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3 **The Impact of Communal Intervention Programs**
4 **on Jewish Identity: An Analysis of Jewish Students**
5 **in Britain**

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9 **Abstract** During the 1990s, Jewish communal leaders in Britain reached a con-
10 sensus that Jewish education, in the broadest sense, was the principal means of
11 strengthening Jewish identity and securing Jewish continuity. This belief motivated
12 considerable investment in communal intervention programs such as Jewish schools,
13 Israel experience trips, and youth movements. Twenty years on, it is pertinent to ask
14 whether, and to what extent, this intervention has worked. The Institute for Jewish
15 Policy Research's (JPR) 2011 National Jewish Student Survey contains data on over
16 900 Jewish students in Britain and presents an opportunity to empirically assess the
17 impact such intervention programs may have had on respondents' Jewish identity by
18 comparing those who have experienced them with those who have not. Regression
19 analysis is used to test the theory based on a set of six dimensions of Jewish identity
20 generated using principal component analysis. The results show that after controlling
21 for the substantial effects of Jewish upbringing, intervention has collectively had a
22 positive impact on all aspects of Jewish identity examined. The effects are greatest on
23 behavioral and mental aspects of socio-religious identity; they are far weaker at
24 strengthening student community engagement, ethnocentricity, and Jewish values.
25 Further, the most important intervention programs were found to be yeshiva and a gap
26 year in Israel. Both youth movement involvement and Jewish schooling had positive
27 but rather limited effects on Jewish identity, and short-stay Israel tours had no positive
28 measurable effects at all.
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33 **Introduction: The Theory and Practice of Communal Intervention**

34 In their book, *Turbulent Times*, Keith Kahn-Harris and Ben Gidley argued that “By the
 35 1990s a firm consensus had been established among [Britain’s] communal leaders that
 36 Jewish day schools were essential to Jewish continuity” (2010, p. 104). The empirical
 37 evidence on which this ‘consensus’ was based is perhaps less important than the fact
 38 that it stands in complete contrast to the motivation of Jewish communal leaders just a
 39 few generations earlier—in spite of their promoting the same policy. As Lipman (1990,
 40 pp. 29–30) notes, the opening of Jewish schools in mid-19th century England was
 41 motivated by the desire to raise the “intellectual character” of the Jewish poor and
 42 “anglicise the children of immigrants” as much as it was a wish to provide them with
 43 “Jewish instruction.” While intervention programming—which in the present paper
 44 refers to any educational initiative undertaken on a community-wide scale—is clearly
 45 not new, the *motivation* for doing so certainly is. Today’s desire to ensure “Jewish
 46 continuity,” which has pervaded British communal thinking since the early 1990s,
 47 now lies behind many, if not most, forms of intervention programming in Britain, from
 48 Israel programs to youth movements.

49 Thus, the key difference between contemporary interventions and those of the
 50 past, apart from the sheer scale of some programs (for example, Birthright Israel
 51 (Saxe et al. 2002, 2011)), is the strategic and ideological foundations upon which
 52 they are based, namely, the desire to avert Jewish intermarriage and ensure ‘Jewish
 53 continuity’ (Kahn-Harris and Gidley 2010). Clearly, such programs are premised, as
 54 they must have been in the past, on the theory that intervention works. In other
 55 words, that sending Jewish children to Jewish youth groups, Jewish schools, on
 56 organized trips to Israel, and so on results in a strengthening of the participant’s
 57 Jewish identity. The Institute for Jewish Policy Research’s (JPR) 2011 dataset of
 58 over 900 Jewish students in Britain presents a unique opportunity to test this theory
 59 to determine whether, and to what extent, communal intervention over the last two
 60 decades may have influenced Jewish identity, and further, which particular
 61 interventions are most impactful and which are not hitting the mark.

62 By the early 1990s, most demographic indicators showed that Britain’s Jewish
 63 population was in a state of atrophy. Since the 1950s it had contracted by over 25%, it
 64 was aging and the number of Jewish marriages was “about half of that expected if
 65 every Jew married another Jew in a synagogue” (Waterman and Kosmin 1986, p. 8).
 66 Further, there was a notable shift away from ‘central Orthodoxy’ at a time when the
 67 Haredi population was still a negligible proportion of the whole (Schmool and Cohen
 68 1998). It was against this backdrop that Britain’s Jewish community began to devote
 69 considerable energy to addressing the issue of Jewish survival, and in which Britain’s
 70 then new Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks issued his call-to-arms entitled, *Will we have
 71 Jewish grandchildren?*, first published in 1994 (Sacks 1995). In it he describes a
 72 ‘crisis’ of continuity, arguing that research showed Jewish identity was ‘dying’ (Ibid.,
 73 p. 26). His message was clear; the Jewish community needed a ‘strategy for renewal’

74 and his suggested solution was Jewish education: “*the fate of the Jews in the diaspora*
 75 *was, is and predictably will be, determined by their commitment to education*” (Ibid.,
 76 p. 47, italics in original). Sacks was by no means the first leader in Britain to argue that
 77 Jewish education was essential for the survival of the Jewish people (his predecessor
 78 Immanuel Jakobovits had been arguing as much since the 1970s (see Valins et al. 2001,
 79 pp. 10–12) but an interesting and concrete outcome of this clarion call arose in the form
 80 of an organization called *Jewish Continuity* which had a substantial impact on the way
 81 Britain’s Jewish community viewed communal intervention. This was because its later
 82 incarnation,¹ the UJIA (United Jewish Israel Appeal), an organization which was also
 83 committed to the renewal of Jewish life in Britain through education, became a vital
 84 conduit through which much of the community’s fund-raising and intervention efforts
 85 promoting Jewish continuity were henceforth channeled (Ibid., pp. 83–89).²

86 Kahn-Harris and Gidley (2010) note that although the principles behind what
 87 became known as the ‘continuity agenda’ were rarely articulated, they could be
 88 summarized as follows:

89 The principal means of ensuring the renewal of the Jewish community was
 90 Jewish education. There is no consensus as to what Jewish education is or
 91 what its goals should be. There is a consensus that education is broader than
 92 simply schooling, although Jewish schooling is an important area to develop.
 93 (Ibid., p. 95)

94 The UJIA operationalized this agenda by seeking out “areas and modes of
 95 intervention—educational leadership, educational tours of Israel, informal educa-
 96 tion, research and development—in which the resources of the organization could
 97 produce the most far-reaching changes in the wider Jewish community” (Ibid.,
 98 p. 89). A key outcome of such ‘renewal in action’ was a significant expansion of
 99 Jewish schooling in the 1990s (Ibid., p. 103). And while Sacks’s message was no
 100 doubt important, so too were changing political attitudes in Britain toward ‘faith
 101 schooling’ in general. By increasing the public contribution to faith-selective
 102 schools, Tony Blair’s New Labour government hoped to encourage the expansion of
 103 what it saw as a highly successful sector as measured by exam results (Hart et al.
 104 2007, pp. 147-8; Valins et al. 2001, p. 10). Indeed, although the number of pupils in
 105 Jewish schools had been increasing since the 1950s (Braude 1981, p. 125), it was
 106 not until the 1990s that a concerted communal effort was made to substantially
 107 increase the number and proportion of Jewish children entering Jewish schools.

108 In purely numerical terms the results were impressive: between 1992 and 2005
 109 the number of Jewish pupils in Jewish schools increased by over 70% from 14,330
 110 to 24,650³ (Hart et al. 2007, p. 142 Fig. 1; JLC 2008, p. 7 Fig. 1; see also Valins

1FL01 ¹ *Jewish Continuity*, the organization, was ultimately “a hostage to fortune” (Kahn-Harris and Gidley
 1FL02 2010, p. 72), being absorbed in 1997 into the Zionist fund-raising body JIA (Joint Israel Appeal) thus
 1FL03 creating UJIA. This new organization took on both roles, i.e., fund-raising for Israel as well as addressing
 1FL04 the renewal agenda work initiated by *Jewish Continuity*.

2FL01 ² Data for 2011 show that UJIA was the second largest British Jewish charity by voluntary income (after
 2FL02 Jewish Care). Source: Charities Aid Foundation (<http://www.charitytrends.org/Default.aspx>).

3FL01 ³ By 2005 about half of these came from the strictly Orthodox community which has exhibited very
 3FL02 strong demographic growth since the early 1990s, and where it is assumed that the demand for Jewish



111 et al. 2001, p. 3). For policy makers and funders the motivation for this expansion
 112 was clear. As Valins (2003, p. 246) has argued, in Britain “the discourse
 113 surrounding the need to prevent inter-marriage through educational initiatives is
 114 extremely powerful, and pervades the viewpoints of all of the [synagogue]
 115 movements providing Jewish faith-based schooling” (see similarly Hart et al. 2007,
 116 p. 150; Kahn-Harris and Gidley 2010, p. 104). For parents, however, the impetus
 117 was more complex though the intermarriage discourse certainly figured high up in
 118 decision making processes. As Valins et al. (2001, p. 128) state, “there is no simple
 119 hierarchy of parental wants and requirements” when choosing schools. They found
 120 that academic standards and ‘ethos’ (incorporating social, cultural, and religious
 121 factors) work alongside each other in the decision making process as well as
 122 practical considerations and word-of-mouth reputation (Ibid., pp. 127–140).

123 But one key distinctive feature of the British school system, which has
 124 undoubtedly buttressed its growth, is the fact that beyond a modest and above all,
 125 voluntary, contribution requested of parents toward Jewish Studies classes, top
 126 Jewish schools are ‘voluntary-aided,’ i.e., they are funded by the government and
 127 are effectively free⁴ (Ibid., p. 26).

128 The communal assumption underlying this growth was of course that Jewish
 129 schooling strengthens Jewish identity. Certainly some American research had
 130 suggested this was the case. Sacks (1995, p. 47) himself cited Fishman and
 131 Goldstein’s (1993) study of the 1990 NJPS data indicating that “Jewish education is
 132 one of the most effective tools for producing Jewishly identified adults” (Ibid.,
 133 pp. 2, 12). More recently Chertok et al. (2007, p. 41) examined data on over 3,000
 134 Jewish undergraduates in the United States and concluded that with respect to
 135 “Jewish identity, Jewish ritual observance, [and] participation in Jewish campus
 136 life... undergraduates with a history of day school attendance stand out. In terms of
 137 most aspects of Jewish campus life and ritual observance, former day school
 138 attendees from Orthodox homes are far and away the most involved.”

139 Unfortunately, Chertok et al.’s study was unable to “separate the influence of
 140 attitudes and behaviors of families who select day schools from the impact of day
 141 schools themselves...” (Ibid.). And as Short (2005, p. 256) has argued, demonstrating
 142 that Jewish schooling has a measurable impact on Jewish identity requires controls to be
 143 put in place for other potential identity predictors, such as family background. The
 144 problem is simple: religious parents are more likely than secular parents to send their
 145 children to Jewish schools, so it is hardly surprising that children in Jewish schools are

3FL03
 3FL04 Footnote 3 continued

3FL05 schooling is universal (Graham 2013; JLC 2008, p. 7; Vulkan and Graham 2008). The proportion of
 3FL06 children entering the Jewish school system also increased significantly but that is difficult to quantify
 3FL07 accurately.

4FL01 ⁴ In Britain, schools are funded in various and complex ways, but Jewish schools tend either to be
 4FL02 privately funded (independent schools) or publically funded (state schools). Virtually all strictly Orthodox
 4FL03 schools operate in the private sector where there is far greater flexibility with the syllabus, whereas most
 4FL04 central Orthodox/Conservative and progressive schools operate in the public sector as *voluntary aided*
 4FL05 schools. That is to say, the land and buildings are usually owned by a charitable foundation (the governing
 4FL06 body) which is responsible for 10% of ‘capital works,’ employs the school’s staff and has primary
 4FL07 responsibility for admission criteria; the remaining 90% is provided by the state (DfE 2012; Valins et al.
 4FL08 2001, p. 18).



146 more religious than those who are not (assuming Jewish identity is defined religiously).
 147 Nevertheless, other studies have controlled for family background and some have
 148 indeed noted a measurable effect. For example, Kalmijn et al. (2006) found that in
 149 Holland “people who went to a Jewish school when they were young are more likely to
 150 marry endogamously than other Jewish persons, even if we take into account that they
 151 are more strongly socialized into a ethno-religious identity than persons who did not
 152 attend a Jewish school” (Ibid., p. 1356).

153 However, lessons from other studies on the measurable impact of Jewish schooling
 154 are ambiguous. For example, Dashefsky and Lebson (2002, p. 120) assessed over 100
 155 (US and Canadian) papers on this topic and concluded: “In all of the research studies
 156 reviewed, there was no firm evidence of a direct causal relationship between formal
 157 Jewish schooling (K-12) and the various measures of dimensions of adult Jewish
 158 identity.” Outside the United States, a similar conclusion has been drawn over many
 159 years. For example, John Goldlust (1970, pp. 49, 59) analyzed data from a 1968
 160 Melbourne study and concluded that “one important finding running contrary to
 161 hypothesized expectations is that Jewish education, considered independently of other
 162 variables, appears to have little generalized effect on Jewish identification.” Similarly,
 163 Gerald Cromer (1974, p. 167), working on British data, reached similar conclusions:
 164 “the limited evidence available on the effect of Jewish education in England suggests
 165 that it has no influence on attitudes towards intermarriage and may even have a negative
 166 one on attitudes towards religious observance.” More recently, Miller et al. (1996, p. 12)
 167 have argued that Jewish education has a rather “insignificant role” and that parental
 168 religiosity and “home background” have a far greater influence on marriage outcomes
 169 (see also Miller 1988, 2003). Similar conclusions were reached by the author examining
 170 Australian data from 2008 (Graham 2012). And even Kalmijn et al.’s (2006) Dutch
 171 study accepted that “family of origin plays a crucial role in fostering [Jewish] ethnic
 172 endogamy” (Ibid., p. 1356).

173 Organized trips to Israel constitute another area in which the British Jewish
 174 community has intervened with Jewish continuity in mind. Like Jewish schooling, such
 175 trips are not new, having been around since at least the 1950s (Kelner 2010, pp. 31–32),
 176 but Israel experience programs—known colloquially in Britain as ‘tours’—had
 177 formerly been viewed as vehicles for promoting Israel and aliyah, but became
 178 increasingly conceptualized as mechanisms for strengthening Jewish identity. Again,
 179 Jonathan Sacks was an early proponent of this radical view when he argued that “Israel
 180 is Jewry’s supreme educational environment [...]. It is impossible to overestimate the
 181 impact of Israel on the formation of Jewish identity” (Sacks 1995, p. 98). And the
 182 significance of conceptualizing an Israel experience in this way is no better exemplified
 183 than by the massive Taglit-Birthright Israel program, created in December 1999, in part
 184 a response to heightened concerns about Jewish Diasporic survival following the
 185 findings of high intermarriage rates in the 1990 NJPS data.⁵ Birthright Israel, a large-
 186 scale ‘experiment,’ was “conceived with the hope that engagement with Israel would
 187 strengthen Jewish identities and counter the threat to Jewish continuity posed by
 188 assimilation and intermarriage” (Saxe et al. 2002, p. ix).

5FL01 ⁵ NJPS data suggested that the US intermarriage rate was 52% for those marrying between 1985 and
 5FL02 1989 (Kosmin et al. 1991, p. 14).



189 A theoretical basis for this approach had been articulated by Barry Chazan (1997,
 190 p. 16) who argued that Israel experience “contributes to the formation of positive Jewish
 191 attitudes and behaviors.” Chazan said that “[s]everal decades of impact research on
 192 Israel trips indicate that there is some connection between more intense levels of adult
 193 Jewish identity and involvement and having been to Israel as a teen” (Ibid., p. 16). While
 194 acknowledging that Israel experience programs are not a substitute for “intensive
 195 synagogue life” and “high-quality Jewish schooling,” he nevertheless argued that an
 196 Israel experience is a “valuable partner and complement to these institutions” (Ibid.). In
 197 a separate study of Israel experience programs, Shaul Kelner (2010) notes that
 198 “[a]lthough pro-Zionist in character, most of today’s educational tours of Israel are used
 199 by their sponsors and participants to construct Diasporic identities, not Israeli ones”
 200 (Ibid., p. 31). Thus Kelner suggests that in the United States, the focus of such trips is “to
 201 strengthen participants’ Jewish identities” (Ibid., pp. 33–34) and as such “Taglit
 202 [Birthright Israel] was seen by its sponsors as a strategic investment in the Jewish
 203 future” (Ibid., p. 45).

204 Research on Birthright has suggested that the program—a free “intense 10-day
 205 educational experience” which since 1999 has attracted about 300,000 participants
 206 aged 18–26 years worldwide (Saxe et al. 2012, p. 5)—impacts positively on certain
 207 aspects of Jewish identity.⁶ For example, it has “effects on participants’ feelings of
 208 connection to Israel and the Jewish people, and on their views regarding the
 209 importance of marrying a Jewish person and raising children as Jews.” However, Saxe
 210 et al. also note that the program has “little or no observable influence on participants’
 211 religious observance, communal involvement, and on their feelings of connection to
 212 Jewish customs and traditions and to their local Jewish community” (Saxe et al.
 213 2009a, p. 3).

214 Although Kelner (2010, p. 45) suggests that for European communities, there is a
 215 greater focus on aliyah through Israel programs, the idea of an Israel experience being
 216 used as a mechanism to enrich Jewish identity is by no means lost on British policy
 217 makers. In Britain, most teenagers’ Israel experience programs are subsidized and
 218 coordinated by the UJIA which, as noted, views such intervention as part of a ‘renewal
 219 agenda,’ the policy for achieving Jewish continuity through education (Kahn-Harris
 220 and Gidley 2010, p. 90). UJIA data show that between 1993 and 2009 a total of 18,117
 221 high school teenagers in Britain went on a short-stay trip or ‘tour’ to Israel. With the
 222 exception of a significant dip around 2002 (a result of safety concerns relating to the
 223 Second Intifada), between 40% and 50% of all non-Haredi Jewish 16-year-olds (or
 224 1,100 people) in Britain have attended these programs annually.⁷

6FL01 ⁶ It should be noted that although the Taglit (Birthright Israel) sample is very large, it does not contain a
 6FL02 fully independent control group; as Saxe et al. (2009a, p. 41 fn2) note, “The pool of applicants does not
 6FL03 perfectly mirror the total population of American Jewish young adults. Accordingly, the findings of
 6FL04 previous studies, as well as the current study, do not indicate how the program might have affected those
 6FL05 who could have applied but did not.” In other words, there may be justification for querying the results’
 6FL06 external validity.

7FL01 ⁷ Calculations based on adjusted 2011 census data and assuming Haredim then made up between 15%
 7FL02 and 25% of the cohort size (Haredim not being part of the target group for these programs). Tour and gap
 7FL03 year data courtesy of Helena Miller, UJIA.

225 In addition to Jewish schooling and Israel experience programs, youth movement
 226 work is another important area in which Britain's Jewish community has chosen to
 227 intervene in support of a 'continuity' agenda. The UJIA is again highly influential
 228 here, and as Kahn-Harris and Gidley (2010, p. 90) note, it has made "systematic
 229 efforts to intervene in the *content* of Jewish youth work, [which] gave it
 230 considerable influence on practices that touched the lives of thousands of Jewish
 231 young people every year." The organization was especially influential in the field of
 232 'informal education' (a term commonly used to describe the world of Jewish youth
 233 organizations (Kahn-Harris and Gidley 2010, p. 90 citing Rose 2005)) where the
 234 "emphasis was as much on developing the Jewish identities of their Jewish
 235 members as it was on *aliyah*" (Ibid., pp. 90–91). Other British communal
 236 interventions include the supplementary Jewish classes known as *cheder* which have
 237 generally been run by synagogues. However, this form of intervention has lost
 238 currency in recent years due in part to parents' negative perceptions of the quality of
 239 the Jewish education this voluntary system has been able to impart, as well as the
 240 increased emphasis on day school education (Hart et al. 2007, p. 149; Miller 2001,
 241 p. 507). Nevertheless, 70% of NJSS respondents reported having experienced this
 242 form of communal intervention (Graham and Boyd 2011, p. 15).

243 Given these and other forms of communal intervention, which have evolved
 244 within a 'Jewish continuity' narrative, it is pertinent to ask what, if any, empirical
 245 evidence exists indicating the impact these programs may have had on the Jewish
 246 identity of their participants. Although 'Jewish education' is an ill-defined concept
 247 and many factors contribute to the formation of Jewish identity, itself an ill-defined
 248 concept, JPR's 2011 National Jewish Student Survey (NJSS) sample offers a unique
 249 opportunity to assess the impact of communal intervention programming which has
 250 taken place for over two decades in Britain. Members of this sample are, for the first
 251 time in their lives, beginning to explore their identity independently of their parents
 252 and other family members and make decisions about how they do, and do not, wish
 253 to live Jewishly. The survey contains data on 925 Jewish students in Britain with a
 254 median age of 21 years (Graham and Boyd 2011). Given the difficulties associated
 255 with sampling large numbers of young adults in national studies generally,⁸ these
 256 data are all the more valuable.

257 Graham and Boyd (2011, pp. 63–67) estimated Britain's undergraduate Jewish
 258 student population (the main target for the survey) to be under 10,000, suggesting a
 259 sample proportion in the region of 11% to 14%.⁹ However, given that no
 260 comprehensive database on Jewish students exists and the tiny proportion they make
 261 up out of the total British student population (less than 1%), it was not possible to
 262 carry out true probability sampling. Even so, by using census data and other sources,
 263 the authors concluded that "the sample is reasonably representative in terms of the

8FL01 ⁸ For example, JPR's 1995 national political attitudes study contained 111 respondents under 25 years of
 8FL02 age (Miller et al. 1996) and JPR's household surveys in London and Leeds contained just 62 respondents
 8FL03 combined in this age group (Becher et al. 2002; Waterman 2003). Author's calculations.

9FL01 ⁹ Around 20% of Jewish 18 to 22-year-olds in Britain are Haredi (Graham 2013, p. 8) but the majority of
 9FL02 this group does not enter the secular higher educational system. Moreover, Haredim are a separate case as
 9FL03 far as intervention is concerned since they are universally educated in private, Haredi-controlled schools
 9FL04 and experience an intense Jewish upbringing (Holman and Holman 2001).



264 students' Jewish denominational background, but that their current levels of Jewish
 265 engagement are probably higher than is the case for Jewish students as a whole"
 266 (Ibid., p. 66). For similar reasons, it was not possible to weight these data and the
 267 analysis below is based on raw NJSS data.

268 To summarize, Britain's Jewish community has come to believe that intervention
 269 programming in Jewish educational arenas (such as Jewish schooling, trips to Israel,
 270 and youth movement work) can be used to strengthen Jewish identity. It has
 271 therefore chosen to invest in such programs in order to ensure Jewish continuity in
 272 Britain. This paper aims to test this hypothesis using JPR's NJSS dataset and the
 273 first step in this analysis is to define, in more precise terms, what exactly is meant by
 274 'Jewish identity' in order to provide a framework within which it can be robustly
 275 measured.

276 **Measuring Jewish Identity—A Multivariate Analysis of Jewish Students**

277 Like all social identities, Jewish identity has many aspects which vary from person
 278 to person and may change throughout an individual's lifetime. Much has been
 279 written about this multifaceted nature (Anderson 1991; Cohen and Eisen 2000;
 280 Cohen and Kahn-Harris 2004; Gitelman et al. 2003; Horowitz 2003; Lazar et al.
 281 2002; Miller 1994, 1998, 2003). For example, Hartman and Hartman (1999,
 282 pp. 280–281) have argued that while Jewish identity may be grounded in religious
 283 practice, it is also about feelings of ethnicity and Jewishness 'inside.' As they note:

284 Being Jewish is not just a religious affiliation: it is more (and sometimes other)
 285 than believing in or performing Jewish rituals or having a set of religious
 286 beliefs. It also involves an ethnic dimension—a sense of belonging and
 287 affiliation with the Jewish people (or nation), feeling a sense of 'we'-ness with
 288 other Jews, sometimes manifest by formal or informal association, and a
 289 differentiation from non-Jews...

290 The need to assess Jewish identity has led to the development of a plethora of
 291 quantitative measures. One of the most commonly used in Britain is denominational
 292 alignment (Becher et al. 2002; Miller et al. 1996; Miller 2003; Schmool and Cohen
 293 1998). This schema broadly maps the denominational makeup of Britain's Jewish
 294 community based on reported levels of Jewish *religious practice*. In the NJSS
 295 sample, most respondents (90%) aligned themselves with one of four denomina-
 296 tional strands: 'Orthodox,' 'Traditional,' 'Reform,' and 'Just Jewish.'¹⁰ The
 297 measure's simplicity is one of its main advantages since it provides a more
 298 manageable set of identity groups that functionally map onto patterns of Jewish
 299 behavior, particularly religious behavior, and is not beholden to synagogue
 300 membership. But this simplicity can also be misleading, especially when applied

10FL01 ¹⁰ The question posed was: 'Which of the following comes closest to describing your current Jewish
 10FL02 identity?' with the following responses: Haredi (strictly-Orthodox) (3%); Orthodox (e.g., would not turn
 10FL03 on a light on Sabbath) (23%); Traditional (28%); Just Jewish (21%); Reform/Progressive (18%); Mixed –
 10FL04 I am both Jewish and another religion (2%); and None (5%) (N=925). The precise labeling of these
 10FL05 categories tends to vary from survey to survey.

301 to non-ritualistic aspects of Jewish identity. Therefore, a measure is required which
302 comfortably incorporates the broader notions of Jewish identity being practiced.

303 A common approach to achieve this is factor analysis, which can be used to
304 examine a wide range of identity indicators to assess significant correlations
305 between any particular pairings: for example, whether synagogue attendance is
306 more strongly related to having many Jewish friends than it is to keeping kosher.
307 Moreover, factor analysis can provide some insight into the possibility of there
308 being underlying 'dimensions' of Jewish identity hidden within the data (Field
309 2011; Hartman and Hartman 1996; Miller 1998). The NJSS sample contains 36
310 individual measures of Jewish identity.¹¹ A Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
311 was carried out which produced seven components of Jewish student identity,
312 explaining 58.4% of the total variance in the sample. The results are shown in
313 Table 1 with the largest factor loadings (>.50) highlighted.

314 While PCA is a statistically robust technique, the components or dimensions of
315 Jewish identity that it reveals are only as valid as the variables originally entered
316 into the analysis, i.e., there may be other aspects of Jewish identity that were not
317 included in the original set of variables and will therefore be missing from this
318 representation. Further, though the dimensions are real in statistical terms, their
319 interpretation, and subsequent labeling, is to a certain extent, subjective.

320 The Cronbach α values at the bottom of Table 1 indicate the statistical reliability
321 of each of the seven dimensions derived by the PCA. Values of .8 and above are
322 ideal, but it is generally accepted that where diverse constructs (such as identity) are
323 being examined values of around .7 are acceptable (Field 2011, p. 675).¹² Therefore,
324 dimension seven with an α value of .42 must be rejected as it is clearly below this
325 threshold and will not be included in the remainder of the analysis. This leaves six
326 dependent variables or dimensions of student Jewish identity.

327 Interpreting the Dimensions of Student Jewish Identity

328 Dimension 1 – Cognitive Religiosity

329 The highest loading variables on the first dimension relate to different aspects of
330 mental Jewish religiosity. In particular, it includes measures of attitudes towards
331 prayer, Sabbath observance, and belief in God as well as measures of religious self-
332 perception. This dimension focuses on cognitive, rather than behavioral, aspects of
333 Jewish religiosity.

11FL01 ¹¹ Twenty of these were based on four-point Likert scale responses (Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree,
11FL02 Strongly disagree). A further eight were based on Yes/No responses and the remaining eight had scales
11FL03 consisting of between three and five response options (such as level of youth movement involvement
11FL04 being None, Occasional, Regular, or Leader).

12FL01 ¹² While dimension three at $\alpha = .66$ is slightly below the .7 threshold, further analysis indicated that the
12FL02 removal of the item 'Whether currently connected, in any way, with other (Jewish student) organizations'
12FL03 would raise alpha from .66 to .68. The author considered this a modest gain at the expense of an important
12FL04 variable in this dimension which approaches, though does not achieve, the .7 threshold. It is therefore
12FL05 included in the remainder of the analysis.



Table 1 Rotated Component Matrix* – factor loadings produced by the principal component analysis (PCA)

Variables	Dimensions						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Feel that being Jewish is about prayer	.76	.21	.09	.18	.16	.19	.05
Feel that being Jewish is about observing at least some aspects of the Sabbath	.71	.14	.16	.19	.17	.10	.11
Feel that being Jewish is about believing in God	.70	.14	.04	.10	.32	.18	-.03
Feel that being Jewish is about studying Jewish religious texts	.69	.29	.07	.24	-.01	.13	.01
Feel that being Jewish is about keeping kosher	.67	.15	.25	.12	.28	.23	.01
Feel that being Jewish is about having a religious identity	.63	.13	.14	.04	.01	.20	.29
Self-described category of current Jewish outlook	.51	.46	.19	.12	.13	.34	-.08
Whether attend Jewish social events most weeks (At home [†])	.09	.64	.11	.07	.17	.14	.08
Frequency of synagogue service attendance (At home [†])	.35	.62	.16	.11	.04	.26	-.02
Frequency of voluntary work for Jewish-related charities	-.05	.57	.31	.19	.05	.03	.05
Whether switch on lights on the Sabbath (At university)	.37	.57	.12	.11	.23	.29	-.23
Frequency of synagogue service attendance (At university)	.32	.52	.25	.12	.08	.31	-.17
Self-described category of Jewish consciousness	.17	.45	.23	.04	.26	.32	.22
Self-described category of current Jewish identity/practice	.35	.44	.25	.04	.31	.35	-.13
Whether been to any [university Jewish Society] JSoc meetings or events	-.02	-.02	.82	.00	.00	.13	.05
Whether attend Jewish social events most weeks (At university)	.10	.18	.76	.09	.18	.16	.02
Whether attend a Friday night (Sabbath) dinner most/every week (At university)	.19	.12	.68	.11	.22	.29	-.08
Whether currently connected, in any way, with other (Jewish student) organizations	.07	.33	.64	.08	.00	.01	.15
Whether feel that being Jewish is about volunteering to support a charity	.14	.14	.08	.81	.06	.03	.13
Whether feel that being Jewish is about supporting social justice causes	-.04	.07	.05	.80	-.06	-.02	.18
Whether feel that being Jewish is about donating funds to charity	.17	.16	.14	.74	.15	.09	.03
Whether feel that being Jewish is about strong moral and ethical behavior	.32	.12	.08	.58	.08	.18	.13
Whether feel that being Jewish is about working hard and being successful	.01	-.27	-.08	.48	.38	-.02	.05

Table 1 continued

Variables	Dimensions						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Whether feel that being Jewish is about supporting Israel	.08	.08	.06	.11	.65	.02	.41
Whether feel that being Jewish is about socializing in predominantly Jewish circles	.21	.09	.11	.14	.62	.00	.01
How respondent feels about Israel	-.04	.27	.05	-.05	.62	.14	.25
Whether feel that being Jewish is about marrying another Jew	.27	.11	.27	.07	.61	.26	.12
Proportion of closest friends that is Jewish	.03	.35	.35	.10	.49	.25	-.14
Whether attend Passover seder most or all years (At university)	.02	.11	.11	.05	.03	.84	.04
Whether fast on Yom Kippur most years or every year (At university)	.12	.09	.21	.03	.06	.77	.11
Whether feel that being Jewish is about feeling part of the Jewish People	.09	.11	.07	.06	.19	.22	.64
Whether feel that being Jewish is about having an ethnic identity	.04	.04	-.02	.06	.00	.08	.62
Whether feel that being Jewish is about combating antisemitism	.01	-.10	.03	.14	.31	-.28	.52
Whether feel that being Jewish is about remembering the Holocaust	-.09	-.12	.05	.14	.33	-.22	.52
Whether feel that being Jewish is about sharing Jewish festivals with family	.29	-.06	.04	.09	.11	.16	.52
Whether feel that being Jewish is about Jewish culture (such as Jewish music, literature, and art)	-.15	-.02	.05	.33	-.13	-.08	.51
% of variance	27.6	9.2	6.2	5.3	3.9	3.3	2.9
Reliability (α)	.89	.74	.66	.81	.72	.71	.42

* Equamax rotation with Kaiser Normalization; rotation converged in 9 iterations

‡ I.e., outside of university term time



334 Dimension 2 – Socio-Religious Behavior

335 The second dimension relates more specifically to religious practice than the first
 336 dimension; thus it includes measures of synagogue attendance and aspects of
 337 Sabbath observance. But it also includes variables with a social bent such as
 338 attendance at Jewish social events specifically outside the university context as well
 339 as volunteering within the wider Jewish community.

340 Dimension 3 – Student Community Engagement

341 The next dimension relates to respondents' Jewish social and organizational
 342 engagement but within the university environment. Specifically, it measures how
 343 engaged students are with their organized Jewish community, which for this sample
 344 is centered on university and campus life. The key items here are behavioral and
 345 include involvement with a university Jewish Society (JSoc), attendance at Jewish
 346 social events on campus, attendance at Friday night dinner events on campus, and
 347 membership of, or involvement with, other Jewish student organizations (i.e., other
 348 than JSoc).

349 Dimension 4 – Jewish Values

350 The highest loading variables in the fourth dimension produced by the PCA
 351 specifically focus on ethical issues. Each is attitudinal rather than behavioral, and
 352 includes whether respondents feel that volunteering is an important aspect of
 353 Jewishness; similarly, whether social justice and charitable giving inform Jewish
 354 identity and whether being Jewish is about upholding high levels of moral and
 355 ethical behavior.

356 Dimension 5 – Ethnocentricity

357 The fifth dimension is essentially attitudinal and the highest loading variables here
 358 figure prominently in British Jewish communal discourse; namely support for, and
 359 attachment to, Israel, and intermarriage. It also includes a measure of attitudes
 360 toward Jewish social exclusivity, which is itself a central aspect of intermarriage
 361 discourse. These high-loading variables point toward a theme of Jewish survival and
 362 are ultimately ethnocentric.

363 Dimension 6 – Cultural Religiosity

364 The sixth dimension consists of two variables which ostensibly relate to Jewish
 365 religious practice but are statistically distinct from the Jewish practice variables
 366 loading highly in Dimension 2. That is because these particular rituals—observance
 367 of the Passover seder and fasting on Yom Kippur—are among the most commonly
 368 observed by all Jews, occur infrequently, are associated with universal human
 369 themes (freedom and repentance) and tend to be observed in a family environment
 370 (e.g., the beginning and end of the fast on Yom Kippur). They are commonly

371 observed because they are at least as much, if not more, expressions of cultural
372 identity as they are expressions of religious identity.

373 **Measuring the Impact of Communal Interventions on Jewish Identity** 374 **Outcomes**

375 By examining the statistical significance of the relationships between the various
376 forms of communal intervention (the independent variables) and the six dimensions
377 of Jewish identity (the dependent variables), linear multiple regression can be used
378 to test the possible impacts that interventions may have had on the Jewish identity of
379 the NJSS respondents. In addition, Jewish upbringing variables are also examined,
380 given that they have consistently been shown to be key predictors of at least some
381 aspects of a Jewish identity in adulthood (Dashefsky and Lebson 2002; Kalmijn
382 2006; Miller 2003, 1998, p. 238).

383 An important aspect of multiple regression is that *independent* relationships can
384 be examined. In other words, a relationship between two variables can be measured
385 while controlling for the possible blurring effects of others. A hypothetical example
386 might be the relationship between attending a Jewish school and Cognitive
387 Religiosity. While the data may show (indeed, they do show) that respondents who
388 have attended a Jewish school are more religiously inclined than those who have
389 not, the apparent relationship may be illusory since religious parents are more likely
390 to send their children to Jewish schools than irreligious parents, and Cognitive
391 Religiosity may actually be an outcome of a religious Jewish upbringing rather than
392 Jewish schooling.

393 Twelve independent variables from the NJSS dataset have been identified for
394 inclusion in a three-staged regression analysis using the Enter method (Table 2). In
395 Model 1, the two demographic variables—age and gender—were entered; in Model
396 2, the three upbringing variables—Friday night meal at home, Kosher meat at home,
397 and denomination of upbringing—were entered. Finally, in Model 3, seven Jewish
398 educational intervention programs assessed in the NJSS data were entered. The
399 ordering of entry is significant because it ensures that outcomes are tested in the
400 order they are likely to have occurred in terms of respondents' lifecycle. Upbringing
401 experiences precede entry into higher education, and therefore the impact they may
402 or may not have on Jewish identity should be measured first, followed by
403 experiences which have happened (for the most part) later in students' lives.

404 The dependent variables were created by combining the variables with loadings
405 greater than .50 (highlighted in Table 1) for each of the six dimensions.¹³ This
406 produced six scale measures of Jewish identity where low scores indicate lower
407 levels of religiosity, Jewish engagement etc., and high scores indicate higher levels.
408 The details of each of these scales are summarized in Table 3. The analysis was

13FL01 ¹³ For example, in Dimension 1 – Cognitive Religiosity seven variables had factor loadings above .50.
13FL02 Each respondent's score on each of these seven variables were summed together to give a 'grand
13FL03 Cognitive Religiosity total' for every respondent. An alternative approach using factor scores generated
13FL04 by the analysis was also examined producing similar findings but increasing the amount of 'noise' in the
13FL05 data and so reducing the overall level of variance explained.



Table 2 Independent variables – demographic, upbringing and intervention with frequencies

Variable type	Variable name	Response categories and frequencies
Demographic	Gender	Male (47%), Female (53%)
	Age	u. 20 (26%), 20 (24%), 21 (24%), 22 (14%), 23+ (13%)
Jewish upbringing	Friday night (Sabbath) meals most/ever/week*	Yes (76%), No (24%)
	Kosher meat at home*	Yes (55%), No (45%)
Communal intervention programs	Type of Jewish upbringing	Just Jewish/Mixed (24%), Reform/Progressive (19%), Traditional (35%), Orthodox/Haredi (22%)
	Part-time classes in synagogue or <i>cheder</i>	Yes (70%), No (30%)
	Jewish schooling	None (41%), Some (28%), All (30%)
	Youth movement involvement	None (12%), Occasional (21%), Regular (22%), Leader (45%)
	Israel 'tour'	Yes (82%), No (18%)
	Youth summer camp	Yes (66%), No (34%)
	Gap year program in Israel (not yeshiva)	Yes (20%), No (80%)
Yeshiva/seminary (any)	Yes (23%), No (77%)	

* The NISS questionnaire did not explicitly ask whether respondents experienced Friday night meals and kosher meat during their *upbringing*. Rather, in the case of Friday night meals, the survey distinguished between experiences occurring 'At home' versus those occurring 'When at university/college' and, in the case of kosher meat consumption, between 'Term time' and 'Outside term time.' For the purposes of this analysis, it has been assumed that practices occurring 'At home' are not simply recent occurrences, but reflect respondents' upbringing experiences. The allocation of kosher meat to the upbringing category is arguably more ambiguous; however, the question immediately followed the question on Friday night meals, and therefore it has been treated as a proxy for an upbringing experience. Tests using just 'Type of Jewish upbringing' show that this assumption is most probably correct since their inclusion increases the variance explained without changing the overall balance between the impact of upbringing variables compared with the impact of intervention programs on Jewish identity

Table 3 Dependent variables – scale statistics for the six dimensions of Jewish identity

Dimension	Min. score*	Max. score*	Mean	Standard deviation
Cognitive Religiosity	1	22	12.9	5.2
Socio-religious Behavior	1	8	3.0	2.0
Student Community Engagement	1	11	5.9	2.9
Jewish Values	1	13	8.7	2.6
Ethnocentricity	1	12	7.5	2.6
Cultural Religiosity	1	3	2.4	0.8

* Low scores indicate low levels of religiosity, ethnicity etc., and high scores indicate high levels

414 restricted to British respondents only in order to focus on the specific impact of
415 British communal intervention programming. This reduced the sample size to 830
416 respondents.

417 The regression results are presented in two tables. Table 4 shows the correlation
418 coefficients (R) produced for each of the three sets of independent variables
419 (demography, upbringing, and intervention) on each of the six dimensions of Jewish
420 identity. It provides an indication of overall ‘model fit,’ meaning how well the
421 variable sets predict each aspect of Jewish identity. The individual contribution of
422 each set of independent variables is indicated by the r-square change value ($R^2\Delta$).
423 Table 5 presents the regression coefficients (B and β) produced in Model 3 in order
424 to assess the independent effects of each of the independent variables on Jewish
425 identity. It also provides R and total R^2 values (bottom row) taking all the variables
426 into account.

427 In Table 4, Model 3 shows that overall the largest correlation value (R) occurs in
428 the two religious dimensions Socio-religious Behavior (.70) and Cognitive
429 Religiosity (.63). R values are slightly lower but similar for Student Community
430 Engagement (.50), Cultural Religiosity (.49), and Ethnocentricity (.47). The lowest
431 R value is for Jewish Values (.32). This suggests that the overall effect of the
432 independent variables is strongest in terms of religiosity dimensions. It is also fairly
433 strong with respect to community-oriented and ethnicity dimensions but is weakest
434 when it comes to predicting values outcomes.

435 The contribution of each *set* of independent variables (i.e., demographic,
436 upbringing, and intervention) toward the overall variation in each of the Jewish
437 identity dimensions is shown by the $R^2\Delta$ (r-square change) values in Table 4. These
438 indicate that demographic variables (age and sex) explain little of the variance in
439 any of the dimensions. On the other hand, the upbringing variables together explain
440 the greater proportion of the overall explainable variance for all dimensions, a
441 finding which is in accordance with other studies already noted. In particular,
442 upbringing variables contribute 32% of the 40% of the total variance explained in
443 Cognitive Religiosity and 33% of 49% of the total variance explained in Socio-
444 religious Behavior. In the other four dimensions, the explanatory power of
445 upbringing is smaller in absolute terms but nevertheless still accounts for the
446 majority of the explainable variance. Hence upbringing variables account for 22%
447 out of 25% of the total variance explained in Student Community Engagement with



Table 4 Correlation coefficients and variance explained for each model of the multiple regression analysis

Independent variable groups	Cognitive Religiosity		Socio-religious Behavior		Student Community Engagement		Jewish Values		Ethnocentricity		Cultural Religiosity	
	R	R ² Δ	R	R ² Δ	R	R ² Δ	R	R ² Δ	R	R ² Δ	R	R ² Δ
Model 1 Demographic variables (Gender; Age)	.07	.01**	.13	.02	.08	.01**	.07	.01***	.00	(.00)	.11	.01*
Model 2 Upbringing variables (Friday night meals; Kosher meat; Type of Jewish upbringing)	.57	.32	.59	.33	.47	.22	.28	.08	.43	.19	.44	.18
Model 3 Intervention programs (Synagogue classes – <i>cheder</i> ; Jewish schooling; Youth movement; Youth summer camp; Israel 'tour'; Gap year in Israel; Yeshiva/seminary)	.63	.07	.70	.15	.50	.03	.32	.02	.47	.03	.49	.04

R = multiple correlation coefficient; R² = variance accounted for by the model

All values significant at $p < .01$ unless indicated; * significant at $p < .05$; ** significant at $p < .10$; parentheses indicate not significant at $p < .10$

Table 5 Multiple regression coefficients for Model 3

Dependent variables (dimensions)	Cognitive Religiosity		Socio-religious Behavior		Student Community Engagement		Jewish Values		Ethnocentricity		Cultural Religiosity	
	b	β	b	β	b	β	b	β	b	β	b	β
Independent variables												
Demographic variables												
Gender	0.82	.08	-0.33	-.08								
Age					-0.27	-.12						
Upbringing variables												
Friday night meals	1.62	.13	0.66	.14	1.42	.21	1.17	.19	1.18	.19	0.29	.16
Kosher meat	3.30	.32	0.67	.16	1.45	.25			0.62	.12	0.40	.26
Type of Jewish upbringing	0.40	.08*	0.18	.09					0.22	.09*		
Intervention programming variables												
Synagogue classes (<i>cheder</i>)											0.13	.08*
Jewish schooling			0.22	.09					0.38	.12		
Youth movement			0.29	.15							0.09	.12
Youth summer camp			0.23	.05**					-0.44	-.08*		
Israel 'tour'	-1.31	-.10	-0.43	-.08							-0.13	-.06**
Yeshiva/seminary	3.62	.30	1.89	.39	0.78	.11	1.10	.18	0.70	.12	0.29	.16
Gap year in Israel					0.94	.13	0.54	.09*	0.62	.10*	0.17	.09*
Total R, Total R ²	.63	.40	.70	.49	.50	.25	.32	.10	.47	.22	.49	.24

b = Unstandardized coefficient; β = Standardized coefficient (Beta); R = Multiple correlation coefficient; R² = Variance accounted for by the model
 All values significant at p < .01 unless indicated; * significant at p < .05; ** significant at p < .10



453 similar results for Ethnocentricity and Cultural Religiosity and the smallest amount
454 (8%) in Jewish Values.

455 Once demographic and upbringing variables have been taken into account, the
456 $R^2\Delta$ values in Model 3 (Table 4) also indicate the proportion of variance communal
457 intervention programs, taken as a whole, explain out of the total explainable
458 variance on each Jewish identity outcome. Overall it shows that once upbringing has
459 been accounted for, intervention has more limited explanatory power than
460 upbringing. That being said, intervention is clearly important for Socio-religious
461 Behavior where it explains 15% of the 49% of the total variance explained. It is also
462 a relatively important explanatory component of Cognitive Religiosity (explaining
463 7% out of 40% of the total variance explained). Its explanatory power is smaller,
464 though still statistically significant, in all four other dimensions. Hence intervention
465 explains 4% of the variance in Cultural Religiosity, 3% in Student Community
466 Engagement and Ethnocentricity, and 2% in Jewish Values.

467 The Effects and Non-effects of Communal Intervention

468 Having explored the overall effects of demographic, upbringing, and intervention
469 variables on the six dimensions of Jewish identity derived by the PCA, attention can
470 now be turned to the effects of specific intervention programs. These are revealed by
471 the regression coefficients (b and β) in Table 5. The b -values indicate the
472 *independent* relationship between each variable and each dimension of Jewish
473 identity, including whether the relationship is positive or negative. But it also
474 reveals the *size* of the effect (which can be interpreted with reference to the
475 statistical details of each dimension described in Table 3). For example, the b -value
476 for Yeshiva/seminary on Cognitive Religiosity is 3.62 (the largest of any b -value in
477 the table). This means that independent of all other variables, including other
478 intervention variables as well as upbringing and demographic variables, the effect of
479 attending yeshiva (as opposed to not attending yeshiva) is to increase respondents'
480 Cognitive Religiosity score in the more religious direction by 3.62 units on a scale
481 ranging from 1 through 22 units. However, since the independent variables are
482 based on different measurement units—for example, yeshiva/seminary is a yes/no
483 measure whereas type of upbringing distinguishes between Just Jewish, Reform/
484 Progressive, Traditional, and Orthodox (see Table 2)—comparisons between b -
485 values are more meaningful using the standardized beta coefficient (β).¹⁴ In the
486 present example, this shows that in terms of the effects of yeshiva/seminary on
487 Cognitive Religiosity, attending yeshiva is by far the most important intervention
488 ($\beta=.30$); in fact it is the only one of those tested which has a positive impact.

14FL01 ¹⁴ The standardized beta values indicate the effect a change of one standard deviation in the independent
14FL02 variable has on the dependent variable. Thus, increasing 'Yeshiva/seminary' by one standard deviation
14FL03 increases Cognitive Religiosity by .30 standard deviations, and increasing 'Kosher meat' by one standard
14FL04 deviation increases Cognitive Religiosity by .32 standard deviations (see further, Field 2011, pp. 239-40)
14FL05 i.e., Kosher meat at home during upbringing has a slightly greater impact on Cognitive Religiosity than
14FL06 yeshiva.

489 Although the regression coefficients b and β do not speak definitively about cause
 490 and effect—i.e., whether yeshiva attendance increases Cognitive Religiosity or
 491 whether individuals with a religious predilection are more likely to attend yeshiva—
 492 they do provide a statistically robust insight into the independent relationship
 493 between the variables and the six dimensions of Jewish identity. In addition, they
 494 indicate whether that association is positive or negative, as well as the strength of
 495 that relationship compared with other variables. Moreover, given that the
 496 interventions are all antecedent to the life-stage at which the Jewish identity of
 497 the respondents has been measured (i.e., while students are at university), it is
 498 arguable that the causal direction can also be inferred. Further, since the regression
 499 controls for both the background factors and whether or not the intervention was
 500 experienced, if both still remain significant predictors of Jewish identity, then causal
 501 inference is strengthened.

502 As discussed in the introduction, one of the most important intervention
 503 programs in which Britain's Jewish community has chosen to invest is Jewish
 504 schooling. The b coefficients in Table 5 show that Jewish school has a positive,
 505 independent effect on two of the six identity dimensions: Socio-religious Behavior
 506 ($b=0.22$) and Ethnocentricity ($b=0.38$). The standardized β values indicate that on
 507 Ethnocentricity, Jewish school ($\beta=.12$) has the same effect as yeshiva/seminary
 508 ($\beta=.12$) but in terms of Socio-religious Behavior, Jewish school ($\beta=.09$) is less
 509 important than yeshiva/seminary ($\beta=.39$) and also less important than youth
 510 movement ($\beta=.15$). Jewish school has no statistically significant effect on any of the
 511 other dimensions, these being Student Community Engagement, Jewish Values,
 512 Cultural Religiosity and Cognitive Religiosity. The relatively limited impact of
 513 Jewish schooling on Jewish identity formation is in agreement with findings by the
 514 author's work on Australian data (Graham 2012), Miller (1988), Cromer (1974), and
 515 Goldlust (1970) but is in contradiction to some American works such as
 516 Fishman and Goldstein (1993) and Cohen (2006).

517 Another key intervention program for Britain's Jewish community has been the
 518 Israel experience summer tour (Israel tour).¹⁵ Based on these findings, the impact of
 519 such programs, in and of themselves, is at best negligible and indeed, on the
 520 dimensions where it is statistically significant, (Cognitive Religiosity, Socio-
 521 religious Behavior and Cultural Religiosity) the effect is *negative*. For example,
 522 Israel tour *reduces* respondents' Cognitive Religiosity scores by 1.31 units (on a
 523 scale from 1 through 22, see Table 3). Indeed, it is apparent that Israel tour has no
 524 positive statistically significant effect on any of the dimensions of Jewish identity
 525 tested, including Student Community Engagement, Jewish Values and, especially
 526 surprising, Ethnocentricity given that this scale includes two indicators of
 527 attachment to and feelings towards Israel (see Table 1). These findings contrast
 528 with those of Saxe et al. (2009a, p. 3, 2012) which show that short-term Israel trips
 529 do appear to strengthen feelings of attachment to Israel; however, it broadly concurs
 530 with their other findings that Israel trips have little or no influence on religious

15FL01 ¹⁵ In the NJSS sample, 82% of (British) respondents had participated in Israel tour, whereas it is
 15FL02 estimated that up to 50% of the (non-Haredi) cohort participates annually, i.e., NJSS oversampled this
 15FL03 group.



531 observance, communal involvement, connection to Jewish customs, and engage-
532 ment with attendees' local Jewish communities.

533 The present study, however, does find that a far more impactful intervention than
534 a short-stay (about three weeks) Israel tour is a gap year program in Israel. In
535 complete contrast to Israel tour, a gap year in Israel positively impacts on four of the
536 six dimensions of Jewish identity. In terms of Student Community Engagement, it is
537 the most important intervention program ($\beta=.13$), ahead of yeshiva/seminary
538 ($\beta=.11$), the only other intervention to have an effect; on Jewish Values ($\beta=.09$) it is
539 the only intervention (other than yeshiva/seminary) to have a measurable effect; in
540 terms of Ethnocentricity its impact ($\beta=.10$) is also important, though Jewish school
541 ($\beta=.12$) and yeshiva/seminary ($\beta=.12$) have a marginally greater impact; similarly
542 on Cultural Religiosity, its effect ($\beta=.09$) is important though again yeshiva/
543 seminary ($\beta=.16$) and Youth movement ($\beta=.12$) have a greater effect. The two
544 dimensions a gap year in Israel does not appear to impact are Cognitive Religiosity
545 and Socio-religious Behavior. (At this juncture it is of course worth remembering
546 that gap years are generally taken immediately before university and so the effect of
547 gap-year experiences may be greatest in this sample of students. Nevertheless, the
548 results are striking.)

549 A third key form of communal intervention in Britain has been youth
550 movements. Table 5 indicates that this program of engagement has a positive
551 effect on two of the six dimensions: Socio-religious Behavior ($\beta=.15$) and Cultural
552 Religiosity ($\beta=.12$). But Youth movement participation has no significant effect on
553 any of the other dimensions including Ethnocentricity, and this is despite the fact
554 that most British Jewish youth movements have a Zionist outlook. Nevertheless, this
555 indicates that youth movement participation has a similar (if not marginally greater)
556 impact on Jewish identity as Jewish school and a considerably larger impact than
557 Israel tours.

558 Of the other dimensions tested, youth summer camp and synagogue classes
559 (*cheder*) have some positive, though statistically weak, impact on one dimension
560 each, though both programs appear to have a more positive effect on Jewish identity
561 than Israel tours.

562 Of all the interventions tested, only yeshiva/seminary impacts on every one of the
563 six dimensions of Jewish identity with a particularly pronounced effect, as might be
564 expected, on Socio-religious Behavior ($\beta=.39$) and Cognitive Religiosity ($\beta=.30$),
565 but it was also the most important of any intervention on Jewish Values ($\beta=.18$).
566 Indeed, in terms of Socio-religious Behavior it was the most important of all the
567 independent variables tested (including the three upbringing variables). Only a gap
568 year program in Israel approaches the impact of yeshiva/seminary (which itself was
569 a form of gap year program for many respondents).

570 Finally, although the focus here is on intervention, it is worth briefly noting what
571 the analysis tells us about the role played by different aspects of Jewish upbringing
572 on the formation of students' Jewish identity (Table 5). First, all of the relationships
573 examined are positive. Second, denomination (Type of Jewish upbringing) appears
574 to be less important than actual home experiences. Thus, it is evident that
575 experiencing Friday night meals (at home) significantly and positively impact all six
576 dimensions of Jewish identity. In addition, experiencing Kosher meat (at home) is a

577 key predictor of five out of the six dimensions. This suggests that future studies
 578 should consider focusing on particular *aspects* of upbringing rather than a single
 579 aggregated measure based on categories that may not be ordinal.¹⁶

580 Discussion and Policy Implications

581 The 1990s saw a firm consensus among Jewish communal leaders in Britain that
 582 Jewish education, in the broadest sense, was essential to ensuring ‘Jewish
 583 continuity’ (Hart et al. 2007, p. 150; Kahn-Harris and Gidley 2010, p. 104; Valins
 584 2003, p. 246). Though the exact meaning of ‘education’ was never explicitly
 585 articulated and the strategy for achieving it was never fully centralized, there was,
 586 nevertheless, a significant expansion of the Jewish school system, as well as
 587 continued investment channeled into Israel programs (i.e., short-stay tour and long-
 588 stay gap year) as well as other educational interventions such as Jewish youth
 589 movements and supplementary synagogue (*cheder*) classes.

590 Twenty years on, it is pertinent to ask, what effect, if any, has all of this
 591 investment had on Jewish identity? Analysis of JPR’s 2011 National Jewish Student
 592 Survey (NJSS) provides a statistically robust and a highly detailed picture of the
 593 overall impact of intervention programming in Britain as well as the impact of
 594 particular programs on specific aspects of Jewish identity.

595 This analysis initially identified six dimensions of Jewish identity, incorporating
 596 behavioral and mental religiosity, student communal involvement, values, ethnicity
 597 and culture, thus extending well beyond its normative religious/faith-based cate-
 598 gorization. But this was not an unexpected result given many previous studies showing
 599 the multi-dimensional nature of Jewish identity. Using multiple regression analysis, it
 600 was shown that Jewish upbringing is the most important predictor of a student’s
 601 current Jewish identity, also in accordance with previous studies. Further, the analysis
 602 revealed the overall *value-added* of British communal intervention programming,
 603 once upbringing and the demographic variables of age and gender have been taken into
 604 account. In sum, the analysis found that intervention programming by the community
 605 has had a measurable and statistically significant¹⁷ effect on the sample across all six
 606 dimensions of Jewish identity. In other words, the investment the community has
 607 channeled into Jewish education in the broadest sense does appear to show a
 608 measurable impact on all aspects of respondents’ Jewish identity.

609 However, though intervention *overall* has clearly had a positive effect, this was far
 610 stronger on some dimensions of identity than on others. For example, the intervention
 611 programs tested here were most successful at explaining the variance in Socio-
 612 religious Behavior (a broad measure of socially-oriented religious behavior such as
 613 synagogue attendance and Jewish volunteering as well as Jewish socialization outside
 614 university term time) and, to a lesser extent, Cognitive Religiosity (a measure of

16FL01 ¹⁶ For example, further analysis by the author indicates that respondents with a ‘Traditional’ upbringing
 16FL02 do not necessarily exhibit higher scores than ‘Reform/Progressive’ respondents on many ‘religious’
 16FL03 variables.

17FL01 ¹⁷ ‘Statistically significant’ should not be confused with ‘large.’



615 religious attitudes). Intervention overall was far less successful at explaining the
 616 variance in other Jewish identity outcomes including Student Community Engage-
 617 ment (a measure of involvement with organized Jewish life on campus), Ethnocen-
 618 tricity (a measure of Israel engagement and attitudes to intermarriage), as well as
 619 Jewish Values (a measure of attitudes towards charitable giving and social justice etc.).
 620 Even so, the fact that it can be shown that interventions explain any statistically
 621 significant amount of variance in any aspect of Jewish identity should be welcomed,
 622 given that a multitude of factors influence a person's Jewish identity and only a limited
 623 number of questions can be asked in a single survey.

624 To that extent, these findings are in agreement with other work in this area. For
 625 example, Dashefsky and Lebson's (2002, p. 108) assessment of over 100 studies
 626 concluded that although the majority showed Jewish home life to be the most
 627 influential factor in determining Jewish identification (as was shown here), they also
 628 point out that all kinds of Jewish education, both formal and informal, reinforce
 629 each other. Similarly, Cohen (2006, p. 13) has argued that after controlling for
 630 Jewish home background "numerous studies... find that almost all forms of Jewish
 631 education diminish the frequency of intermarriage and elevate adult Jewish
 632 engagement, albeit with significant variations in magnitude of impact..."

633 However, Cohen also noted that in the United States, Jewish day schools uniformly
 634 lead the list as the most effective form of Jewish education (Ibid.). But this study did
 635 *not* reach such a conclusion. This is despite the fact that the main focus of British
 636 communal intervention investment in recent decades has been on increasing Jewish
 637 school enrollment. This analysis found that the most significant effects of Jewish
 638 schooling on Jewish identity were on Ethnocentricity and Socio-religious Behavior,
 639 but in both cases other programs were at least as impactful, if not more so. To be clear,
 640 this study found no measurable effect of Jewish schools on Cognitive Religiosity,
 641 Student Community Engagement, Jewish Values, or Cultural Religiosity. It is only
 642 possible to speculate as to why such different results were obtained; however, it may
 643 relate to the fact that in the United States, Jewish schools are private and most are
 644 Orthodox whereas in Britain, most of the largest Jewish schools are state-funded (i.e.,
 645 free) and most pupils are not Orthodox.¹⁸ It seems likely therefore that US pupils'
 646 home environment is more closely aligned with their school's ethos than is the case in
 647 Britain and this would have positive, reinforcing effects on American pupils which
 648 may not be the case for British pupils, at least to the same extent.

649 The other intervention receiving considerable investment and promotion in
 650 Britain is short-stay Israel experience programs. As part of its 'renewal' agenda, the
 651 community has put its full weight behind the program known as Israel tour, which is
 652 attended by around 50% of 16/17-year-olds nationally. Yet this study finds no
 653 evidence that short-stay (three-week) Israel experience tours impact positively on
 654 any of the six dimensions of Jewish identity examined. Although US studies on
 655 Birthright data appear to have found that short-stay programs (of about ten-days
 656 duration) engender positive effects, especially on ethnocentric aspects of the Jewish

18FL01 ¹⁸ In the non-Haredi community, the majority of Britain's Jewish pupils come from non-Orthodox homes
 18FL02 even if they attend Orthodox Jewish schools (as a majority does).

657 identity of young adults (see for example Saxe et al. 2002, 2009a, 2011), this study
658 was unable to identify any such relationship.

659 What might account for this striking difference between Saxe et al.'s results and
660 those presented here? At this stage it is once again only possible to speculate. While
661 there are certainly structural differences between the two programs,¹⁹ some
662 ecological and methodological differences may also be important. First, in Britain,
663 Israel tour is typically experienced through a youth movement and most participants
664 will therefore already be Jewishly socialised *before* they participate in a tour—albeit
665 to varying degrees—through their youth movement. Further, some may already
666 have been to Israel before participating in a tour. By contrast, Birthright focuses
667 recruitment on those who have never been to Israel on an 'Israel peer education
668 program' (Saxe et al. 2012, p. 5) and therefore may, on average, hail from relatively
669 less Jewishly engaged sections of the community. It could therefore be hypothesized
670 that the potential for Jewish 'value-added' is greater on Birthright than on Israel
671 tour. Second, methodologically, the control groups (as in those who did not
672 participate in the program) are also rather different. In Birthright, the control group
673 consists of *applicants* who did not ultimately participate in the program but were,
674 nevertheless, predisposed to apply in the first place (Saxe et al. 2009b, pp. 10–12;
675 Saxe et al. 2012, p. 5). By contrast, in NJSS the control consists of any student who
676 *incidentally* has not been on an Israel tour (i.e., whether or not they had applied and
677 whether or not they had previously been on another Israel program).²⁰ In other
678 words, NJSS non-participation is incidental for inclusion in the control group,
679 whereas in Birthright it is instrumental. Although the NJSS control is arguably more
680 robust (since it theoretically captures a Jewishly broader group of non-participants),
681 it is likely that tour participants were oversampled (see footnote 15), and this may
682 also have affected the results. In sum, it is difficult to say precisely what effect these
683 differences between the two surveys may have had on the results other than to note
684 that they may not be directly comparable and further assessment is required.
685 Nevertheless, the difference remains intriguing.

686 All that said, Israel tour findings from this analysis are in complete contrast to the
687 results obtained for long-stay gap year in Israel programs. Indeed, next to yeshiva/
688 seminary experience (which positively impacts on all six identity dimensions but
689 only appeals to a minority of Britain's Jewish community), this was the most
690 important intervention program, positively impacting Student Community Engage-
691 ment, Jewish Values, Ethnocentricity, and Cultural Religiosity.

692 Therefore, this analysis only partially supports Chazan's (1997) thesis that trips
693 to Israel strengthen Jewish identity. As far as the short-stay summer Israel tour is

19FL01 ¹⁹ For example, Israel tour participants are younger (age 16-17 compared with 18-26 for Birthright) and
19FL02 the tour is a longer program (typically three weeks compared with ten days for Birthright). It is also the
19FL03 case that Israel tour, though subsidized, is an expense born by participants whereas Birthright is free for
19FL04 those accepted on the program. Cohort penetration rates are also very different; as noted, the Israel tour
19FL05 attracts up to 50% of any year group whereas US Birthright probably attracts less than 5% (assuming 18
19FL06 to 26 year-olds constitute about 10% of the total US Jewish population).

20FL01 ²⁰ Sample eligibility for NJSS was based on the following instruction: "please only complete the survey
20FL02 if you are Jewish and currently registered to study full- or part-time at a UK-based university or college"
20FL03 (Graham and Boyd 2011, p. 63).



694 concerned, the evidence is lacking entirely; but as regards a full gap year program in
 695 Israel the thesis is on much firmer ground. Indeed, these findings suggest that policy
 696 makers should consider ways of increasing Israel gap year participation given that
 697 relatively few young British people embark on these programs.²¹

698 In conclusion, leaders within Britain's Jewish community can take some
 699 satisfaction from these results which show that even after controlling for the
 700 important effects of Jewish upbringing on several Jewish identity outcomes, Jewish
 701 communal intervention, taken as a whole, appears to have a broadly positive effect
 702 on most aspects of these students' Jewish identity. In particular, the greatest impact
 703 of these interventions is on behavioral and mental aspects of Jewish religiosity and
 704 socialization. Nevertheless, the findings raise some challenging questions since
 705 intervention has a rather limited overall impact on four out of the six Jewish identity
 706 dimensions tested where Jewish upbringing is by far the most important predictor.
 707 This is despite over twenty years of intervention investment in the 'continuity
 708 agenda' (Kahn-Harris and Gidley 2010, p. 95).

709 Thus, these data provide communal leaders and policy makers with a valuable
 710 insight into the efficacy of the use of interventionist programs to strengthen Jewish
 711 identity. The study also presents a statistically robust method by which future
 712 investments in Jewish educational intervention programming can be assessed in
 713 order to ensure they generate a higher return per pound spent. In terms of individual
 714 programs, with the notable exception of yeshiva/seminary, a gap year in Israel
 715 stands out as being the most important intervention of those examined after
 716 controlling for the effects of home background and all other intervention programs.
 717 On this evidence it should be considered by policy makers in Britain as a vital tool
 718 for strengthening Jewish identity and promoting the continuity agenda. Jewish
 719 schooling, however, exhibited a relatively weak impact on Jewish identity and,
 720 moreover, was no more important than Jewish youth movement involvement. And
 721 finally, (short-stay) Israel tour showed no positive impact on any dimension of
 722 Jewish identity tested. These results should give pause for thought to those who hold
 723 to the prevailing theory that direct communal intervention in the Jewish educational
 724 arena is the panacea for strengthening Jewish identity. Extant ideas about delivering
 725 long-term Jewish continuity should continue to be developed and, above all, tested.

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21FL01 ²¹ According to UJIA data, the annual average proportion of gap year enrolments is 12% of tour
 21FL02 participants. This does not include those attending yeshivas in Israel which is an additional 12%. Note gap
 21FL03 year uptake fell in 2011 with the increase of university tuition fees. Data courtesy of Helena Miller, UJIA,
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