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Author(s): Staetsky, L. Daniel
Date: 2017
Abstract: This study takes an in-depth look at attitudes towards Jews and Israel among the population of Great Britain, both across society as a whole, and in key subgroups within the population, notably the far-left, the far-right, Christians and Muslims.

It introduces the concept of the ‘elastic view’ of antisemitism, arguing that as antisemitism is an attitude, it exists at different scales and levels of intensity. Thus no single figure can capture the level of antisemitism in society, and all figures need to be carefully explained and understood.

It finds that only a small proportion of British adults can be categorised as ‘hard-core’ antisemites – approximately 2% – yet antisemitic ideas can be found at varying degrees of intensity across 30% of British society. Whilst this categorically does not mean that 30% of the British population is antisemitic, it does demonstrate the outer boundary of the extent to which antisemitic ideas live and breathe in British society. As such, it goes some way towards explaining why British Jews appear to be so concerned about antisemitism, as the likelihood of them encountering an antisemitic idea is much higher than that suggested by simple measures of antisemitic individuals. In this way, the research draws an important distinction between ‘counting antisemites’ and ‘measuring antisemitism’ – the counts for each are very different from one another, and have important implications for how one tackles antisemitism going forward.

The research finds that levels of anti-Israelism are considerably higher than levels of anti-Jewish feeling, and that the two attitudes exist both independently of one another and separately. However, the research also demonstrates that the greater the intensity of anti-Israel attitude, the more likely it is to be accompanied by antisemitic attitudes as well.

Looking at subgroups within the population, the report finds that levels of antisemitism and anti-Israelism among Christians are no different from those found across society as a whole, but among Muslims they are considerably higher on both counts. On the political spectrum, levels of antisemitism are found to be highest among the far-right, and levels of anti-Israelism are heightened across all parts of the left-wing, but particularly on the far-left. In all cases, the higher the level of anti-Israelism, the more likely it is to be accompanied by antisemitism. Yet, importantly, most of the antisemitism found in British society exists outside of these three groups – the far-left, far-right and Muslims; even at its most heightened levels of intensity, only about 15% of it can be accounted for by them.
Date: 2017
Abstract: How often do incidents of antisemitic violence occur in contemporary Europe, and what trends are
showing? How exposed are Jewish populations in different countries? Who commits these crimes? We
need to answer such questions as precisely as possible in order to effectively combat and prevent
antisemitism in general and violent antisemitism in particular, but we lack the knowledge to do so because
systematic studies of the subject are few and far between. As a step towards filling this research gap, the
current report presents some tentative findings about violent antisemitism in a sample of European
countries and proposes directions for further research.

Combining incident data based on police reporting with a 2012 survey on antisemitism carried out by
the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), this report tentatively compares the levels of
antisemitic violence in different countries. The seven-country sample contains comparable data for France,
UK, Germany and Sweden only. Among these countries, Jews’ exposure to antisemitic violence appears to
have been highest in France, lower in Sweden and Germany, and lowest in the United Kingdom.
Figures for Norway, Denmark and Russia are not directly comparable because of differing data
sources. However, Russia clearly stands out with a very low number of incidents considering Russia’s
relatively large Jewish population. Russia is also the only case in which there is little to indicate that Jews
avoid displaying their identity in public.

Available data on perpetrators suggest that individuals of Muslim background stand out among
perpetrators of antisemitic violence in Western Europe, but not in Russia, where right-wing extremist
offenders dominate. Attitude surveys corroborate this picture in so far as antisemitic attitudes are far more
widespread among Muslims than among the general population in Western Europe.
The findings presented here are tentative. More and better data as well as more research are needed in
order to form a more accurate picture of the nature and causes of antisemitic violence, a prerequisite for
determining relevant countermeasures.
Date: 2017
Abstract: Hvor ofte forekommer antisemittiske voldshendelser i dagens Europa, og hvilken vei går utviklingen?
Hvor utsatt er de jødiske befolkningene i ulike land? Og hvem står bak ugjerningene? Effektiv forebygging
og bekjempelse er avhengig av at slike spørsmål besvares så presist som mulig, men vi mangler den
nødvendige kunnskapen ettersom svært lite forskning er gjort på feltet. Denne rapporten presenterer noen
tentative funn om voldelig antisemittisme i et utvalg europeiske land og foreslår retninger for videre
forskning.

Ved å bruke hendelsestall basert på anmeldelser i kombinasjon med EUs Fundamental Rights Agency
(FRA) sin spørreundersøkelse om antisemittisme fra 2012, er det mulig å foreta en begrenset og tentativ
sammenlikning av det antisemittiske voldsnivået på tvers av land. I denne rapportens utvalg foreligger
sammenliknbare data kun for Frankrike, Storbritannia, Tyskland og Sverige. Jøders utsatthet for
antisemittisk vold synes å være høyest i Frankrike, mindre i Sverige og Tyskland, og lavest i Storbritannia.
Tall for Norge, Danmark og Russland er ikke sammenliknbare på grunn av mangelfulle data. Vi har
telt 10 hendelser i Norge, 20 i Danmark og 33 i Russland for perioden 2005-2015. Nivået i Russland er
tilsynelatende svært lavt i forhold til vesteuropeiske land og gitt Russlands relativt store jødiske minoritet.
Russland er også det eneste landet der vi ikke har funnet indikasjoner på at jøder unngår å vise sin identitet
offentlig.

Tilgjengelige data tyder på at personer med bakgrunn fra muslimske land skiller seg ut blant dem som
begår antisemittiske voldshandlinger i Vest-Europa, men ikke i Russland, der høyreekstreme aktører
dominerer. Holdningsundersøkelser bygger opp under dette bildet for så vidt som antisemittiske
holdninger er betydelig mer utbredt blant muslimer enn befolkningen generelt i vesteuropeiske land.
Denne rapportens funn er tentative og ment som et oppspill til videre forskning. Bedre data og flere
systematiske studier er nødvendig for å danne et mer presist bilde av fenomenet og dets årsaker, hvilket
igjen er en forutsetning for å kunne bestemme relevante mottiltak.
Date: 2017
Abstract: The Holocaust (Shoah) Immovable Property Restitution Study is the first-ever comprehensive
compilation of all significant legislation passed since 1945 by the 47 states that participated in
the 2009 Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference and endorsed the 2009 Terezin Declaration
that came out of the Prague conference.

The Terezin Declaration (and its companion document, the 2010 Guidelines and Best Practices,
endorsed by 43 countries) focuses in substantial part on the treatment of immovable (real)
property restitution: private, communal, and heirless property. The Study examined private,
communal, and heirless property as discrete components of each country’s restitution efforts
from 1944 to 2016.

Russia endorsed the Terezin Declaration in 2009, but declined to endorse the 2010
Guidelines and Best Practices. In 2012, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that “the
[Terezin] declaration does not contain principles that are essential to our country. We
consider it important to deal with these issues on the basis of post-war settlement
principles fixed in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of the Allied powers. We would
like to emphasize that it’s necessary to regard the Holocaust era as fixed in the
declaration, which means from 1933-1945.”

As part of the European Shoah Legacy Institute’s Immovable Property Restitution Study,
a Questionnaire covering past and present restitution regimes for private, communal and
heirless property was sent to all 47 Terezin Declaration governments in 2015. As of 13
December 2016, no response from Russia has been received
Date: 2017
Abstract: The Holocaust (Shoah) Immovable Property Restitution Study is the first-ever comprehensive
compilation of all significant legislation passed since 1945 by the 47 states that participated in
the 2009 Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference and endorsed the 2009 Terezin Declaration
that came out of the Prague conference.

The Terezin Declaration (and its companion document, the 2010 Guidelines and Best Practices,
endorsed by 43 countries) focuses in substantial part on the treatment of immovable (real)
property restitution: private, communal, and heirless property. The Study examined private,
communal, and heirless property as discrete components of each country’s restitution efforts
from 1944 to 2016.

Poland endorsed the Terezin Declaration in 2009. In 2010, 43 of the countries that
endorsed the Terezin Declaration approved nonbinding Guidelines and Best Practices for
the Restitution and Compensation of Immovable (Real) Property Confiscated or
Otherwise Wrongfully Seized by the Nazi, Fascists and Their Collaborators during the
Holocaust (Shoah) Era between 1933-1945, Including the Period of World War II
(“Terezin Best Practices”). Poland initially agreed to the Terezin Best Practices but then
withdrew its support.

Poland is one of a handful of countries with a government office dedicated to Jewish
Diaspora and post-Holocaust issues. As of March 2016, Mr. Sebastian Rejak holds the
post of Special Envoy of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs for Relations with the
Jewish Diaspora.

As part of the European Shoah Legacy Institute’s Immovable Property Restitution Study,
a Questionnaire covering past and present restitution regimes for private, communal and
heirless property was sent to all 47 Terezin Declaration governments in 2015. As of 13
December 2016, no response from Poland has been received.
Date: 2017
Date: 2017
Abstract: The Holocaust (Shoah) Immovable Property Restitution Study is the first-ever comprehensive
compilation of all significant legislation passed since 1945 by the 47 states that participated in
the 2009 Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference and endorsed the 2009 Terezin Declaration
that came out of the Prague conference.

The Terezin Declaration (and its companion document, the 2010 Guidelines and Best Practices,
endorsed by 43 countries) focuses in substantial part on the treatment of immovable (real)
property restitution: private, communal, and heirless property. The Study examined private,
communal, and heirless property as discrete components of each country’s restitution efforts
from 1944 to 2016.

The Czech Republic endorsed the Terezin Declaration in 2009 and the Guidelines and
Best Practices in 2010.
The Czech Republic is one of a handful of countries with a government office dedicated
to Jewish Diaspora or Post-Holocaust issues. As of 2015, Ambassador Antonín Hradílek
is the Czech Republic’s Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues and Combat of
Antisemitism. His predecessor was Ambassador Jiri Šitler.
As part of the European Shoah Legacy Institute’s Immovable Property Restitution Study,
a Questionnaire covering past and present restitution regimes for private, communal and
heirless property was sent to all 47 Terezin Declaration governments in 2015.
Ambassador Jiri Šitler, the former Czech Republic Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues
and Combat of Antisemitism, reviewed earlier drafts of this report and provided valuable
comments.
Date: 2017
Abstract: This study, which was produced by JPR on behalf of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, takes an in-depth statistical look at synagogue membership figures in the UK. Synagogue membership data have been gathered and analysed consistently over several decades, and constitute the best measure of Jewish communal affiliation in the UK that exists. They provide the only consistent indicator of patterns of Jewish affiliation and belonging over time, and are thus of particular interest to community leaders and planners.

The report, authored by JPR researchers Dr Donatella Casale Mashiah and Dr Jonathan Boyd, finds that despite the fact that there are now 454 synagogues in the UK – the largest number ever recorded – synagogue membership numbers have dropped below 80,000 households for the first time since records began. Indeed, there has been a 20% decline over a quarter of a century, and a 4% decline since the last such report was published in 2010.

However, the overall decline masks important developments at a denominational level. Critically, the sector that has declined most sharply is central Orthodoxy – broadly understood as the United Synagogue, the Federation and various independent modern Orthodox synagogues dotted around the country – which collectively have seen a 37% drop since 1990. This decline is partly due to disaffection, but it has also been driven considerably by natural decrease – more members dying than being born.

In contrast, membership of strictly Orthodox synagogues is growing. Indeed, it has grown dramatically over time – by 139% since 1990. A generation ago, the strictly Orthodox comprised 4.5% of all synagogue members households; today they comprise 13.5%. This growth is driven almost exclusively by demographic forces – particularly, high birth rates in this sector of the community.

Taken as a whole, Liberal, Reform and Masorti figures have been fairly stable over time. Liberal and Reform have both declined slightly since 1990, whereas Masorti has grown, albeit from a lower base. But this overall picture of stability is somewhat misleading: in reality, Liberal and Reform synagogues are both losing members at a similar rate to the central Orthodox ones, but unlike those central Orthodox ones, they are also attracting members from their religious ‘right’ to offset those losses.

Search results

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