THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

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VOLUME XXIV: NUMBER 1: JUNE 1982

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Editor: Judith Freedman

CHANGE OF SPONSORSHIP OF THE JEWISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

The Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress founded the J.J.S. in 1959; the Editorial in the first issue stated:

'This Journal has been brought into being in order to provide an international vehicle for serious writing on Jewish social affairs ... Academically we address ourselves not only to sociologists, but to social scientists in general, to historians, to philosophers, and to students of comparative religion. ... We should like to stress both that the Journal is editorially independent and that the opinions expressed by authors are their own responsibility.'

With great regret, for financial reasons, the World Jewish Congress relinquished its sponsorship of the J.J.S. as from the last issue of 1980.

Private funds have established a Maurice Freedman Research Trust (a non-profit-making limited company, registered as a charity), primarily to sponsor the J.J.S. as an independent organ affiliated to no institution. There has been no change in the editorship or aims of the Journal, which is to appear as in the past twice yearly — in June and December. William Heinemann Ltd will continue to be the publishers.

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POPULATION MOVEMENT AND REDISTRIBUTION AMONG AMERICAN JEWS

Sidney Goldstein

Introduction

NTIL a few years ago, the American Jewish press reflected the view that the major challenge facing American Jewry was the effect on the size of the Jewish population of relatively high rates of intermarriage and very low rates of reproduction. However, while these concerns persist, a growing and substantial shift in the focus is pointing to the relevance of population distribution in the future vitality of the community. The nature of the concern is clearly evident in such recent articles as 'Population Shifts Create New Problems for Jewish Federations'; 'South Dakota's Lone Rabbi Travels Far and Wide to Sell Judaism to All'; 'Jewish Outposts in Dixie'; 'A Growing Trend: Jewish Population Moving from Northeast to Sun Belt'; and 'Being Jewish Where There Is No Community'. Population movement and its impact on the Jewish community are clearly receiving concerted and concerned attention.

Occuring at a time when American Jewish fertility has reached what probably is its lowest level ever, and when intermarriage and assimilation are inherently threatening the demographic and socio-religious vitality of the community, high levels of population mobility and dispersion throughout the United States represent a new threat and a new challenge to the community as a whole. The kinds of education which American Jews obtain and the kinds of occupation which they now enter may often lead to movement away from family and out of centres of Jewish population concentration. Moreover, many high level positions require repeated transfers which may make it more difficult for individuals and families to grow deep roots in any single Jewish community. Yet migration may in its own way contribute to renewed vitality by bringing more Jews to small communities which did not until then have the density necessary to develop or maintain strong institutions. It may also do so, as Lebowitz² suggests, by

bridging the traditional age and affiliation cleavages, thereby providing the 'social cement' necessary to hold a community together.

Jaret,³ using data from Chicago, found that geographic mobility has different implications for Reform/non-affiliated and for Orthodox/Conservative Jews. For the former, mobility was linked to reduced ethnic identification and participation. Among the latter, evidence suggested that mobility need not mean ethnic detachment and can even promote ethnic participation. If the differentials observed are general, any substantial change in the degree to which Jews identify with, and are committed to, their ethnic community could well be associated with both higher levels of residential mobility and lower levels of Jewish social participation. But what is cause and what is effect remains to be determined.

Although we have had reasonably reliable estimates of the distribution of the Jewish population among the various regions of the United States,⁴ much less is known about the extent and character of Jewish migration. Some insights may be gained from individual community studies but, to the extent that each community is unique, the possibility of generalizing to the total American scene has been limited. Community studies have suggested, however, that high levels of population mobility characterize American Jews; in a number of cases, as many as 70 per cent of local Jews were born in a community other than that in which they were living at the time of the survey.⁵

However, it is also clear that mobility levels vary considerably between communities. For an analysis of national patterns, national statistics are therefore essential; and the only such recent data are those available from the National Jewish Population Study (NJPS). Some preliminary assessment of the NJPS migration data was undertaken in 1974, and these also point to high rates of mobility. Further exploration of these data for fuller analysis of the specific characteristics of the migrant and non-migrant populations, and of the direction of their movement in the United States, provides the basis for the research undertaken in the present analysis. Before proceeding to a description of the survey and an analysis of the NJPS migration data, some background on the changing regional distribution of the Jewish population is in order.

Estimates indicate that in 1900, proportionally twice as many Jews (57 per cent) were living in the Northeast as was the general American population. Jews were under-represented in the North Central and Southern regions, but had as small a proportion (five per cent) living in the West as did the general population. Thirty years later, because of the heavy concentration of eastern European immigrants in the cities of the Northeast, that region increased its share of the total Jewish population to 68 per cent, and the proportions in all other regions declined.

By 1980, because of the cut-off of large-scale immigration and internal mobility, the Jewish population distribution more nearly resembled that of the total American population. Although the Northeast still contained a disproportional share of American Jewry (57 per cent), growing proportions now lived in the South (16 per cent) and in the West (15 per cent). Jews thus seem to have followed the pattern of redistribution characterizing the population as a whole. These changes in regional distribution are likely to become accentuated in the future, as Jews seek jobs away from their communities of upbringing, as family ties become less important for third and fourth generation Jews, and as more Jews no longer feel it necessary to live in areas of high Jewish density. In an ecological sense, therefore, the population has already become — and is likely to continue to become — a more truly 'American population', with all that this implies in terms of both assimilation and a visible numerical presence.

Source of data

The absence of a question on religion in the United States decennial census precludes tapping the wealth of information which would otherwise have been available from that source on the characteristics and distribution of the American Jewish population. In an attempt to provide data on American Jewry that would be national in scope, the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds sponsored the National Jewish Population Study in 1970-71. The study was designed to sample the Jewish population, including marginal and unaffiliated Jews as well as those closely identified with the organized Jewish community, in every geographic region of the United States, and generally from every Jewish community within an initially estimated Jewish population of 30,000 or more.8 Interviews were also conducted in appropriate proportions in medium-sized and small Jewish communities, and a special effort was made to contact Jewish households in a sample of counties which heretofore had been assumed to contain virtually no Jewish population. Two types of sample were used: 1) an 'area probability sample', collected by contacting and screening many thousands of households on a door-to-door basis in order to identify those which included a Jewish member; and 2) a 'list sample' based on households known to be Jewish through inclusion on lists furnished by Jewish communities or lists specifically developed for the study. These two sample groups were cross-checked and weighted to provide the needed balance between marginal Jews and those directly associated with the Jewish community.

Housing units were screened for the presence of Jewish respondents. If any of the occupants had been born Jewish, had a parent who had been born Jewish, or regarded themselves as Jewish, that housing unit

was eligible for interviewing. Household members temporarily away, for example at college, were assigned to the involved sampling unit if they were then living in some kind of group quarters or in an institutional setting. In this respect, the survey differed from U.S. Census procedures. Jews in homes for the aged, prisons, or custodial care in mental hospitals, were excluded from survey coverage.

The final response rate among the Jewish housing units was 79 per cent, with a total of 7,179 such households being interviewed. In order to adjust for the disproportional sample design, weights were assigned to both households and individuals. This report uses the individual weights; however, the 49 individuals who had been assigned weights of 50 or more are omitted from this analysis because their weighted number of 3660 would have unduly distorted the regional distributions. This procedure has resulted in a total weighted sample size of 33,165 persons. Only individuals who were identified as Jewish are included in the current analysis.

To date, no full evaluation of the quality of the NJPS data has been completed. In the absence of such an assessment, especially with respect to the quality of the data for purposes of regional comparisons, their use here for such analyses and for assessment of migration is exploratory in character; the patterns observed must be regarded as suggestive only, especially since subdivision of the population by region and migration status often leads to very few cases in particular cells.

The wide range of topics encompassed in the survey included mobility and housing. In that section, there were specific questions about the year in which each household member had moved to the current residence and about the previous address. In addition, in order to provide comparability with the U.S. Bureau of the Census measure of migration, a question was asked on specific residence on 1 April 1965. Comparability, however, is reduced by the fact that the data collection for NJPS extended over two years and, therefore, for some respondents the interval was six rather than five years. This could bias the comparability in the direction of higher mobility for Jews because of the longer interval. For the head of the household, information was also collected on the reasons for the move. For those household members aged 18 and over, information was collected on plans for movement within the next five years, including specific city, state, or country of intended destination.

In addition to these specific questions directed at mobility, the section of the questionnaire devoted to family background included a question on the city, state, and country in which every household member was born, and year of immigration to the United States for those born overseas. Thus, the basis was provided for obtaining information on lifetime movement, mobility between 1965 and the time

of the survey, and the last move. Only the former two sets of information are used in the present analysis, and particular attention is given to the 'five-year question' since the characteristics of the population relate more directly to movement within the period immediately preceding the survey than they do to lifetime changes in residence. Additional background data collected on socio-economic characteristics of the respondents are used as the basis for assessing the extent of migration differentials within the Jewish population.

Lifetime migration patterns

Judged by the lifetime migration measure, American Jews display a high degree of mobility. Just under one third of both men and women were living in the city in which they had been born. The great majority of the population, therefore, had moved at least once; and a considerable proportion seem to have moved a substantial distance. About 15 per cent of all respondents were foreign-born and therefore immigrants to the United States. An additional 20 per cent were living in a state different from their state of birth, pointing to considerable shifting in residence within the United States on the part of American-born Jews. Not surprisingly, high levels of short-distance movement are also evident, with approximately one third of the population having moved from their city of birth but living within either the same metropolitan area or the same state. Undoubtedly, a substantial proportion of the within-metropolitan-area migrants had moved to the suburbs — a characteristic trend in the United States during the twentieth century. The overall mobility level of Jews is not very different from that of the general population: of the native-born Jews, 25.3 per cent were living in a state other than that in which they were born; while for the total native white population of the United States in 1970, the comparable percentage was 28.4.10

The patterns of lifetime migration are closely related to age. The greatest stability tends to characterize younger individuals, and the highest mobility rates occurred among the older population. The greatest degree of lifetime international movement characterizes the very oldest segment, while such movement declines very sharply in younger age groups. With the exception of the two older age groups, (50–64 and 65 and over), interstate lifetime migration rises with increasing age; almost three out of every ten persons between the ages of 40 and 49 were living in a state other than that in which they were born. That one in five men and women aged 20–29 had also done so points to the considerable redistribution of the Jewish population and the even greater redistribution which is likely during the remaining life span of these younger persons. Furthermore, only one person in four was living in the city of birth; and even among those who were below

the age of 20, the majority no longer lived in their city of birth, probably having moved with their parents. A substantial number of these younger persons, however, had made a relatively short move, as suggested by the high proportions living within the same metropolitan area — again pointing to the redistribution which has occurred as a result of suburbanization. Clearly, for all age groups, movement is a common phenomenon, although the particular direction and distance of lifetime movement varies substantially by age.

Recent migration patterns

More related to current concerns are the data on recent movement. These and succeeding data sets are restricted to the population 20 years old and over to reflect adult movement only. As one would expect, they point to considerably greater stability since they refer only to the five to six year period preceding the survey. Whereas three quarters of those aged 20 and over were living in a city other than that in which they were born, this was true of only one third of the adult population when the five-year migration measure is used (Table 1). Perhaps of more significance is the fact that so many persons had moved during such a short interval. Most of these moves were over a short distance, involving particularly movement within the same metropolitan area (18 per cent of all adults) and to a lesser extent within the same state (six per cent); but 10 per cent of the adult population had been living in a different state or country in 1965, indicative of the extent to which geographic mobility is characteristic of American Jewry.

TABLE 1. Five-year Mobility Status, by Age and Sex, in Percentages

Age	Same	Same	Same	Other	Foreign	Total	
	City	SMSA*	State	State	Country	%	Number
MALES				-			
20–29	54.1	25.9	5.3	11.4	3.3	100.0	1,953
30-39	45.5	26.9	8.4	14.4	4.8	100.0	1,511
40-49	69.9	17.9	5.3	5-4		0.001	2,065
50-64	73⋅5	13.9	5.8	5-3	1.5 1.6	100.0	2,953
65 and over	76.6	12.7	2.0	5.9	2.7	100.0	1,597
Age 20 and over	65.5	18.6	5-3	7.9	2.6	100.0	10,223
FEMALES							
20-29	52.6	24.0	5.8	14.0	3.6	0.001	2,193
30-39	51.6	25.0	8. ₃	10.6	4.4	100.0	1,778
40-49	65.7	19.2	6.0	7.8	i.2	100.0	2,499
50-64	76.9	11.5	5.2	5-3	1.1	100.0	2,856
65 and over	67.8	14.4	5.5	9.5	2.8	100.0	2,102
Age 20 and over	64.6	0.81	5.9	9.0	2.4	0.001	11,705

NOTE In this and subsequent tables, the data refer to the U.S. Jewish population and are based on information collected by NJPS.

^{*} Standard Metropolitan Štatistical Area, a designation of metropolitan areas developed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.

As with the lifetime movement, the mobility status showed minimal differences between men and women. A slightly higher proportion of men were stable, as judged by continued residence in the same city or within the same metropolitan area, and fewer had made moves to other states. Both men and women followed the same general pattern of age differentials: recent migration is more likely to occur at those critical stages of the life cycle associated with marriage and job mobility. Reflecting this pattern, about half of both men and women between the ages of 20 and 39 were five-year movers, compared to only about 25–30 per cent of those who were 50 and over. For all age groups, the single largest proportion moved within the same metropolitan area, but the rate of such movement was considerably lower for the older than for the younger persons. The same was also true of the comparative levels of interstate movement.

Thus, although the data suggest a high rate of movement in a relatively short period of time, they concurrently indicate that a disproportional amount of movement is within the same general area of residence. Such short-distance movement probably involves a change in housing related to the life cycle stage — family formation and expansion, or possibly household dissolution for older persons. The higher mobility rates for older women compared to those for older men lend support to the latter interpretation, since women tend to survive their husbands. Equally important, a considerable proportion of the population made a longer distance move within this short time, especially men and women under 40 and women who were 65 and over. For younger individuals, such moves were most likely the result of changes in job location, or perhaps marriage. Among older women, the high level of mobility was most probably associated with a move either to join children after being widowed or to settle in a retirement area.

It is not possible to directly compare the mobility patterns of the American Jewish population with those of the total white U.S. population, since NJPS used a different coding system. However, taking these differences into account, the evidence suggests a close similarity in mobility levels: while 65 per cent of the Jewish population lived in 1970 in the same city as in 1965, 54 per cent of the total white population lived in 1970 in the same house as in 1965. Some movement between houses within the same city is to be expected, but these two statistics can be regarded as quite comparable, as can the 18 per cent of the Jewish population who moved within the same metropolitan area and the 21 per cent of the U.S. population who changed only county of residence. Just over nine per cent of the total U.S. white population, aged 20 and over, changed state of residence in the five-year interval; this is only slightly higher than the comparable percentage for American Jews. Overall, therefore, these data, like the

lifetime data, suggest that the Jewish population adheres very closely to the patterns characterizing the American population as a whole.

Origin-Destination of recent migrants

Attention turns next to movement in terms of place of residence and place of origin for five-year movers. This assessment is undertaken from two perspectives: 1) for each of the major regions of the United States, with New York City counted as a separate region, an attempt is made to ascertain the extent to which the adult population resident in the region at the time of the survey was characterized by particular five-year mobility patterns; and 2) for those individuals who, in this analysis, were identified as having made an interstate move, determination is made of the region of origin of the move in relation to the region of residence in order to allow assessment of the direction of the migration streams for longer distance movement.

With the exception of women in Middle Atlantic states, at least 60 per cent of the adults in all regions were living in 1970 in the same city as in 1965 (Table 2). However, mobility was somewhat less prevalent among residents in the northeastern part of the United States than it was in the rest of the country. In large measure, this differential reflects the considerably greater rate of intra-metropolitan movement characterizing New England, New York City, and the Middle Atlantic states, especially the New York City area. Clearly, in these older parts of the country, movement to the suburban areas has contributed disproportionately to the total mobility of the population living there at the time of the survey. The one-in-four persons who moved within the New York City metropolitan area stands in very sharp contrast to the low levels of

TABLE 2. Region of Residence in 1970 by Five-year Mobility Status, by Sex (persons age 20 and over), in Percentages

	Same City	Same	Same	Same	Other	Foreign	Total	
		SMSA	State	State	Country	%	Number	
MALES					·			
New England	64.9	17.9	5.4	10.8	0.9	100.0	664	
New York City	61.9	29.1	2.8	3.0	3. ĭ	100.0	4,254	
Middle Atlantic	61.0	14.5	10.4	13.5	0.6	100.0	1,448	
North Central	67.6	13.1	8.2	6.9	4.2	100.0	1,601	
South	75-3	5.5	2.7	15.8	0.8	100.0	1,010	
West	71.4	5.6	7.1	12.5	3.4	100.0	1.092	
'EMALES								
New England	63.0	17.2	8.1	10.5	1.2	100.0	754	
New York City	61.7	28.2	3.8	2.8	3.4	100.0	4,818	
Middle Atlantic	58.7	13.8	10.4	16.4	ŏ.8	100.0	1,681	
North Central	69.6	14.6	6.3	7.0	2.6	100.0	1,665	
South	71.0	5.9	2.0	20.2	0.8	0.001	1,229	
West	67.8	3.4	10.8	14.8	3.2	100.0	1,281	

such mobility in the South and the West. Even when movement within the state is added to the intra-metropolitan movement, the differentials still remain sharp.

Contrasts also extend to the levels of interstate mobility of the various regions. Only about three per cent of those resident in the New York City area had moved in within the previous five years from other states, while seven per cent of those in the North Central region had done so. On the other hand, in New England and the Middle Atlantic states as well as in the South and the West, at least 10 per cent of the population had lived in another state in 1965, and this proportion was considerably higher for males in the Middle Atlantic and the South and for women in the West, Middle Atlantic, and South.

One must be cautious in interpreting these statistics, since some interstate movement (especially in New England and the Middle Atlantic states) could, in fact, be equivalent to suburbanization, given the smaller size of the states and the existence of many metropolitan areas which extend across state boundaries. This is perhaps less likely in the South and the West, where states are larger and where more of the intra-metropolitan movement is therefore within the state. The conclusion seems justified, however, that during the period 1965–1970 the Jewish population resident in the South and the West was substantially augmented, and a considerable shifting occurred between states in the Northeast and the Middle Atlantic region.

Finally, Table 2 reveals the quite substantial role of recent international movement: in New York City, for example, immigrants constituted a proportion of the population larger than that of the interstate movers. In the North Central region and the West, immigrants constituted a noticeable percentage of the total population, but well below the levels of interstate movement; while for the other regions of the country, they accounted for one per cent or less of the total resident population.

That distance is a factor in influencing the streams of interstate movement is clearly evident (Table 3). For both males and females, the largest single migration stream is intra-regional, with about half of the interstate migrants moving within the region of residence. But the data also suggest that movement does not always occur equally in both directions. In New England, for example, almost 80 per cent of the men and 70 per cent of the women had moved either within the region itself or from the adjoining Middle Atlantic region. For both males and females, as many as three quarters of those moving to states of the Middle Atlantic region were also intra-regional movers or from New England, as was true for the men who moved to New York City. The North Central states also drew most heavily from among states within their own region, but the sources of migrants from outside the region were more widespread. By contrast, in the South one in four migrants

came from the Middle Atlantic states, and 11 per cent of the men and eight per cent of the women came from the North Central region. This pattern is consistent with the earlier noted decline in the relative proportion of Jews living in the Northeast and North Central parts of the United States, and the gains in the proportion living in the South. For the West, the data are distorted somewhat by the considerable proportion of males of unknown region of origin. Overlooking this, the single largest group came from other western states; the next most common region of origin was the Middle Atlantic, followed by the North Central. For women, the South accounted for more migrants to the West than did the North Central region, but the differences were small. For the West, the South, and the North Central region, New England provided a minimal number of migrants.

TABLE 3. Region of Current Residence by Region of Residence in 1965 for Persons Living in a Different State, by Sex (persons age 20 and over), in Percentages

Region of Residence, 1965											
Region	New	Middle	North		Foreign			Τ	Total		
1970	England	Atlantic	Central	South	West	Country	Unknow	n %	Number		
MALES											
New England	44.0	35.2	5.5	3.3	2.2	5.5	4-4	0.001	90		
New York City	16.2	55.9	3.4	5.7	0.7	10.4	7.7	0.001	297		
Middle Atlantic	19.0	56. r	ï.8	13.6	2.7	ī.Š	5.0	0.001	221		
North Central	2.8	10.5	48.6	6.5	2.8	20.2	8.5	100.0	247		
South	0.0	26.1	10.6	50.8	0.5	1.0	11.1	100.0	199		
West	0.0	13.9	4.9	0.0	46.9	6.8	27.5	100.0	309		
FEMALES											
New England	30.8	38.5	4.8	4.8	1.9	6.7	12.5	100.0	104		
New York City	7.9	48.8	5.8	9.1	1.8	17.6	g. i	100.0	330		
Middle Atlantic	20.4	54.9	2.1	8.8	1.8	1.5	10.4	0.001	328		
North Central	2. i	10.7	47-3	3.7	3.3	10.7	22.2	0.001	243		
South	1.5	23.7	8.4	60.2	1.1	ı.É	3.3	0.001	274		
West	0.0	7.8	5.0	8. 1	57.0	7.5	14.6	100.0	321		

Among men, immigrants accounted for proportionally more of the migrants to the North Central region than they did to any other region, including New York City; elsewhere, the proportion never exceeded seven per cent. For women, New York City had by far the highest proportion of immigrants in its migration group, almost 18 per cent, and this was followed by 10.7 per cent for the North Central region and 7.5 per cent for the West. The reasons for the regional differences in the proportion of male and female immigrants in the migrant streams is not at all clear, but could be related to the small number of cases.

The NJPS data point to substantial stream and counter-stream movement in most regions and, reflecting the varying magnitude of the

streams, the net effect is a redistribution of the Jewish population among the regions of the United States. The top panel of Table 4, based on migrants of known regional origin and destination, shows a total of 1,088 inter-regional migrants 13 between 1965 and 1970. By far the largest streams involved movement between New England and the Middle Atlantic states, and between the Middle Atlantic states and the South; in both sets, the movement was substantial in both directions. A significant number of 1965 Middle Atlantic state residents also moved to the West by 1970, but the reverse movement was small by comparison. In fact, the total movement out of the West of 47 sample members was far below that out of any other region, being equal to only 10 per cent of the largest regional out-migration, that of the Middle Atlantic states, and only one quarter that of movement out of the South.

TABLE 4. Inter-Regional Migration Streams and Net Migration Gains or Losses, 1965-1970 (persons age 20 and over)

	1970 Residence								
1965 Residence	New England	Middle Atlantic	North Central	South	West	Total			
NTER-REGIONAL STREAMS	 .								
New England	-	199	15	13	0	227			
Middle Atlantic	148		6 <u>5</u>	174	91	478			
North Central	10	41	-	54	33	138			
South	11	ri6	43	-	28	198			
West	4	20	17	6	_	47			
Total	173	376	140	247	152	1,088			
VET MOVEMENT									
New England	_	+51	+5	+2	-4				
Middle Atlantic	-51		+24	+58	+71				
North Central	-5	-24	_	+11	+ :6				
South	-2	-58	-11	_	+22				
West	+4	-71	-16	-22	-				
Total 1970 gain or loss	-54	-102	+2	+49	+105				
Gain or loss as percentage of 1970									
population	-3.7	-o.8	+o.1	+2.1	+4.0				

More significant perhaps is the net exchange between regions, the details of which are in the lower panel of Table 4. Generally consistent with patterns noted earlier for changes in regional distribution of population, New England lost migrants to all regions, except for a small gain from the West. The Middle Atlantic states were also net losers of migrants, except for their exchange with nearby New England. In turn, whereas the North Central states gained from their exchange

with the Northeast (New England, the Middle Atlantic), they lost to the South and West. The South gained from all parts of the United States except the West, but especially from the Middle Atlantic states. Finally, the West, because it had relatively few out-migrants to the rest of the country, gained from all regions but New England and, like the South, gained especially from the Middle Atlantic states.

The overall effect of these inter-regional gains and losses was a net loss in migrants by New England and the Middle Atlantic regions amounting to 3.7 and 0.8 per cent, respectively, of their 1970 populations. The North Central region was characterized by a near balance in gains and losses. By contrast, both the South and the West achieved fairly substantial gains in the five-year interval, equal to 2.1 and 4.0 per cent, respectively, of their total adult population. Clearly, then, these data on inter-regional movement point to a shift of the Jewish population to the South and West despite fairly substantial movement among all regions and considerable counter-movement for many.

Socio-economic differentials

As earlier analysis has shown, the mobility of American Jewry is very much affected by age; but other factors must also be considered. Because migrants respond differentially to the stimulus for movement and to the attractions of different types of locations, depending to some degree on their own social and economic characteristics as well as on the characteristics of the places of origin and destination, they tend to be differentially concentrated in selected socio-economic segments of the population. Within the constraints of this analysis, attention can be given only to three such factors: marital status, education, and occupation.

Stages of the life cycle can affect the volume and distance of movement. If movement is job-related, it is likely to involve distances greater than movement arising from housing needs associated with changes in marital status or family size. Similarly, the end of a marriage by either divorce or death may result in a change of residence and may account for patterns of movement for divorced and widowed persons which differ from the patterns of those still married. Within the Jewish population, the large majority (62 per cent) of males between the ages of 20 and 29 were still single; but in the next several age groups, virtually every male in the sample was married: 92 per cent of those in their thirties; 95 per cent of those in their forties; and 94 per cent of those between the ages of 50 and 64. Even in the oldest age group (65 and over), 86 per cent were married, while those widowed accounted for nine per cent of the total; on the other hand, 40 per cent of women in that age group were widows, reflecting the sex selectivity of mortality.

For males, therefore, the only relevant comparisons of migration in relation to marital status are between the youngest age group and all other age groups.

Comparison indicates that stability is to a very great extent associated with being single. Of the single males aged 20-29, 62 per cent were living in 1970 in the same city as in 1965, in contrast to only 42 per cent of the married ones. Here it must be remembered that NJPS counted students at universities as members of their parental households, so that education-related movement is not counted unless an independent household was established in the process. Since there is a high proportion of Jewish males in that age group still enrolled in universities, the comparatively high level of stability is understandable. This partly explains why only 7.5 per cent of all single males aged 20-20 were interstate migrants during that period, in contrast to 18 per cent of married males. Clearly, completion of education is associated with entry into the labour force and family formation, both of which serve as major stimuli to longer distance movement. These life cycle factors continue to affect the mobility of those in their thirties; but after they reach the age of 40, married men tend to become much more stable and much more of the movement that does take place is within the same metropolitan area. In the very oldest age group, over three quarters of the married males have not changed their city of residence, and that is also true of just over 70 per cent of the widowed. For males, therefore, only among the very youngest age group does marital status have a significant impact on mobility behaviour.

The NIPS data show that in contrast to men in their twenties, the majority of women (53 per cent) in the 20-29 age group were married. On the other hand, as with males, virtually all the women between the ages of 30 and 49 were married; but 11 per cent of those in the 50-64 group were widows, and in the oldest age group (as noted earlier) the proportion widowed rose sharply to 40 per cent. For females as for males, those who were still in their twenties and unmarried had greater geographic stability. Among married women not only was there much more movement, but a considerable part of the movement involved a change in state of residence: one in five of all 20-20 year old married women had gone to live in a different state, compared to only seven per cent of single women. Among married women aged 30-39, there was an almost equally high level of movement, but more of it was over shorter distances. Among older married women, the levels of stability rose considerably, and only five to seven per cent had engaged in interstate movement in the five-year interval.

Among married and widowed women in the 50-64 age group, the differences in mobility patterns tended to be small; but the married women were slightly less stable because a higher proportion moved within the same state. Widowed and married women aged 65 and over,

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however, show very sharp differences. The latter, like married women aged 40-64, were quite stable; most of whatever movement occurred took place within the same metropolitan area. By contrast, over one third of the widows moved during the interval, and considerably more of the movement was interstate or within the state but outside the metropolitan area. This suggests that widowhood leads many older women to move across substantial distances. The movement patterns of single women aged 65 and over more closely resemble those of the widowed than they do the married; this suggests that the absence of close family ties may allow for greater mobility and especially for the considerable amount of interstate movement. It also may reflect the possibility that a number of women reported as single were in fact widowed or divorced, but misclassified. For women as for men, therefore, marital status clearly has a substantial impact both on the level of stability and on the type of move made when there is a change of residence.

Although the patterns of marital status differ for men and women, the patterns of mobility within the married segment are very much alike. This similarity suggests that movement involves entire households: that, at least in the 1960s, mobility decisions were carried out by household units as a whole and not by individuals within them. Only among the single, the widowed, and the divorced is mobility likely to be a one-person action. Moreover, in the period under study, mobility decisions, especially those which were job-related, were likely to have been made in terms of the needs of the heads of households, who were predominantly male. Because of these considerations, the analyses of education and occupational differentials in mobility which follow will be restricted to the males, the large majority of whom (87 per cent) were the heads of households. 14

For men, higher education is associated with a tendency toward higher five-year mobility levels. Whereas 72 per cent of those with less than a secondary education were living in 1970 in the same city as in 1965, that was true of only 57 per cent of those with a post-graduate education (Table 5). More of those with higher education were involved in all kinds of movement than were those with less education, and the differentials were greatest for destinations involving longer distances. These data thus support the thesis that higher education serves to stimulate moves which are job-related, and therefore also leads to moves that are between labour markets and involve greater distance.

These overall educational differentials may vary considerably, since both the educational composition varies by age and type of move is a function of age. Controlling for age, however, indicates the important role of education in mobility, especially for the younger age groups. For those in their thirties, for example, the proportion who remained in the

TABLE 5. Distribution by Five-year Mobility Status by Education and Age, Males, in Percentages

Age and	Same	Same	Same	Other	Foreign	Total	
Education	City	SMSA	State	State	Country	%	Number
20-29							
None/primary	52.6	42.1	0.0	0.0	5⋅3	100.0	19
Secondary	46.3	32.0	1.7	12.6	7-4	100.0	175
College	60.3	21.9	6.2	7.9	3⋅7	0.001	1,112
Post-graduate	49.1 •	25.9	4.3	18.9	1.7	100.0	582
30-39							
None/primary	0.0	42.9	14.3	0.0	42.9	100.0	7
Secondary	64.3	27.8	2.8	4.0	1.2	100.0	252
College	46.4	24.4	11.2	16.1	1.7	100.0	577
Post-graduate	3 6 .8	29.1	8.2	17.5	8.6	100.0	653
40-49							
None/primary	76.4	9. i	7-3	0.0	7-3	100.0	_55
Secondary	71.9	18.6	4.5	3.2	ι.6	100.0	645
College	69.7	18.5	5.4	5.3	1.1	100.0	699
Post-graduate	66.9	17.9	6.0	7.8	1.4	0.001	626
50-64							
None/primary	75-3	11.3	6.7	1.3	5⋅3	0.001	150
Secondary	82.3	10.9	2.2	3.6	0.9	100.0	1,209
College	66.1	17.5	9.1	5.1	2.2	100.0	997
Post-graduate	72.2	9.3	6.0	11.3	1.2	100.0	503
65 and over							
None/primary	71.9	17.1	1.9	7.3	1.7	100.0	531
Secondary	78.9	8.8	2.7	6.7	2.7	100.0	475
College	82.2	9.1	1.7	4.8	2.2	100.0	230
Post-graduate	79.8	15.7	1.8	1.3	1.3	100.0	223
All ages							
None/primary	71.8	16.3	3.2	5-4	3.3	0.001	762
Secondary	75-4	15.2	2.8	4.7	8.1	100.0	2,756
College	62.9	19.6	7-4	7.7	2.4	100.0	3,615
Post-graduate	57.3	20.7	5.8	12.0	3.2	100.0	2,587

same city declined from almost two thirds of those with secondary education to just over one third of those with a post-graduate education. While quite similar proportions in each educational level moved within the same metropolitan area, the proportion moving to other states increased from only four per cent of those with a secondary education to over 17 per cent of those with a post-graduate education. Similar patterns, although not quite as sharp, characterize those aged between 40 and 64. For the oldest age group, however, stability is much higher at all educational levels. The evidence that fewer older males with higher education make interstate moves may reflect a greater tendency on their part to remain in the labour force until a later age and therefore not to engage in post-retirement migration on a permanent basis.

The occupational differentials in mobility closely parallel those noted for education, as expected. 15 For all the age groups combined,

the level of stability among males varied substantially from a high of 72 per cent of those in blue collar jobs to only 55 per cent of those engaged in professional work; and professional men were found more frequently in each of the internal mobility categories than were those in managerial, clerical/sales, and blue collar work. The patterns of differences among the lower three occupational groups is not as clear, except for a considerably lower proportion of blue collar workers who moved between states or within the same state outside the metropolitan area. These data therefore suggest that it is largely white collar employment, especially in the professions, which leads Iewish males to move longer distances. The somewhat lower proportion of managers who moved between states may stem from the stronger ties which they developed to a given location through ownership of a business. As Iewish men take more appointments as employed managers, their participation in interstate movement can be expected to rise. This possibility is supported by the age specific data.

Again, as with education, general stability is much higher for all occupational categories within the older than within the younger population; and in the younger age groups, the general patterns noted for the population as a whole obtain. For the 30–39 year age group, for example, the level of stability is much greater for the blue collar than for the white collar males; in fact, it varies indirectly with the hierarchy of occupations, with only 40 per cent of the professionals living in 1970 in the same city as in 1965 compared to 63 per cent of the blue collar workers who did so. While considerably more of the white collar than of the blue collar workers moved within the same metropolitan area, even sharper differentials characterize movement between states. Almost 14 per cent of the professionals and over 20 per cent of those engaged in managerial work made an interstate move during the five-year interval, compared to only five per cent of the clerical/sales workers and less than two per cent of those in blue collar work.

Although not as sharp, the same pattern of differentials in interstate movement characterized those aged 40–49. From the age of 50, however, the relationship between occupation and movement became less distinct: for all occupational groups, the vast majority continued to live within the same city and most of the movement which did occur was local. Clearly, occupational affiliation in conjunction with stage of the life cycle accounts for a considerable difference in levels of geographic stability and type of mobility within the Jewish male population.

Conclusion

Whether judged by wider regional distribution, by greater dispersion throughout the metropolitan areas, by an increasing tendency to

reside in smaller towns, or by lesser segregation within cities and suburbs, it is clear that the patterns identified in this analysis reflect wider residential dispersion and point to an increasing 'Americanization' of the Jewish population. The relatively high rates of mobility shown by the data from the National Jewish Population Study, as measured either by lifetime movement or by mobility within the five years preceding the survey, lend support to the thesis that Jews are participating in the major currents of population redistribution characterizing the American population as a whole. Even while distinct areas of Jewish regional population concentration remain, and while Jews continue to be highly concentrated in metropolitan areas, the observed patterns of redistribution have resulted in fewer Jews in the Northeast and North Central regions and more in the South and West, substantial decreases in the concentrations in central cities, and possibly (from evidence not fully available in this analysis) even some reduction in the suburban population as Jews join the movement to non-metropolitan areas, to smaller urban places, and even to rural locations. Regardless of which migration stream becomes more popular, the net result is likely to be a much more geographically dispersed Jewish population in the decades ahead.

That this trend is likely seems to be reinforced by the socio-economic differentials observed. The tendency for migration rates to be higher for those with more education, and for education to be positively correlated with movement involving greater distance, suggests that the continuing high levels of college and university enrolment of Jews will in turn be conducive to continuing high levels of movement. Such a conclusion is given weight by occupational differentials which pointed to a positive association between white collar employment and levels and distance of mobility; if more Jews should enter jobs in industry and commerce rather than establish businesses of their own, the need to seek job opportunities at more distant points may grow. Moreover, the migration effects of both changing education and occupational patterns may be compounded by changes in marital and fertility behaviour. If age at marriage rises, if the propensity to marry at all declines and the tendency to disrupted marriage rises, if fertility remains at low levels, 16 conditions conducive to stability or to only short-distance mobility may weaken further so that even higher levels of mobility and of movement involving greater distances may result.

The patterns observed in this evaluation and their likely continuation in the 1980s suggest that Jewish population movement must be considered as a key variable in any assessment of the future strength of the American-Jewish community. Taken in conjunction with a likely stabilization, if not reduction, in total size as a result of low fertility and high rates of intermarriage, greater dispersal provides additional challenges to the community's vitality. On the one hand, high levels of

movement and especially repeated movement may lead to a weakening of individual ties to local communities and a consequent weakening of Jewish identity on both attitudinal and behavioural levels. That may, in turn, contribute substantially to the maintenance of high rates of intermarriage and to an increasing degree of assimiliation. But on the other hand, the shifts associated with population movement may also give smaller communities the population density needed to maintain basic institutions essential for group survival and enrichment. Which course will be followed and how it may vary by type of movement, socio-economic composition of the migrant streams, and size of community of origin and of destination needs to be evaluated more fully.

What is clear, even in the absence of additional research, is that the ongoing distribution patterns are of such importance that not only individual Jews, but especially the organized community, must assess their impact on American Jewry from both the local and the national perspectives. Changes of residence have significant implications for the communities of origin and destination, as well as for the migrating individual or family. As they extend over a growing web of metropolitan areas, states, and regions, such moves acquire much broader significance at the national level. A national perspective is therefore needed if the potentially negative consequences of migration are to be mitigated and full advantage is to be taken of the positive contributions that such movement can make.

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NOTES

1 Sidney Goldstein, 'Jews in the United States: Perspectives from Demography', American Jewish Year Book, vol. 81, Philadelphia, 1980, pp. 29-56.

² Barry D. Lebowitz, 'Migration and the Structure of the Contemporary

Jewish Community', Contemporary Jewry, vol. 2, Fall/Winter 1975, p. 8.

³ Charles Jaret, 'The Impact of Geographical Mobility on Jewish Community Participation: Disruptive or Supportive?', Contemporary Jewry, vol. 4, Spring/Summer 1978, pp. 9–20; see also Chaim I. Waxman, 'The Fourth Generation Grows Up: The Contemporary American Jewish Community', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 1981, pp. 70–85.

⁴ Alvin Chenkin and Maynard Miran, 'Jewish Population in the United States, 1980', American Jewish Year Book, vol. 81, Philadelphia, 1980, p. 170.

⁵ Goldstein, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

⁶ Fred Massarik and Alvin Chenkin, National Jewish Population Study: Mobility, New York, 1974.

⁷ A detailed analysis is presented in Goldstein, op. cit., pp. 20-33.

⁸ Fred Massarik and Alvin Chenkin, 'U.S. National Jewish Population Study: A First Report', American Jewish Year Book, vol. 74, Philadelphia, 1973; see also Bernard Lazerwitz, National Jewish Population Study: Methodology, New York, n.d.

⁹ For a full discussion of the sampling, interviewing, and weighting

procedure, see Lazerwitz, op. cit.

10 U. S. Bureau of the Census, General Social and Economic Characteristics, United States Summary, PC(1)-C1, Table 69. Washington, D.C., 1972.

11 For simplicity, this will be termed 'five-year migration'; and the 1970/71

survey years will be designated as 1970.

12 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Mobility for States and the Nation, Subject Reports PC(2)-2B, Washington, 1973, Table 1.

13 For 344 known interstate migrants, or 11.6 per cent of all interstate movers, state of origin was not known.

14 Massarik and Chenkin, 'U.S. National Jewish Population Study', op. cit.,

pp. 272-74.

The data used in the analysis of occupational differentials refer only to those males who were in the labour force at the time of the survey; retired persons are therefore not included.

16 Goldstein, op. cit., pp. 11-21.

SELIG BRODETSKY AND THE ASCENDANCY OF ZIONISM IN ANGLO-JEWRY: ANOTHER VIEW OF HIS ROLE AND ACHIEVEMENTS

Stuart A. Cohen

ISTORIANS are acutely sensitive to the pitfalls of attempting to gauge the precise extent of an individual's contribution to the circumstances of his time. Excessive particularity, they warn, is to be avoided. However forceful his personality, the protagonist must be placed firmly within the historical context of his milieu. The character of the man cannot be studied in isolation, but has to be weighed against the conditions of his period, with due regard being paid to the broader — and less highly personalized — developments over which he could not have possessed sole control.

Such is the approach adopted in Dr Gideon Shimoni's valuable article in the December 1980 issue of this Journal: 'Selig Brodetsky and the Ascendancy of Zionism in Anglo-Jewry (1939–1945)' (JJS, vol xxii, no. 2). From his detailed reconstruction of the tangled web of communal politics during the Second World War, Dr Shimoni draws two principal conclusions (p. 154). First, 'the cumulative effect of the "Zionization" of the Board of Deputies (and the energetic activities of the World Jewish Congress) was to generate an overwhelmingly Zionist consensus among the Jews of Britain for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine'. So much for the zeitgeist, or spirit of the age. As to the man (and this is his second point), 'Selig Brodetsky himself was never entirely in control of these communal developments... However, it was he above all other British Jews who epitomized the dramatic ascendancy of Zionism in the Jewish community of Great Britain'.

Is this not too cautious a view? Does it not magnify the forces of the period (the 'dramatic' ascendancy of Zionism) at the expense of the man (who did no more than 'epitomize' the process), exaggerating the significance of the background and thereby obscuring that of the figure

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in the foreground? The present paper is designed to re-open the issue, and to suggest a somewhat different perspective. Its purpose is not to query the details of Dr Shimoni's account, but to propose some realignment of the focus of his enquiry. Consequently, no attempt will be made to retrace the details of Zionist activities at the Board; instead, more specific emphasis will be placed on Brodetsky's own assessment of the factional gyrations of the period and their potential influence on the style and structure of communal discourse. An examination of Brodetsky's concerns and their consequences, it will be argued, indicates that his impact on Anglo-Jewish attitudes towards the Jewish National Movement and its leaders was more substantial than Dr Shimoni seems to allow. Far from being the foil of Zionism's communal progress, Brodetsky was a major determinant of its tone and direction.

I

In order to avoid possible confusion, an initial clarification is called for. It will here be argued that Brodetsky imparted a particular character to the ascendancy of Zionism in Anglo-Jewry. It will not be claimed that he alone made such ascendancy possible. There existed no linear or causal relationship between his term of office at the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the 'Zionization' of Anglo-Jewry. The true mainspring of Zionism's communal power before and during the Second World War was the steady growth in popularity of the Zionist Federation, which itself owed much to Lavy Bakstansky's organizational skills. 1 Brodetsky's election to the Presidency of the Board in December 1939, although of undoubted symbolic importance, did not constitute an institutional watershed. By that date, the Zionist 'caucus' of Deputies had already demonstrated its cohesion, as well as its ability to exercise an occasionally decisive influence over the Board's appointments.2 Brodetsky himself took no steps to further the process. As the evidence adduced by Dr Shimoni himself amply illustrates, Brodetsky did not instigate his own election in 1939, nor did he prod the Zionists into 'capturing' the Board in 1943. On the contrary, he persistently opposed the latter strategy, regarding its inception and consummation as a personal affront. If, then, a straightforward count of Zionist heads amongst the Deputies is to be made the only criterion of assessment, Brodetsky's Presidency could just as well be portrayed as something of an irrelevance. Zionist supremacy at the Board was not, after all, a totally unexpected development. There is evidence to suggest that it had been predicted (even by anti-Zionists) as early as 1937.3

What could not then be foreseen, however, were the exact circumstances of that eventuality, still less its precise timing. These were the most relevant of the communal imponderables on the eve of the Second

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World War, and those which injected the greatest degree of complexity into the structure of politics at the Board of Deputies. Reduced to their essentials, the basic elements of the issues involved can be summarized quite briefly: would the Zionist 'conquest' of the Board be a swift operation, virtually surgical in its painless sterility and recuperative potential: or would it develop into a lengthy and bruising war of attrition? Even thus baldly stated, more was at stake than simply the pace of Zionist progress. Also involved was its effectiveness and its possible cost. Might not a precipitate fight for Zionist dominance at the Board isolate both the Zionists and their opponents from much Anglo-Jewish opinion, depriving even the victor of the Board's traditional reserves of institutional strength? Moreover, would not a querulous contest between the parties deal a serious, perhaps crippling, blow to the prestige and authority of the Board itself — and that at precisely the moment when the community ought to be harnessing its resources in order to deal with the momentous domestic and foreign problems posed by the War?

Brodetsky's contribution to the ascendancy of Zionism within Anglo-Jewry lay in the degree to which, by his actions and policies, he helped to determine the answers to these questions. He was not the only Zionist leader of his time to consider communal problems; but he did analyse them more comprehensively than most of his contemporaries, and with an insight which was infused by his clear understanding of the political and psychological dimensions of the communal situation as it existed during the Second World War. Anglo-Jewry, he believed (as much intuitively as rationally), needed and demanded unity and cohesiveness; and it was by serving those ends that the Zionists might earn their communal laurels and gain their rightful communal recognition. At the Board of Deputies, therefore, they had to demonstrate statesmanship rather than brute strength. It was to that purpose that he directed his own Zionist efforts and for that reason that he deprecated factious dissent, whatever its hue. As early as January 1940, Brodetsky had the Zionists as well as the anti-Zionists in mind when he declared:4

The Board must be the recognised central institution in Anglo-Jewry. It must be independent, democratic, representative of every section of the community, and not subservient to any person or section inside the Board, or to any group or organisation outside the Board.

Central to the argument that follows is the contention that there was more to such declarations than a ceremonial bow in the direction of communal unity. They articulated, rather, Brodetsky's genuine concern with the imminence of communal disarray. This, it must be stressed, was not a figment of his imagination. He had not, after all, inherited a healthy and sovereign institution. On the contrary, the

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Board of Deputies was by 1939 in serious danger of atrophy and decay; the sense of general communal dissatisfaction with the institution (which had been clearly evident during the First World War) had by the 1930s become acute. One of the reasons may have been the perceptible intrusion into communal life of second and third generation immigrants, many of whom had far more time than their fathers and grandfathers for communal affairs and far less patience with the Board's traditions of leisured and patrician leadership. More important, however, was the pressure of external circumstances. The domestic and foreign events of the 1930s imparted an unprecedented degree of urgency into communal life, with the result that the inadequacies of the Board's Defence Committee were castigated throughout the period; so too were its allegedly feeble representations to the Government on the fate of Jewish communities abroad. The foundation of the Jewish People's Council in 1935, as well as the establishment of the British Section of the World Jewish Congress in 1936, were in this respect very real warnings. They indicated that unless the Board took immediate steps to restore its public image, the institution might soon become largely defunct and many of its most important functions devolve upon other bodies.

The importance of the contemporaneous communal struggle between the Zionists and their opponents lay in that it crystallized, and to a large extent exacerbated, the wider debate over the viability of the Board. This was not simply because the members of the Zionist 'caucus' embraced and exploited many of the general discontents (most notably during the campaign for Brodetsky's own election), 5 but principally because it was the struggle between Zionists and anti-Zionists which shaped other (sometimes extraneous) communal tensions. By the late 1930s, Jewish Nationalism had become an issue on which the protagonists of both sides had adopted unequivocably antagonistic positions; in so doing they had already brought about the emergence of a 'party system' at the Board which was undermining that institution's stability and effectiveness. As much had become apparent in 1937, during the proceedings of the Board's Committee of Enquiry into the Constitution and Functions of the Joint Foreign Committee. It was then that several Zionist Deputies (at whose instigation the Committee had been established) had given notice of their intention to work as an independent faction within the Board. threatening to disrupt its proceedings unless their wishes were satisfied. Their opponents had similarly thought it prudent to begin to organize their own forces, whilst at the same time warning the community of the dangers inherent in 'the introduction of the "boss" system, in which the Deputies are to be regarded as merely registering the decisions of a body outside the Board'. Brodetsky himself does not seem to have been misled by the fact that he was elected unopposed to

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the Presidency in 1939. He appreciated that the anti-Zionists still wielded some influence and feared that, if driven into a corner, they might attempt to use it — very much as they had done in 1917. His object was to avert that danger, and thereby to ensure as wide a measure as possible of communal unity.⁷

Brodetsky's subsequent public career can, in many respects, be portrayed as a determined attempt to attain that unity. Consequently, no survey of his Presidency should be restricted to a narrow study of his Zionist pronouncements. For Brodetsky was profoundly convinced that the communal debate on Zionism could not be viewed in isolation, nor even on its strict merits. Any assessment of his ultimate contribution to the ascendancy of Zionism in Anglo-Jewry must be similarly broader in outlook. It must give full recognition to Brodetsky's fundamental desire to harmonize the interests of Zionism with those of Anglo-Jewry, and his determination to dispel the impression that there might exist a dichotomy between them. There was, therefore, no paradox in the fact that his deprecations of a Zionist 'capture' of the Board were as frequent and as insistent as were his protestations of loyalty to his Zionist principles. To Brodetsky's mind, these were two sides of the same coin. Zionist ascendancy would not be attained by polarizing the Board, still less by supporting possible organizational alternatives to it, but by so strengthening the institution that it would best serve all Jewish interests.

Dr Shimoni, although referring to this line of reasoning, appears to obscure its importance by denying it the prominence it deserves. Further examination of the material suggests that the argument was crucial, and provides a key to an understanding of Brodetsky's entire behaviour. His concern for the institutional strength of the Board was not limited to his quarrel with the World Jewish Congress (an episode which Dr Shimoni discusses). What needs to be stressed is that it also coloured his attitude towards relationships between the Board and the Zionist Federation and the Board and the Anglo-Jewish Association. In all three cases, the arguments were identical:

I cannot agree to the weakening of the Board, or to something even worse—and not improbable—namely the emergence of two Jewries in this country: Anglo-Jewry as a reactionary assimilationist body on the one side, and a Zionist and progressive part which would be accused of representing only foreign Jews.⁸

Nothing shall be done which can only produce artificial separation in the community, with consequent harm to any efforts that might be made in connection with Jewish objects.⁹

We must avoid two dangers. The first is that the views of the community shall not be represented . . . the second is that the community shall not be split up into bodies struggling with each other. 10

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That, then, was the background of concentric pressures and concerns which largely motivated Brodetsky's actions. The communal progress of Zionism could not, he maintained, advance on a trajectory which was independent of the restoration of the Board's institutional strength; the two processes had to be interdependent. Some of Brodetsky's Zionist critics, either unwilling or unable to appreciate this argument, were reduced to suggesting that his 'Presidential' status might have gone to his head. 11 But that view was uncharitable, as well as inaccurate. It implied that there existed a hierarchy amongst interests to which Brodetsky himself preferred to give equal weight. His own concerns are better illustrated by his efforts to prod the Board (even against the wishes of some Zionist Deputies) to undertake a series of constitutional and structural reforms, designed to equip it with the machinery necessary for the implementation of a wide range of policies which lay outside the immediate Zionist purview. 12 Strictly 'Zionist' work could not be clearly compartmentalized and kept apart from 'General Jewish work'. Even if the two sets of activities were undertaken independently (as they generally were), they had ultimately to interlock in a way which took account of both the overall Iewish situation and the intricacies of Anglo-Jewry's vested communal interests. Any other course would upset the balance of the communal system as a whole, and in so doing cause harm to the Zionist cause.

'Imbalance', however, was precisely the threat which Lavy Bakstansky's policy of communal 'conquest' seemed to pose. His plan to 'capture' the Board 'in the name of the democratic forces of Jewry' superficially promised to make the Board more 'popular'; but it threatened to be counter-productive in the long run. Pushed to its ruthless end (and Bakstansky was nothing if not ruthless in his pursuit of Zionist success), the plan would have effectively reduced the Board to little more than a branch of the Zionist Federation. Brodetsky could not countenance such a development because it would have invalidated the Board's claim to be representative of the community as a whole. He wanted the Board to benefit from the popularity of Zionism, not to be destroyed by it; and to that end he considered it imperative that the Zionists themselves become an integral part of the institution, not a pressure group which was essentially alien to it: 13

If I have any criticism to offer of some Zionists it is that their habit has been to leave 'communal' work to others and to concentrate upon Zionist work alone, taking very few steps in order to join in the work and to mould it in accordance with their desires.

Brodetsky's objective was to encourage Zionists to join the Board equally with all other Jews . . . This does not mean that the Board is to become a Zionist institution. The Board must contain the representatives of

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all opinions, all religious views, all Jewish political views and tendencies, all interpretations of Jewish cultural and spiritual ideals. It should be our aim to make the Board complete and all-embracing, to let the views of Anglo-Jewry be the outcome of internal discussion in which all views are freely expressed.

Thus perceived, Brodetsky's quarrel with Bakstansky (the details of which Dr Shimoni supplies) was essentially far more about ends than means. The activities of the Zionist 'caucus' aroused his ire, not only because they were rude and blatant, but because they were also - and perhaps above all — selfish and misconceived. To portray the issue in terms of personality (vide Dr Shimoni's references to Brodetsky's 'essentially moderate temper' or his wish to be 'as objective and impartial as possible') is really to miss the subtlety of his approach and the breadth of his concerns. A closer examination might show that he objected to the actions of Bakstansky's Zionist battalions on the grounds that they were as much harmful as they were distasteful. The 'mobilization' of the Zionist Deputies in 1943, and the subsequent dissolution of the partnership between the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association on the Joint Foreign Committee, reinforced the image of the Zionists as nothing more than a powerful lobby at the Board, single-mindedly bent on the subordination of all other interests to their own. Thus the Zionists injected an unprecedented element of bitterness into communal life, and as a result generated debilitating communal strife. For Brodetsky, whether or not the Zionists did indeed represent the majority of the community was really beside the point. What he found galling was their persistent efforts to demonstrate their strength, by turning every meeting of the Board into something like a Zionist demonstration:14

The work of this Board and the work of the community as a whole has in the last couple of months been pushed to a very low level by considerations which are based on all sorts of interests, most of which have nothing whatever to do with the interests of the community. I must say that, as far as we are concerned in the office, it is impossible to get on with any job. Our time is taken up with irrelevancies . . . This is how the energy of the community is being used up at the present moment, and at a time when we are told that something like 4,000,000 Jews have been exterminated in Europe.

Bakstansky, mistaking victory for success, seemed to understand nothing of this. For Brodetsky, however, the consideration was paramount:15

I believe that the most important thing for everybody concerned is the largest possible cooperation within the community. There has never been a period when this cooperation has been so absent as it is today. Above all I think that a Zionist 'isolationism' within the Board will, on the one hand,

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largely destroy the status of the Board as representing the community and, on the other hand, will do much harm to the Zionist movement as such.

III

Brodetsky's contribution to the maintenance of communal harmony seems to be most pertinently illustrated by the circumstances of the communal crisis of 1943-44. The episode is a crucial one, since the movement of events during those years did seem to constitute a series of personal setbacks to Brodetsky. In 1943, and much to his annoyance, the Zionist 'caucus' captured the Board of Deputies; in 1944, and much to his discomfort, the Anglo-Jewish community suffered the indignity of separate institutional representations to the Government on matters affecting Palestine. Dr Shimoni's discussion suggests (by implication rather than by explicit statement) that these events have to be regarded as a victory for the forces of communal extremism over Brodetsky's moderation. In the light of all that has been said above concerning Brodetsky's aims and ambitions, however, a less sombre picture can be painted. Brodetsky did certainly lose some important battles in 1943 and 1944; but, at the same time, he had also achieved some significant gains. What was important, in the final analysis, was not that a communal crisis erupted in those years, but that it assumed a form which was less destructive to both Zionism and the community than had once seemed probable. That is the conclusion to emerge from a re-examination of the timing of the crisis, its tone, and its ultimate impact. A study of Brodetsky's role in these three co-ordinates indicates that they largely vindicated his earlier strategy and the obstinacy with which he had pursued it.

First, the timing of the crisis. It occurred later than might have been expected. In April 1940, Brodetsky had written to Chaim Weizmann: 16

When I was first invited to stand for the Presidency of the Board of Deputies there was a certain amount of fear on the Zionist side that the election of an outspoken Zionist might have the effect of alienating, and perhaps even producing hostility among, certain sections of the community in regard to Palestine affairs.

The anti-Zionists, it must be remembered, had begun to organize their forces even before 1939, and were not caught completely unawares by the subsequent preparation of a pro-Zionist communal statement on Palestine. Consequently, they had been able to prepare a reasoned and comprehensive statement of their own objections to Jewish Nationalism as early as 1941, even though they did not issue a formal and public statement on the subject until 1944.¹⁷ Nevertheless, it was the Zionists who made the most use of the interval. By that time, they were in a far better diplomatic and communal position than they had been at the outbreak of war. With Churchill's help, they had re-established some

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form of working partnership with the Government; inspired by the Biltmore Conference held in New York in 1942, they had also developed a comprehensive Palestine programme of their own. In so doing, they had in effect stolen a march on the anti-Zionists who during the same period had deliberately postponed the public presentation of their own case.¹⁸

Brodetsky was not, of course, exclusively responsible for that delay, much of which is to be attributed to a cluster of other diplomatic and political circumstances. But he had played a significant role in making it possible, principally by insisting that the pro- and anti-Zionists within the community explore various possibilities of a compromise between them. His part in initiating a series of round-table talks between the two sides as early as 1940 was, in this context, particularly noteworthy. So, too, were his persistent efforts — even after the formal dissolution of the Joint Foreign Committee — to keep open a line to the A.J.A. 19 Neither initiative served the original purpose of achieving a unified communal platform on Palestine; but the prolongation of contacts between the two sides did restrict the freedom of manoeuvre of the anti-Zionists.

This was as much a matter of tone (the second co-ordinate), as of time. Not the least remarkable feature of the anti-Zionist pronouncements which the A.J.A. published in 1944 and 1946 was the unmistakably apologetic tone with which they were invariably tinged. Not only were these statements by and large less aggressive than the infamous Manifesto which had caused a communal rumpus in 1017; they were also couched in language which was far less confident than that employed by the anti-Zionists in 1941. Leonard Stein wrote to Chaim Weizmann in November 1944 that the A.J.S.'s Memorandum on Palestine 'was meant sincerely and in complete good faith, to make it clear that the A.J.A., far from being lukewarm or indifferent about Jewish aspirations in Palestine, was warmly and actively sympathetic, and that the support which in 1917 was lacking in the circles represented by the A.J.A. was this time forthcoming in full measure'.²⁰ What had changed, principally and perceptibly, was not the substance but the spirit of the arguments. The anti-Zionists undoubtedly remained convinced that their case was fundamentally valid; but they appeared uneasy about the manner and timing of their representations, and about their chances of success. As much is evident from the records of the hesitations which characterized discussions at the A.J.A. and of the delays which preceded the establishment of the (anti-Zionist) Jewish Fellowship. 21

This change of mood cannot be attributed entirely to the magnitude of Bakstansky's electoral success at the Board of Deputies in 1943. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that the anti-Zionists were neither crushed nor frightened by that event. Brodetsky's actions seem to have

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done more to bring about their change of heart. His undeniably successful management of communal affairs had won their respect; his assiduous attempts to cultivate their co-operation had also earned their esteem. Leonard Stein, the President of the A.J.A. (who, like Brodetsky, had assumed office in 1939) was particularly affected by the latter consideration. He appears to have been genuinely impressed by the sincerity of Brodetsky's desire for communal unity, and to have made substantial efforts to convince his colleagues of the need to respond to Brodetsky's advances. He, too, sought an arrangement which would 'unite instead of splitting the community'; he hoped that there was enough statesmanship in the A.J.A. 'to stand firm against anyone who may be spoiling for a fight'. 22 Accordingly, Stein accepted Brodetsky's proposals for regular and informal contacts (even after 1943), and invited Chaim Weizmann to address the A.J.A. in 1944.23 Both actions demonstrated his desire to maintain the tradition of communal co-operation which Brodetsky -- certainly against Bakstansky's advice - had done much to establish. It was a measure of Brodetsky's achievement that Stein, together with most other anti-Zionists, were ultimately distressed when their own actions brought such cooperation to an end. They saw themselves forced on to the communal periphery, while the Zionists were now in virtually complete control of the effective levers of communal power.24

The obvious, and self-confessed, isolation of the anti-Zionists must also account, finally, for the very limited extent of communal damage caused by the crisis of 1943-44. Admittedly, tempers did run high at the time of the confrontation; but thereafter they seem to have cooled remarkably quickly. Indeed, once the dust raised by the debate over the terms 'State' and 'Commonwealth' for a Jewish Palestine had been allowed to settle, Anglo-Jewry's public life reverted to its former course. Zionism did not dislodge all other items from the communal agenda; neither was the spectre of anti-Zionism sufficiently harrowing to generate major changes of institutional command. 25 Even at the Board itself, matters followed an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary course. The establishment of a group of 'independent' (that is, anti-Zionist) Deputies was soon dismissed as an irrelevance; and just as soon, Bakstansky's hyperbolic complaints of 'communal treachery' were rejected. Neither development brought about a serious fracture of the communal superstructure, and the fears that the community might suffer a rash of institutional secessions from the Board proved to be unfounded.26 The Board retained its position as the community's senior forum, for the Zionist capture of the Board meant in effect that the Board had captured the Zionists.

Here, too, Brodetsky's role seems to have been decisive. The Board was powerful primarily because he had made it so; and he had made it so by refusing to allow that institution to develop into little more than

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an instrument of exclusively Zionist interests. Once again, the contrast with Bakstansky is instructive. The latter, even after the elections of 1943, sought to flaunt and exploit Zionist strength. His directives to the 'Progressive Group' of Deputies therefore became more peremptory; his attacks on the anti-Zionists even more strident.²⁷ But these efforts often threatened to produce precisely the opposite of the effect intended. They gave rise to charges that the Zionists were 'terrorising' the community and to the fear (even in Zionist quarters) 'that unnecessary hostility and antagonism is being fostered which may drive the A.J.A. to much more serious opposition than that into which it can be canalised'.²⁸ Above all, Bakstansky's actions appeared to be depriving the Zionists of the just fruits of their own communal popularity. They seemed to be degrading the Board of Deputies, and thereby weakening it at precisely the moment when the Zionists should have been in a position to benefit from its strength.²⁹

Brodetsky's contribution to the ascendancy of Zionism in Anglo-Jewry was of an entirely different order. He had throughout insisted that:³⁰

The value of British Jewry's support to Zionism will depend upon whether the Board is really an independent institution and not subject to such influences as will deprive it of that character. To get the most successful results we must have width of vision and carry out a policy which shows that our aim is to lead and not to force subjection.

His distinction lay in the degree to which he attained that end. He may have been less of a tactician than Bakstansky, slower to perceive an opening, and less decisive in his exploitation of an opportunity. But he was more of a strategist, possessing (with only very few lapses) a more secure grasp of the wider influences at work within the community and a more subtle appreciation of the consequences to which those influences might lead. Thus, although Brodetsky may have done less than Bakstansky to augment Zionism's immediate numerical strength at the Board of Deputies of British Jews, he certainly did more to increase its ultimate communal influence. His contribution, indeed, lay in that he refused passively to preside over (or even 'epitomize') a Zionist 'conquest' of the Board; rather, he created the impression that the Board had managed to capture the Zionists, and would benefit from their zeal and energy. Thus I would argue that it was Brodetsky, rather than the Zionist Federation, who 'helped to transform and invigorate the Board'.31 It was a substantial achievement, the magnitude of which is diminished by neither the setbacks which he undoubtedly suffered nor the criticism to which he was subjected. It was largely Brodetsky's efforts which prevented the Zionists from becoming a 'faction' (albeit a victorious one) in Anglo-Jewry. Instead, he helped to raise Zionism to the level of a communal norm, and its spokesmen to the status of the celebrants of a communal consensus.

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NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS

AJ Anglo-Jewish Archives, Mocatta Library, London CZA Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem DEPS Files of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, London JC Jewish Chronicle WA Weizmann Archives, Rehovot

¹ See the copies of various papers and reports of the Zionist Federation for the years 1934-39 in CZA, Z4/3565. On Zionist strength in 1946, see *JC*, 11 October 1946, p. 9.

² As was shown by the defeat of Otto Schiff's candidacy for the vice-Presidency of the Board in 1938; see JC, 18 February 1938, p. 9, and

20 February 1938, pp. 24, 31.

³ See, especially, Brodetsky's recollection of Laski's acceptance of this point in 'Note on Meeting with representatives of the A.J.A.', 9 July 1947, p. 5; DEPS, C11/1/7.

⁴ The statement was first made during the monthly meeting of the Board in January 1940. Pointedly, Brodetsky read it out again in an emotional speech to

the Deputies on 25 July 1943. See transcript in DEPS, E1/111.

⁵ See, for example, the circular which S. Temkin (of the Public Relations Committee of the Zionist Federation) published on 8 December 1939: 'We shall fight this contest, and once and for all, the Anglo-Jewish democracy will make it clear... that we are no longer prepared to be governed by a clique from above'. Copy in S. Brodetsky MSS, CZA, 182/9 (i).

⁶ See 21 February 1937, N. Lazarus to N. Laski, DEPS, C11/1/5 and 4 May 1937, Laski to Sir R. Waley Cohen, ibid. Also, 18 March 1937, Laski to L. Bakstansky, DEPS, E1/111. Compare, however, 22 August 1934, Bakstansky

to Werner Senator, CZA, Z4/3565 (viii).

- ⁷ I April 1940, Brodetsky to C. Weizmann: 'The chief consideration which prompted me to accept the Presidency of the Board was that with a Zionist at its head the *Board* could not possibly be placed in a position similar to 1917'. WA (my emphasis). Also, 'Confidential Statement' by Brodetsky to the Zionist 'caucus', p. 6, 8 October 1943: 'When in January 1940 [sic] I took on the Presidency of the Board I did so in order to get a measure of unified action in the community'. Brodetsky MSS, AJ.
- ⁸ 11 January 1943, Brodetsky to S. Wise, N. Goldman, and Rev. S. Perlzweig, DEPS, C11/7/3a/2.

9 30 June 1943, Brodetsky to S. Marks, Brodetsky MSS, AJ.

¹⁰ 3 June 1943, Brodetsky to Bakstansky, ibid. See also the earlier discussions at meetings of the Zionist Executive on 19 September 1940 (CZA, Z4/302/24); 3 November 1942 (CZA, Z4/302/26); and 2 December 1942 (ibid).

¹¹ For example, 19 October 1944, A. L. Easterman to Bakstansky, CZA,

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F13/97: 'As a Scoto-Jew, I have never, from my earliest thinking years been able to accept the pretensions of the Anglo-Jewish community and its Board of Deputies. I have certainly never accepted the methods of its successive Presidents, which always tend to develop, or rather to degenerate into little "tin-goddism". When the puka (sic) Anglo-gentlemen assume this pose it is bad enough, but when a real Jew strikes the Anglo attitude it is worse'.

12 On which see: 3 January 1940, Minutes of meeting of Officers and Chairmen of the Board, DEPS, C11/7/3a/2a; Minutes of the Law and Parliamentary Committee of the Board for 1943 (DEPS, C10/1) and report of Board meeting on 21 February 1943 (JC, 26 February 1943, pp. 1, 13) when, owing to apparent Zionist opposition, some constitutional amendments were defeated. See also Board of Deputies, Annual Report, 1946, London, 1946, pp. 13-14. Brodetsky's insistence on the propriety of all elections is fully discussed by Dr Shimoni.

13 S. Brodetsky, 'The New Board of Deputies', Zionist Review, 5 March 1943, pp. 4-5.

14 'Final Statement by the President at the Meeting of the Board of Deputies on 12th September 1943', transcript in DEPS, E1/111.

15 23 September 1943, Brodetsky to Bakstansky, Brodetsky MSS, AJ.

¹⁶ I April 1940, Brodetsky to Weizmann, WA. For an example of an anti-Zionist warning to the effect (veiled, but nevertheless unmistakable in intent), see Anthony de Rothschild's letter to Weizmann of 1 December 1939: 'I am writing this line to ask you whether Brodetsky is generally suited to take up this kind of work. Has he got sufficient knowledge and experience of the different aspects of communal life in this country or has he not rather concentrated his abilities in other directions?' WA.

¹⁷ See 'Secret' minutes of meeting held at New Court, 9 September 1941, WA; and 3 December 1941 and 19 March 1942, Anthony de Rothschild to Weizmann, ibid.

¹⁸ The deliberate delay is referred to in the first paragraph of the Anglo-Jewish Association, Memorandum on Palestine, November 1944; see drafts in Archives of the A.J.A., AJ, 37/6/16; and the final version in AJ, 95/69. See also 6 November 1944, Brodetsky to Stein, DEPS, B4/11.

19 On the 1940 initiative see 8 September 1940, Brodetsky to Weizmann, WA; on the negotiations during 1944-45 see the Minutes of the 'Consultations between representatives of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Board and the A.J.A. in DEPS, C/11/1/7 and C11/1/9. Significantly, Bakstansky was not a party to these discussions, which were attended by Brodetsky, Dr I. Feldman, B. Janner, Lord Bearstead, L. Stein, and A. Alexander.

²⁰ 5 November 1944, Stein to Weizmann, WA. Not the least impressive aspects of the A.J.A.'s 1944 Memorandum were its reasoned defence of the idea of a 'National Home' (although not, of course, 'State'), and its detailed exposition of the Yishuv's achievements. These must be compared with the Manifesto (published in The Times on 25 May 1917) and even with Waley Cohen's statements in 1937 (on Zionist reactions to which see, for example, 18 November 1937, A. Lourie to Weizmann, WA). The Memorandum was criticized by such die-hards as Leonard Montefiore: see his note, dated 12 July 1944, in AJ, 36/6/1b3. On the other hand, the JC's editorial comment of 3 November 1944 (p. 8) was not unfavourable.

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²¹ See, for example, Minutes of A.J.A. Palestine Committee, 26 July 1944, AJ, 27/6/1b3; 14 September 1943, Stein to B. Henriques, J. Leftwich MSS, CZA, A330/19; and 22 June 1944, J. Leftwich to I. Greenberg, I. Greenberg MSS, Tel Aviv, Jabotinsky Institute.

²² 4 September 1944, Stein to Brodetsky, DEPS, B4/11. Brodetsky's esteem for Stein is apparent in his *Memoirs: From Ghetto to Israel*, London, 1960,

pp. 224-32 passim.

²³ No less significant is the fact that Weizmann accepted the invitation (see the transcript of his address on 20 April 1944 in WA) and subsequently maintained contact with Stein (see 1 September 1944, Weizmann to Stein, ibid.).

²⁴ See, for example, Stein's statement on 11 September 1946 to the A.J.A. Council, explaining why the A.J.A. could not accept an invitation to consultations with the Government on Palestine unless the Jewish Agency did so; AJ, 37/6/1b3.

²⁵ Even at the United Synagogue, Waley Cohen (despite his avowed anti-Zionism) continued to hold sway. Zionism, moreover, seems to have played little or no part in the considerations affecting Israel Brodie's election as Chief Rabbi in 1948. On the circumstances of that choice, see Aubrey Newman, *The United Synagogue 1870–1970*, London, 1977, pp. 179–82.

²⁶ On the formation of the 'Independent Group' of Deputies and the reactions

to it see JC, 25 October 1946, pp. 1, 16; also DEPS, B5/2/11.

²⁷ For example, the circular, dated June 1944, from M. Levy to members of the 'Progressive Group' in Bakstansky MSS, CZA, F13/369 (ii) and JC, 9 February 1945, pp. 8–9.

²⁸ 8 May 1944, A. M. Hyamson to J. Magnes, CZA, Z4/15620; and 12 December 1944, A. Krausz (Sheffield Zionist Association) to Bakstansky,

CZA, F13/417.

²⁹ 10 August 1943, D. I. Sandelson (Leeds) to Brodetsky, Brodetsky MSS, AJ; 15 December 1944, Zionist Central Council of Manchester and Salford to Bakstansky, CZA, F13/417; and I. Feldman, letter to the editor, JC, 14 June 1946, pp. 5–6. Compare, however, 20 March 1945, M. Shevah (Liverpool Zionist Central Council) to Bakstansky, CZA, F13/369 (i).

30 23 June 1943, Brodetsky to Bakstansky, Brodetsky MSS, AJ.

31 See Shimoni, op. cit., pp. 153-54.

JEWS AMONG EVANGELISTS IN LOS ANGELES

Jacques Gutwirth

Introduction

SIZABLE number of persons in the Los Angeles conurbation can be described as marginal — not only those who are obvious drop-outs, but also Hispanic Chicanos, Asiatics, and some urban American Blacks. Many are recent immigrants and others do not come from a Christian background. There are also young Whites who are marginal not because of their ethnic origin but because they had joined groups such as the Jesus Movement, which arose largely as a reaction to the excesses of the counter-culture of the late 1960s. The Jesus Movement rejected sexual permissiveness and the use of drugs, but approved of a communal life-style.

For a number of years, I have been carrying out anthropological fieldwork in Messianic Judaism in the United States. 1 That movement combines Christian evangelism and a stress on Jesus Christ as the Messiah with elements from the Jewish liturgy and Jewish traditional observances. There has been a Messianic synagogue in the San Fernando Valley of Los Angeles since 1973, and it was while I was studying that synagogue that I learnt of the Open Door Messianic Jewish Congregation, which had been established in 1977. Eventually, I discovered that it was a branch of the Open Door Community Church, which referred to it as a 'house church' - and, in order to distinguish it from its other house churches, called it the 'Jewish church'. To my surprise, at least half the members of the Jewish church were clearly non-Jews: they were Blacks, Hispanics, Asiatics, and white Gentiles. I decided to discover more about the parent organization, the Open Door Community Church. I attended meetings and rallies and tape-recorded speeches, I had many informal interviews with leaders and ordinary members, and I also studied the literature published by the O.D.C.C., as well as various reports on the Church's activities by outside observers.2

The Open Door Community Church

The leader of the O.D.C.C., Dr Robert Leslie Hymers, is a white American who was born in Glendale, Los Angeles County, in 1941.

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After the age of ten, he was placed in various foster homes and he attended 13 different schools. The turning point for him, at the age of fourteen, was when he came into contact with a Chinese Southern Baptist church and discovered warmth and friendship. He converted to evangelical Christianity and found a new purpose in life. He surmounted many hardships, and obtained degrees in Divinity and Religion from seminaries in San Francisco. In 1970, he was ordained as a Southern Baptist minister, and his particular concern in the San Francisco area was with the 'unchurched, the poor, the minorities',3 with whom he could readily sympathise, in view of his own personal background. In 1974, he moved to Los Angeles and became associated with the Jesus Christ Light and Power movement, which ministered to counter-cultural and marginal groups near the campus of the University of California at Los Angeles. In the following year, he left that movement and with two associates he founded the Open Door Community Church.

Doctrinally, there is little to distinguish that church from the evangelical mainstream. While the O.D.C.C. does have a non-sectarian, inter-denominational character, Hymers stresses its dependence on the evangelical tradition. He refers to himself as a Wesleyan and seeks to re-establish the dynamic revivalism and the kind of religious education which characterized the early Wesleyan movement in the United States.⁴

The O.D.C.C. stresses the value of commitment and urges its members to lead a life of repentance, holiness, and separation. In seeking to establish a kind of 'primitive' evangelism, it looks to the Baptist and Methodist churches for its inspiration, and also to individuals like Charles Finney (1792-1875), a famous revivalist preacher. 5 Finney is regarded as a spiritual ancestor of the Church, and his fighting vigour and concern for the urban proletariat are reflected in Hymers' own ministry. Hymers frequently refers to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the golden age of American evangelism, and urges his Church members to work for a restoration of that golden age. On the other hand, he does not encourage the emotionalism which characterized nineteenth-century revivalist movements; speaking in tongues is generally ruled out of order.6 The primary aim of the O.D.C.C. is to inspire its members with a faith which is based on rational principles and which can be strengthened through disciplined self-improvement rather than through emotional stimulation.⁷

The Open Door Community Church operates on a two-tier system: it consists of a series of house churches and each individual is a member of a specific house church as well as of the wider unit, the O.D.C.C. The house churches are generally found in rented houses or apartments, where the pastor or deacon of the house church resides with a few members of his congregation. Weekday prayer meetings and Sunday

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morning services are usually held in the living room of the house church and visitors are welcome, but numbers are generally limited to about two dozen persons. When the congregation grows larger, the house church divides; thus, there were three house churches in 1977, seven in 1978, 13 in 1979, and 23 by the summer of 1980.

Once a week, on Sunday evenings, all the members of all the house churches of the O.D.C.C. come together at a rally held in a rented hall, where they become aware that they are part of a large group, hundreds strong, rather than members of a small sect.

The location of the house churches reflects the social background of the members. In 1979, of the 13 house churches, three were in Hollywood, two in the San Fernando Valley, and one each in Culver City, Echo Park, Mar Vista, Palms, Santa Monica, Venice, and Watts - while the Jewish church was in the Pico-Robertson area. By 1980. one more house church had been established in the San Fernando Valley, three more in Mar Vista, and a further three in Hollywood; and downtown Los Angeles, east Los Angeles, and Highland Park each acquired a new house church. It is significant that the most rapid growth occurred in Mar Vista and Hollywood, which are both white middle-class areas with an appreciable number of marginal individuals - students, young actors and artists, as well as Asiatics and Blacks. The San Fernando Valley house churches are in another predominantly white middle-class neighbourhood, and they attract a large following from the Hispanic minority in that area. In at least five house churches there are bilingual pastors to cater to the Hispanic members. Although the O.D.C.Č. generally serves marginal individuals in middle-class white localities, there are some exceptions: the members of the newer house churches in downtown Los Angeles and Watts are mainly inner-city Blacks.

The rapid expansion of house churches was reflected in the numbers attending the Sunday evening rallies: from 250–300 in 1979 to 500–600 in 1980.

Messianic Judaism and the Open Door Messianic Jewish Congregation

Messianic Judaism, which centres on the acceptance by Jews of Jesus Christ as the Messiah, is a recent religious movement which has grown rapidly. In 1973, there were only three congregations of Messianic Jews in the United States; by 1980, there were about 30, in large cities such as Los Angeles, Washington, and Philadelphia. The size of the congregations varies from 20 members in some cases to more than 200 in others.

Evangelical Christianity has long attracted some Jewish converts, but it was only in 1917 that they formed their own organization, the

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Hebrew Christian Alliance of America. The founders were Jewish converts working as missionaries among Jews whom they hoped to attract by the use of Jewish forms of worship. Several Hebrew Christian churches were established, but they were short-lived.⁹

In the early 1970s, autonomous Jewish Christian congregations reappeared in a new form — Messianic Judaism. I believe that predisposing factors were the sense of Jewish re-awakening and self-assertion after the Six-Day War of 1967, and the growing emphasis on ethnicity in the United States. The adherents of Messianic Judaism stress their 'affiliation' with the Jewish followers of Christ in the first century of the Common Era. In their services, they use hymns drawn from the Jewish liturgy, and some of their prayers are taken from the Siddur (the Jewish prayer-book). Their synagogues are decorated with Jewish symbols, such as a Star of David and a menorah (a branched candelabrum). Male worshippers usually wear skullcaps, and sometimes also prayer shawls.

The Open Door Messianic Jewish Congregation has two leaders, a pastor and a cantor, both of whom were marginal Jews. The pastor, the Reverend B., was born in New York in 1936 into a middle-class 'socialist' family. He states that he himself had been a 'radical atheist', strongly committed to the civil rights movement. While demonstrating in the Southern states, he was impressed by the activities of non-violent black Christian militants. In 1963, he converted to Christianity and for some time worked as a missionary for the American Board of Mission to the Jews, a fairly traditional missionary organization. In 1976, he was ordained as an American Baptist Minister and became 'interim pastor' of a black Los Angeles church. The following year, he joined the Open Door Community Church with the express intention of organizing a Jewish group. At a Messianic Jewish Conference in Los Angeles, he summarized his beliefs and objectives as follows:

I am a Minister of the Gospel of Jesus Christ. God has called me to the Jewish people. I believe very strongly in the points of view of the Fuller School of World Mission¹⁰ which advocates indigenous churches, churches that meet the cultural needs of people they are talking to. Jewish people have a distinct culture . . . I will be culturally Jewish, . . . nevertheless my root is not Judaism but Evangelical Christianity.

The second leader of the Jewish congregation, its 'cantor' and liturgist, is Dr S., a fourth-generation Los Angeles Jew with a doctorate in Economics. He also was born in 1936, into an upper-class Reform Jewish family. After being involved with the hippy movement and various exotic religious cults, he converted to Christianity in the early 1970s but was determined to retain his Jewish identity. He eventually joined the Jewish congregation of the O.D.C.C.

When the Jewish congregation was established in July 1977, it had only eight members and was situated in the Fairfax area of Los

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Angeles, where there is a high proportion of Jewish residents. Initially, according to Reverend B., it operated in 'a pleasant, quiet way', requiring only a moderate commitment from its members. Before long, however, it was decided that the more authoritarian patterns of the other house churches of the O.D.C.C. would be adopted, and that a greater commitment would be required. It was also decided to encourage Gentiles to join — partly in order to ensure the survival of the congregation, which had not been noticeably successful in recruiting Jews. In 1978, the Jewish house church moved to a house in the Pico-Robertson area, a middle-class neighbourhood which, like Fairfax, has a large proportion of Jewish residents. 11 It holds two weekly prayer meetings, on Friday evening and on Sunday morning. In this it departs from the practice of other house churches, which hold meetings on Thursday evenings and on Sunday mornings. The Friday evening service at the Jewish house church — the 'Shabbat' service — is worth describing in some detail, for it serves to clarify the role of an 'indigenous' Jewish group within the context of the O.D.C.C.

The Friday evening service. I attended Friday evening services in 1979, before the expansion of the congregation had necessitated their renting a hall for the prayer meetings. In a room about 18 feet square, there were some two dozen chairs arranged in a semi-circle facing a lectern; there were no visible Jewish symbols (unlike the case in other Messianic meeting places), and in fact the only decoration was a poster about Jesus Christ. The service began at 7.15 p.m. and lasted until about 10.30 p.m.; it was attended by some 20 young male and female worshippers, informally dressed. However, all the men wore skullcaps. lending a strong Jewish symbolic tone; and the cover of the brochure containing the order of service was decorated with a drawing representing the Star of David, open Torah scrolls wrapped in a prayer shawl, and the Tables of the Law supported by two lions. Within the brochure were several prayers in transliterated Hebrew accompanied by a translation in English; their author is the cantor, Dr S., and he has based them on traditional Jewish liturgies but has adapted them with references to 'Yeshua' (Jesus).

The Friday evening service begins with the cantor reciting a prayer which starts with the words, 'How fair are they tents' (as rendered in the translation in the brochure) — words familiar to Jews who attend the preliminary morning service in a synagogue. One of the female members of the house church then kindles the Sabbath light in the same manner as that of an observant Jewish woman, but as she does so, Dr S. christianizes the rite by declaring, 'Yeshua, our Messiah, says, "I am the Light of the World". There is then a responsive reading of psalms from the King James Authorized Version, followed by about 20 minutes of hymn singing. One of the hymns is often Oseh Shalom, sung in

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the melody of Jewish liturgy, but there are usually another four or five hymns taken from the Baptist Hymnal¹² used in the O.D.C.C. The words of the hymns are projected onto a wall and the singing is accompanied by piano, guitar, and vigorous hand-clapping which is spurred on by the animated gestures of the pastor or the cantor. Anthropologists have demonstrated how community singing has a strong physical, emotional, and intellectual impact on the participants and helps to foster a feeling of cultural unity.¹³ In this case, the feeling of cultural identity is far closer to traditional evangelical Christianity than it is to Judaism, owing to the selection of the hymns.

When the hymn singing is over, however, several important elements of the Jewish liturgy are introduced into the service. The cornerstone of the Jewish creed, the Shema—'Hear, O Israel, the Lord is our God, the Lord is One'— is recited by the entire congregation in Hebrew and in English; it is followed by the Amidah or the Shmoneh-Esre (the 'eighteen' benedictions). The opening benedictions are taken almost verbatim from the Jewish liturgy, but the text of the others is altered by the insertion of references to 'Yeshua'.

Reverend B. then delivers a 'pastoral prayer' from the lectern. The prayer follows a fairly typical evangelical Christian pattern, and while it is informal and improvised, it also follows a stereotyped form: in the course of the prayer, Reverend B. comments on the past and coming events affecting individual members, the congregation as a whole, and the life of the Church. The congregation then recite the Our Father in unison and very formally, after which there are responsive readings from the New Testament (or, as they say, the New Covenant). There is then a period of silent meditation, when all sit with bowed heads and closed eyes. By now, the service has come to resemble a fairly traditional evangelical meeting; but true to this liturgical medley, the silent and solemn meditation is rudely interrupted by a loud and joyous exchange of Shabbat Shalom and renewed singing — but now the singing follows the melodies of synagogue chants.

For a few minutes, all the members enjoy a period of brief relaxation. Reverend B. then makes a series of announcements and recommendations in the informal but authoritarian style which is characteristic of the leaders of the Open Door Community Church. The congregants are frequently reprimanded; on one occasion, he upbraided two young men who had escorted two 'unsaved' girls to the cinema, pointing out that although it was not necessarily wrong to see a film, it was wrong to accompany to the cinema girls who had not been converted: missionary duties must take precedence over frivolous amusement.

Then follows a sermon, usually also delivered by Reverend B., but occasionally by a pastor from another house church. In the latter case, the visiting pastor usually begins his sermon with a testimony about his own conversion after a life of sin, and his spiritual rebirth — this shows

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the members that their leaders have gone through the same experiences. The sermons delivered on Friday evenings at the Jewish church are very similar to those heard at other house churches of the O.D.C.C.; the Jewish element is limited to the occasional use of Hebrew phrases such as Yeshua Ha-Mashiah (Jesus the Messiah) or Brit Ha-Hadashah (the New Covenant). A regular feature of many sermons is an attack on 'antinomianism' and on false teaching; at one service, the preacher harshly attacked what he called 'the perverted Gospel' and labelled as antinomian not only such creeds as Islam and Mormonism, but also modern Judaism as well as the type of Christianity practised by the Liberal churches of America.

After the sermon comes the 'Invitation' — a call to conversion, for uncommitted friends and visitors. The Invitation is common to all house churches of the O.D.C.C. The pastor urges all those present to commit themselves to Christ:

Many of you have lived a filthy life . . . I am speaking to everyone individually. Give up a life of sin . . . Can I ask you to bow your heads and close your eyes and surrender to Yeshua Ha-Mashiah. Say, 'I want to make peace with God . . . I may be Jewish, Catholic, it makes no difference . . .'. If you want this, slip your hands up.

The dramatic style of the sermon, the build-up to it, and the stress placed on the appeal to each individual person, often produce the desired effect. At the service in which I recorded the above Invitation, two Filipino high-school students did, in fact, slip their hands up. Altogether, the testimony, sermon, and Invitation last about forty minutes, by the end of which time the congregation must have little doubt that if the road to salvation is open to all, it is nevertheless a very straight and narrow path.

By now, the Friday evening service is practically over; but on one occasion I witnessed a somewhat rare occurrence — a 'confession session'. An undesignated female member of the congregation was said to be guilty of having committed sins which were also undesignated. The leader urged her to confess; she failed to do so, but the majority of the congregation did stand up one by one to confess their own sins, in low tones occasionally interrupted by sobs. The sins could hardly be termed grievous — failing to make peace with a companion in a university dormitory, or neglecting to perform some menial task for the Church. Each confession was followed by a few questions from the pastor or the cantor, prayers by a fellow worshipper, and absolution by the cantor. Thus, although the alleged culprit did not confess, the plea that she do so led to a most effective form of ritual mortification, with little or no penance, but with renewed submission and commitment to the Church. 14

A more usual way of bringing the Friday evening service to an end, however, is spontaneous praying in a subdued light; some members sit

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on the floor, some kneel, while others stand, and there is a restrained emotionalism. Personal difficulties are frequently mentioned: problems at school or at work, or with parents, are very common. Prayers are also offered up for friends or relatives, that their difficulties may be resolved or that they may find salvation. Intercession is invoked on behalf of the leaders and the members of the Church and for the success of the Church's activities. Health and healing are rarely mentioned, but the atmosphere of prayer meetings is very similar to that which prevails in group therapy sessions, in which personal anxieties are relieved. The style of the prayers also binds the group together and gives each member the feeling of being part of a strong fellowship.

Finally, at about 10.30 p.m., the service ends with the congregation chanting the Eve of Shabbat Parental Benediction, while in an adjoining room the cantor blesses the traditional Sabbath bread, the *challa*, and kasher wine; then all partake of the bread and wine, and the meeting merges into an informal social gathering.¹⁵

Why does such a mixture of ritual elements, more of a patchwork quilt than a true syncretic phenomenon with strong cultural and social roots, attract and keep together a group of persons of whom only a minority are of Jewish origin? Reverend B.'s answer is that Jewish members feel comfortable with the Jewish component in the service, while the Gentile members are also attracted by it. However, another explanation might be that there is in fact no such special attraction, and that the members of that house church simply go to the house church assigned to them by the O.D.C.C.

The patchwork impression which services at the Jewish house church give is the direct result of Reverend B.'s avowed attempts at communicating the precepts of evangelism through an 'indigenous frame'. His aim is not to integrate Jewish cultural and religious elements into an evangelical whole. In other words, he is a missionary who takes account of some of the cultural needs of his congregants. Moreover, the Jewish members of the house church are not particularly Jewish-oriented. If they were, they would find it difficult to be at ease in the essentially evangelical atmosphere of the church, which does not encourage the development of a Jewish identity. Reverend B.'s technique is in line with the general strategy of the Open Door Community Church: pragmatic flexibility towards religious and cultural backgrounds, but within the one goal of furthering a distinctly North American evangelism.

The Jewishness of the Jewish house church is skin-deep rather than fundamental — which is why the congregation cannot be regarded as truly representative of the Messianic Jewish movement, whose members try to maintain and even to develop their Jewish identity. It is surely significant that the O.D.C.C. Jewish house church has attracted

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comparatively few Jewish converts since its foundation. Moreover, between 1979 and 1980, when the size of the congregation almost doubled (from about 30 to about 60 members), only a handful of Jewish members were recruited. Nevertheless, the O.D.C.C. is so committed to its Jewish house church, that it assigns to it members from other house churches. In one case, the person was half-Jewish and had only a slight Jewish cultural or religious background; he was a graduate student at the University of California at Los Angeles and the son of a Stanford University professor. It seems that the purpose of the transfer was to enhance the prestige of the Jewish house church.

Usually, when a congregation has expanded to 50 or 60 members, it is divided into two house churches. In the case of the Jewish church, such a division was not thought advisable; one large so-called Jewish sub-group of the O.D.C.C. was apparently considered to be a valuable showpiece. The Jewish house church has members from several minority groups — Blacks, Asiatics, and Hispanics. The Asiatics are mainly lower-middle class, while the Blacks and Hispanics (many of whom are college students) are mainly from working-class households. The Jewish members of the congregation, on the other hand, are from middle or upper-middle class backgrounds, although some of them may have been drop-outs in the past; and they are also highly educated. The U.C.L.A. graduate student who was transferred to the Iewish church was awarded his Ph.D in 1979, so that with the cantor (Dr S.) the congregation could boast of two doctorates. At that time, the only other person in the whole Open Door Community Church known to have a Ph.D. was its leader, Dr Hymers. The few Jews in the Jewish house church do not have a profound Jewish cultural or religious influence on the congregation, but they certainly give it social lustre.

In order to arrive at an appreciation of the Jewish contribution to the Open Door Community Church, it is necessary first to look in more detail at the total membership of that Church.

Composition of the Open Door Community Church

In 1980, the O.D.C.C. distributed a questionnaire to all its members, and gathered 515 completed forms. ¹⁶ The survey showed that the two largest single ethnic groups were the Whites (36.8 per cent) and the Hispanics (35.4 per cent), while Blacks accounted for 19.6 per cent and Orientals for 8.2 per cent.

More than two thirds (67.2 per cent) were under the age of 26—40 per cent being under 21. Altogether, four fifths of the total (80.2 per cent) were under 31, and they included some very young members: 11.6 per cent were in the 11-15 age group. By contrast, those aged 41 to 60 accounted for seven per cent, while only 2.2 per cent were over 60 years old. These figures confirm my own observations at a rally of the

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O.D.C.C. which I attended in May 1979, when the overwhelming majority of the 250-300 members present were clearly under the age of thirty.

As for religious upbringing, the largest single group (43.4 per cent) came from a Catholic background; 36 per cent came from Protestant households, and 6.1 per cent were of Jewish origin; the remaining 14.5 per cent either had no religious background or had belonged to a very small sub-group (as in the case of some Buddhists from Asia). The majority of the former Catholics were the Hispanics who constituted, as stated above, 35.4 per cent of the total O.D.C.C. membership.

Most of the adult members of the Church had attained a fairly high standard of education: 84 per cent had attended high school, 41 per cent had received a college education, and nine per cent had spent more than four years in an institution of higher learning. The published survey did not give data on occupation or income, but the educational achievements of the members show that they were generally oriented towards the middle class.

The marginality of the members is apparent from their replies concerning their life-style before joining the Church: 13 per cent said they had been 'dropouts from society'; 17 per cent had used hard drugs and 41 per cent, marijuana and other soft drugs; and 10 per cent stated that they had been 'cured' of homosexuality.

Flexibility and rigidity

Since the Open Door Community Church's policy is to establish 'indigenous' house churches, those which cater for Hispanics therefore have decorations found more commonly in Catholic than in evangelical churches. But, as in the case of the liturgy in the Jewish house church, such non-evangelical features are merely superficial; the major part of the weekday and Sunday morning services at the house churches follows the style of many Baptist, Methodist, or other revivalist churches. There are pastoral prayers, testimonies, and a sermon, followed by a 'class meeting' during which the members discuss the sermon, memorise Biblical passages, confess their sins and temptations, and pray for each other.

While there is some latitude in incorporating features from nonevangelical rituals, there is no compromise over such matters as religious discipline and the fulfilment of duties assigned by the leaders. Each house church keeps a record of the activities of its members, and if one of them fails to perform mandatory missionary duties, the penalty is exclusion from one or more services of the Church. The O.D.C.C. seeks to 'cure' homosexuals, but any formerly homosexual members who relapse are automatically barred from the Church for life.

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Adultery, reading pornographic material, pre-marital sex, taking drugs, drunkenness, heavy smoking, laziness, and greed are punished by temporary or permanent exclusion, and the culprits may be publicly castigated in the Sunday evening rallies. On 29 September 1979, all the members were sent a circular which gave a detailed list of transgressions and penalties, and mentioned the names of some of those who had 'sinned'.

On the other hand, the Open Door Community Church is not as harsh and authoritarian as some of the more extreme evangelical churches. Dating is permitted within certain limits, members may watch television and listen to the radio as well as go to the cinema—but only if the programmes are 'good'. However, even such concessions do not alter the fact that the standards of behaviour required by the Church are in sharp contrast to the permissiveness found in the Los Angeles area. The Church stresses the importance of working hard at school and college, of application in one's job, and of establishing a strong family unit. In other words, it wants to ensure that its members, however marginal they may have been in the past, become successful and respectable citizens.

Most inter-denominational or non-denominational churches tend to be even more theologically and politically conservative than are those in the mainstream of evangelism. ¹⁷ The O.D.C.C., however, claims in the words of Dr Hymers: 'We do not preach politics here, we do not endorse candidates'. Nevertheless, Communism is vigorously attacked, as are Liberal Christians. Dr Hymers condemned the financial support given by the 'liberal' World Council of Churches to the Patriotic Front of what was then Rhodesia, because of the politics of the Front. ¹⁸

In the matter of abortion, the Church takes an uncompromisingly conservative stand; an amendment to its constitution and by-laws states that the 'United States is under judgement because of the perfidious act of abortion on demand'. On the other hand, the O.D.C.C. showed a surprisingly tolerant attitude towards the rights of homosexuals; it even joined Liberal Christians in a demonstration against a proposition for limiting the employment opportunities of homosexual men and women in California. Some cynics might explain this stand as a strategical move to attract and 'cure' homosexuals and enrol them in the O.D.C.C.

It is at the Sunday evening rallies for all members, and friends and visitors, that the faithful are urged to renew their allegiance while the others are exhorted to commit themselves to Christ. The variety of original religious backgrounds is stressed, and Dr Hymers in the course of his rally sermon will often ask Catholics, Protestants, and Jews to stand up and identify themselves. Some of the features of Judaism are praised — for example, the beauty of religious celebrations such as the

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Passover seder or the kindling of Hanukah lights. However, there is no doubt that the road to salvation for all is only through a commitment 'to live for Christ'. The faithful will sometimes be asked at the Sunday evening rallies to stand up and 'handclap Jesus'; as they do so, most of the uncommitted also rise. At one rally, the preacher urged those who were seated to come forward:

Raise your hand! Come back to God! Have the courage! You may be a Catholic, a Protestant, a Baptist, a Jew. It does not matter! You need Christ! . . . It takes courage . . . I know you are kind of nervous . . . There is a kind of struggle inside you between God and Satan.

At every Sunday evening rally I attended, several dozen persons responded to the Invitation and were welcomed by the Church leaders, while the rally choir and congregation sang the emotional nineteenth-century hymn, 'Just as I am, without one plea'.

The stress throughout the rallies is not on millennial prophecies, but on individual salvation, with a warning that there was always the possibility 'for the unsaved to die on the freeway this evening', and if that happened they should be 'ready to meet God'. Those who respond to the appeal and step forward are told that they represent 'America that comes to live for Christ'. The aim of the church is to create here and now a better America, an America patterned on the one which is said to have existed in the golden age of the nineteenth century.

The committed members of the O.D.C.C. are closely supervised to prevent backsliding. They must all help in 'Gideon's Army', by spreading the good word from door to door for several hours every Saturday; there are regular choral and instrumental rehearsals; and a 'class ticket' is checked and punched by the pastor supervising each activity. Working for Gideon's Army, however, may be more effective in reinforcing the convictions and identity of the proselytizer than in attracting new members to the O.D.C.C.

Church, cult, or religious half-way house?

The members of the Open Door Community Church, with their disciplined behaviour and life of commitment, stand in sharp contrast to the surrounding permissive society of Los Angeles, 19 and it is the well-defined lines separating them from their environment which has led some critics to say that the Open Door Community Church is a cult. Dr Hymers, in reply, stated ironically in a sermon: 'We are authoritarian, sure we are, but the Church resembles a cult like a humming bird resembles an ostrich'. But he took the accusation sufficiently seriously to enumerate, in an 'Open Letter to Parents' distributed in 1979, the strong and varied relations of his church with other Born Again evangelical groups. He stressed that he was an ordained Baptist

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minister and that while his church was not a Baptist church, its inter-denominational status placed it in the same league as other famous evangelical churches, such as Moody Memorial Church in Chicago and Calvary Chapel in Costa Mesa. He pointed out that the Open Door Community Church co-operated with Mother Teresa of Calcutta, the Billy Graham Evangelist Association, Jews for Jesus, World Vision International, and Jesus to the Communist World, and that it gave 'money through those well-known mainstream organizations each week'. The Church also used materials provided by the Billy Graham Evangelist Association and handed out anti-Communist tracts supplied by the Jesus to the Communist World organization.

Almost all the income of the O.D.C.C. is derived from a tithe: the members must give the Church at least ten per cent of their gross income. Holy Communion is held twice a month, but only those 'who are sure they are Born Again should share in the Lord's Supper';²⁰ however liturgically pragmatic the Church may be, in this case it adheres strictly to hard-core evangelism.

In 1980, in a forceful attempt at refuting charges of being a cult, the O.D.C.C. held a rally at Hollywood Palladium Hall ostensibly concerned with the subject of the inerrancy of Scripture. That was aptly chosen, as such a theme is a central doctrine of many 'hard-line' conservative evangelical churches. The sponsorship committee included several well-known evangelical personalities: a famous entertainer and author, the former pastor of a well-known evangelical church in Boston, and the leader of the Campus Crusade for Christ. The rally was held on a weekday evening and about 1,600 persons attended. The principal guest speaker was a best-selling evangelical author and former editor of the 'trans-denominational' evangelical magazine, Christianity Today. The Jews for Jesus²¹ also participated in the event, with a musical performance by their group, 'Israel Light', while the leader of the Jews for Jesus took the public donations and made a short speech. The Jewish presence in the O.D.C.C. was thus again emphasized on this occasion.

If the Open Door Community Church is not a cult, neither is it an institution in the usual mould of evangelical Christianity — in view of its semi-communal life-style, its emphasis on discipline, and the authoritarian attitude of its leaders. Although the Church has expanded since its foundation, it has also lost a great many adherents; the number of new recruits has exceeded that of those who have fallen away. The leaders frequently warn that Satan is on the attack. There have certainly been many notable defections: one 'liberal' Presbyterian minister was accused of taking away several members from one of the house churches, and even more strikingly, one O.D.C.C. preacher 'rebelled' and left the Church, taking a number of adherents with him. Sometimes, a resident of a house church 'escapes' during the night,

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without warning. It seems that many are called, but not all stay the course.

It may well be that, in practice if not in intent, the main function of the Open Door Community Church is to 'rescue' drop-outs and members of ethnic minorities, guide them in a new style of living, and teach them the values of the 'moral majority' until they become integrated successfully within the wider middle-class community and leave the Church. Since most of the members of the O.D.C.C. are young men and women under the age of 30, they tend to respond positively to the paternal authority of the Church leaders at first, especially since these leaders do not seek to cut them off from most contacts with the outside world - as do many cults. However, after two or three more years, when they are in steady employment and then marry, they find it increasingly difficult to submit to authoritarian leadership and they leave the Church. One way of retaining their allegiance might be to promote them within the Church, but of course such positions are limited in number, and only a few have the abilities necessary for leadership.

Conclusion

Jews in the United States have expressed great concern about the appeal which various cults have for the vulnerable young of their community.²² The February-March 1980 issue of *Alternatives* (a Christian magazine published in New York) has a directory which lists nine specialized services, of which six are 'Missions to the Jews'.

However, the Jewish involvement in the Open Door Community Church is clearly very limited in terms of numbers, since in 1980 only about six per cent of all members were of Jewish origin. On the other hand, Jews are prominent in positions of leadership; in 1979, four of the 13 house churches were led by Jewish pastors; and one of these four had a Master's degree in psychology and acted as a qualified counsellor for young members of the Church. That was a very useful asset in any discussion with parents who were fearful about their children's adherence to the O.D.C.C. It is also worth noting that the leading musician at the Sunday evening rallies is a Jewish lady pianist.

The Church is so intent on recruiting Jews that it has passed an amendment to its constitution and by-laws to the effect that 'This Church does not recognize conversion from Judaism to Christianity, does not require Jews to convert from Judaism to become members, and considers its members to have remained Jews.' Few, if any, Christian churches have been known to make such a formal pronouncement. The Jews for Jesus movement has goals which are somewhat similar to those of the Open Door Community Church, and there is close collaboration between the two organizations, whose

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leaders hold one another in great esteem. The important difference between them is that Jews for Jesus is a missionary movement among Jews rather than a church, while the O.D.C.C. reaches out to members of all religions, including Jews.

The subject of the State of Israel occurs rather infrequently in sermons at the Sunday evening rallies, but on at least one occasion the leader of the Open Door Community Church declared, 'We support Israel . . . All across the United States, believing people are strong supporters of Israel'. However, it is clearly not this pro-Israel attitude which leads the Church to emphasize the Jewish presence in its midst.

In an article on 'The Jews of Los Angeles', the Los Angeles Times of 29 January 1978 stated that Jews 'by most accounts have the highest per capita income and per capita are the best educated, most productive and socially active citizens in the community'. Presumably, such an influential daily newspaper reflects the opinion of a substantial proportion of the population of the Los Angeles area. Generally, Jews in the United States are seen as the model of a poor urban community which became strikingly prosperous and respectable within one or two generations. The Open Door Community Church undoubtedly attaches special importance to its Jewish house church, and to Jewish recruits in its other house churches. Most of the members of the O.D.C.C. are young persons from ethnic and marginal groups, and it is likely that they look upon the Jewish members of the Church as a link with the world of the established middle classes whose values the Church has taught them to appreciate, and whose ranks they wish to join.

NOTES

1 See my discussion on Messianic Judaism in my 'Rapport de Mission CNRS/NSF', Revue des Études Juives, vol. 136, no. 3-4, 1977, pp. 415-23. See also my 'Fieldwork Method and the Sociology of Jews: Case Studies of Hassidic Communities', The Jewish Journal of Sociology, vol. 20, no. 1, June 1978, pp. 49-58.

² I am grateful to the leaders and members of the O.D.C.C. for their unfailing co-operation. I am also grateful to Professor C. Peter Wagner of the School of World Mission, Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, California, who made available to me papers on the O.D.C.C. by four of his graduate students: William P. Addley, Brian Kingsmore, Kenneth M. L. Wheaton, and C. Wayne Zunkel; and to Barbara Clairchilde, then graduate student at U.C.L.A., for her co-operation.

A valuable source material is Dr R. L. Hymers' dissertation for a second doctoral degree at San Francisco Theological Seminary, Guidelines for House Churches: A Study on Organizing and Developing House Churches, 2 vols, June 1981.

³ Most, but not all, biograpical data are taken from Hymers, Guidelines . . ., op. cit.

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⁴ For a survey of Revivalism, Methodism, and the Wesleyan influence, see Sidney A. Alsthrom, A Religious History of the American People, vol. 1. New York. 1975.

⁵ Ĭbid., p. 557.

6 In his Guidelines ..., op. cit., Hymers states: 'We ... believe that all spiritual gifts described in the New Testament are currently operative today. but believe that the 'sign' gifts are given only to some and not to be over-empasized' (vol. 2, p. 341).

⁷ In this context, see Garry Schwartz, Sect Ideologies and Social Status, Chicago.

1970, pp. 177-80.

⁸ The Church distinguishes between 'members' and 'friends', but both participate equally in the life of the Church; membership is contingent on a screening and examination process. As the distinction is difficult for an observer to detect and as participation is equal, the term 'member' in this paper refers to both members and friends.

On the Hebrew Christian movement, see Ira O. Glick, 'The Hebrew Christians: A Marginal Religious Group' in Marshall Sklare, ed., The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group, New York, 1958, pp. 415-31; and B. Z.

Sobel, Hebrew Christianity: The Thirteenth Tribe, New York, 1974.

10 Dr Hymers and other leaders of the O.D.C.C. consult Professor Wagner of

the Fuller School on matters of their Church policy.

11 In an area of about three square miles, south of Beverly Hills, about half of the 23,000 residents are said to be Jewish; see Neil Reisner, ed., Jewish Los Angeles: A Guide, Jewish Federation Council of Greater Los Angeles, 1976, p. 12.

12 Worship and Service Hymnal, Hope Publishing Co., Carol Stream, Illinois,

- 13 See Roger Bastide, Le Candomblé de Bahia, Paris, 1958; C. Lévi-Strauss, Le Cru et le Cuit, Paris, 1964, p. 36; and Gilbert Rouget, La Musique et la Transe, Paris, 1980.
- 14 See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Commitment and Community, Cambridge, Ma., 1972, pp. 73-74, where she indicates how mortification in utopian communities involves submission to social control and leads the individual into new directions and fosters personal development.
- 15 For the words of the Benediction, see Numbers, 6: 24-26. Partaking of the bread and wine on this occasion is in the Jewish ritual manner, and is not intended as Christian Holy Communion.

¹⁶ See Hymers, Guidelines . . ., op. cit., pp. 71-76.

¹⁷ See Louise L. Lorentzen, 'Evangelical Lifestyle Concerns Expressed in Political Action' in Sociological Analysis, vol. XLI, 1980, pp. 144-54.

¹⁸ On this issue, the stand taken by the O.D.C.C. was similar to that of other evangelical churches: see Ernest W. Lefever, 'The WCC: An Uneasy Alliance Between God and Marx', in Christianity Today, 7 September 1979, p. 25.

19 See Robert W. Balch, 'Looking Behind the Scenes in a Religious Cult: Implications for the Study of Conversion', in Sociological Analysis, vol. XLI, 1980, pp. 137-43.

²⁰ See Hymers, Guidelines . . ., op. cit., vol. 2, p. 306.

²¹ The Jews for Jesus movement arose about 1970 in the San Francisco area. Its public appeals for conversion attracted a great deal of interest; see 'Jews for

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Jesus' in Time magazine, 12 June 1972. For a sociological analysis, see Dan La Magdeleine, Jews for Jesus: Organizational Structure and Supporters, unpublished M.A. dissertation, Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, Ca., 1977. See also the article by the leader of the Jews for Jesus, Moshe Rosen, 'Why Are Young Jews Turning to Christ?' in Christianity Today, 10 November 1972; and Moishe (sic) Rosen and William Proctor, Jews for Jesus, Old Tappan, N.J., 1974.

The Jews for Jesus movement is often wrongly identified by the public at

large with Jewish Christianity and Messianic Judaism.

²² During the high tide of the Jesus Revolution, the visible presence of Jews in the movement led to many alarmed articles. See, for example, André Ungar, 'Jews and Jesus Freaks' in *Reconstructionist*, December 1973, pp. 7-11. This concern persists; more recent articles include Mark Cohen, 'Missionaries in our Midst: The Appeal of Alternatives' in *Analysis*, vol. 64, March 1978 (publication of the Institute for Jewish Policy Planning and Research of the Synagogue Council of America).

It has been suggested that as many as 40 per cent of all cult members are Jewish, but a more reasonable estimate is made by Rabbi Maurice Davis, who puts the proportion at about 12 per cent: see Lita Linzer Schwartz, 'Cults and

the Vulnerability of Jewish Youth', in Jewish Education, Summer 1978.

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Adam Kuper

(Review Article)

HE political views of every adult Jew will be largely conditioned by the two great crises of modern Jewish history: the Holocaust, and the establishment of a Jewish State. These climacterics arouse a specifically Jewish political response. We are the only people for whom the genocide of the Jews is the overwhelmingly most important feature of Hitler's war. And only Jews (or perhaps Jews and Palestinians) would single out the establishment of Israel as the most significant event in the post-war collapse of the colonial empires.

Yet history is read in different ways, and while we do share key points of reference, the conclusions we draw are diverse. Political commitments are responses not only to seminal historical events, but also to the day-to-day constraints of social life and status. It would not be surprising if the politics of Jews proved to be quite variable.

Or is there something in the heritage of Jews, apart from the salience of these recent communal events, which can be traced in the varieties of modern Jewish political commitments? This question is explored by Professor Cohen and by Dr Shimoni.* Gideon Shimoni's fine study analyses the political responses of South African Jews, especially their uneasy acceptance of the distribution of power in South Africa itself, and their exceptionally strong communal identification with Zionism. Percy Cohen examines the apparently disproportionate Jewish presence in the student radical movements of the late 1960s. Both are concerned with the political behaviour of Jews as Jews, and they balance the responses to a history of immigration and to the traumas of the 1940s; the impact of particular local circumstances; and the possibility that some other force is at work, something more specifically Jewish, the heritage of a religious tradition.

The large majority of the South African Jewish population is of Lithuanian origin. A special stream of Lithuanians diverged from the great river of eastern European Jewish migration, and some forty

^{*} Percy S. Cohen, Jewish Radicals and Radical Jews, Foreword by Neil J. Smelser, xviii + 224 pp., Academic Press for the Institute of Jewish Affairs, London, 1980, £10.80. Gideon Shimoni, Jews and Zionism: The South African Experience (1910-1967), xiii + 428 pp., Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1980, £12.00.

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thousand Jews went to South Africa between 1880 and 1910, the great surge coming after the discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand in 1884. The Jewish population later grew to something over one hundred thousand, but largely by way of natural increase. Few German Jews were admitted by the government in the 1930s. This homogeneous population started in trade, often in the country districts, but soon moved into the cities and into industry, wholesale and retail merchandising, and the professions. The immigrants took over the communal institutions established by the handful of early British Jewish settlers and turned them to their particular purposes, giving them a dominantly Zionist character in the process.

Within South Africa, the Jews were quickly identified with the urban, English-speaking section of the white population, as against the rural Afrikaans-speakers. Politically, they overwhelmingly supported the United Party, which always included a group of Jewish MP's, and which sided with the Allies during the Second World War. In 1948, the United Party was swept from power by an Afrikaner Nationalist party. exclusive, Calvinist, and racist. Many feared that the Jews would be a target of the new régime, and indeed some leading Nationalists had been Nazi sympathizers. The historian Keppel-Jones wrote a sombre futurist novel in which South Africa rapidly became an African version of Nazi Germany, but at least so far as the Jews were concerned, his prophecies were quite wrong. 'Keppel-Jones' pogrom never came to pass', Shimoni comments. 'Quite to the contrary, Dr Malan's ascent to power inaugurated a gradual process of accommodation and rapprochement between Afrikaner and Jew which, weathering some grave setbacks in the 1960's, has continued to this day' (p. 206).

In retrospect, this is not very surprising. The Afrikaner Nationalists were preoccupied with the issue of African nationalism. Given their own Afrikaner (as opposed to South African), nationalist ideology, they were content with a measure of white solidarity, and did not seek to assimilate non-Afrikaners. There was certainly a continuing undertone of antisemitism, which surfaced from time to time, particularly when Jewish radicals made trouble; but the Jews were not central to their concerns.

For their part, the majority of the Jews had never challenged the institutionalized racial discrimination and oppression which characterized South Africa from the moment of their arrival; and South Africa was perhaps not very different, in this respect, from Tsarist Russia or Britain's African colonies. The peculiar notoriety of the South African political system is a feature only of the last generation: the collapse of the colonial empires left the country in an exposed position, as an increasingly visible and hated anomaly. There has always been a radical white opposition in South Africa, however, and a high proportion of its leading figures have been Jews. Yet their numbers are

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still so very small that it would require a microscopic, biographical study to establish the reasons for their stand. In general, the Jewish community has been more liberal than the White community as a whole, but this may be a function of its high level of urbanization and of the professional occupations of its leading figures.

As the Nationalist government settled in, and the outside world became increasingly hostile, the Jews (together with the rest of the whites) became more conservative. This shift was reinforced by the alignment of Israel with South Africa, apart from a period during the 1960s. 'By 1967', Shimoni comments, 'there appeared to be more than a grain of truth to the witticism which had begun to be current, that most Jews spoke like Progressives, voted for the United Party and hoped that the National Party would remain in power . . . If it is thus correct to say that many White liberals and radicals were Jews, it is equally correct that not many Jews were liberals and radicals' (p. 304).

The uniform commitment of South African Jews to Zionism was no doubt initially carried over from eastern Europe. But, as Shimoni emphasizes, South Africa provided a special niche for communal nationalism. Apartheid enshrined the dominant white belief that each 'ethnic group' in the black population should have its own homeland. This conception reflects something of the white vision of a white community composed of several 'national groups' only one of which, the Afrikaners, claims an unequivocal identification with South Africa.

From 1961 to 1967 there was a diplomatic break between Israel and South Africa, as Israel attempted to win Third World support. During that period, South African Jews were for the first time obliged to consider the possibility that they might have to choose between two loyalties. There had already been a decline in the fervour of Jewish commitment to Israel; and had the break with Israel been prolonged, Zionism would probably have been much weakened in South Africa. In the event, the Six-Day War and its aftermath led to the restoration of friendly diplomatic relations, and there was a surge of pride in Israel among the Jews. Yet entrenched attitudes had been shaken. The episode paralleled the effect on English South Africans of the break with Britain and the Commonwealth. This rupture occurred at the same period, and it also had an impact on Jewish attitudes to South Africa. Overall, many identified more positively with the Afrikaners; and many others decided that they did not belong at all.

Percy Cohen is concerned with another political issue, the wave of student radicalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As many remarked at the time (for a variety of motives), Jewish students seemed to be disproportionately involved in the movement. Cohen notes (p. 21) that Nathan Glazer estimated that about one third of the young civil rights workers who went to Mississippi in 1964 were Jewish, and that a third to a half of the radical student activists in the United States

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in 1969 were Jewish. Yet Jews were only a very small minority of the total number of American college students, and only about five per cent of Jewish students were left-wing radical activists. The difficulty is to explain why a minority of these young Jews should have been so active in radical groups, while at the same time accounting for the passivism, or conservatism, of the vast majority of other young Jews.

Cohen deals with recent history in the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Argentina; and in addition to general historical sources, he draws on specially conducted interviews with a few young Jewish radicals in these countries. The empirical contribution of the study, however, is not its strong point. The variations between the circumstances of the different countries are treated briefly and unsystematically. The interviews do not provide sufficient information to pinpoint the special characteristics of Jewish students who became radicals. Moreover, the division of the sample into 'radical Iews' and 'Iewish radicals' does not prove very useful, for there appears to be a continuum of attributes and attitudes between those who rejected the Jewish tradition and opposed Zionism, and those who adopted a more nuanced or even definitely 'Jewish' point of view. (Cohen himself acknowledges at the outset (p. q) that 'the disjunction between . . . the two types of radical is by no means always simple and clear cut'.) On the theoretical side, however, the author has many stimulating things to say, both in his criticisms of current theories in this field, and by way of his own hypotheses.

His analysis is set against an inevitably somewhat sketchy historical account of the post-war social transformation of Western Jewry. Jewish emancipation had been supported by left-wing parties in Europe, and opposed by the Right. For a long time, antisemitism could be expected from the Right rather than the Left. Consequently, the first generation of emancipated Jews identified with the Left. Their children inherited this association, but the post-war generation had lost its intellectual centre in *Mitteleuropa*, was cut off from the eastern European communities which had survived, and was now dominantly middle-class, even upper-middle class.

In response to their new circumstances, and also in reaction to Soviet antisemitism and anti-Zionism, Jews in the West were increasingly inclined to adopt a conservative political position. By the 1960s, the parental generation, comfortable and assimilated, distanced itself from its inherited radicalism. And yet, in Cohen's view, enough of this old commitment persisted for some of the children to sense a gap between what their parents said and what they did, and to accuse them of political hypocrisy. In the United States, the civil rights movement and the Vietnamese war precipitated a dramatic polarization. This incongruity between the implicit commitment to political radicalism and the actual conservatism of the parents galvanized at least some of the

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children. Their readiness for activism was enhanced by a sense of marginality, of vulnerability, which the parents also had transmitted. And they were influenced moreover by an inherited conviction of the power of ideas, even by a certain messianism. Thus, 'the need to emulate and to surpass parental idealism — a true idealism in which ideas themselves are invested with so much power — is sustained by a covert culture which not only encourages particular sympathies but also transmits the motives to continue to respond to them' (p. 215).

Their Jewish heritage might have made some young Jews more responsive than other contemporaries to radical movements, but Percy Cohen is inclined to believe the statements of the majority of the interviewees that they were not engaged specifically as Jews. Overtly Jewish themes were not of great salience in the New Left. Even anti-Zionism was never crucial. Those who were also interested in Jewish organizations were able to adopt a variety of intellectual positions. Jewish Radicals and Radical Jews is often illuminating, but it left me feeling that it is still not clear who these radical young Jews were, what made them act so eccentrically, and what marked them off from their Jewish and non-Jewish contemporaries.

Both books are original and interesting studies, yet both pay too little attention to the development which is, after all, central to modern western Jewish life, although at first sight the South African Jews seem to present a divergent picture. I mean, of course, the process of assimilation. In the West, Zionism and the Hassidic revival represent weak counter-currents, but the overwhelming trend is towards assimilation and intermarriage, particularly in the case of the professionals and intellectuals. If this is so, then the political activities of the 1960s must have been, in part, a statement about this assimilation — about what it was to which the young Jewish intellectuals were being assimilated. Students who had considered the fate of the assimilated German Jews might even have felt a special historical virtue in their critical response.

In South Africa, the Jews remained unassimilated and pro-Zionist. But the intellectual and professional élite, who elsewhere were the first to assimilate, did not stay. The educated younger generation has left for western Europe, North America, Israel, and Australia. Today, as Shimoni notes in his conclusion, 'South African Jewry has an inordinately aging population barely replenished by natural increase' (p. 364). Younger Jews migrated, in my view, because even the most uncritical assimilation was impracticable; and because of a strong and characteristically Jewish sensitivity to the political insecurity of the country. The Zionist orientation of the community, which had been supported by structural features of the wider society, reinforced doubts about assimilation, and about the viability of South African society, and provided an alternative. It was an alternative which every South

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African Jew of the post-war generation seriously considered. Although few took it up, its presence made it easier to consider also other destinations.

Percy Cohen, Gideon Shimoni, and I myself are all South African Jews who became part of this new migration. Shimoni settled in Israel. Cohen carried out fieldwork in Israel, and now is a Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economis. My wife and I proposed to identify ourselves with the new Africa, and settled in Uganda; but we beat a retreat when Amin loomed on the horizon and we came to Europe. We are all university teachers; and here I am, commenting on what they have written about Jewish politics. We all sailed before a single wind. Now, with so many other South African Jews, we have rejoined the mainstream of western Jewish life.

Some of our western Jewish contemporaries engaged in a Quixotic battle with a chimera of fascism. A few chose to become Israelis. The majority merged into the professional and intellectual classes of western Europe and North America. We were still responding directly to the political crises of the 1940s. These crises will seem very distant to our children who, by virtue of the choices we have made, will find less solace and less guidance in the cultural traditions which may still move us.

WILLIAM R. BEER, The Unexpected Rebellion: Ethnic Activism in Contemporary France, xxxii + 150 pp., Foreword by Nicholas Wahl, New York University Press, New York and London, 1980, \$24.00.

Observers of ethnicity are apt to agree that there is, lately, a lot of it about. But while a general trend is clear enough, the extent of correspondence between the many phenomena now called 'ethnic' is not. Are they each versions or styles or stages of a single process? Or have we ballooned the ordinary affective elements of political economy into a catch-all category for all those contemporary developments of it which cannot be classified in conventional analytic terms?

Both possibilities hold. There are echoes of the history of the American migrations in the contemporary European experience of non-European immigration; and there is some kind of parallel between, say, Jews organizing a new life in London at the turn of the century and Hausa traders accommodating to their Yoruba neighbours in Ibadan. All these cases have involved new settings, new confrontations of difference, new adaptations of traditional cultures to new constraints and opportunities. And to the extent that the only obvious common element among them is a migration of some kind, it is tempting to suppose that ethnicity is something that happens when people move. Yes, but...

The title of this book is to the point: ethnic activism in France now is 'unexpected' precisely because none of the assumed preconditions of ethnicity is present to make us expect it. No migrations are involved (France's sizable immigrant populations get no mention), nor is there evidence of the persecutions and deprivations which migrants so often suffer, and which have elsewhere made authochthonous ethnics of native people who have not moved from their traditional homes. Nevertheless, this book is about some people in some parts of France who are reviving old political idioms and deliberately honing their minority status for political use.

Seven regions are compared: Alsace, Flanders, Brittany, Occitania, Corsica, Basque, and Catalan. These were all once nations of a kind and (so?) all qualify as 'ethnic' regions now. But in respect of property ownership, industrial development, and distinctiveness of language they are quite unlike. The analysis of fact centres on the observation that the strength of ethnic activism — here measured as a combination of political violence and voting patterns — bears no neat relation to any

of these economic and cultural differences. It is significant that awareness of change and loss seems to count more than conditions of poverty or dependence: ethnic activism increases, for example, as decision-making begins to move away from the local people, not when it has left them altogether (pp. 34, 35).

In any case, as the argument runs these political developments cannot be other than 'ethnic'. And, in this setting, if they are ethnic they are anomalous. Notice, however, that the sequence also works the other way around: it is because they are anomalous that these new political movements are explained in terms of ethnicity. Ethnicity is a notion which stands for, and stands in for, a whole range of counter-cultural and contra-establishment trends. Whatever its theoretical ironies, therefore, the rise of ethnicity is a pressing issue for practical politicians.

In the Foreword to this book, Wahl spells out the problem for them: 'If modern democratic theory is correct then ethnic activism is one of the recent developments that most threaten western government — its stability, effectiveness and legitimacy' (p. xxvii). In my view this makes too strong and too general a claim for ethnicity in any form. Few of us are exclusively ethnic all the time, most of us also cherish other-thanethnic identities, and all of us are or have been party to encounters and situations — even in the formal political arena — in which our ethnic origins or sympathies do not count at all. There are moreover many other-than-ethnic 'single issue' interest groups who now, as Wahl puts it, 'refuse to play by the rules of the pluralist democratic game'. But it may be significant that the 'ethnic phenomenon' is the cause of particular anxiety in France. 'The monism of French culture and the centralization of French politics would appear to allow scant legitimacy and little hope for the ethnic activists . . . ethnic politics has been considered subversive of one of the nation's oldest civic values — the reality of a "public good", defined for the nation as a whole by central political institutions and pursued by a centralized state machine . . . Only the ethnic activists have always rejected any notion of a "French" public good that could transcend class, region and ideology' (p. xxviii).

In this way the historical culture of France can account for what strikes the anglophone ear as a curious dominance of ethnic themes in French political discourse, and the overlay of ethnic and regional boundaries accounts for their potential strength. Against the standards described in this book, neither the British nor the Americans would find ethnicity so useful a resource for those who have reason to protest against the establishment, or so great a focus of anxiety for those whose job it is to defend it. But the book is concerned to explain changes that have occurred within this overarching framework, and Beer poses three questions in respect of ethnic activism in contemporary France: Why an ethnic revival now? Why more ethnic activism in some of the seven

proto-ethnic regions studied than in others? And — on quite another level because the link between the individual and the group process is never made — What circumstances or characteristics turn a man into 'an ethnic activist' and so provide the leadership necessary for 'an ethnic movement'?

The discussion proceeds 'in the form of testing hypotheses derived from social theory' (p. xxvi). It involves a convincing if unoriginal demonstration that the hypothetical inverse relation between ethnicity and modernization/rationalization need not hold and clearly does not hold in this case; it is rising expectations frustrated and the deprivation of particular regions relative to those expectations and to the prosperity of the centre which are the currency of discontent. Beer's critical adaptation of Hechter's model of internal colonialism to deal with these aspects of the French case is for me the most interesting contribution of his book (Chapters II and III). The strength of the argument fades somewhat in the section dealing with 'The Social Characteristics of Ethnic Activists', largely, as I have said, because the difficult change of gear from social-economic to psychological explanation is not smooth. But the analysis is not unconvincing: the same social strains that (some) regions have suffered in the wake of industrialization (and others have suffered for the lack of it!) have produced a cadre of 'rootless local intellectuals, searching for a simpler, more stable and more satisfying life in a world beset by inflation and changing values'. These 'have turned to ethnic revival and defense as a refuge' (p. xxxi) and ethnic activism becomes for them both a means of drawing attention to local economic grievances and a way of solving problems of individual identity.

This brings us back to the starting point. All versions of ethnicity are reactive: to be 'us' we need a 'them'; to identify ourselves we need to know who we are not. In all advanced/late industrial societies, individuals are depersonalized by the size and the remoteness of state bureaucracy, and this lack of identity, of a personal place in the scheme of things, is most strongly felt or at least most strongly expressed by the young. In this circumstance any recognizable ethnic heritage becomes an advantage. It provides 'ethnics' with a ready identity resource which they can focus on and even activate for political purposes. Beer's 'activists' were not only young, highly educated, and upwardly mobile (p. 91), they were also much more concerned with the marking and maintenance of lines between 'us' and 'them' than with the social milieu of their activity (p. 108).

I do not know how much this book tells the French things they would not otherwise know about France, but it indicates the extent to which the expression of ethnicity is dependent on complex combinations of historical, social, and personal context. More important perhaps, it demonstrates that ethnic activism — which in other contexts shows

itself as racism — is a function of the identity crises of the people who express it, not of the colour or the culture of the people they express it against.

SANDRA WALLMAN

BERNARD S. JACKSON, ed., The Jewish Law Annual. Volume Three, viii + 257 pp., published under the auspices of the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists and the Oxford Centre for Postgraduate Hebrew Studies by E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1980, 84 guilders.

This volume offers a rich and varied diet for all who are interested in the ramifications of legal principles and practice. It has two main parts. In Part One, there are eight learned contributions by eminent jurists and rabbinic scholars on the subject of Unjust Enrichment. Since it is defined as embracing 'all those situations in which one person derives a material benefit from another without being entitled thereto' (p. q), it can affect cases of salvage, business transactions based on the use of another's money or property, the fluctuations in the value of money, and delay in payment of debts while use is being made of the money involved. Of major importance is the right of the benefactor to claim compensation from the beneficiary or reimbursement of outlay of expenditure. In Jewish law there are four distinct instances which affect the issue: 1) where one party derives no benefit and the other suffers no loss; 2) where one party benefits and the other suffers loss; 3) where one party benefits and the other suffers no loss; and 4) where one party does not benefit and the other suffers loss.

The third instance is the one which has received most attention, and it is in this connection that Dr Rakover has devised the 'Exemptive Principle': where no loss has been incurred, no payment need be made for a benefit received. That would arise in the case of a squatter in a property deserted by the owner, who would moreover not have let it for profit. However, there are exceptions to this principle, and these are discussed.

Professor Albeck deals with gemirat da'at, the resolve to act in a given manner. When a benefactor must have resolved to confer a benefit, why should he be compensated? On the other hand, one can presume that the beneficiary would have made payment if he had been asked to do so, since it is usual that people pay for benefits received — especially if the benefactor has been involved in a pecuniary loss. However, no question of compensation arises, nor is consideration given to the willingness or the unwillingness of the beneficiary, when the saving of life or the personal safety of the beneficiary is involved.

The contribution of the late Dr Ehrman to the subject of Unjust Enrichment concentrates on the theme of ona'ah — fraudulent dealing.

Of special interest is the interpretation by rabbinic scholars of the original reference to the subject in Leviticus 25: 14-17. The Biblical context would imply that ona'ah is applicable to both movable and immovable property (as it later did in Roman law); but Talmudic exegesis limited it to movable property. It was argued that since land sales are subject to more detailed negotiation between the parties concerned, there is less likelihood of misrepresentation.

The second part of the volume is a miscellany comprising current rabbinic Responsa, rulings of Israel's Supreme Court, a sidelight on American statutes as they may affect Jews, a discussion on the application of international law to the Peace Treaty of 1979 between Israel and Egypt, the legal issues arising from the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, and Israel's relations with the European Economic Community.

One of the Responsa deals with the criteria of death; it discusses the concept of 'brain death' as opposed to cessation of respiration, and whether cessation of cardiac and neurological activity as well as of respiration must occur. Another considers Privacy and Confidentiality as they affect the medical profession, and testimony given by witnesses in camera; in this connection two Biblical injunctions would appear to be in conflict: 'tale bearing' and 'placing a stumbling block before the blind'. A responsum by Dayan Grossnass, formerly of the London Beth Din, is given prominence; he forbade aborting a pregnant mentally defective girl, but permitted her subsequent sterilization.

It is of interest to learn that Israel's Supreme Court judges do not hesitate to cite Biblical texts and rabbinic sources when dispensing justice in cases where there is no modern judicial precedent. This is very much in line with the Foundations of Law bill (passed by the Knesset in 1980), which requires Israeli courts in such cases to be guided by the principles of the 'heritage of Israel' rather than by Common Law and the doctrines of equity in force in England — on the grounds that 'it is intolerable for courts of a sovereign state to be bound by laws of another sovereign state'.

A digest-survey of recent literature is presented in alphabetical order of subjects ranging from Abortion to Usury, and the Appendix contains a bibliography of Jewish law articles in selected law journals. Thus, comprehensiveness is the keynote of the whole volume.

ISAAC LEVY

BERNARD S. JACKSON, ed., Jewish Law in Legal History and the Modern World (Supplement Two of The Jewish Law Annual), ix + 175 pp., E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1980, 60 guilders.

This volume is a collection of papers delivered at an international conference on 'Jewish Law in Legal History and the Modern World' at

Oxford in August 1978. The basic theme was that of the relationship between Jewish law and other legal systems.

Four of the papers are on historical aspects of the theme. Professor Yaron makes the point that 'for all practical purposes of Jewish law, a biblical text means what the Talmud says it does' (p. 30); the historian, in contradistinction to the halakhist, must see biblical law in the general context of law in the ancient Near East, and recent scholarship will lead him to discover a 'diminishing biblical uniqueness', though the Bible does have some uniquely 'humane' provisions, such as with regard to the manumission of slaves. David Daube, in the course of a string of elegantly expressed thoughts and anecdotes, touches on some points of contact between Roman and Jewish law; it is a pity that the volume does not carry a more balanced and comprehensive account of the relationship between the two systems. S. D. Goiten gives a systematic presentation of the relationship between Muslim and Jewish law in the early Islamic Empire; he makes skilful use of the documents preserved in the Cairo Geniza to show the mutual influences and common problems, and to illustrate the enhanced position of Jewish women in contrast to that of their Muslim sisters. The historical section concludes with Ze'ev W. Falk's paper on the relationship between Jewish law and Christian Medieval canon law; he summarizes the similiarities and differences in their growth and structure, and discusses some probable instances of interaction between the two systems — for example, the process of legislation by ban and the custom of celebrating anniversaries of death (Yahrzeit).

The other papers are devoted to the interaction of Jewish law with contemporary society. Professor Kirschenbaum surveys the research and scholarship which have at last made possible a restatement in contemporary terms of Jewish law, and thus prepared the way for its future growth and development; one should read this paper in conjunction with the fuller treatment in the second volume of The Jewish Law Annual, though Kirschenbaum's survey is vigorous and masterly. Haim H. Cohn reports authoritatively on 'the manner and extent in which Jewish law has been applied by the legislature and the courts of Israel'; apart from the judicature of the rabbinical courts, he considers in some detail references to Jewish law in legislative and judicial practice, including the Surety Law, the Succession Law, and the famous Law of Return. Bernard J. Meislin's paper on Jewish law in the United States is addressed to a fascinating dilemma facing American legislatures and courts. Can they entertain Jewish law - for example, the desire of a wife to receive a get (bill of divorcement) - without contravening the prohibition against religious establishment? On the other hand, can they disregard it, when contracted for by the affected spouses, without offending the constitutional guarantee of the free exercise of religion?

Professor Jackson introduces these papers with a perceptive analysis of the relationship between history and dogmatics, and discusses the ways in which the impact of one legal system on another may be manifested in form and content. His structuralist presentation effectively diminishes the conflict between the historical approach, with its emphasis on causal relationships, and the dogmatic, which stresses logical consistency, for the structuralist cannot permit the isolation of innate and environmental factors from each other.

Papers are not the whole of a conference. There is a spirit, a 'music', which may be shared by the participants, but which is difficult to set down on paper. In the brief résumés of the discussions which followed each paper, Professor Jackson has done much to bring to life what would otherwise have been a set of unrelated accounts of aspects of the relationship between Jewish law and other legal systems. One senses something of the excitement and personal interactions of the distinguished scholars who took part in what was undoubtedly a stimulating occasion, probably the first of its kind; it has already resulted in the formation of the Jewish Law Association and the fostering of continued international contacts between these scholars.

The volume is well produced, accurately printed, and will be a source of pleasure as well as instruction for all who recognize law as a central feature of Jewish society.

NORMAN SOLOMON

JACOB KATZ, From Prejudice to Destruction. Anti-Semitism, 1700-1933, viii + 392 pp., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Ma., and London, 1980, £12.00.

The plaited bread with which the observant Iew begins and ends his Sabbath unintendedly symbolises the pained bewilderment which any historical analysis of the continuing hostility to Jews must evoke, especially when its primary focus is the history of antisemitism in Europe over more than two hundred years — even if it deliberately avoids the ultimate culmination of that evil in the holocaust. As one strand in the plaited loaf disappears, so another takes its place, yet one knows that the disappearing strand only seems to have done so. Its link with the new strand is that of a composite whole. So it is with antisemitism. One can follow the Christian-religious origins to a point where secularization and liberalism dissolve the force of this opposition, which promptly reappears in the guise of socio-economic, racial, or cultural hostility. The prolonged conflicts over civil rights were accompanied by demands for total assimilation, which itself gave rise to a rejection of its most successful adherents, so that an eventual reversion to the traditional alternatives of exclusion, expulsion, or annihilation are resorted to with an immoral but incontrovertible logic.

Jacob Katz, the doyen of Jewish historians, has set himself the difficult task of drawing together the social and intellectual foundations of antisemitic thought in Germany, France, and Austria-Hungary. The result is a massive compendium, a skilful blend of historical development and sociological analysis. Inevitably in such a wide-ranging study, the weight given to particular authors, the substantive values of analytical categories, will — indeed, ought to — give rise to serious debate and alternative interpretations. To cite but one example, can one really regard the period 1848 to 1873 as 'an interval of almost two generations' (p. 247) in which anti-Jewish attitudes subsided to an extent that made it necessary to 'reawaken' anti-Jewish bias and theories? Is this not the period of Gobineau, of the literary assaults on Jews by Gustav Freytag (1855) and Wilhelm Raabe (1864) which Katz discussed at length in an earlier chapter? More significantly, is this not also the period when Moses Hess restated the case for Jewish nationalism in his famous Rom und Jerusalem (1862), precisely because he had come to the conclusion that anti-Jewish hostility was ineradicable?

This is not so much a criticism as a genuine question of the kind which Katz's analysis will inspire. The cool, lucid, and scholarly style of the book betrays none of the passion, not to say outrage, which one finds, for example, in another great historian of antisemitism, Leon Poliakov. It is admirable, but does lead to a certain blandness in the final section, which considers, but does not really resolve, the ultimate question whether the force of antisemitism moves in a linear progression from philosophical antipathy to bestial fury, whether the distaste for the individual Jew as a stranger and alien is the essential precursor of Jews as a pariah nation in our own time.

JULIUS CARLEBACH

ROSS P. SCHERER, ed., American Denominational Organization. A Sociological View, viii + 378 pp., William Carey Library, 1705 N. Sierra Bonita Avenue, Pasadena, Ca., 1980, \$14.95 (paperback).

The contributors to this volume make imaginative use of concepts from the sociology of organizations as well as from the theory of open systems in their analysis of three major American religions — those of the Protestants, the Catholics, and the Jews. It is mainly the former two, and especially Protestantism, with which they are concerned; only one of the twelve essays is about Judaism.

The editor's Introductory synthesis is remarkably instructive. It is followed by the first part, entitled 'Overview of Major Denominational 'Families''; the second part is about 'Selected Agencies and Subgroups'; and the third is on 'Strain and Change in Denomination'. Both

the title of the volume and the way the contributions are organized emphasize the notion of 'denomination'. Indeed, according to Scherer and to some others, Troeltsch's typology of sect and church is not applicable to the United States — where religious freedom and religious pluralism make churches, temples, and synagogues into voluntary associations (to a greater or lesser extent, either centralized or federated), ever liable to rifts and secessions which in turn might lead to the formation of new denominational aggregates.

Thus Garry Burkart, in 'Patterns of Protestant Organization', examines the operation of various denominations as open systems, with all that such a perspective entails: transformations, reactions to the environment, a skill in interpreting external reality, a solid internal structure as well as ongoing exchanges with the participants, and finally ideology and fission. Burkart's study throws a special light on some recent events. For instance, we learn that the Disciples of Christ were the first denomination wholly indigenous to the United States, and that its organization is characterized by a moderately centralized federalism. However, what was not generally revealed, at the time of the tragedy in Guyana, is that Jim Jones, the leader of the so-called 'sect' of the People's Temple, was a member of the Disciples of Christ—who never disowned him!

Gertrude Kin applies the systems theory and makes use of the comparative method in her study of 'Roman Catholic Organization'; she notes that the Roman Catholic Church is more 'corporate than federated and its polity espiscopal rather than either congregational or presbyterian'. According to her, the celibacy of priests is a contributory factor in Catholic centralism, since they can easily be transferred from parish to parish. However, one has no reason to believe that the married Protestant clergymen have any less mobility in the United States or elsewhere. Moreover, in spite of its authoritarian centralism, the Catholic Church is certainly not immune to the effect of the ultimate weapon of its rank and file — desertion of the churches!

Daniel Elazar, in his 'Patterns of Jewish Organization in the United States', demonstrates the extent to which Jewish religious organizations are decentralized. However, his analysis does not gives us a great deal of data on the history, the moving principles, or the religious ideologies of such major 'denominations' as Reform and Conservative Judaism. But he does show that the relationship which American Jews have with their Judaism is certainly not limited to the practice of their religion, which explains why their most centralized (or at least, their most federated) organizations are mainly political or philanthropic in nature — as, for example, the American Jewish Congress or the American Joint Distribution Committee.

Several of the contributors to this volume look upon the Jewish model as the paradigm of the development of religious organization in

the United States. They do not seem to take account of the fact that there is a specific historical peculiarity in the case of the Jews. Admittedly, Jews are not a homogeneous group, but they are nevertheless not as heterogeneous as American Catholics (Poles, Italians, Irish, Puerto Ricans, etc.) or even as American Protestants (the poor Blacks of the Southern States, the Wasps, the 'Rednecks', the poor Whites of the Middle West and elsewhere).

In the second part of the book, Thomas Ganon's 'Catholic Orders in Sociological Perspective' traces the history and development of these orders since their beginnings in Europe. He shows that the more recent orders, such as the Jesuits and the Dominicans, who have abandoned the monastic mode of existence, have 'religious virtuosi' fulfilling specialized functions which are well adapted to modern life. Ralph Winter's study of Protestant missionary societies and schisms reveals that the emergence of dynamic groups of seceders has helped to revitalize Protestantism, not to weaken it. Lloyd Hartley and David Schuller ably examine theological schools and analyse the varieties of their organization and their financial sponsorship; some are independent institutions, while others are linked to universities.

I found the last (mainly theoretical rather than factual) part of the book somewhat disappointing. Nevertheless, this volume is an important contribution to the knowledge and understanding of religious life in the United States. It has interesting theoretical perspectives, and it also provides a great deal of valuable information on the 'denominations' of North America.

JACQUES GUTWIRTH

STEPHEN STEINBERG, The Ethnic Myth. Race, Ethnicity, and Class in America, x + 277 pp., Atheneum, New York, 1981, \$14.95.

This is a very stimulating book and an important addition to the vast literature on ethnicity in America. Stephen Steinberg states at the outset: 'The theoretical perspective that governs this study insists on establishing the social origins of ethnic values and trends. There is nothing in this approach that denies that ethnicity can be a determinant in its own right' (my italics). He notes: 'The reification of ethnic values has made a mystique of ethnicity, creating the illusion that there is something ineffable about ethnic phenomena that does not lend itself to rational explanation. This is especially the case when ethnic groups are assumed to be endowed with a given set of cultural values, and no attempt is made to understand these values in terms of their material sources' (pp. ix, x, my italics).

These statements are not taken out of context, an accusation often levelled at reviewers. Indeed, halfway through the book, Steinberg is even more explicit: 'An alternative to cultural theory is a social class

theory that does not deny the operation of cultural factors, but sees them as conditional on preexisting class factors' (p. 131). It is difficult to square ethnicity being 'a determinant in its own right' and at the same time 'conditional on preexsiting class factors'. The author's way out of this difficulty is to insist that ethnicity informs consciousness and influences behaviour and, therefore, can have causal significance, but that the form and content of ethnicity are structurally based on social stratification.

Thus, it seems that a typical class analysis is employed. For example, the rapid social success in America of the eastern European Jewish immigrant was not derived from his traditional cultural values, but (contrary to general belief) from the fact that in contrast to the other, largely peasant, European immigrants he had superior skills as well as urban middle-class values. Therefore, the Jewish Horatio Alger story must be re-written. Again, it was not simply racism which kept Negroes in America at the bottom of the pile; and it was neither their racial inferiority nor their lack of family solidarity which prevented them from surging forward—it was merely the unavailability of other cheap labour on cotton plantations, when cotton was the single most important factor in the capitalist development of America. Such points are well argued, even though the evidence adduced is sometimes selective, in order to fit the theoretical premise.

We are given yet another example. Within the shortest imaginable period, the same eastern European Jews revolutionized, and made an incredible impact on, intellectual life in the United States — in this case competing not against peasants but against the highest social class in the country, the White Anglo-Saxon Protestants. The Jews were not only able, but also lucky because it so happened that these superior people were a 'leisure class' uninterested in pure intellectualism. Or, again, take the Negroes who in the South were trapped by the over-riding importance of cotton; in the industrial areas of the North, Negroes failed to move up the social ladder not because of their weak family ties (Herbert Gutman is quoted in support of this view, while others who thought otherwise are not mentioned), but rather because they happened to run into periods of unemployment, in contrast to the period of economic expansion at the time of the European Jewish immigration. In this way, a class analysis benefits somewhat from historical chance factors in this explanatory scheme.

There is much else of interest in this book, particularly the argument that ethnicity (if not race) is on the way out. A homogenizing, amalgamating American society is at work, reflected in the atrophy of ethnic cultures. In this respect, Robert Park and Herbert Gans are held to have been right, while Milton Gordon, Marshall Sklare, Nathan Glazer, and Daniel Moynihan were wrong. For Stephen Steinberg, pluralism has not only failed to become established but is a feature

which is incompatible with democracy. He does more than simply deflate some ethnic myths, as he modestly claims; in fact, he sets about demolishing the whole theoretical edifice concerning ethnic pluralism in American society. He does so by reducing ethnicity to class and in the process makes short shrift of potent factors, such as cultural values, religion, or family structure. In sum, he oversimplifies a very complex situation by insisting that the ultimate determinant of what appear to be ethnic inequalities is mainly social class.

ERNEST KRAUSZ

The Yonina Talmon Prize

The seventh Yonina Talmon Prize will be given in 1983 for an article on the sociology of the kibbutz, collective settlements, or planned communities. The Prize carries an award of u.s. \$400.

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Dr Charlotte Green Schwartz,

The deadline for the receipt of typescripts is i November 1982. Further details may be obtained from the Secretary of the Department of Sociology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem or from Dr Charlotte Green Schwartz.

The Research Unit of the Board of Deputies of British Jews published last November data on synagogue marriages and on burials and cremations under Jewish religious auspices in Great Britain in 1980.

The number of synagogue marriages, which had shown a small increase in 1979 over the previous year (1,303 against 1,291 in 1978), fell to 1,222 in 1980. The five-year average had been 1,845 for 1960–64, 1,834 for 1965–69, 1,821 for 1970–74, and 1;391 for 1975–79. There has clearly been an overall downward trend over two decades.

The Central Orthodox segment of British Jewry accounted for a little over two thirds of the total number of marriages in 1980 (68.6 per cent); the Reform synagogues, for 15.3 per cent; the Right-wing Orthodox, 7.5 per cent; the Liberals, 5.8 per cent; and the Sephardim, for the remaining 2.8 per cent.

The total number of burials and cremations in 1980 was 4,656, a decrease of 233 over 1979 (when the total was 4,889), and 'one of the largest annual fluctuations in Jewish deaths during the last 10 years in what normally has

been a very stable demographic indicator'. More than four-fifths of those who died (83.4 per cent) were buried in Orthodox cemeteries in 1980; 8.6 per cent were buried or cremated under Reform auspices, and 8.0 per cent under Liberal auspices. The geographical distribution remained unchanged: in 1978, 1979, and 1980, the proportion of burials and cremations was 66 per cent in London and 34 per cent elsewhere in Great Britain.

On the other hand, the proportion of marriages celebrated in London synagogues rose from 70 per cent of the total in 1978, to 71 per cent in 1979, and 75 per cent in 1980, showing 'a continuation of the decline of the provincial communities, with young people, i.e. the majority of those marrying, more likely to be found in London.'

The March 1982/Adar 5742 issue of Israel Scene, a publication of the Department of Information of the World Zionist Organization, gives the following data on the activities of ORT (the Organization for Rehabilitation through Training), which was founded a century ago, in 1880, for Jews in the Russian Empire.

ORT now provides training in 'more than 100 categories of job and professional skills, including automation, avionics, computers, electronics, mechanics, drafting, graphics, design, automotive operation and maintenance, sheet-metal and welding trades, carpentry, secretarial skills, home economics and hotel trades'. There are about 100,000 ORT students in 45 countries. The Israel network is the largest, with some 69,000 students and a teaching and administrative staff of nearly 3,000 in 103 schools and centres.

In 1961, ORT initiated the 'factory school' in Israel, where it now has 4,800 pupils in 21 factory schools attached to various industries; the students attend classes on the premises and are supervised in workshops. ORT is in charge of 80 per cent of industrial schools in Israel, and in addition it runs seven centres for about 3,800 apprentices. After high school, advanced technical training is available for 5,000 students in 11 ORT centres; they will eventually graduate as technicians, engineers, and teachers. The most imposing of these centres is the ORT School of Engineering, which was established in 1976 with 600 students and now has 1,000 at the Givat Ram campus of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

ORT also has a Technical Assistance Programme, with 150 instructors in 20 developing countries. The tuition is sponsored by individual governments and by multilateral funding agencies, such as the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the United Nations Development Programme.

The January 1982 special issue of Jewish Affairs, published by the South African Jewish Board of Deputies, reproduces part of an address delivered in November 1981 at the Biennial General Meeting of the United Communal Fund (Cape) by the Administrator of the Cape. He noted that the United Communal Fund for South African Jewry supports a broad spectrum of some 18 agencies, but clearly gives top priority to education since more than 70 per cent of the Fund's income is devoted to it.

He also noted that while Jews account for only about 3.5 per cent of the total white population of South Africa, 21 per cent of all doctors, dentists, and veterinary surgeons are Jewish, as are 10 per cent of jurists, 11 per cent of accountants, 12 per cent of teachers, and 17 per cent of auxiliary medical workers. He stated:

I am pleased that, as Administrator of the Cape, I can say that not only do we appreciate the part played by the private schools, but we are prepared to contribute to them. This year has seen the Administration raise the subsidy for private schools to R140 per pupil per year.

In the same issue of Jewish Affairs, it is stated that the total enrolment for 1982 in Cape Town's five Herzlia day schools (four primary schools and one high school) is 'almost 2,400 — this representing approximately 65% of all school-going Jewish children in Cape Town'.

The South African Board of Jewish Education is reported to have stated, at a Conference held last August in Johannesburg, that there were 8,568 pupils enrolled in 18 day schools throughout the Republic. They were taught by 160 Hebrew teachers and 505 teachers for secular studies.

According to the Central Bureau of Statistics of Israel, there was a slight decrease in the total number of foreign tourists in 1981 in comparison to the previous year: 1,137,200 against 1,175,800 in 1980. More of them entered the country by land in 1981: 103,200 against 93,700 in 1980; the increase might be attributed to the number of visitors (32,500) who came through the Neot Sinai border crossing from Egypt.

A spokesman of the Ministry of Tourism commented that Israel's loss of tourists (about three per cent) was far smaller than that reported by several Mediterranean countries in respect of 1981.

The Productivity Institute of Israel carried out in 1981 a survey among 700 students who were in their final year of education at eight high schools. Only 7.6 per cent of the boys and two per cent of the girls were willing to consider working in a factory. About three quarters of all students said that such work was of 'low social status', while 40 per cent commented that it was 'dirty, boring, and poorly paid'. When they were further asked to rank the industries they would prefer, if they had to choose one, they put electronics at the head of the list, followed by chemical plants, textiles, food processing, and metal work.

According to the Aliyah Department of the World Zionist Organization, nearly a thousand (964) persons left Great Britain in 1981 to settle in Israel; two thirds of them were under the age of thirty. London provided about half of the total number, and Manchester more than a quarter (28 per cent).

The January 1982 issue of Jewish Cultural News, a publication of the Cultural Department of the World Jewish Congress, reports the establishment of the International Association of Historical Societies for the Study of Jewish History, as an affiliate of the Comité International des Sciences Historiques. The objects of this new Association will be to 'encourage the foundation of Jewish Historical Societies in various countries and encourage cooperation in education, the exchange of students and research workers, and the support and establishment of chairs and departments of Jewish History in institutions of higher learning. The Association will publish its own bulletin and help in the exchange of bulletins and publications between its members. It will organize conferences and symposia in the field of Jewish history and related fields'.

The Institute of Jewish Affairs (11 Hertford Street, London w17 7DX, England) regularly publishes Research Reports. The December 1981 Reports include the following titles: 'The Post-War Career of the Protocols of Zion'; 'The International Status of the PLO'; 'Recent Developments in Unesco. The World Heritage List, the Jerusalem Excavations and the Islamic States Broadcasting Services Organization'; 'The Abuse of Zionism'; and 'The Pro-Arab Lobby in Britain'.

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