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Date: 2017
Abstract: CIDI registreerde in 2016 109 antisemitische incidenten in Nederland, tegenover 126 in 2015. In meer Europese landen, bijvoorbeeld in Frankrijk, is een daling geconstateerd. Deze cijfers zijn echter hoger dan vóór 2014, met 171 incidenten een piekjaar in verband met de oorlog in Gaza. CIDI is verheugd over de daling, maar wijst tegelijk op de volgende twee punten: Na twee jaar is het aantal meldingen nog hoger dan in het ‘normale jaar’ 2013, toen heeft CIDI 100 incidenten geteld. Bovendien is de daling voor een groot deel toe te schrijven aan het dalen van het aantal scheld-email-berichten (van 12 in 2015 naar 7 in 2016); dit medium lijkt vervangen te worden door sociale media, waarover CIDI steeds meer meldingen ontvangt. Sociale media hebben steeds meer invloed op de publieke opinie en het maatschappelijk veld. Daarom heeft CIDI besloten met ingang van 2017 incidenten op internet die op personen gericht zijn ook mee te nemen in de Monitor Antisemitische Incidenten. Vooral het dalen van het aantal incidenten op scholen stemt positief. Helaas is het aantal incidenten rondom voetbal nog steeds hoog. (9 in 2016, 10 in 2015) en is het aantal scheldpartijen gestegen. In de categorie scheldpartijen en lastigvallen op straat heeft CIDI in 2015 24 incidenten geregistreerd, in 2016 waren het 25 incidenten. Vandalisme (21 incidenten) en fysiek geweld (3 incidenten) vormen nog steeds een probleem. Ter vergelijking: in 2015 telden we 20 vandalisme- en 5 fysiek geweld incidenten. In 2016 telde CIDI 2016 3 meldingen in de ‘traditionele’ media. In 2015 telden we geen melding in deze categorie. Het woord “Jood” wordt helaas steeds vaker als scheldwoord gebruikt. Steeds meer constateren we het gebruik hiervan bij (algemene, niet eens op Joden gerichte) scheldpartijen. CIDI vindt dit zeer verontrustend. De Joodse gemeenschap wordt nog altijd bedreigd. Inlichtingen van antiterreurorganisaties in binnen- en buitenland geven aan dat joden bovenaan de “hitlijst” staan van terroristen. Daarom verdient de beveiliging van Joodse instellingen de hoogste prioriteit. CIDI blijft wijzen op het belang van educatie vanaf jonge leeftijd, op scholen en op informele clubs zoals sportverenigingen.
Date: 2017
Abstract: Настоящая книга представляет собой второе издание (исправленное и дополненное) книги автора "20 лет Большой алии: статистический анализ перемен", вышедшей в 2013 году, которая, в свою очередь, явилась логическим продолжением предыдущей книги автора “Еврейское население бывшего СССР в ХХ веке (социально- демографический анализ)”. Если первая книга автора была посвящена развитию со- ветского еврейства в стране исхода, то нынешняя – тем изменениям, которые претер- пела еврейская русскоязычная община в Израиле, где сейчас проживает ее бóльшая часть. Наш анализ охватывает период с начала 1990-х годов до настоящего времени, и включает динамику общей численности репатриантов по республикам исхода, их расселение по городам и регионам Израиля, демографические аспекты, образование (как взрослого населения, так и детей и молодежи), владение ивритом и английским языком, компьютерную грамотность, армейскую/национальную службу. Особое внима- ние уделяется профессиональному трудоустройству репатриантов, и в частности, специалистов с высшим образованием. Рассматриваются также изменения в эконо- мическом положении репатриантов, их состояние здоровья, а также общая удовлетво- ренность жизнью в Израиле, национальное самосознание, традиции и ценности. По сравнению с предыдущим изданием, данные уточнены в соответствии с новыми ис- точниками и с учетом тенденций последних лет. Данные по репатриантам сопоставляются со всем еврейским населением Израиля, а по возможности – с еврейскими иммигрантами из бывшего СССР в США и Германии. Книга предназначена для демографов, социологов, специалистов, занятых проблема- ми интеграции репатриантов в различных сферах и всех интересующихся данной про- блемой.
Author(s): Illman, Ruth
Date: 2017
Abstract: This article focuses on religion and change in relation to music. Its starting point is the argument that music plays a central role as a driving force for religious change, as has recently been suggested by several researchers of religion. Music is seen to comprise elements that are central to contemporary religiosity in general: participation , embodiment, experience, emotions, and creativity. This article approaches the discussion from a Jewish point of view, connecting the theoretical perspective to an ethnographic case study conducted among progressive Jews in London with special focus on music, religious practice, and change. The article outlines the ongoing discussion on religion and change by focusing on features of individualism, personal choice, and processes of bricolage, critically assessing them from an inclusive point of view, focusing on individuals as simultaneously both personal and socially as well as culturally embedded agents. The analysis highlights a visible trend among the interviewees of wanting to combine a radically liberal theology with an increasingly traditional practice. In these accounts musical practices play a pivotal yet ambiguous role as instigators and insignia of religious change. As a conclusion, insights into more 'sonically aware religious studies' are suggested. We need a kind of … something that retains the tradition; that holds on to these precious traditions and rituals, the music and all the rest – but with an open mind and a much more questioning and open approach to Jewish law. In these words Rebecca 1 expresses what she strives to achieve in her work as an innovative yet historically perceptive and liturgically informed can-1 The names of the persons interviewed have been anonymised, and common Jewish names are used as aliases. See the reference list for or more detailed information about the ethnographic research material and research method.
Author(s): Wynn, Natalie
Date: 2017
Author(s): Irwin, Vera
Date: 2017
Author(s): Remennick, Larissa
Date: 2017
Abstract: This chapter offers a comparative overview of immigrant trajectories and inte-gration outcomes of Russian-Jewish youths (the so-called 1.5 generation) who immigrated to Israel and Germany with their families over the last 25 years. At the outset, I compare Israeli and German reception contexts and policies and present the generic features of the 1.5 immigrant generation. Next I overview the Israeli research findings on Russian Israeli 1.5ers – their schooling, social mobility, cultural and linguistic practices, parents’ role in their integration, and juxtapose them with (still limited) German data. 󰀀e final section presents two recent German studies of young Russian-Jewish adults and the initial findings from my own study among these immigrants living in four German cities. My interviews with 20 men and women, mostly successful professionals or entrepreneurs, indicate that their upward social mobility was facilitated by the continuous welfare support of their families, school integration programs, and low financial barriers to higher education. Despite common occupation-al and social downgrading of the parental generation in both countries, the 1.5-ers in Israel had to struggle harder to overcome their inherent immigrant disadvantage vs. native peers to access good schools and professional careers. Most young immigrants deem full assimilation in the host country’s main-stream unattainable and opt instead for a bilingual and/or bicultural strategy of integration
Date: 2017
Abstract: Quelle est la fréquence des actes antisémites violents dans l’Europe d’aujourd’hui et quelles sont les tendances observables ? Dans quelle mesure les membres de la communauté juive sont-ils exposés dans les différents pays ? Qui sont les auteurs de ces crimes ?
Il est évidemment impératif de pouvoir répondre à ces questions aussi précisément que possible si l’on veut combattre efficacement l’antisémitisme, et en particulier l’antisémitisme violent.
Le travail présenté dans cette note tente d’établir une première comparaison des niveaux de violence antisémite dans différents pays en combinant les données relatives aux incidents fondées sur les rapports de police avec les résultats d’une enquête sur l’antisémitisme réalisée en 2012 par l’Agence des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne (FRA). Un échantillon de sept pays (Allemagne, Danemark, France, Royaume-Uni, Norvège, Suède et Russie) permet d’esquisser des analyses mais c’est surtout sur la base des données de quatre pays du panel (France, Royaume-Uni, Allemagne et Suède) que l’étude comparative a été rendue possible. C’est en France que l’exposition des Juifs à la violence antisémite semble la plus forte.
Concernant les auteurs d’actes antisémites violents, les données disponibles montrent, en Europe de l’Ouest, la prédominance de personnes de culture musulmane, alors qu’en Russie le profil qui prévaut est celui de militants d’extrême droite.
Les résultats présentés ici constituent une première contribution à une évaluation rigoureuse de l’antisémitisme violent dans les pays européens. Ce travail appelle à la construction d’indicateurs communs. La définition d’une mesure précise de l’antisémitisme est l’outil indispensable d’une lutte efficace contre ce redoutable préjugé, capable d’engendrer des comportements violents, y compris meurtriers.
Author(s): Staetsky, L. Daniel
Date: 2017
Abstract: This study takes an in-depth look at attitudes towards Jews and Israel among the population of Great Britain, both across society as a whole, and in key subgroups within the population, notably the far-left, the far-right, Christians and Muslims.

It introduces the concept of the ‘elastic view’ of antisemitism, arguing that as antisemitism is an attitude, it exists at different scales and levels of intensity. Thus no single figure can capture the level of antisemitism in society, and all figures need to be carefully explained and understood.

It finds that only a small proportion of British adults can be categorised as ‘hard-core’ antisemites – approximately 2% – yet antisemitic ideas can be found at varying degrees of intensity across 30% of British society. Whilst this categorically does not mean that 30% of the British population is antisemitic, it does demonstrate the outer boundary of the extent to which antisemitic ideas live and breathe in British society. As such, it goes some way towards explaining why British Jews appear to be so concerned about antisemitism, as the likelihood of them encountering an antisemitic idea is much higher than that suggested by simple measures of antisemitic individuals. In this way, the research draws an important distinction between ‘counting antisemites’ and ‘measuring antisemitism’ – the counts for each are very different from one another, and have important implications for how one tackles antisemitism going forward.

The research finds that levels of anti-Israelism are considerably higher than levels of anti-Jewish feeling, and that the two attitudes exist both independently of one another and separately. However, the research also demonstrates that the greater the intensity of anti-Israel attitude, the more likely it is to be accompanied by antisemitic attitudes as well.

Looking at subgroups within the population, the report finds that levels of antisemitism and anti-Israelism among Christians are no different from those found across society as a whole, but among Muslims they are considerably higher on both counts. On the political spectrum, levels of antisemitism are found to be highest among the far-right, and levels of anti-Israelism are heightened across all parts of the left-wing, but particularly on the far-left. In all cases, the higher the level of anti-Israelism, the more likely it is to be accompanied by antisemitism. Yet, importantly, most of the antisemitism found in British society exists outside of these three groups – the far-left, far-right and Muslims; even at its most heightened levels of intensity, only about 15% of it can be accounted for by them.
Date: 2017
Abstract: How often do incidents of antisemitic violence occur in contemporary Europe, and what trends are
showing? How exposed are Jewish populations in different countries? Who commits these crimes? We
need to answer such questions as precisely as possible in order to effectively combat and prevent
antisemitism in general and violent antisemitism in particular, but we lack the knowledge to do so because
systematic studies of the subject are few and far between. As a step towards filling this research gap, the
current report presents some tentative findings about violent antisemitism in a sample of European
countries and proposes directions for further research.

Combining incident data based on police reporting with a 2012 survey on antisemitism carried out by
the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), this report tentatively compares the levels of
antisemitic violence in different countries. The seven-country sample contains comparable data for France,
UK, Germany and Sweden only. Among these countries, Jews’ exposure to antisemitic violence appears to
have been highest in France, lower in Sweden and Germany, and lowest in the United Kingdom.
Figures for Norway, Denmark and Russia are not directly comparable because of differing data
sources. However, Russia clearly stands out with a very low number of incidents considering Russia’s
relatively large Jewish population. Russia is also the only case in which there is little to indicate that Jews
avoid displaying their identity in public.

Available data on perpetrators suggest that individuals of Muslim background stand out among
perpetrators of antisemitic violence in Western Europe, but not in Russia, where right-wing extremist
offenders dominate. Attitude surveys corroborate this picture in so far as antisemitic attitudes are far more
widespread among Muslims than among the general population in Western Europe.
The findings presented here are tentative. More and better data as well as more research are needed in
order to form a more accurate picture of the nature and causes of antisemitic violence, a prerequisite for
determining relevant countermeasures.
Date: 2017
Abstract: Hvor ofte forekommer antisemittiske voldshendelser i dagens Europa, og hvilken vei går utviklingen?
Hvor utsatt er de jødiske befolkningene i ulike land? Og hvem står bak ugjerningene? Effektiv forebygging
og bekjempelse er avhengig av at slike spørsmål besvares så presist som mulig, men vi mangler den
nødvendige kunnskapen ettersom svært lite forskning er gjort på feltet. Denne rapporten presenterer noen
tentative funn om voldelig antisemittisme i et utvalg europeiske land og foreslår retninger for videre
forskning.

Ved å bruke hendelsestall basert på anmeldelser i kombinasjon med EUs Fundamental Rights Agency
(FRA) sin spørreundersøkelse om antisemittisme fra 2012, er det mulig å foreta en begrenset og tentativ
sammenlikning av det antisemittiske voldsnivået på tvers av land. I denne rapportens utvalg foreligger
sammenliknbare data kun for Frankrike, Storbritannia, Tyskland og Sverige. Jøders utsatthet for
antisemittisk vold synes å være høyest i Frankrike, mindre i Sverige og Tyskland, og lavest i Storbritannia.
Tall for Norge, Danmark og Russland er ikke sammenliknbare på grunn av mangelfulle data. Vi har
telt 10 hendelser i Norge, 20 i Danmark og 33 i Russland for perioden 2005-2015. Nivået i Russland er
tilsynelatende svært lavt i forhold til vesteuropeiske land og gitt Russlands relativt store jødiske minoritet.
Russland er også det eneste landet der vi ikke har funnet indikasjoner på at jøder unngår å vise sin identitet
offentlig.

Tilgjengelige data tyder på at personer med bakgrunn fra muslimske land skiller seg ut blant dem som
begår antisemittiske voldshandlinger i Vest-Europa, men ikke i Russland, der høyreekstreme aktører
dominerer. Holdningsundersøkelser bygger opp under dette bildet for så vidt som antisemittiske
holdninger er betydelig mer utbredt blant muslimer enn befolkningen generelt i vesteuropeiske land.
Denne rapportens funn er tentative og ment som et oppspill til videre forskning. Bedre data og flere
systematiske studier er nødvendig for å danne et mer presist bilde av fenomenet og dets årsaker, hvilket
igjen er en forutsetning for å kunne bestemme relevante mottiltak.
Date: 2017
Abstract: The Holocaust (Shoah) Immovable Property Restitution Study is the first-ever comprehensive
compilation of all significant legislation passed since 1945 by the 47 states that participated in
the 2009 Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference and endorsed the 2009 Terezin Declaration
that came out of the Prague conference.

The Terezin Declaration (and its companion document, the 2010 Guidelines and Best Practices,
endorsed by 43 countries) focuses in substantial part on the treatment of immovable (real)
property restitution: private, communal, and heirless property. The Study examined private,
communal, and heirless property as discrete components of each country’s restitution efforts
from 1944 to 2016.

Russia endorsed the Terezin Declaration in 2009, but declined to endorse the 2010
Guidelines and Best Practices. In 2012, the Russian Foreign Ministry stated that “the
[Terezin] declaration does not contain principles that are essential to our country. We
consider it important to deal with these issues on the basis of post-war settlement
principles fixed in the Yalta and Potsdam conferences of the Allied powers. We would
like to emphasize that it’s necessary to regard the Holocaust era as fixed in the
declaration, which means from 1933-1945.”

As part of the European Shoah Legacy Institute’s Immovable Property Restitution Study,
a Questionnaire covering past and present restitution regimes for private, communal and
heirless property was sent to all 47 Terezin Declaration governments in 2015. As of 13
December 2016, no response from Russia has been received
Date: 2017
Abstract: The Holocaust (Shoah) Immovable Property Restitution Study is the first-ever comprehensive
compilation of all significant legislation passed since 1945 by the 47 states that participated in
the 2009 Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference and endorsed the 2009 Terezin Declaration
that came out of the Prague conference.

The Terezin Declaration (and its companion document, the 2010 Guidelines and Best Practices,
endorsed by 43 countries) focuses in substantial part on the treatment of immovable (real)
property restitution: private, communal, and heirless property. The Study examined private,
communal, and heirless property as discrete components of each country’s restitution efforts
from 1944 to 2016.

Poland endorsed the Terezin Declaration in 2009. In 2010, 43 of the countries that
endorsed the Terezin Declaration approved nonbinding Guidelines and Best Practices for
the Restitution and Compensation of Immovable (Real) Property Confiscated or
Otherwise Wrongfully Seized by the Nazi, Fascists and Their Collaborators during the
Holocaust (Shoah) Era between 1933-1945, Including the Period of World War II
(“Terezin Best Practices”). Poland initially agreed to the Terezin Best Practices but then
withdrew its support.

Poland is one of a handful of countries with a government office dedicated to Jewish
Diaspora and post-Holocaust issues. As of March 2016, Mr. Sebastian Rejak holds the
post of Special Envoy of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs for Relations with the
Jewish Diaspora.

As part of the European Shoah Legacy Institute’s Immovable Property Restitution Study,
a Questionnaire covering past and present restitution regimes for private, communal and
heirless property was sent to all 47 Terezin Declaration governments in 2015. As of 13
December 2016, no response from Poland has been received.

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