twentieth century, on the basis of birth, marriage and death rates; and its dispersal throughout the country, beyond the major concentrations in Glasgow and Edinburgh. Hopefully, this study will serve as a model for other genealogical research into defined groups, religious or otherwise, at the national level.
This paper is a study of the demography of the contemporary post-Soviet Jewish Diaspora based on various statistical sources collected from many countries where these Jews live. It examines (post-) Soviet Jewish resettlement, and the demographic transformation of FSU Jews in the wake of the recent mass migration, especially in Israel. Based on this analysis, an update for 2010 of the number of the 'core' Jews (by self-identity) originating from the FSU by country was presented, and the total number of people belonging to the post-Soviet Jewish Diaspora worldwide and their distribution was estimated.
Книга предназначена для демографов, социологов, специалистов, занятых проблема-ми интеграции репатриантов в различных сферах и всех интересующихся данной про-блемой. Многие статистические материалы, представленные в книге, публикуются впервые.
социально-демографического развития еврейского населения бывшего СССР
за истекшее столетие, включая динамику численности и расселения по
республикам и городам, этноязыковой состав, половозрастную и семейную
структуру, рождаемость и смертность, уровень образования,
профессиональную структуру, участие в советской политической системе и
эмиграцию в другие страны. В частности, рассматривается влияние
Катастрофы, как на общую численность еврейского населения, так и на его
социально-экономическую структуру. Большое внимание в книге уделяется
представительству евреев среди студентов, специалистов и научных
работников бывшего СССР.
Книга предназначена для демографов, социологов, историков и всех
интересующихся данной проблемой. Многие статистические материалы,
представленные в книге, публикуются впервые.
marriages and of burials and cremations of Jews for 1989 The findings are
presented below. As in past years, marriage and death totals are
subdivided into various synagogue groupings. This is done for analytical
purposes and in order to indicate trends. The statistics for groups show
only which section of the community recorded the marriage or death. They
in no way measure the level of religious observance of individuals
Objective. To describe the demographic characteristics and health care usage patterns of the strictly orthodox Jewish population of Gateshead.
Methods. Registration and claims data were used in combination with encounter data from computerized and manual practice records. Jewish patients were identified and comparisons made between Jewish and non-Jewish populations registered at the same practices.
Results. The orthodox Jewish population was predominantly young (69% aged under 20). The birth rate in orthodox Jewish women aged 20–44 was much higher (294 per 1000) than non-Jewish women. Rates of uptake of cervical screening and childhood immunizations were significantly lower in the orthodox Jewish population. Uptake of breast screening and attendance at diabetic clinics did not differ significantly. The average number of consultations and home visits per annum was higher in Jewish than in non-Jewish patients.
Conclusions. The demographic and health care utilization patterns of orthodox Jewish and non-Jewish patients in Gateshead are different. There are implications for the provision of primary care services, particularly with regard to preventative health care.
efforts on a compact and accessible geographical area with a large number of Jews. Efforts were directed towards finding some way of using official statistics from the 1971 Census, in particular of the borough of Hackney.
The study has shown that the Jewish population of Hackney is a variegated and diverse group of people. However, most of them felt that they had some links or group identity in common, whether culturally or religiously-based, and they were certainly seen as a cohesive ethnic grouping by other Hackney residents. Many of the Adath-Orthodox are happy to remain distant from both the mainstream of Anglo-Jewish life and many facets of twentieth century urban civilization, but the poor and aged, like many other inner city dwellers, have a feeling that they are a forgotten people living in physical insecurity in a high crime area. It is hoped that this study will bring to the attention of the Jewish community and all our fellow British citizens, that there still exists, in the 1970s, a Jewish proletariat in the inner city whose needs must not be forgotten. With such knowledge we in Britain may learn from the mistakes of American society when dealing with the complex problems of poor multi-ethnic neighborhoods.
This survey of contemporary issues in Ukrainian Jewish life provides detailed information on the following topics: contemporary Ukrainian political and economic climate; Jewish history; Jewish demography; contemporary antisemistism; indigenous Jewish leadership; the role of international Jewish organizations; and Ukrainian national Jewish organizations.
The immigration of Muslims and the rise of Islam in the Netherlands have created problems for the Jewish community and will continue to do so. There are about one million Muslims in the Netherlands. Their influence on the political system is increasing. This cannot be positive for the Jews. The more power the Muslim community gains, the more it will weaken the Jewish community’s relations with a number of ministries.
The Jewish community faces increasing anti-Semitism. This has led to enhanced security measures. It also threatens to intensify attitudes based on fear.
An important element in Dutch Jewish history over the past decade was the restitution negotiations. As a result, the Dutch government made a payment of 400 million guilders (180 million Euros) to the Dutch community. Banks, insurance companies, and the stock exchange made additional payments that totaled 340 million guilders (155 million Euros).
This report, entitled “Britain’s Israeli Diaspora,” uses UK Census data to paint a portrait of the diverse Israeli population in Britain. Whilst it includes a fair number of stereotypical, born-and-bred, accented Israelis who are recent migrants to the UK, it also contains a considerable proportion of people who hold dual Israeli-British citizenship, have been living in Britain for many years and appear to be well-integrated into British society.
There is clear evidence to show that the Israeli population of the UK has grown over time, increasing by an estimated 350% between 1971 and 2011, and whilst it is still small, it now stands at its highest ever recorded level. Moreover, in the decade between 2001 and 2011, a greater number of Israelis moved to Britain than British Jews moved to Israel, at a ratio of three to two.
Many of the Israelis who have moved to the UK recently are in their mid-20s to mid-40s, and are highly educated, and whilst most are secular and relatively few choose to engage in Jewish communal religious life, approximately half of those with children choose to send their children to Jewish schools. At the same time, it is important to note that the Israeli population in the UK includes a sizeable proportion of strictly Orthodox Jews (about 16%), and a not insignificant proportion of non-Jews (9%).
Based on these data, it is difficult to determine the forces that may be driving Israeli migration. Whilst one might be tempted to argue that political or economic considerations are key, the most compelling evidence points to rather more prosaic factors – most notably, partnering with, or marrying, someone from Britain.
Demographically, post-Soviet Jewry has seen an overall decline resulting from assimilation, intermarriage, low fertility, high mortality, and emigration of younger age cohorts. Some demographers believe that less than 500,000 Jews remain in the post-Soviet states. An intermarriage rate that some view as exceeding 80 percent creates complex situations for those Jewish groups that prefer to confine their programs to halachically Jewish individuals.
Jewish identity among Jews in Russia and Ukraine is most likely to be expressed as a sense of Jewish heritage, in particular, a common cultural or intellectual heritage, rather than a sense of common spirituality or sharply focused religious practice. Post-Soviet Jews also tend to believe that Jews should be familiar with modern Israel, but not necessarily feel obligated to live in Israel.
The inconsistency between the demographic decrease and the expansion of Jewish day schools is the focus of this study, which describes and analyzes these developments in Jewish education and examines the origins of these trends and the factors affecting them.
UK Census data continues to be by far and away the most comprehensive and valuable dataset that exists on the UK Jewish population as a whole. Whilst the census does not capture the entire Jewish population, census data allow us to examine the socio-demographic characteristics of the Jewish population in greater detail than any other source. In this report, we utilise these data to explore how the numerical balance between the 'mainstream' and the strictly Orthodox (haredi) Jewish population is shifting over time, and what the age profiles and total fertility rates of both groups indicate about the future.
In particular, we highlight how the haredi population is growing at an extraordinarily fast rate, due to its rare combination of high fertility and low mortality. By contrast, the non-haredi Jewish population is declining, not least due to its below replacement level fertility. We note how these measures, combined with an analysis of population momentum over time, help us to develop a probable picture of a future in which the haredi population will become an increasingly large part of the whole.
Whilst this is a demographic certainty, the report also notes that 30% of all haredi adults are aged 15-24. Proportions at this type of level in other populations worldwide have been associated by political scientists and demographers with a range of social problems, not least due to the existence of large numbers of young people who are unemployed or on low incomes. There is no suggestion here that haredi Jews are likely to succumb to the worst of these problems – on the contrary, the community has very high levels of social cohesion and a large number of mechanisms that help to counteract these – but the possibility of increased apathy, disillusionment or abandonment of a strictly Orthodox lifestyle should not be dismissed. Indeed, examined from a demographic perspective, these types of possibilities represent the clearest and most obvious risks facing the haredi community.
In presenting a probable picture of the future of the British Jewish population as a whole, the findings in this report should be utilised for the specific purposes JPR intended: to help Jewish community leaders, operating either within the haredi or the non-haredi sectors, to develop policy to respond to the various challenges that are highlighted.
years. This paper examines, via the results of a mail-back survey, how economic,
social, religious and other factors have interacted to create distinctive settlement
patterns. Comparisons with similar findings for other Jewish communities are
made. It concludes that the most important factor influencing residential location
is access to a place of work but that the combined effects of community and
materialism will ultimately determine the development pattern of any individual
2002, exploring the psychological impact of conversion, the nature of their Jewish identity and
the durability of their religious commitment through time. Recognising the large variation in the
Jewish practice and attitudes displayed, I also examined the influence of motivational, family
and biographical factors on their Jewish identity.
Motivation for conversion was multi-dimensional. The instrumental desire to create family
unity was identified as the most powerful motivating factor. The strength of this variable
was found to be a significant predictor of the level of behavioural changes in the converts’
Jewish lifestyle. Counter-intuitively, this motivational factor formed negative correlations
with ethnicity and a non-significant relationship with ritual behaviour.
The data highlight differences between the factorial structure of the Jewish identity of converts
and born Jews. For converts, four identity factors were identified: ritual practice, ethnic
belonging, Jewish development and spirituality. Miller et al. have identified three factors
underlying the Jewish identity of born Jews under 50: behavioural ethnicity, religiosity and
mental ethnicity. Survey data of converts has shown a clear division of ritual and ethnic
behaviours, whilst in born Jews, the same differentiation is not demonstrated.
Like moderately engaged born Jews, converts emphasised the notion of affective identity rather
than the actual performance of Jewish ritual acts, though it is clear that ‘on average’ converts
have a somewhat more intense pattern of ritual practice than born (Reform) Jews.
The majority of the converts felt content with the results of their conversion but the relative lack
of emphasis placed on Jewish continuity as opposed to the convert’s individual self-fulfilment,
can be seen as an indication of a possibility that the conversion process may only delay
demographic decline in the Jewish community for just one or two generations.