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THE CONVERSION OF KARL MARX'S FATHER

Lewis S. Feuer

TWENTY years ago I was teaching at a small university in an isolated town of northern New England: the University of Vermont. I became much interested in the history of the region, and in the succession of people's philosophers, sectarians, and socialists who had found there, since the days of Ethan Allen in the American Revolution, their place of origin or refuge. When I left Vermont, I still continued to return to it during holidays, using these intervals for a kind of social antiquarianism. Great was my surprise when, several years ago, my Vermont antiquarian research suddenly intersected with some of the controversial issues concerning the personality and background of Karl Marx. In the archives of the University of Vermont I discovered several unpublished letters of Karl Marx, his daughter Laura Marx Lafargue, and Karl Kautsky. The circumstances of their presence in Vermont I shall describe later. Meanwhile, however, I was struck by the fact that Laura's letter was at variance with many of the accounts of the conversion of Marx's father to Christianity. The whole psychological character of Marx's relationship to his Jewish origins and his parents was involved in this question. Laura Lafargue's letter therefore set me on an inquiry to determine what the truth was concerning the renunciation of Judaism by the Marx family.

Karl Marx's father, the lawyer Heschel Marx, was some time in 1816 or 1817 in the town of Treves baptized as a member of the Evangelical Established Church of the Kingdom of Prussia. He took the name of Heinrich. His son Karl was born on 5 May 1818. Six years later, on 24 August 1824, Karl, together with five sisters and a brother, was also baptized as a Christian. The mother, Henriette, daughter of Rabbi Pressburg of Holland, did not join the Church until 20 November 1825, after both her parents had died.[1]

Historians have been sharply divided in their explanations of the conversion of Heinrich Marx. The issue is an important one, for undoubtedly the character of Karl Marx was much affected by his father's decision. Were its circumstances such as to impart to Karl Marx a measure of rational self-confidence or did they plant the seeds of shame and self-hatred?

There have been essentially two different accounts of Heinrich Marx's conversion. Eleanor Marx, Karl's youngest and favourite daughter, said plainly that the grandfather became a Christian because he would not otherwise have been able to pursue his career as a lawyer: 'The reason why the 18th century disciple of Voltaire submitted to such a ceremony was that otherwise he would not have been permitted to practice as a lawyer.'[2] Franz Mehring, the authoritative biographer of Marx, considered on the other hand that Heinrich Marx, in renouncing Judaism and adopting Evangelical Protestantism, had acted entirely on the basis of his philosophical convictions: 'Even considered from a purely religious standpoint, a man who acknowledged "a pure belief in God" with Locke, Leibnitz and Lessing no longer had any place in the synagogue and belonged rather in the fold of the Prussian State Church, in which at that time a tolerant rationalism prevailed, a so-called religion of reason . . .' According to Mehring, Heinrich Marx became a Christian for much the same reasons that Eduard Gans, Ludwig Börne, and Heinrich Heine did: it gave them their passport to the 'community of European culture'; it was presumably their act of 'social emancipation'.[3]

There is, however, much circumstantial evidence which tends to support the assertion by Eleanor Marx that professional requirements led Heinrich Marx to become a Christian. In 1815 Frederick William III of Prussia forbade the Jews of the Rhineland to practise law; this order was reinforced by a supplementary one in 1816. That year the Prussian Minister of the Interior specifically refused to accept a recommendation that Heschel Marx be received into the Prussian civil service. It was shortly after this that between 23 April 1816 and 17 August 1817 Heschel Marx became a Christian.[4] The coincidence of these events is so striking that Edmund Silberner and Boris Nicolaevsky have both concluded that Heinrich Marx's conversion was the outcome of economic considerations, not philosophical ones. Thus Nicolaevsky writes: 'Confronted with the choice of changing his faith or his occupation, he had himself baptised and adopted the name of Heinrich.'[5]

Curiously, however, the most important evidence that Heinrich Marx's conversion was founded on philosophical convictions has remained unpublished and unknown to scholars: it is the letter of Karl Marx's second daughter, Laura Marx Lafargue, to John Spargo, written on 27 December 1907.

The story of this letter can be briefly told. In 1907, John Spargo, at that time the most widely read American socialist, was engaged in writing the first biography in English of Karl Marx.[6] Spargo had a deep attachment to Marx's memory; in his youth he had known Friedrich Lessner, Marx's friend and the courier who had brought the manuscript of the *Communist Manifesto* to London, and also Marx's daughter Eleanor.[7] Like other writers, he had taken it for granted that

Heinrich Marx's conversion had been due to material exigencies. But in 1907 he sent various queries to Madame Laura Marx Lafargue, the only surviving child of Marx. In the letter, Laura wrote clearly:

> My paternal grandfather renounced the Jewish religion for Protestantism in 1824: he did so freely and not in obedience to any official edict. He believed in God, he told his son, as Newton, Locke and Leibnitz had done before him. He also believed in Voltaire. As for my grandmother she declared, on being rallied upon her belief in God, that she believed in him, not for God's sake, but for her own.

Spargo pursued his queries upon this matter, and wrote to Karl Kautsky, then the most revered authority in international Marxism. Kautsky, in his letter of 10 March 1908, agreed with Laura Marx Lafargue that Heinrich Marx had become a Christian for philosophical reasons:

> Dear comrade,
>
> Mad. Lafargue is quite right with her statement on the renunciation of the Jewish religion by Karl [*sic*] Marx. Liebknecht was mistaken.

Fortified by the authority of Laura Marx Lafargue and Karl Kautsky, Spargo wrote in his biography *Karl Marx* that there was a 'popular legend' to the effect that Heinrich's acceptance of the Christian religion was purely nominal and compulsory.[8] In fact, he affirmed: 'That Heinrich Marx and his gentle wife renounced Judaism, and adopted the Christian religion was due to no official edict, or other compulsion, but to their own free will.'[9] He paraphrased the passage from Laura's letter: 'The fact is that, as he told his son, Heinrich Marx forsook Judaism and became a Christian as a matter of conviction. He believed in God, he told his son, as Newton, Locke, Leibnitz, and others, had done before him.' But Spargo did not specifically cite Laura's letter as the basis for these statements. He did in his Preface state his deep indebtedness to her, and there was a footnote to the letter from her.[10] Nevertheless, he did not cite her as his specific source for the statements on this issue. Consequently, Edmund Silberner, a painstaking scholar, was misled into charging John Spargo with having invented his statements: 'He [Heinrich] is reported by one writer to have told Karl that he forsook Judaism and became Christian by inner conviction. But this statement . . . is a product of pure imagination and its author was unable to furnish the slightest evidence to prove his point of view.'[11] Unfortunately, Spargo had not published Laura's letter.

All of which now brings us back to the question: which of the two sisters, Eleanor or Laura, was right in her interpretation of Heinrich Marx's conversion? It is likely that Eleanor would have viewed askance any notion that her grandfather would have renounced Judaism voluntarily. For as Eleanor told the socialist historian, Max Beer: 'I am the only one of my family who felt drawn to Jewish people, and particularly

to those who are socialistically inclined. My happiest moments are when I am in the East End amidst Jewish workpeople.'[12] She called her house 'Jews' Den', and said 'we Jews'.[13] She might very well then have inclined to project something of her own Jewish loyalty upon her grandfather and to attribute to him a reluctance to renounce Judaism which he possibly had not felt. And yet equal misgivings arise when we consider Laura's letter with its emphasis upon a free conversion based on philosophical convictions. For what were Heinrich Marx's philosophical principles, and was his conversion to Christianity consistent with them? Laura simply states that Heinrich Marx believed in God 'as Newton, Locke and Leibnitz had done before him'. She also adds that he 'believed in Voltaire'. The great names of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought are thrown together, disparate though they were, to provide a basis for theism. Voltaire who scoffed at Leibniz's optimism, Leibniz who rejected Newton's mechanistic philosophy, Locke whose empiricism was opposed to Leibniz's world-view, are enumerated as in Heinrich's pantheon. Eleanor stressed more the Voltairean in her grandfather: 'He knew his Voltaire and Rousseau by heart', 'was a genuine Frenchman of the 18th century', an '18th century disciple of Voltaire'.[14] Would a Voltairean, however, have voluntarily accepted the dogmas of Evangelical Protestantism? We must draw a distinction between the act of renouncing Judaism and the quite different act of accepting Christianity. We can well understand that a Voltairean, soaked in writings in which the master railed at Jewish superstition and fanaticism, might be inclined to renounce that religion.[15] But Voltaire had had equally little regard for Protestant dogmas; nothing in the Voltairean philosophy would have led a disciple to enrol among the Evangelical Christians.

It was only in a letter to his son Karl that Heinrich on 18 November 1835 expressed his religious-philosophical views:

> That you remain morally good, I do not really doubt. Yet a great instrument for morality is a pure belief in God. You know that I am least of all a fanatic. But this belief is sooner or later a real need for man, and there are moments in life when the atheist is also drawn involuntarily to worship the Highest. And that Newton, Locke, and Leibniz had a common belief . . . , to that everyone must submit his judgment.

Heinrich Marx uses the names of the great thinkers simply as the highest authorities who believed in God. The only philosopher, however, whom he cites directly as his having read is Kant. The father, after telling his son sadly that he cannot understand the sense or direction of his poetry, then adds:

> In ordinary life it is an indisputable proposition that with the satisfaction of the highest desire the value of the desired object is very much diminished and often entirely destroyed. That you might well not wish

to accept. That should also be considered of the utmost as a moral axiom, for led by this thought, one can fend off immoral pleasures and allow oneself to be restrained, so that one can hold fast to a deferment of the wish, or even a heightened pleasure. Kant says happily something similar in his Anthropology.[16]

Nicolaevsky wrote that 'Marx's father was a Kantian'.[17] Certainly the terminology of a 'morality based on a pure belief in God' has a Kantian association, and there is further evidence of Heinrich's acceptance of Kant in a memorial I shall cite, and his reference to a book by Kant. German Jews indeed were strongly attracted to Kant's philosophy; three of them especially were central figures at the end of the eighteenth century in propagating Kant's philosophy: Marcus Herz, Solomon Maimon, and Lazarus Bendavid.[18] In the twentieth century the neo-Kantians included the distinguished names of Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer. Jews were far more drawn to the philosophy of Kant than they were to Hegel's; Kant's combination of a rational scientific spirit with a pure religious faith, his complete repudiation of ontological metaphysics as beyond human knowledge, and his emphasis upon a universalistic, practical ethics, answered to the deepest longings and even traditions of many Jewish thinkers. It is noteworthy that in another sentence of Heinrich's letter to Karl, the father uses Kant's term *Schwärmerei* (wild raving, enthusiastic nonsense) to characterize his son's poetical metaphysics: 'Will you find happiness in abstract idealizing (somewhat analogous to *Schwärmerei*)?'[19] Karl did indeed spontaneously dislike Hegel's philosophy; he became sick when he first read it. But the influence of the contemporary student culture and the generational appeal of young Hegelians prevailed over his own direct response. Nevertheless, in the one passage of his writings where he gave an ethical postulate for his communist politics, it was Kant's 'categorical imperative' that Karl Marx cited: 'The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that *man is the highest being for man*, hence with the categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a degraded, enslaved, neglected, contemptible being . . .'[20]

In Kant's *Anthropology* Heinrich Marx would have read the critical philosopher's antisemitic remarks; no doubt they brought him the emotional discomfort which every thrust at one's origins brings. 'Men spit upon the lucky cheat,' wrote Kant and, in a long footnote, added:[21]

> The Palestines who live among us have fallen into the not unfounded reputation of being for the greater part addicted to cheating ever since their exile, owing to their usurious tendency. Now, it is true that it seems strange to conceive of a *nation* of cheats. But it surely is quite as strange to conceive of a nation composed altogether of merchants, the greater part of whom, united by an old superstition, recognized by the State wherein they live, aspire to no civil honors, but try to replace the loss of it by the

> advantages to be obtained in overreaching the people who extend to them protection, and even in overreaching each other. Now, it is true that this cannot be otherwise with a whole nation of merchants—they thus being non-productive members of society (like the Jews of Poland); and hence their constitution, sanctioned by old traditions, and even recognized by us, among whom they live (and who have certain holy writings with them in common), cannot be abrogated by us without our becoming guilty of *inconsequence*; although they make it their highest principle of their morality in dealing with us, that 'Every purchaser ought to keep his eyes wide open'. Instead of entering upon idle plans to make this people moral in regard to the points of cheating and honesty, I prefer to express my notion concerning the origin of this curious constitution—namely, a people composed solely of merchants.

Kant had not only portrayed the Jews as a nation rendered cheats by their pursuit of trade. He had also characterized their commandments as a 'busy Do-nothingness',[22] and their faith as not really a religion at all. 'The Jewish faith', wrote Kant, 'was, in its original form, a collection of mere statutory laws upon which was established a political organization.' Judaism, he said, lacked a belief in a future life, and was also so exclusive as to keep from its communion the entire human race.[23]

This was an age, indeed, in which many Jews threw aside their adherence to Judaism. Between 1812 and 1846, four thousand conversions to Christianity were recorded among Prussian Jews.[24] In the whole territory of the Rhine, there had been only about twenty thousand Jews in 1815.[25] But Heinrich Marx was scarcely as indifferent to Jews and Judaism as some writers would have us believe. Heinrich expressed his feelings in a memorial, never published, which he sent to the Governor-General of the Middle and Lower Rhine. It was a defence of the Jews against the 'infamous decree' in 1808 of the Napoleonic regime in the Rhineland.[26]

Moreover it was a remarkably revealing and pathetic document; long unknown, it has been later ignored by most scholars. In it we see Heinrich Marx, a man devoted to his fellow Jews, indignant at their persecution, but in despair as to his own course of action. He denounces the antisemites as scoundrels trying to enrich themselves at the expense of the Jews. He defends his co-religionists' nobility of character; he appeals to the King's sense of justice. He is respectful towards Christianity, but at no time places Judaism on a lesser moral footing. He defends the Jews even against the charge that they are usurers. If the son Karl Marx wrote a bitter essay against the Jews, the father Heinrich Marx wrote one which was equally fervent a defence.

His letter to the Governor-General began with customary phrases. Heinrich Marx rendered homage 'to the best of Kings and the most enlightened of statesmen', urging him to repeal the tyrannical Napoleonic edict against the Jews. Not that 'no laws might be necessary to

make my co-religionists worthy of the good fortune of being citizens', he wrote, but 'a praiseworthy goal cannot be reached by using degrading treatment . . .' He himself 'by a combination of [his] own abilities and costly experience' had made 'a good human being of himself' and, in doing so, had become 'aware of the actual existence of deep-rooted defects' in his co-religionists. Yet it would bring him 'the most sacred joy' if he could help make them into 'more useful citizens'.

Then Heinrich Marx expressed his devotion to the Jews. Would he had the genius of Newton or Kant, for then, he said, 'I would let myself be swept into presenting a formal treatise in favour of my co-religionists'. Newton had discovered the system of gravitation, 'and Kant, with his transcendental vision, indicated the boundaries of philosophy'. But was a treatise in defence of the Jews really needed in the nineteenth century?, he asked. 'Why defend them when there were no accusers?' Would anyone be intolerant 'because they are circumcised and eat unleavened bread at Easter?' That would be French intolerance. 'We are permitted quiet circumcision and delicious Easter Cakes.' The threat comes from 'scoundrels', 'wolves in sheep's clothing who inveigh mercilessly against the Jews'. The trouble began 'during the disorderly time of the French Revolution' when French demagogues and councillors wanted to get money from Alsatian Jews. Such 'scoundrels' wished to destroy the humanity in the Jews, but they had not succeeded, 'for, eternal thanks to God, we were and still are human beings . . . Anyone who is not debased after such a long oppression bears the unmistakable stamp of noble humanity; in his heart resides the indestructible seed of virtue, and his mind is animated by a divine spark. It is true and makes me happy to proclaim it . . .' To be sure, 'the gentle spirit of Christianity' had, despite fanatics, helped his 'forefathers', to some extent, to remain upright. The 'inalienable human rights . . . all rest on the same teachings'.

Heinrich Marx then protested against the usury measures directed specifically against Jews. It was unfair to place the burden of proof in such charges on the creditors, not the debtors. It was unfair to allow the debtor to expunge his debts if it were found that the rate of interest exceeded 10 per cent, thereby enriching himself at another's expense. It was unfair to grant to the 'arbitrary will' of a petty despot, the municipal councillor in a small town, the privilege of deciding on unreasonable dates of payment. Such privileges were readily misused for personal vengeance: 'in our district it happened that . . . the farmers were publicly summoned to appear before a high council to tell all they knew about each Jew'. A righteous monarch should make general laws only, not laws directed against a particular sect; strong laws against usury in general would then be 'a very good bridle for many non-Jews'.

'I do not wish to analyse here', wrote Heinrich Marx, 'how well-founded the charge of usury is against my co-religionists'; nevertheless,

he averred eloquently, 'The only motive a law can have which punishes a whole sect is the most abhorrent intolerance.' The most ignorant people would be given leave to engage in 'the most dishonourable breaches of faith' and to commit crimes.

And what would be the effect on the Jews themselves? The older people could not embark upon a new livelihood. 'Fathers of families could not begin anew to devote themselves to the arts, to learning, to trades.' The young people would see their fathers' fortunes despoiled, 'kindling the spirit of vengeance in the hearts of the children'. As the whole sect would be covered with scorn, the striving for good would inevitably die. 'The best people, becoming frightened, abandon their tracks . . .' The few who remain constant 'finally in old age drop their hands bewilderedly, seeing too late that they were not strong enough alone to defy the ruling spirit of the times'.

That indeed was what Heinrich Marx did. The Prussian Governor-General never even deigned to reply to Heschel Marx. The latter dropped his hands resignedly, and gave up his Judaism. Heschel Marx could not withstand the ruling spirit of the times.

The Voltairean–Kantian philosophy probably made it easier for Heschel Marx to renounce Judaism. The Jewish code of observances was possibly meaningless; its exclusiveness was at odds with the cosmopolitan spirit, though Heschel Marx spoke warmly of its customs. Yet nothing in Voltaire or Kant would have led Heschel Marx to embrace the dogmas of the Christian religion. As a man of the Enlightenment, he would, while renouncing Judaism, have preferred to remain a free enlightened thinker. To substitute one set of theological dogmas for another was scarcely in keeping with a voluntary act of a Voltairean–Kantian. Thus, one must conclude that neither Eleanor nor Laura had grasped the whole truth of their grandfather's conversion to the Evangelical Church, but that none the less both had accurately apprehended parts of the situation. Laura was right in so far as Heschel Marx had through his own philosophical convictions become estranged from the theology of Judaism. Eleanor was right in so far as it was the threat to his professional work that led Heinrich Marx to receive baptism into the Prussian State Church.

Did the son Karl Marx feel ashamed of his father's act? Evidently he did, because he used the term 'convert' (*ein Konvertit*) as a derogatory description. In an article written when he was editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung*, published on 16 October 1842, Marx, then in a pre-communist stage, was replying to the insinuation of the Augsburger *Allgemeine Zeitung* that he had communist sympathies. Marx wrote in the course of his polemic:[27]

> One of their Paris correspondents, a convert, who handles history as a pastry-cook does botany, once as a youth had the bright notion that the

> monarchy must seek in its way to appropriate socialist–communist ideas. Do you now understand the displeasure of the Augsburger, which won't forgive us for having exposed communism to the public in its *unwashed* nakedness? Do you understand the embittered irony with which we are reproached? Thus communism, which once had the elegant good fortune to play a part in the *Augsburger Zeitung*, is recommended to you.

The Marxian humour is heavy-handed, but the tone of the jibe at the unnamed Paris correspondent, a 'convert', is unmistakable; it is used to cast doubt on the sincerity and honesty of its presumably once communistic writer. The term is dragged in for its emotional effect not unlike the fashion frequently exhibited in Soviet polemics, especially under Stalin, of placing the opponent's Jewish name in parentheses next to his well-known party name. Who would trust a convert? Marx like later Marxists would seem to say. Yet indeed his own father was a convert.

Marx from time to time indulged in a frenetic diatribe against anyone who somehow might be regarded as having renounced or concealed his Jewish origin. When he wrote his unread and unreadable personal polemic *Herr Vogt*, his invective descended upon the hapless figure of Joseph Moses Levy, the founder of the London *Daily Telegraph*. To Levy's person, Marx devoted several pages; to Levy's nose in particular a whole long paragraph, in which he enlisted Tristram Shandy and Greek literature for erudite sarcasm. Then, after a remark on the Y which appeared in Levy's name instead of an I, Marx wrote:[28]

> As Eduard Simon wants with all his strength to be among the Romans, thus Levy wants absolutely to be numbered among the Anglo-Saxon race. At least once a month he takes up the cudgels against the un-English politics of Mr. Disraeli, for Disraeli (the Asiatic mystery) does not derive, as the *Telegraph* from the Anglo-Saxon race. But what good does it do Levy to attack Mr. Disraeli and to put a Y for an I, for Mother Nature has written his pedigree in absurd block letters right in the middle of his face.

If Levy used Y instead of I, Karl Marx's father, as he knew, had taken 'Heinrich' as a substitute for Heschel. Marx's father, Eleanor tells us, had a very Jewish face, perhaps as stamped with its pedigree as Joseph Moses Levy's.[29] Thus Karl wrestled in shame and self-contempt with surrogate figures for his father. That is why all his life he never publicly wrote or mentioned his own Jewish background; he preferred to repress associations and unpleasant feelings about his own father.[30] And, in accordance with Marx's logic, one might infer that the anti-Jewish essay which Marx wrote in his youth was meant to conceal his own Jewish descent.

Perhaps the personality of Joseph Moses Levy aroused Karl Marx to such ill-temper and indeed misrepresentation because he showed what a Jew could do who did not renounce or rail at his origins. Joseph Moses

Levy was, as T. H. S. Escott wrote, 'liberally gifted with the real journalistic genius'.[31] When the Newspaper Stamp Act was repealed in 1855, Levy was probably the only man in England who recognized the possibilities this opened for a people's newspaper. He founded *The Daily Telegraph* that year as London's first daily penny newspaper. Its standards were scholarly, and he sought out some of the ablest journalists in Britain to be among its writers. By 1856 he had aroused the ire of 'the entire metropolitan, and a large section of the provincial press', but he stood his ground, and by 1870 his newspaper had the largest circulation of any daily in the world. He was a Liberal, a supporter of Gladstone. 'At all times Levy was proud of his Jewish origin. He declined to change his family name as his brother and his son did.'[32] In a strange way, Joseph Moses Levy was probably the kind of man that Marx, who began life as a Liberal journalist, would have wanted to be, had he not been possessed of the 'demon' which the father saw in his character. Hence the pages of unprovoked billingsgate.

The medieval philosopher of Judaism, Moses Maimonides, curiously enough showed a generosity to the 'convert' that the historical materialist Karl Marx never evinced. Maimonides and his family were evidently once obliged by persecutors in Morocco to disguise themselves as Arabs; possibly they even professed themselves Muslims.[33] Had they become proselytes, Jewish law would still have forbidden that they be later rebuked for their conduct, for a ban was declared upon any Jew who would ever say that a fellow Jew had once previously been a convert. Maimonides argued for an understanding attitude towards those who were forced by external enemies into conversion to Islam; he did, however, hold that the duty of those thus persecuted was to try to migrate as soon as they could to a freer country. The medieval philosopher would never have denigrated the humanity of his fellow Jews as the materialist politician felt privileged to do.

Marx, of course, remained a militant unbeliever all his life to a point that struck the English Comtist, Frederic Harrison, as a trifle ludicrous. Harrison has told an amusing story on the subject: among the Communard refugees in London was a young man, Le Moussu, a draftsman, who said that he had invented a new copying machine. Karl Marx decided to invest in the machine, and 'claimed to have it assigned to him'. The Communard and Communist agreed to let Harrison arbitrate their case. They came to his chambers. 'Before they gave evidence', tells Harrison, 'I required them in due form to be sworn on the Bible, as the law then required for legal testimony. This filled them both with horror.' The Frenchman, who claimed to have commanded at the execution of the Archbishop of Paris, would not sink so low. 'Karl Marx protested that he would never so degrade himself. . . . For half an hour they argued and protested, each refusing to be sworn first in presence of the other. At last I obtained a compromise, that the witnesses should

simultaneously "touch the book" without uttering a word. Both seemed to me to shrink from the pollution of handling the sacred volume, much as Mephistopheles in the Opera shrinks from the Cross.' The young Communard won the case, 'for Karl Marx floundered about in utter confusion'.[34] Thus the author of *Capital* ended his career as a capitalist.

APPENDIX A

A word concerning the provenance of the letters reproduced in Appendix B. John Spargo, born in England in 1876, died in Old Bennington, Vermont, on 17 August, 1966. According to his wishes, his library of several thousand volumes and his manuscripts and correspondence were given to the University of Vermont in Burlington. Thus, several letters of Karl Marx as well as those published here found their resting-place in the Wilbur Archives in a small town of northern Vermont. I found these letters in going through the Spargo papers, and received the kind permission of their curator, Professor Thomas D. Seymour Bassett, to publish them.

Spargo is perhaps the most forgotten leader in the history of American socialism; his former comrades probably forgot about him because they wanted to. Spargo, an English tin-miner, self-taught through extension courses from Oxford and Cambridge, became the national executive secretary of the American Socialist Party, and its delegate in 1910 to the Copenhagen Congress of the Socialist and Trade Union International. He left the Socialist Party in 1917 because he supported American participation in the World War. His English loyalties were much stirred. When I talked with him for several hours in June 1959 at his Bennington home, his eyes still kindled as he described how the Milwaukee Socialists, mostly Germans, rose at a meeting and applauded wildly as they heard the news that the *Lusitania* had been sunk. Spargo called himself a 'liberal Marxian socialist'. His disillusionment with American socialist chiefs was complete. He had small regard for the personality of Eugene V. Debs, so revered among his comrades. He described how Debs, scheduled to give an important speech, was found by reporters drunk in the local house of ill-fame; evidently this was not an infrequent occurrence, but, said Spargo, the reporters shielded him from publicity. Spargo was the first American socialist to publish books against the Bolshevik Revolution and Communism, emphasizing the latter's abrogation of democracy and individual liberties. For this foresight his quondam comrades could not forgive him.

Spargo spent the second half of his life, from 1927 to 1954, as the director-curator of the Bennington Museum, of which he was a founder.[35] He became the world's leading authority on American revolutionary flags, colonial pottery, porcelain, glass, and furniture. Perhaps his two lives, as a socialist propagandist and a historian of crafts, were not so disconnected as they might seem. One of his early works was *The Socialism of William Morris*; love for the traditional handicrafts and the old town community was part of Morris's conception of socialism, one quite different from the Marxian apotheosis of technology.

APPENDIX B

1. Laura Marx Lafargue to John Spargo

Draveil,
Seine et Oise,
France. Decbr. 27th, 1907.

Dear Comrade,

I received your letter on the 23rd inst. and I seize the earliest opportunity of replying to your queries.

My father was of Jewish descent both on the father's & the mother's side.

My paternal grandfather renounced the Jewish religion for Protestantism in 1824: he did so freely & not in obedience to any official edict. He believed in God, he told his son, as Newton, Locke & Leibnitz had done before him. He also believed in Voltaire. As for my grandmother she declared, on being rallied upon her belief in God, that she believed in him, not for God's sake, but for her own.

Concerning my father's personal appearance, he was well above the average height, well-proportioned & strongly built, broad-shouldered, with smallish hands & feet. His countenance was most expressive; he had a noble brow, a humourous twinkle in his eye & a somewhat sarcastic mouth.

My mother was a beautiful woman, very tall, with a fine, full figure of which my father was a great admirer. I can remember how, when we were children, he used to walk up and down the room with her, with his arm round her waist.

Karl Marx was the kindest, the best of fathers; there was nothing of the disciplinarian in him, nothing authoritative in his manner. He had the rich & generous nature, the warm & sunny disposition that the young appreciate: he was vehement but I have never known him to be morose or sullen and steeped in work or worry as he might be, he was always full of pleasantry with us children, always ready to amuse & be amused by us. He was our comrade & playfellow.

There is no family picture extant, but in compliance with your wish I send you a print of the house in which Karl Marx was born.

In conclusion, I would say that Liebknecht's little book, although the spirit of it is wholly faithful, contains many inaccuracies.

The 'Neue Beiträge zur Biographie von Karl Marx u Friedrich Engels', published by Mehring, in 1907, in the Neue Zeit & the Letters published not long ago by Sorge are of great interest.

Shortly after my father's death, my husband wrote a paper for the Neue Zeit, in which he gave many particulars of Marx's private life. But it is in the works of Mehring, in the "Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels u Ferdinand Lassalle", 1902 & in the "Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie" zweite Auflage 1903 (published by Dietz, Stuttgart) that you will find the fullest information & abundant material, historical & biographical. These books are invaluable & indeed indispensable to all who would study the history of socialism in Germany & who are

desirous of making a more intimate acquaintance with the author of *Capital.*

With fraternal greetings from my husband & myself,

I am, dear Comrade,
Yours cordially,
Laura Marx Lafargue

John Spargo,
Yonkers, N.Y., U.S.A.

I enclose two photographs which I shall feel obliged by your returning to me as they are the only copies I possess.

The one, a very fine & rare one, shows my father in profile, in the other, his eldest daughter, Jenny, is by his side. The "little grandson" was my little boy, born in december, 1868.

2. *Laura Marx Lafargue to John Spargo*

20 Grande rue,
Draveil,
Seine et Oise,
France.

March 12, 1909.

Dear Comrade Spargo,

I have your letter of Febry. 26th & I thank you for return of the photos & papers.

As probably you may not possess them, I send you herewith the photographs of Hess, Weydemeyer, Ernest Jones & Wilhelm Wolff (the faithful friend to whom my father dedicated the first volume of *Capital*). I am also sending you, since you desire to have the same, the title pages of the books of verse.

Respecting the dates of the birth & death of the children, I am not sure of the exact dates of all of them. *Jenny*, the eldest girl, born May 1st 1844, died 1882. *Laura*, the second daughter—26th September 1845. *Edgar*, born (probably in 1847—died in 1856). *Henry & Franzisca*, the former born I think in the year 1850 & the latter in the year following, both died in 1852. *Eleanor*, the youngest child, born January 16th, 1856, died March 30th, 1898.

We are very happy to hear that you purpose coming to Europe & we look forward to the pleasure of seeing you during your stay in France.

Fraternally yours,
Laura Lafargue

3. *Laura Marx Lafargue to John Spargo*

Draveil,
Seine et Oise,
France.

Sepbr. 28, 1909.

Dear Comrade Spargo,

I have your letter & the "clipping" from the journal. The statement respecting my father's relations with Heinrich Heine tallies perfectly with

what I have heard my parents say. They were great admirers of Heine who valued their judgment & when it happened that my father, who was "nothing if not critical", had hurt the too thin-skinned poet, Heine would come to my mother who, full of the milk of feminine kindness, poured balm upon his wounds with her light hand. As to the story of the bath, I really do not know whether it is apocryphal or not, but it is of no consequence one way or the other.

I have no portrait of Bucher, but I send you a letter of his addressed to my father which may interest you & which I must beg you to return. Pary accept my very cordial thanks for your kind promise to let me have your two books. I am looking forward to the pleasure of reading them.

Meantime, I send you my husband's book: "le Déterminisme de Marx" —& my own translation of my father's "Zur Kritik".

Fraternally yours,
Laura Lafargue

My mother used to say of Heine that he was '*so modern*'.

4. Karl Kautsky to John Spargo

:: DIE NEUE ZEIT ::

Berlin-Friedenau, den March 10, 1908
Nied-Strasse 14

Dear Comrade,

Mad. Lafargue is quite right with her statement on the renunciation of the Jewish religion by Karl Marx. Liebknecht was mistaken.

But not Mehring, he deals with the question in his edition of the posthumous works of Marx and Engels (Gesammelte Schriften von Marx und Engels, 1841–1850, I v. p. 4). Mehring's preface and commentaries to that edition are of the utmost importance for everybody writing on Marx.

I have never made the statement that Marx was provoked by the work of Malthus. If I had made it, it would not have been true. Wilhelm Marr was an Anarchist in the shape of a 'Young-German' (Jungdeutscher), not at all related with Marx. Both have a different spelling. Wilhelm Marr (with two rr, not rx). You will find particulars concerning him in Mehring's history of the German Social democracy, 2. ed. v. p. 234 ff.) The man became afterwards an Antisemite.

Perhaps will be of some use for you on Marr, D. G. Adler, die Geschichte der ersten sozialpolitischen Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland. Not too trustworthy, but giving many particulars on Marr (p. 51–63).

As to Marx' birthplace I don't know any better print of it.

Your works, the bitter Cry etc. will be of greatest interest for me. The socialist movement in America will become of the greatest importance and may one day outrun the European one.

I am, dear comrade yours truly,
K. Kautsky

5. Karl Kautsky to John Spargo

DIE NEUE ZEIT

Berlin-friedenau, den June 18, 1910
Nied-Strasse 14

Dear Comrade Spargo,

I have got your book on Marx and of course will read it as soon as I find the time. I thank you very much for your having it send [*sic*] to me.

As I am just now very busy and want to publish a review of the book as soon as possible I have asked a friend to review it, whose special study since years is the biography of Marx and who is preparing a book on Marx in German.

The proceedings of the Chicago Convention I have read with great interest and was very glad to see your fearless opposition to the exclusion movement—led not by native Americans, but be [*sic*] immigrants themselves, among them Russian Jews, who are not better off than the Chinese.

I hope to see you at Kopenhagen and there we may speak about the German publication of your book.

I am dear comrade
Yours truly,
K. Kautsky

6. E. S. Beesly to John Spargo

21, West Hill,
St. Leonards-on-Sea.

15 Feb. 1909.

Dear Sir,

I did not know Marx even by sight in 1864 & therefore I cannot tell you whether he was present at the meeting of Sept. 28 in St. Martin's Hall, but I should think he was. He certainly took no part in the proceedings. I doubt if he ever spoke at any public meetings in England; for though his English was fluent it was not always correct, & his pronunciation was very bad.

I am sorry I cannot undertake to write my reminiscences of Marx.

I dare say you have read 'The Secret History of the International' by Onslow Yorke. He speaks several times of Marx as "a cold unsmiling icy man". This is quite incorrect. I knew him well from 1867 till his death & always found him most genial & pleasant, though as a Positivist I of course did not agree with all his opinions.

If you have access to the Fortnightly Review for November 1870 you will find an article which I wrote on the "International" by Marx's desire & for which he furnished me with all the materials.

I did not know Major Wolff. I knew Mazzini. He & Marx detested one another.

You ask me for photographs of Marx or myself. I enclose a reproduction

of one of Marx in my possession. If you publish it do not leave out the inscription. I also send one of myself. You need not return either.

Your address is to me quite illegible. I am therefore obliged to cut it out & gum it to the envelope.

Yours faithfully,
E. S. Beesly[36]

APPENDIX C

To his uncle Lion Philips, in a letter dated 29 November 1864, Marx referred in passing to their common Jewish ancestry. The allusion came in the context of a diatribe against Disraeli: 'Benjamin Disraeli, of our common stock, made a fool of himself again this week, when at a public meeting, he boasted of being the guardian angel of the high church, of the church rates, and its defender against critics of religious matters. This is the best proof that great talent without conviction makes for a scoundrel, even including liveried and "right honourable" scoundrels.' Marx allowed certain aspects of his character to emerge in correspondence with his uncle which he concealed from others. He told Lion Philips on 24 June 1864 that he had speculated in English and American shares and had 'won over £400'. 'This sort of operation takes very little time and one can risk something to fleece one's enemies,' wrote Marx, by way of justifying himself. With his uncle he discussed Spinoza and the Pentateuch; when his feelings were unusually warm, Marx would drop his German, and write in English. 'Despite carbuncles and furuncles, I consider the two months I have lived in your house as one of the happiest episodes of my life, and I shall always feel thankful for the kindness you have shown me.' One must bear in mind, however, that Marx had a material stake in cultivating the goodwill of Lion Philips. 'I extracted £160 from my uncle,' he wrote to Engels on 7 May 1861. His mention of their Jewish origin, and his boasting about his success in speculation were perhaps in part an enactment of a nephew's role in a way which would maintain Lion Philips's good will. See *Marx Engels Werke*, Band 31, Berlin, 1965, p. 432.

Marx's allusion to his Jewish origin is mentioned, though without the reference, in Arthur Prinz, 'New Perspectives on Marx as a Jew', *Publications of the Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XV*, London, 1970, p. 111. Cf. Isaiah Berlin, 'Benjamin Disraeli, Karl Marx and the Search for Identity', *Midstream*, August–September 1970, p. 43. Also cf. letters of Marx to Lion Philips, 20 February 1864, *Marx Engels Werke*, Band 30, Berlin, 1964, p. 648; 25 June 1864, p. 665; letter to Engels, 7 May 1861, p. 161. Lion Philips himself was received into the Netherlands Reformed Church in 1826. At that time, his father Benjamin, together with his wife and ten sons, joined the Church; Lion, the eldest, was born in 1794. Lion was married in 1820 to Sophie Pressburg, the sister of Marx's mother, and talented in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. Cf. P. J. Bouman, *Growth of an Enterprise: The Life of Anton Philips*, 2nd edn., London, 1970, pp. 14–15.

NOTES

[1] Edmund Silberner, 'Was Marx an Anti-Semite?', *Historia Judaica*, vol. XI (April 1949), pp. 11–12. Also cf. Eugene Kamenka, 'The Baptism of Karl Marx', *The Hibbert Journal*, vol. LVI (1957–58), pp. 340–42.

[2] Cf. Eleanor Marx-Aveling, in Wilhelm Liebknecht, *Karl Marx: Biographical Memoirs*, tr. Ernest Untermann, Chicago, 1901, pp. 164–65.

[3] Franz Mehring, *Karl Marx: The Story of his Life*, tr. Edward Fitzgerald, New York, 1935, p. 31.

[4] Laura Marx Lafargue mistakenly gives 1824, the year of Karl Marx's baptism, as that of her grandfather Heinrich's. Laura also gives the names of six children born to Jenny and Karl Marx. Actually there was a seventh child, born in July 1857, who died soon after it was born. Cf. Jenny Marx, 'Short Sketch of an Eventful Life', in *Reminiscences of Marx and Engels*, Moscow, n.d., p. 23. Evidently this was the child the circumstances of whose death were so 'atrocious' that Marx was ' "out of his wits for several days"'. Edgar Longuet, 'Some Aspects of Karl Marx's Family Life', in *Reminiscences of Marx and Engels*, p. 262.

[5] Boris Nicolaievsky and Otto Maenchen-Helfen, *Karl Marx: Man and Fighter*, tr. Gwenda David and Eric Mosbacher, London, 1936, p. 4.

[6] W. J. Ghent, *Socialism and Success: Some Uninvited Messages*, New York, 1910, p. 147.

[7] Spargo's little book, *The Marx He Knew*, Chicago, 1909, was based largely, he told me, on his conversations with Lessner. It was dedicated 'To Madame Laura Lafargue, Daughter of Karl Marx'.

[8] John Spargo, *Karl Marx: his life and work*, New York 1910, p. 19.

[9] ibid., p. 20.

[10] ibid., p. 26.

[11] Silberner, 'Was Marx an Anti-Semite?', op. cit., p. 9.

[12] Max Beer, *Fifty Years of International Socialism*, London, 1935, p. 72.

[13] ibid., pp. 73–74.

[14] Eleanor Marx, in Liebknecht, op. cit., pp. 163–64.

[15] Arthur Hertzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews*, New York, 1968, pp. 281–86.

[16] Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Werke, Ergänzungsband, Schriften, Manuscripte, Briefe bis 1844*: Erster Teil, Berlin, 1968, pp. 617–18. The passage in Kant's *Anthropology* to which Heinrich Marx alludes is that which ends with the exhortation: 'Young man! deprive thyself of the satisfaction of thy senses—gayety, luxury, love, etc.—though thou doest it not with the stoical purpose of becoming able to do without them, but with the refined Epicurean purpose of having constantly in view an ever-increasing enjoyment. This stinginess in regard to the capital of thy vital senses, makes thee truly richer through the postponement of enjoyment, . . .' Immanuel Kant, 'Anthropology', tr. A. E. Kroeger, *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vol. XI, 1877, p. 317.

[17] Nicolaievsky and Maenchen-Helfen, op. cit., p. 25.

[18] Peter Wiernik, 'Lazarus Bendavid', *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, vol. III, New York, 1902, p. 2.

[19] Marx, Engels, *Werke*, op. cit., p. 618. Kant in 1790 wrote an essay *Über Schwärmerei und die Mittel dagegen* (On Enthusiasm and its Remedy). Cf. Gabriele Rabel, *Kant*, Oxford, 1963, pp. 231–32.

[20] Karl Marx, 'Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction', in *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, tr. L. D. Easton and K. H. Guddat, New York, 1967, pp. 257–58.

[21] 'Kant's Anthropology', tr. A. E. Kroeger, *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vol. XV, 1881, p. 66.

[22] ibid., vol. IX, 1875, p. 411.

[23] Immanuel Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Practical Reason*, tr. T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson, Chicago, 1934, pp. 166 ff.

[24] Silberner, op. cit., p. 12.

[25] Adolf Kober, *Cologne*, tr. Solomon Grayzel, Philadelphia, 1940, p. 191.

[26] Heinrich Marx's work was entitled, *Some Observations on the Napoleonic Decree of March 17, 1808 on the occasion of the happy union of our land with the Royal Prussian Monarchy* (1815). The essay was published by Adolf Kober in 'Karl Marx' Vater und das napoleonische Ausnahmgesetz gegen die Juden 1808', in *Jahrbuch des Kölnischen Geschichtsvereins*, vol. 14, 1932, pp. 111–25. The translations from Heinrich Marx's essay are by me, L. S. F.

[27] Karl Marx, 'Der Kommunismus und die Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung', Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, Band I, Berlin, 1961, p. 106.

[28] Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, Band 14, Berlin, 1961, p. 601.

[29] '[T]he type was generally definitely Jewish,' wrote Eleanor Marx-Aveling. 'Remarks on a letter by the Young Marx', *Reminiscences of Marx and Engels*, Moscow, n.d., p. 257.

[30] See Appendix C.

[31] T. H. S. Escott, *Masters of English Journalism: A Study of Personal Forces*, London, 1911, p. 211.

[32] *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, vol. 7, New York, 1942, p. 13.

[33] Solomon Zeitlin, *Maimonides: A Biography*, New York, 1935, pp. 5 ff.

[34] Frederic Harrison, *Autobiographic Memoirs*, London, 1911, vol. II, pp. 32–34.

[35] Cf. *The National Cyclopedia of American Biography*, vol. 52, New York, 1970, pp. 317–18.

[36] Cf. Royden Harrison, 'E. S. Beesly and Karl Marx', *International Review of Social History*, vol. IV, 1959, pp. 22–58.

A MERGER OF SYNAGOGUES IN SAN FRANCISCO

Carolyn L. Wiener

I

MOST American Jews are not aware that Reform Judaism preceded the Conservative movement in the United States; they assume that there was a natural progression from Orthodox to Conservative to Reform. In fact, the Conservative movement was the last to be established.

The Reform movement was initiated in the 1820s, and was largely supported by immigrants from Germany; it evolved, by 1873, into the formation of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. In 1875 the Hebrew Union College was established. The inclusion of the word 'Union' reflects a period in the 1860s and 1870s when moderate elements of Reform and of the Historical School (later to become the Conservative movement) tried to unite all American Jewry. The attempts failed.

In 1885 Reform Judaism accepted the Pittsburgh platform, which denied the return to Zion and accepted as binding only those *mitzvot* (divine commandments) which were moral precepts. Most historians date the final cleavage from that year.[1] The leaders of the Historical School turned to building and institutionalizing a movement of their own, and in 1887 established the Jewish Theological Seminary, which in turn led to the formation of a separate institution for Conservative synagogues, the United Synagogue of America. Henceforth, Orthodox, Reform, and Conservative Judaism went their divergent ways.

Initial Conservative criticism of Reform had centred on the lack of observance of kashrut and of the Sabbath, the substitution of English prayers for Hebrew, and the modification of the traditional law of marriage and divorce. By 1937, the Reform movement had significantly altered: it repudiated the Pittsburgh platform in that year and recommended to all its congregations that traditional symbols, ceremonies, and customs be re-introduced into the Sabbath service. Moreover, it acknowledged its error about a Jewish national home. (The children of eastern European immigrants had over the years infiltrated both the

pulpits and the pews of Reform synagogues.) Nowadays, the theological opinions of many Conservative rabbis are scarcely distinguishable from those of their Reform colleagues.

However, affiliated San Francisco Jews have until recently clung tenaciously to the traditional labelling of their particular synagogues. They were therefore very surprised to learn, in the summer of 1969, that there had been a merger of the city's oldest Conservative synagogue with its newest Reform congregation.

The present study was undertaken in an attempt to explore whether or not this merger was a manifestation of a shift towards the centre in American Judaism. Was it possible to reach an accommodation between the two branches? What divisive issues still existed? To what extent were the labels Conservative and Reform still meaningful distinctions? If, as rumour would have it, this was simply a 'marriage of convenience' it was of no less significance. Whatever circumstances had brought the two congregations together, they were now engaged in an experiment which could result in the 'relatively homogeneous religious community' presaged by a number of Jewish scholars, and expressed in the following manner by David Rudavsky:[2]

> Thus, the objective of a united American Jewry which Isaac M. Wise hoped to achieve by means of his *Minhag America* and the parallel goal of Leeser, expressed in his advocacy of 'an adjectiveless Judaism' may come about, not as the result of an ideological determination, but as the product of other forces, mainly sociological, in American Jewish life.

I was a member of the Reform synagogue (Temple Judea) which merged with the Conservative congregation (Beth Israel), and as a native of San Francisco was well acquainted with members of both congregations. I used the technique of participant observation, attending board and committee meetings and temple services, interviewing board members, and engaging in informal conversations. All board and committee members knew from the outset that I was recording their deliberations, but my presence did not seem to inhibit them. They had been assured that their utterances would remain anonymous.

Temple Judea, established in 1953, was located on the southern boundary line between San Francisco and Daly City (a community of moderate-priced homes); it had, during its sixteen-year history, been troubled by the problems which usually beset suburban synagogues. The congregation had a very large number of young families, a sizable religious school enrolment, and a dearth of older and philanthropic members. Various fund-raising schemes had failed to produce the much-needed capital, and a merger with a reputedly wealthy congregation seemed most attractive.

Congregation Beth Israel was founded in 1860; it was the first Conservative synagogue in the Far West, and it was very proud of its

history and traditions. However, despite real property holdings and a substantial income from its cemetery, it was dying in its location in the heart of San Francisco's black district. Tales of purse-snatching and car-stealing had alarmed members attending Sabbath and High Holy Days services; the congregation was not attracting third-generation Jews; and enrolment in its religious school had been rapidly falling. Moreover, the rabbi was about to retire, and it seemed essential to assess the situation realistically.

Beth Israel had held merger talks with other congregations in the past (including Temple Judea some years earlier), but had failed to reach agreement. Now the Judea leaders saw a way out of their impossible financial situation, and the Beth Israel leaders a chance for an injection of new blood. During the merger explorations, most ideological differences were glossed over in the zeal to effect a consolidation. One participant later remarked, 'If there were eight people there, there probably were eight levels of understanding.' As in many such negotiations, personal considerations and relationships played a greater role than clear reasoning and fair assessment. It would certainly be going too far to accuse those involved of deliberate misrepresentation; on the other hand, there seems to be no doubt that the official merger agreement unintentionally did not take enough account of some promises made to individual members of each congregation.

The Beth Israel congregation was said to number about 450 families and 50 single members; Temple Judea gave its membership as 320 families. Congregational meetings of both synagogues for the purpose of polling the membership were held separately on the same night. Both were emotional and heated, forcing the leaders into defending positions about which they still harboured some doubts. The Beth Israel rabbi (who had held office for forty-two years) made an eloquent plea for the merger; less than half of the membership attended the special meeting which decided in favour of the merger by 146 votes against 57. The Temple Judea meeting was attended by 272 members; 216 voted for the merger and 56 voted against it. It was agreed that the Beth Israel rabbi would become the Emeritus Rabbi and that the Temple Judea rabbi would lead the merged congregation; Temple Judea had no cantor and the Beth Israel cantor would officiate at the services of the new synagogue. A new board, with twelve men from each congregation, was constituted; the name of the new synagogue was to be 'Congregation Beth Israel-Judea'.

In the years before the merger Beth Israel had allowed innovations which some Conservative synagogues would have found unacceptable: they had an organ and a professional choir of men and women; and a black non-Jew served as *mashgiah* (supervisor) in their kasher kitchen. On the other hand, many Reform Jews were re-introducing practices which had been rejected in earlier days. The Temple Judea rabbi, for

example, wore a skullcap and a prayer shawl, as did some of the members.

Beth Israel had been run for many years under the same leadership, but two years before the merger eight men had staged what they liked to refer to as a Palace Coup. They were called the Young Turks (young by conventional synagogue standards: two were in their thirties and the rest in their forties and fifties); these men who had a keen desire for a religious school for their young children, were largely responsible for initiating the merger negotiations. They revealed in their interviews with me that they had chosen to join a Conservative congregation in order to retain as much orthodoxy as possible—some out of a romantic attachment to their childhood experience and others out of respect for deceased parents. Those who had come to America from Germany had found comfort in the similarity between the service at Beth Israel and that of the German liberal synagogues of their youth. All the men considered themselves 'flexible' and 'ready for change'. They candidly admitted that they had come to find the traditional service too long and repetitious, but their many other comments revealed their respect for the traditions of Beth Israel and the solidity of their congregation as compared with the upwardly mobile nature of Judea's membership.

The Judea men were proud of what they felt to be the essence of their synagogue: the warmth and sense of community that often come with the financial struggle involved in pioneering. Like many American Jews of the younger generation, they were pragmatic in their approach to Judaism; they desired some form of identification with a religious institution or sought a religious school for their children, and had joined Judea because it was close to their home. Nine out of the twelve board members had become frequent attenders at Friday night services; all said they would countenance 'a little more Hebrew' but would not be in favour of 'too much change'. A number reported that although they had come from Conservative backgrounds, they had learned to read Hebrew by rote and did not understand what they were reading, while others said they could no longer read Hebrew at all. Some of the Judea men had previously been members of Beth Israel, had parents still attending there, and had been married (or had had children married) by the rabbi of Beth Israel. But the interviews clearly showed that Reform affiliation was a conscious choice, that is, that they were more 'comfortable' in a Reform congregation.

I inquired of each board member why he sought synagogue affiliation, and why he chose to be active in synagogue affairs. There were no noticeable differences between those of Reform and of Conservative orientation; their replies ran along the lines of, 'I don't think one can be a complete Jew unless one supports a synagogue', or 'It is part of my heritage to belong; I never thought of anything else.' One member stated, 'Ritual is the least meaningful part of belonging to a synagogue.'

Some reflected in their answers the Jewish sense of communal responsibility: the synagogue represented a 'good cause' worthy of support, which might easily have been diverted towards B'nai Brith or the American Jewish Congress. Only two board members said that they belonged to a synagogue because they found the religious services fulfilling, but all agreed that the building of a religious school and the retention within Judaism of the young were the first priorities of the merged congregation.

The men were conscientious about attending board and committee meetings. However, early board meetings were marred by bickering, and did indeed resemble a marriage of the kind occurring late in life, in which each partner is set in his ways and anxious to maintain his position. The size of the board was an added impediment, as each member felt it incumbent upon him to express his opinion on every issue. The result was an inconsistency in attention to detail; items which appeared early on the agenda were examined microscopically, while quick judgement was made on a more important subject as the hour grew late. Predictably, those who had entertained the highest expectations for a real amalgamation were the most frustrated at this point.

All board members were fully cognizant of the role money had played in their mutual attraction, and it was a recurrent source of testiness. Judea men expressed fears which were true reflections of the anxieties of Judea congregants: 'We've sold our birthright', 'The money will take over', and 'We'll lose our identity'. A heated discussion occurred about the payment of synagogue dues. Judea members (couples and families) had all been paying the same rate, with the exception of those under thirty years of age and those in need. In 1964 the rate had jumped from $137.50 to $300 annually. Beth Israel, on the other hand, was proud of its low rates. In addition to the income from its cemetery, it relied on payments made in all Conservative synagogues for *Aliyah*[3] and on the Kol Nidre appeal on the eve of the Day of Atonement. Some of the Beth Israel members had paid as little as $75 a year; others with children paid $135. It was eventually agreed that Beth Israel members would pay more and Judea members pay less than they had done in the past. It was also decided that members would pay their dues monthly.

Symbolically, the official date of the Articles of Consolidation of the merged synagogues was timed to coincide with the first day of the Jewish New Year. There was no way of estimating whether the entire membership could be contained within Temple Judea's walls for the services, and it was decided that both synagogues would be used; members were given a choice of location. Beth Israel leaders were not prepared for the expression of emotional attachment to the synagogue building and to the particular pew in which each family had maintained continuity. (Temple Judea was committed to unassigned seating, and

this commitment had been included in the Articles of Consolidation—a decision which did not find favour with some Beth Israel members.) The remark most often heard was, 'I wish we could move the building.' It was then that the first complaints were voiced about the location of Temple Judea—'too far', 'inaccessible by public transportation'. Faced with this flow of sentiment, a highly placed Beth Israel leader was heard to promise, 'We're not selling the building yet'—a statement which was not well received by members of the merged board. A motion was presented at the next meeting ordering that all property should be immediately offered for sale, and all offers received reported to the board.

The next discussion entailing finances marked an important turning-point. In November, the Rabbi presented a proposal which he had long contemplated: the board would subsidize a seven-week trip to Israel for the Confirmation[4] class. The Rabbi was enthusiastic at this prospect, and was astonished to find opposition from some of the Judea men, on the grounds of the expenses involved. A shift had already begun to take place in the merged board. Positions had ceased to be along former temple lines; henceforth, the differences were to be philosophical—the measured conservative approach versus advocacy of quick and radical change.

The proponents argued that the trip represented a challenge to a unique board, a chance to prove that what had been accomplished was not just an amalgamation of bank accounts. Further, it was said, the merger had been undertaken for the sake of the young—here was an opportunity for alienated American Jews to find their identity. The Rabbi carried the argument one step further when he reminded the board that amid their usual concern with the business operation of the temple, they now had their first opportunity to deliberate on what Judaism was all about. The amount proposed was $200 per child and there were about fifty children involved. One Beth Israel elder made a suggestion which was probably indicative of the way such matters had been handled in the past. As an alternative to a temple subsidy, he offered to make a personal contribution equalling the amount proposed to cover three grants ($600); his assumption was that others would do the same. His proposition fell on deaf ears. As the motion for a subsidy of $10,000 was passed by a substantial majority, one Beth Israel realist was heard to mumble, 'They think we're millionaires.'

At this time the Rabbi wisely suggested a seminar for board members, at which all agreed that there was need to curb the board's habit of redefining the work of committees. That practice was attributed by some to 'a ghost board in the background', that is, to families with power and prestige, nothing new in synagogue life, but new to Judea probably because sixteen years do not provide sufficient time for that development. However, the problem persisted after the seminar. When

long hours of committee work were followed by long hours of board deliberation, some began to feel discouraged about serving on committees. It was asserted that decisions distasteful to the leadership were simply not implemented; one member stated bluntly, 'If the Real Estate Committee is made up of people who don't want to find a buyer for the Beth Israel synagogue, a buyer won't be found.' As impatience with the rate of implementation increased, more pressure was placed on the President, who was destroying himself by the very characteristics that had made him attractive as presidential material. Affable, dedicated, devoting more time to the temple than to his business, he was trying vainly to please everyone, a posture which even a Solomon would find impossible. He pleaded at meetings, 'We don't want to offend anybody', 'We must go slow for the sake of harmony.' (By March of the following year, after a particularly heated discussion regarding the holding of High Holy Day services, in which each board member was asked to express an opinion, the distraught President commented, 'I think everyone is right.')

It can be said for the seminar that it gave the participants a better chance of becoming acquainted with one another, and relaxed some of the tension that had built up during their evening meetings. However, the diligent efforts of one board member, who urged the men to define their priorities for the merged congregation, were unsuccessful, as was reflected in the ensuing discussions.

II

Prayer has always been an important component of the Jewish tradition; but as Rabbi Albert I. Gordon learned from his study of the generational changes in Minneapolis Jewish life, 'Prayer, both public and private, is apparently becoming a lost art.'[5] Congregation Beth Israel-Judea was now offering full Friday night and Saturday morning services throughout the year. Although there was some agitation from congregants and board members alike for 'a composite service' and 'a middle ground of Judaism', these terms were never defined, and the Friday night service remained basically the same as it had been for Temple Judea, while the Saturday service, conducted by the Rabbi Emeritus, followed its traditional Beth Israel pattern. The chairman of the Ritual Committee, a highly respected elder of Beth Israel, tried early on to interest the Judea board members in attending the Saturday morning services. The carrot he offered was a shortened service (by half an hour) and the substitution of English for some of the Hebrew prayers. He was disappointed by the comment of one Judea man: 'Attending twice a week was not part of the merger agreement.' (This man remarked later that, having alienated half the board with his reply, and the other half with another comment he innocently made at

the next meeting, he tried remaining silent during the third meeting, only to be asked, 'What did you come for, the refreshments?')

For the most part these discussions remained within the confines of the Ritual Committee, at whose meetings the Rabbi Emeritus was invited to be present. Tempers ran high, particularly in the early months; one Beth Israel man who complained: 'We've made enough concessions', was angrily asked, 'What do you think this is, the Paris peace talks?' Differences were no more along former temple lines than were the differences at board meetings—one of the Beth Israel men most knowledgeable in ritual was the most outspoken in advocating a revision of the Saturday service. He likened the strict traditionalists to the Russian aristocracy, clinging steadfastly to their established forms, heedless of the revolution stirring around them.

Minutes of the Ritual Sub-Committee of the two temples, before the merger, reveal that it had been agreed to retain the Friday night service on an experimental basis, using a 'combination service' with the participation of the Cantor. The prospect was attractive to Temple Judea, which had not been able to afford cantorial services; the Cantor had been with Beth Israel for over twenty years, and was highly esteemed for his exceptionally beautiful voice and knowledge of traditional music. The Rabbi's attempts at innovation—use of the Hertz Supplement[6] and substitution of informal dialogue with the congregants for the sermon—were accepted by the congregation with equanimity, but attendance usually numbered from 75 to 100, except on nights of a Bar Mitzvah, and included few former Beth Israel members. Of these few, the strict ritualists objected to the reading of the Torah, the ceremony traditionally reserved for Saturday morning, and on a trifling point of detail, to the Judea custom of dimming the lights for the Silent Prayer, a practice of which the Rabbi was especially fond. Some reported that they wanted a *shul*,[7] not a social organization —for association with other Jews they could join B'nai Brith. Others objected to the insistence of the Judea women that they continue to keep the Sisterhood Gift Shop open on Friday night; Conservatives regarded it as a breach of the injunction to refrain from business activities on the Sabbath. Beth Israel had been solvent because of its cemetery income, and one member forcefully stated, 'It's our dead who have paid for what we had. We want the traditions upheld because of these dead, our parents.' As to the larger membership at this point, the Reform members generally were choosing to have little or no contact with the Conservative service on Saturday mornings, and vice versa on Friday nights. In the interest of expediency, the merged synagogue used the Reform prayer-book on Friday nights and the Conservative prayer-book on Saturday mornings. Services at Passover, Shavuot, and Succot were well attended by approximately 150 to 200 former Beth Israelites, but did not serve to bridge the gap between the two groups, since

Judea members were not accustomed to attending for these Holy Days.

The Rabbi had never been the type to berate his congregants for not attending services. But believing, as he does, in the benefit of prayer, he looked with favour upon what for Judea would be an innovation—the daily service held at sundown, another vital component of Conservative practice. The service lasts approximately thirty minutes, and appeals especially to those who wish to say prayers for the dead. Transplanted to the new setting, it proved a dismal failure; the older stalwarts who had attended at Beth Israel found it difficult to get to the new location, and the younger men found attendance incompatible with their secular life. An attempt to hold a morning *minyan* also failed. The next approach, once a week at sundown, was aided by the conscription of Bar Mitzvah trainees, but in time this compromise also proved unsuccessful. In the resultant post mortems, it was learned that even at the old location it had been necessary in recent years to pay some non-members to attend prayers.

It was December before the board faced the first issue concerning religious practice. This is not as surprising as it may appear; the interviews revealed that most of the board members thought they had been chosen for their business acumen, and saw themselves as being charged mainly with the administrative operation of the temple. Generally, the board was aware of its lack of expertise in religious matters; but there was one religious issue on which each member had a decided opinion: the establishment of a kasher kitchen in the synagogue, an article of the merger agreement. The division was marked, but again it did not fall along former temple lines.

Recent studies show a great decline in the observance of kashrut by second and third generation Jews;[8] and yet the matter remains one of the few delicate differences still dividing institutionalized Conservative and Reform Judaism. Although quite candid about their own non-observance in the home, many Conservative Jews are adamant in their belief that the synagogue must maintain this last vestige of tradition. The subject was debated, with no little agitation, at the Ritual Committee meetings of the merged congregation. Confronted with the anomaly of perpetuating an 'archaic' practice in a congregation which had merged largely for the purpose of retaining young adherents, the Rabbi Emeritus pointed out that everything in Judaism can be termed archaic, in the light of a 5,000-year history. Kashrut had value historically, he asserted, as a preservative force. It had physically protected the Jew at a time when Gentiles were often poisoned by unclean foods, and a preservative force it remained today by virtue of distinguishing Jews from non-Jews.

Arguments ran the gamut from, 'If you want to be religious, you have to make sacrifices' to 'We have to respect the rights of the minority.

no matter how small that minority might be.' The latter position received a curious answer from the board member who, on all social issues, considered himself a civil libertarian: 'In this case the rights of the majority may be more important.' No one was prepared to discuss the religious significance of kashrut, or its relevance for today's Jews; the closest to this was the statement, 'If we're going to bring about a new Judaism, everything is up for grabs', which was completely ignored.

When the matter was discussed at the December board meeting, the language became more heated. A Judea man revealed that when he had questioned his counterpart from Beth Israel on the negotiation committee about Beth Israel's practice, he had been told, 'We just look the other way.' Another Judea man pointed out, what the Beth Israel men had already learned, that many Reform Jews are doctrinaire Reform—they are not simply indifferent to rituals and observances which they regard as anachronistic; they are antagonistic to them. The Beth Israel men were surprised to find the kashrut issue a source of serious contention, since it had been one of the specific items agreed upon by the sub-committee before the merger—specific to the extent that the minutes read, 'Kosher kitchen—same as at present at Beth Israel.' This, a Judea man said, had been explained to him as meaning 'reasonably kosher'; but he was now told that the explanation had been made in jest. A compelling argument against strict kashrut was the loss of revenue if it would no longer be possible to hire the social hall and kitchen to non-Jews and non-kasher caterers. The hall, which had frequently been hired for weddings and other affairs, had provided Temple Judea with an annual income of $6,000 to $8,000. After a lengthy discussion, in the course of which it was decided that it was legal, if not moral, to change anything that was part of the merger agreement, the entire matter was referred back to the Ritual Committee, where it was thrashed out again.

The compromise agreed upon at the January 1970 meeting was worded as follows: 'Congregation Beth Israel-Judea shall have a kitchen which shall be run along the same lines of kashrut as previously in effect at Beth Israel, and as agreed in the merger agreement.' This was 'understood' to mean the serving of kasher meat only and the separation of meat and milk dishes and utensils. It was agreed that bakery goods could be brought in, leaving the women on the honour system. Amid growls of 'lip service' and 'hypocrisy', the board consented to an official scouring of the kitchen set for June 1970, after which the provisions would be enforced. But it was August before the new House Committee Chairman (a Beth Israelite) saw that the kitchen was ritually cleansed, and by September he was angrily protesting that it had been defiled when it was hired for a function at which non-kasher food was served. Amid threats of resignation, the Rental Committee chairman made the point that it would remain impossible

to maintain a kasher kitchen as long as the congregation continued to hire the facilities to non-Jews: 'It's hard enough getting our own members to observe the rules; how can you expect it of someone who doesn't even know what kosher means?' Other board members tried a more rational approach, suggesting that it was time to face the possibility of losing the rental income, since policing was impractical—'Can you tell an erring caterer to leave when two hundred people are waiting for the reception?' and 'Can you expect non-Jews to pay the increased cost charged for kosher food?' There was also a complaint about hiring the hall for parties on the Sabbath; a member said that this was a desecration and that the income was 'blood money'.

Eventually there was a renewed plea for a definition of what the new configuration of the merged temple was to be. Once more, a decision on the subject was postponed; it was agreed to hold another all-day seminar for just such a discussion. But it was many months before the seminar was held; the kasher kitchen, which had consumed two hours of discussion at the first seminar, received only fleeting mention at the second gathering.

III

It is an accepted fact of American Jewish life that most Jews are unaffiliated with any synagogue. A San Francisco study, conducted in 1959, indicated that 72 per cent of the Jewish population identify with one of the three branches of Judaism, but only 37·6 per cent are actual members of congregations.[9] Although more recent figures are not available, this percentage is believed to have decreased even further recently, owing to the exodus to the suburbs. Of the affiliated Jews, most attend only once a year, at the High Holy Days. This fact was the main obstacle to the board's determination of actual membership figures; the attempt to estimate the future attendance of the newly merged congregants led to much friction.

The first visible sign of the problems to come had appeared during the discussion of an acceptable scale of synagogue dues, when a case had been made against frightening off the older members. A former Beth Israel member, a woman, had been honoured with a life membership on the board in recognition of her past services. She attended meetings with unfailing regularity, and became the spokesman (often the only spokesman) for the amorphous body of older members who thought, she reported, that 'many have pulled the wool over our eyes'. Interviews with the board members had indeed revealed that an increase of dues, although 'expected' by some, was one of the many issues that had escaped scrutiny at the congregational meeting before the merger. When the merged board finally decided on a scale of dues lower than that recommended by the Finance Committee, many of the

Judea men (with fresh memories of weighing the gas and electricity bills against the income) expressed their misgivings.

Only six Judea families had resigned initially, because they disapproved of the merger. In January 1970, when the first monthly bills went out, sixty-six former Beth Israel families resigned, citing as reasons, 'Too far to go', 'Transportation', or 'Joined Reform temple where children are affiliated'. The honorary board member mentioned above had repeatedly rebuked the men for talking about attracting new members while not offering transport for the older ones. For those who had cars, the distance was not much greater. But some had overlooked an old San Francisco prejudice—to many, going 'to the other side of Golden Gate Park' was like going to the moon. Notices in the temple bulletin, with names of those to telephone for rides, had failed to bring any requests; people commented, 'I don't like to be a schnorrer [beggar].' More important, the synagogue was not accessible by public transport, and the Rabbi's suggestion of running a shuttle bus the short distance from the nearest public transport stop to the temple never came to fruition. Even some of the Judea men who had been most apprehensive about being swallowed up by the Conservative contingent began to experience guilt pangs. As one of them put it, 'It's like the second wife reaping all the rewards the first wife struggled for.'

By March 1970, 40 per cent of the members had not paid their bills. Although that percentage included a number of persons who had not settled their dues for the previous year, nevertheless there now seemed to be sufficient indication that some people were voting by not paying. The ratio of former Beth Israel to Judea delinquents was two to one, the latter classified as perennial problems. Some advocated a tougher policy, but the moderates (of whom the President was the leading spokesman) won. Telephone calls received by the office had indicated that 'members of Beth Israel are waiting to see what's going to happen'. The meaning of 'what's going to happen' was clear—where were the High Holy Days services to be held, and what type of service was planned? The former Beth Israel sanctuary had not been sold, and the President was under much pressure to use it for a traditional service as had been done the previous year. One board member was candid enough to admit privately that perhaps the temper of the congregation had been misread—heeding only the dangers of Beth Israel's location, the leadership had not fully reckoned with the depth of emotional attachment to the building, or the tenacity with which people cling to their ways. One example he cited (which particularly annoyed the Judea men, who took pride in their 'democratic' seating) was the advantage of having a reserved seat to return to after the habitual walk round the block during the all-day Yom Kippur service. (One cannot help wondering how such peregrinations could possibly be pleasant in the heart of a hostile neighbourhood, but this was not a time of

rational discussion.) This board member admitted that the problems had not been sufficiently considered before the merger; he suggested that a vote by mail would have been more equitable. Further investigation disclosed that before the congregational meeting to decide on the merger, many of the older people had telephoned the office to ask to vote by proxy, because they did not go out at night. A not-so-silent minority, they had telephoned again after the meeting to express their disagreement.

When the first realization of the extent of the delinquency in the payment of dues began to filter through, the Judea men were pleasantly surprised to find some of the Beth Israel Turks aligned with them against the moderates. Others were even more surprised when, in the discussion of separate locations for High Holy Days services, a couple of Judea realists said that since, as far as they were concerned, a 'middle ground' was not the purpose of the merger, it might be more practical to admit that for the time being there were two congregations sharing one bank account. However, that was not the feeling of the majority; for most of the members, worshipping together under one roof was important as a symbol of a truly merged congregation. The chairman of the Ritual Committee said that he shared their desire for joint worship, but reported that efforts to hire a large enough hall to accommodate the full membership had proved fruitless. Some found it difficult to understand his refusal of the ecumenical offer (without payment) of Grace Cathedral, San Francisco's large and imposing Episcopal church; but most could see that acceptance of the offer would have affronted the traditionalists. One man observed that the board members, having met for a year, had progressed to the point where they could think in terms of a 'middle ground', but that it was quite a jump to assume that the congregation had moved along with them.

Referred back to committee after a two-hour discussion, the issue came up again at the next board meeting; it was clear that much private rehashing had taken place. The Rabbi now suggested two services in two locations, advocating that they be 'similar'. He reminded the board that he still felt it was in the best interests of the new temple to create something new, but (and he admitted that the pressure put upon him was perhaps only that of a vocal minority) it was too much to ask of the people this year. He was optimistic about the movement towards a middle ground evident at recent Ritual Committee meetings, and he made his first public commitment to change in the Friday night and Saturday services. The few remaining die-hards asked him to be more specific about the Holy Days services; he promised to create one service for Rosh Hashanah and to make the Yom Kippur services 'as identical as possible', although both synagogues would be used. The board agreed.

In June, letters were sent to the former Beth Israelites to ascertain whether the opening of the Beth Israel sanctuary would justify the effort and expense of an additional choir, the hiring of a sound system to replace the one already dismantled, the cleaning of an unused building, police protection, and parking space. The initial response was slow, but follow-up telephone calls evoked substantial interest among many whose dues had been unpaid for six months. By this time some of the wait-and-see people had joined the Conservative temple on their side of Golden Gate Park; others, demonstrating the proclivity of Jews to select a synagogue near their home, had crossed the line to Reform affiliation by joining an old-established temple which, it should be noted, most resembled the former Beth Israel sanctuary in decor and appointments.

By now, the board felt the full impact of a grim financial situation; of the 550 households billed, 150 had made no payment since January. Moreover, there had been unexpected expenses, such as repair of the well shaft in the cemetery, and the principle of a joint service and of unreserved seating was overshadowed by the remunerative advantage of using the Beth Israel sanctuary. The telephone calls informing members that there would be no High Holy Days seats unless they settled their outstanding dues were producing some strange reactions, such as that of the woman who simply could not understand why her child would not receive the $200 subsidy for his trip to Israel unless she paid at least $100 of her outstanding account. Although letters had been sent periodically to remind members of the monthly billing system and the new schedule of dues, most answers followed the line, 'I've always paid *X* dollars, I've always paid in August, and that's what I'll continue to do.' Many alleged that they had not understood (or had thrown away) their monthly statements, only to come into the office later, prepared to pay to the last cent what they owed.

The cold hard fact was that of those wishing to attend at the Beth Israel sanctuary, many clearly would never remain as members once the building was sold; retaining them for another year was a chance to recoup lost revenue. It was now hoped that the estimated expenditure involved in reopening the sanctuary would not only be met, but exceeded, by selling tickets to unaffiliated Jews. Even those with the strongest misgivings were lured by the prospect of financial recovery. Beth Israel was reopened.

The decision proved to have been an important turning-point. The first meeting after the High Holy Days brought a spurt of motions which seemed to indicate that most board members had made firm New Year resolutions to stop procrastinating. A report from the Ritual Committee touched the sensitivities of the Judea men no less than of those Beth Israelites who had reluctantly agreed to the use of two locations. Written with the best of intentions by a man who had been

opposed to the merger, it told of the nostalgic emotion felt by those who had worshipped at the Beth Israel sanctuary: 'Everyone was happy to be back home again', and 'It was very apparent to see many a misty eye in the audience, as families sat in their same seats, the same ones they sat in for many years, and came to the realization that perhaps this would be the last time for them in these same seats.' Consternation over the report was relayed to its author within twenty-four hours; he retorted, 'Would they have liked it better if we had *not* enjoyed being there?' Many were annoyed that there had been no report on the service at the Judea sanctuary.

The use of the Beth Israel synagogue had been a mixed blessing. It had brought in the expected revenue, both by payment of outstanding dues and through the sale of tickets to unaffiliated worshippers. Of the 126 member-families who chose to worship there, two-thirds had begun to pay their dues only in August—from which it was assumed that membership had been contingent upon the location of the High Holy Days services. The chairman of the Membership Committee, a Judean who had family ties with Beth Israel, had attended its services on Rosh Hashanah and he reported that 'everything seemed the same as it was ten, twenty, thirty years ago, and everyone was happy that it was'. He estimated, on the basis of informal conversations with many members, that approximately 25 to 30 per cent could be expected to stay with the merged congregation once Beth Israel was permanently closed; the number would include those members who lived near the new location.

Sixty former Beth Israel families had chosen to attend services at the Judea sanctuary. The service, which had been modified as promised, included a commentary compiled by the Rabbi, with explanations of the traditional Rosh Hashanah prayers. These were read silently in conjunction with the relevant portion of the service. An innovation for Judea members was walking with the Torah among the congregation; the practice, symbolic of bringing the Torah to the people, is observed in Conservative synagogues but had been discontinued by Reform Judaism. There were complaints after the service that the male choir members and organist had not worn skullcaps; the traditionalists were offended. The matter was put right on Yom Kippur and on all subsequent Friday night and Saturday services.

The service had remained traditional at Beth Israel, and the Rabbi Emeritus had chosen not to incorporate the commentary compiled by the Rabbi into the service, but had made it available for optional distribution. One of Beth Israel's prime movers in favour of the merger now expressed his intense disappointment at the lost opportunity to 'present a blending of the service to people who may not come back again'. After a thorough airing of displeasure, the Board approved a motion requesting the Rabbi 'expeditiously' to prepare 'new' services

for Holy Days and for Friday night and Saturday. A motion was also passed to close the Beth Israel synagogue, and for the closure to take effect immediately.

IV

The merged congregation had now moved into its second year with a new President, whose style was in complete contrast to that of his predecessor. A thirty-one-year-old former Judean, he had exhibited the blunt attitude that was to become his hallmark in one of his first letters to members in debt, stating, 'We find we are in a financial position that we can no longer tolerate.' At his first board meeting he showed that he was determined to discontinue the previous practice of avoiding all divisive subjects. The first issue concerned an apparently innocuous motion that the parents of B'nai Mitzvah continue to be allowed the choice of either Friday evening or Saturday morning for the ceremony. (That choice had been authorized until the end of 1970.) It came as a surprise to many Judean board members, as it certainly would have done to almost the entire Judean membership, that the Merger Committee had agreed that as from January 1971, the ceremony for boys would be on Saturday mornings and that for girls on Friday nights.

The Bar Mitzvah, for a time soft-pedalled by the Reform movement in favour of group Confirmation, today plays an important role in all denominations. The ceremony is observed when a boy reaches his thirteenth birthday, to symbolize his arrival at manhood, and places upon him responsibility for his actions and for observing all the commandments. Albert Gordon states:[10]

> In East European Jewish communities, where male children began their Hebraic studies at a very early age, the ceremony of Bar Mitzvah involved little, if any, special preparation. On the Sabbath nearest his birthday the boy was called up to the reading of the Torah and accorded the privilege of reading the prophetic portion. The youth would in many cases be responsible for his own preparation. He even prepared a special Talmudic discourse which he delivered on the Sabbath of his Bar Mitzvah, as a demonstration of his erudition and learning. Following the synagogue ceremony, parents would invite friends who had witnessed the public ceremony to their home for kiddush (the blessing of the wine) and a repast. The child received a few special presents or gifts. He knew, however, that he had acquired a new and important status in the eyes of the Jewish community.

In America, where Hebrew education was usually minimal, the Bar Mitzvah ceremony came in most cases to be a caricature of the traditional practice, and often an excuse to mount a lavish party. Hence the surfeit of today-I-am-a-man jokes and tales of banquets displaying the

boy's face modelled in chopped liver. In recent years, however, both Reform and Conservative synagogues have striven to raise the standards in their Hebrew schools and in the preparation for B'nai Mitzvah. Third generation Jews have enrolled their children in this programme, some to ensure for them minimal Jewish identification and others in order to please grandparents. Moreover, most Reform Jews now share the Conservative view expressed by Solomon Shechter, the chief architect of the Conservative movement, that 'a nationality without an historical language, without a sacred literature, is a mere gipsy camp'.[11] The emergence of the State of Israel has increased the respect for knowledge of the Hebrew language. The result has been an upgrading of B'nai Mitzvah requirements, and, in San Francisco at any rate, a movement away from extravagant parties. The Bar Mitzvah ceremony, a fairly recent innovation, extends the rite to girls of thirteen, but it has not been universally accepted.

Temple Judea had traditionally held all B'nai Mitzvah on Friday nights; Saturday morning ceremonies were held only at the special request of the parents. Some Beth Israel advocates of compulsory Saturday B'nai Mitzvah saw it as a way to combat dwindling Saturday attendances. But it emerged in private discussions that those Beth Israelites on the Merger Committee who had insisted on the change had objected mainly to the Torah being brought out of the Ark and read on Friday nights. They held that the practice was traditionally reserved for Saturday mornings, festivals, and (in Orthodox practice) Mondays and Thursdays.

The Rabbi of Beth Israel-Judea sees the Torah reading as a means of democratizing the synagogue; he stresses the importance of the accessibility of the Ark in which it is housed, and the fact that any one is entitled to read it. Moreover, he encouraged the participation of a knowledgeable layman in an interpretation of the weekly portion, an interpretation which occasionally differed from his own, as another example of the importance of the laity in Judaism. If Torah reading were restricted to Saturday mornings, most Judea members would miss it altogether. The issue was finally resolved by allowing present practice to continue indefinitely, on the grounds that the proposed uniform service was still not a reality.

Another explosive issue came up at the first meeting chaired by the new President—that of mixed marriage. Among Orthodox parents, the marriage of their child to a non-Jew is cause for the seven-day mourning period otherwise observed for the dead. Of course, the Gentile partner may be converted to Judaism after undertaking a required course of study, ending in examination by a rabbi. In recent years, it had become the practice of the Judea Rabbi to officiate at a mixed marriage even if the Gentile partner was not ready to make a full commitment to Judaism, on the ground that assimilation was accelerating at such a

pace that it was politic to compromise in the hope that the children of the union would be retained as Jews.

C. Bezalel Sherman tells of the efforts of Jews, in their early days in America, to impede the entry of converts into the Jewish community.[12] Until the nineteenth century, Congregation Shearith Israel in New York refused membership to a Jew who had married a Gentile, even if the latter had been converted. In many synagogues such a Jew was not permitted to buy a plot for himself in the congregation's cemetery. 'Even the liberal Temple Emanu-El of New York, which in its early years granted the Jew of a mixed marriage full membership rights, denied his partner a place in the synagogue and cemetery.'[13] The merged board had agreed to a by-law providing for burial of 'the husband, wife or offspring of a member of the congregation irrespective of the faith of such deceased person', but it was not prepared to look as kindly upon mixed marriage. The resultant discussion disclosed that although deliberations on the issue had not been recorded in the minutes of the Merger Committee, and had not been put to the Congregational Meeting at Temple Judea, the Rabbi had been told 'informally' that there would be no ratification of the merger unless he agreed to discontinue his practice.

A letter from a charter member of Judea, expressing dismay about the proposed new restriction which would apply to her own daughter, pushed the subject to the fore again, and compelled the board to reconsider an issue which had been quiescent but far from dead. Some of the anger that had been suppressed during the B'nai Mitzvah discussion was now released. In the end the matter was deferred, but it was soon to become a focal point for those Beth Israelites who felt that the merger agreement was not being upheld.

Another all-day board seminar was held in the autumn of the second year of the merger. Most of the morning discussion centred on ritual and the role of the synagogue; the members agreed that the goals of the synagogue were prayer, continuity, identification, and social assembly. The afternoon meeting considered the role of the Rabbi versus the role of the board. The Rabbi had announced that he was returning to his former policy of officiating at the marriage of a Jew and a Gentile. He cited a battery of statistics to back up his decision, and laid special emphasis on a 1964 study which showed that more than one-third of Jewish young people marry non-Jews and that of the children of the mixed marriages, 75 per cent are 'lost to Judaism'. The Rabbi, with a synagogue close to San Francisco State College, noted the changing attitudes of the young, the fact that couples will marry whether or not a rabbi officiates, and the frequent disaffiliation of the non-Jewish partner from Christianity. Since one can no longer *tell* young people what to do, he would no longer require conversion, but would *suggest* reading material, and request a commitment to rear the

children as Jews. It was his conviction that if he could reduce the 75 per cent to 74·9 per cent, he would be contributing to Jewish survival. A forthright statement of support came from a board member, actively involved in synagogue work and now educating his children in a Jewish Day School, who told the board of the obstacles he had encountered when he tried to find a rabbi in the Bay Area who would agree to marry him to a Gentile who did not wish to be converted. He was eventually married by a cantor who had been licensed by the state of California to perform ministerial duties. He asserted that he would have felt rejected by Judaism if he could not have had a Jewish wedding; he would never have joined a synagogue and most probably would not have reared his children as Jews.

Some members angrily raised the issue of whether the Rabbi had usurped the board's authority in this matter. Others upheld his freedom of action, but nevertheless expressed some concern: 'Are we not telling our children that the congregation approves and invites such marriages?'

At the next board meeting the President was asked to appoint a committee to study 'various points contained in the merger agreement and come back with specific recommendations regarding implementation'. The committee report called for:

(1) a more liberalized Saturday, and a 'slightly more traditional' Friday service;
(2) one single unified service for the High Holy Days;
(3) *all* Bar Mitzvah services on Saturday and all Bas Mitzvah services (except in special cases) on Friday evenings;
(4) strict adherence to Kashrut, with specific instructions to renters;
(5) no functions other than those of a spiritual nature held in the building on Sabbath;
(6) no smoking on Sabbath;[14]
(7) explicit restriction against the Rabbi's performing intermarriages *in* or *out* of the temple facilities, except in specific cases previously presented to and convincing the board.

Discussion was again delayed for a month, by which time a minority report was presented in the form of a letter from a member of the committee; he protested that the committee had never met as a whole and therefore could not benefit from a true exchange of ideas. The Merger Game, as the Rabbi had playfully referred to it in the past, reached a climax at this point. Before the committee report had been re-introduced for discussion, there was a counter-manœuvre in the form of a motion stating, 'Though we do not encourage or endorse mixed marriages, it is the opinion of the board that discretion in regard to marriages is left to the Rabbi.' A former Beth Israelite questioned the propriety of such a discussion before the deliberations on the full committee report, and eventually the committee chairman resigned and

walked out. A somewhat chagrined and embarrassed board attempted to resume discussion; one man suggested that mixed marriages be left to the Rabbi's discretion, but insisted that the partners must pledge to (1) affiliate with a Jewish congregation and (2) rear their children as Jews. He was told by a man somewhat his senior, 'The children you and I have raised won't make such a pledge—to them it's meaningless and hypocritical.'

The real point at issue was illuminated by the man who poignantly stated, 'I have a commitment to the Beth Israel people to whom I sold a merger.' Regardless of any merit they might see in the Rabbi's position, the Beth Israel board members were understandably concerned about the reduced membership and their own part in the dilution of traditional Judaism. That very night they had raised no objection when the second day of services for Passover, Shavuot, and Succot had been eliminated because of diminished attendance. Now they had to listen to a Judean who summarized the situation, 'It has become clear that anxiety lest the merger not come about precluded proper analysis of the implementation of promises made. We have a lot of don'ts and very few do's, or dues!'

Neither the President nor the Rabbi was denying that an understanding had existed. Both said that an agreement made in good faith and honoured for two years was not forever binding. The Rabbi, moreover, reminded the board members that his right to perform marriages was not for them to give or take away: 'I am a rabbi, ordained by the House of Israel and licensed by the state of California. You can deny me the use of the sanctuary, but that is the extent to which you can restrict me.' The subject had become symbolic of the Rabbi's future freedom of action, which was upheld in a very close vote.

That this victory had engendered some remorse was evident at the next meeting, when Judea men spoke in favour of the section of the committee report dealing with the kasher kitchen, despite fears of 'losing our golden goose' by imposing more hiring restrictions. It was eventually decided that the kitchen would not be officially called a kasher kitchen although there were to be 'certain restrictions': only kasher meat, no shellfish, and no mixing of milk and meat dishes. At a meeting two months later, it was agreed that henceforth the 'restrictions' would apply to renter and member alike.

V

Although the emphasis in this study has been on the lay leadership, this should in no wise imply the lesser importance of the role of the Rabbi. He had arrived at Temple Judea after they had had four rabbis in eight years, and had spent his own seven years there unifying the congregation. The Rabbi was proud of his influence on the planning

of the synagogue building, often pointing to the fact that the steps were designed to cover the full width of the pulpit and that the Ark was of open construction, accessible to all, and symbolizing the democratic ideas of Judaism. His suggestion that the men and women of the temple undertake the actual building of one wall of the synagogue, as a way of getting the people involved, had been rejected as impractical, but it exemplifies the kind of symbolism to which he is attracted. He was understandably sensitive about the fact that the Beth Israel contingent had not selected their rabbi; had never questioned him on his theological stance; and had not agreed to his request to confer with him before the merger.

The two spiritual leaders were of quite dissimilar personalities. While the Rabbi had always taken a strong position in regard to his board and the operation of the temple, the Rabbi Emeritus had a different concept of his role in relationship to the board, and he had not been as deeply involved in all administrative decisions. Particularly in later years, he had attended board meetings only on request, and had been fortunate to have the assistance of an executive director and an office staff for the daily operation of the synagogue. A dignified gentleman and stalwart defender of tradition, the Rabbi Emeritus was much loved, especially by the older congregants, in most of whose life cycle ceremonies he had shared.

Although well established among his own congregants, the Rabbi was now in the difficult position of endearing himself to the older Beth Israelites, who naturally preferred continuity and stability to the disruption they now faced. While attempting to court those with whom he came into contact (the few who attended services or who called upon the temple for a family matter), he was still criticized for 'not contacting each member personally'. Generally strong-willed by nature, the Rabbi now found himself in a position not unlike that of the first President of the merged synagogues—trying to balance viewpoints more diverse than one would find in the usual congregation, pleasing one and offending another in the process. In the matter of observance he showed himself to be clearly of the Reform school, believing that the rabbi's role was to instruct, persuade, and inspire, but not to command. Thus, in matters such as the procrastination in establishing a kasher kitchen, the Rabbi did not take the forceful action which would have been characteristic of a Conservative rabbi.

Difficulties arose over the sensitive positions in which the two men now found themselves. The Rabbi Emeritus, fully aware of the part he had played in the merger vote, was determined to protect the interests of his people. Both men were accustomed to operating independently, and the younger man, jealously guarding his prerogatives, was not looking for 'guidance'. They had different views of the thin line between the sharing of wisdom and the giving of advice. Moreover, the stress

inherent in any such situation, where the older person remains on the scene to witness the transferring of his former authority, was exacerbated by theological differences. In the early months, the Rabbi was prodded by the Young Turks into taking on a stronger role, with the eventual goal of revising the Saturday service altogether. The few such attempts annoyed the Rabbi Emeritus, and in the ensuing events the resentments of both men increased.

An ideological gap also divided the Rabbi and the Cantor. The by-laws of the merged congregation state that the Cantor is under the immediate supervision of the Rabbi, but after twenty-two years of complete autonomy in a traditional service, the adjustment expected of the Cantor (who had opposed the merger) to the Friday night service and to a Reform prayer-book was considerable. The Cantor, in his late sixties when the merger was accomplished, was one of the few remaining European-trained *hazzanim* on the American scene, and had won national respect for his quality of voice and unique musicianship.

The kind of ritual compromise which board members spoke of in the abstract met its greatest hurdle in the differing viewpoints of the Cantor and the Rabbi. The Rabbi had, a number of years earlier, been successful in convincing the board of an impoverished Temple Judea of the need for a choir partly composed of professionals. Since there was no Cantor, the Rabbi had had complete charge of the service, including guiding the non-Jewish choir director in the selection of music. The Cantor now felt entitled to full musical authority, and resented the fact that the Rabbi continued to read Hebrew portions of the service which are chanted by the Cantor in the traditional service. The Rabbi, well aware of the shorter attention span of Reform Jews, was anxious to retain his faithful Friday night adherents, and insisted on maintaining his control over the entire service, in order to limit the number of cantorial selections by the virtuoso with whom he was now sharing the pulpit. Perhaps one example will suffice to demonstrate the chasm between the two representatives of these two branches of Judaism. There is a very beautiful melodic Havdalah prayer which is traditionally sung to usher out the Sabbath; the Rabbi, reflecting a Reform orientation which allows for much flexibility within the structure, would occasionally request the soloist to sing that prayer on Friday evenings. Since there is no Havdalah service in the synagogue on Saturday evening, and virtually no Reform member held the service in his home, the Rabbi could well argue that it was the only contact his members had with that traditional prayer. But the Cantor naturally found it jarring to hear a farewell to the Sabbath when it had barely begun.

By the autumn of the second year of the operation of the merger, the Cantor informed the Board that he wished to retire, making it clear that although his retirement had been under consideration even during the

merger talks, the date had now become imminent because of his frustration. In 1972, the congregation hired a man to serve as Educational and Cultural Director; his diverse tasks include cantorial work.

VI

It is ironic that so many words can be written about the deliberations of this new congregation with only passing mention of the concern which brought both synagogues together—the young. In a discussion in the merged congregation's Ritual Committee, a foreign-born Beth Israelite argued for retaining the traditional service because of the reward of having his son beside him, just as he had prayed beside his father. He was reminded, not too gently, that this would indeed be desirable, but his son did not, in fact, attend.

Rabbi Hertzberg describes the synagogue in America today as being 'to a large degree, a Parent–Teacher Association of its religious school'[15] —not too harsh a judgement when one considers that of the twenty new families who joined the merged congregation in the summer of 1970, not one asked questions about kashrut or any other form of observance; all were interested only in the religious school. American Judaism has experienced a Protestantization of its educational system with the substitution of the Sunday school for daily instruction, and the teaching of Jewish history and ethics, in English, for the intensive Torah study of the *shtetl*. Moreover, the school is expected to provide what was previously taught by example in the home, and to inculcate within each child a Jewish self-consciousness. But, as Glazer and Moynihan point out, 'the parents of these children do not want them to be any more religious than is necessary, and that often means just enough to make them immune to marriage with non-Jews'.[16]

Both the board and the Religious School Committee were aware of the limitations of the conventional religious school programme. Very few still hold the view expressed by one member, 'Whether children like it or not, Sunday school is like chicken pox or measles—a necessity they must go through.' Most members were inclined to agree with the answer this statement elicited: 'But we have inoculations now!' The new congregation experimented with an elective programme (with courses running from Jewish cooking to Israel Today), and an assistant teacher programme which by the third year had attracted thirty-two young people, many of whom found they were learning more as teachers than they had as students. In addition, a group of fifteen- and sixteen-year-olds prepared one service a month in lieu of the regular Friday night service, in which they experimented with new English prayers. During the third year, the Confirmation class students were involved in work-study programmes at the Jewish Home for the Aged,

Mount Zion Hospital, and the library of the Bureau of Jewish Education. One innovation of which the congregation was proud was the group trip to Israel for 'post-confirmants'; the practice has since been copied by other synagogues, but few give a partial subsidy as Beth Israel-Judea has done for three years.

The Rabbi and the President spoke out strongly for a family-oriented curriculum, with the President going so far as to suggest compulsory courses for those parents whose children were being educated at the religious school. They both favoured buying or renting a camp site to provide a more inspiring setting than the classroom. Mounting building costs, declining membership figures, and the inability to sell the Beth Israel synagogue, have necessitated a reassessment of the scale of the new religious school building, which the Articles of Consolidation had specified should be built 'as soon as practicable'. Only a minority had questioned whether concrete and brick were the answer to the synagogue's educational problems; if nothing else, it was hoped that focusing on a building programme would unify the congregation, particularly since the prospect of a building to serve the needs of both young *and* adults had been the central point of agreement leading to the merger. Plans have now been approved for the school area, which is expected to be completed by the autumn of 1973. There is also a project to build eventually a 1000-seat auditorium and provide new administrative offices and public rooms.

The board remained firm in its decision not to reopen Beth Israel again for the High Holy Days; one member commented, 'It produced revenue but didn't add to our dignity.' That decision, plus the one to raise dues during the second year, resulted in a drop of membership, predominantly among the older Beth Israelites. Of this group, a sizable portion had opposed the merger and did not share in any part of synagogue life in the new setting; others had prejudged the potential for success and proceeded to look for, and find, substantiation of their prejudices; and still others, uprooted from a familiar environment, have explained that the new synagogue was not *haimish*.[17]

At the end of the second year, a report from the retiring Membership Committee chairman advised the congregation that resignations were about two and a half times the number of new members acquired. The membership rolls, which initially had been estimated at 630 billing units (so designated since some were single members), then contained 470, of which 100 were in arrears; some were returning their monthly bills either unpaid or partly paid with a note about the unfulfilled merger agreement. There were also former Judeans who blamed the merger for their disaffection. When asked specifically for their reasons, they said, 'We've made all the compromises' and 'It's not our temple any more', with as much conviction as their Beth Israel brethren. A recurrent grievance is that there is a lack of familiar faces on their

self-admittedly infrequent attendance at services. All synagogues find that periods of active participation are sometimes followed by periods of less than full activity, often because of changing family circumstances; but it had become convenient to blame the merger for a situation which was not, in fact, unusual.

Rabbi Jacob Weinstein, while a guest speaker at a special Friday night service, had remarked, 'If this congregation has succeeded in bringing Judea and Israel together, they've accomplished what our forefathers were unable to do.' In an attempt to ascertain how prophetic this comment was, a questionnaire was distributed during the second year of the merger. The sample selected reflected the then ratio of former Beth Israelites, former Judeans, and new members. The 100 respondents were telephoned before the questionnaire was posted; a total of sixty-one replies were received.[18]

Asked for their preference regarding the future of the merged congregation, 13 per cent said that they would like it to continue Conservative *and* Reform; 19 per cent that they would like to see a middle ground emerge; 16 per cent that they preferred a new form of Judaism; 19 per cent that they wanted it to be Reform, and 16 per cent Conservative; 17 per cent chose not to answer that question.

Regarding a 'middle ground of Judaism', answers were as follows :

	% *Favourable*	% *Opposed*	% *Indifferent*	% *No Answer*
How would you feel if this entailed more Hebrew in the service?	41	33	23	3
How would you feel if this entailed more English in the service?	41	21	23	15
How would you feel if this entailed some rewriting of the English prayers?	54	13	25	8

Questioned on the elimination of the Torah reading at Friday night services, 31 per cent said they were very opposed; 16 per cent somewhat opposed; 31 per cent, indifferent; and 20 per cent, pleased; 2 per cent did not reply. Regarding the possibility of discontinuing the kasher kitchen, 14 per cent said they would be very opposed; 7 per cent, somewhat opposed; 35 per cent, pleased; and 44 per cent, indifferent. On the subject of mixed marriage between their own child and a non-Jew, 17 per cent said that they would wish the Rabbi to perform the ceremony only if the Gentile partner were converted; 50 per cent said

that they would wish him to officiate even if the Gentile partner remained unconverted; and 33 per cent did not reply.

The answers to questions dealing with religious observance followed the pattern of other studies of American Jews, indicating a preference for rituals celebrating Jewish survival, the Passover and Hanukah: 90 per cent reported that they either held or attended a Seder, and 80 per cent that they lit Hanukah candles. Sklare and Greenblum note the rise in observance which occurs during the early years of parenthood and comment that 'in impressing on his child the importance of Jewish survival, the parent is involved in making an ultimate commitment'.[19]

Sixty-seven per cent said that they fasted on Yom Kippur; 41 per cent lit Sabbath candles; 39 per cent wore skullcaps and 26 per cent wore prayer-shawls when praying in the synagogue. Only 2 per cent said they observed the Sabbath strictly, 5 per cent kept a kasher home, and 3 per cent observed kashrut both in the home and outside it. But 69 per cent had a *mezuzah*.

Herbert Gans[20] noted another pattern of religious practice characteristic of a community of diminishing observance: the survival of rituals connected with those aspects of birth and death which relate the Jew to his parents. This is confirmed by the 57 per cent who said that they lit a *Yahrzeit*[21] candle in the home and the 54 per cent who said they observed *Yahrzeit* in the synagogue, and by the 69 per cent who believed that the Brith was important.

In reply to a question about the reasons for religious observance, the most frequent answers were, 'I want to continue the observance of my parents' and 'They teach my children what it is to be Jewish'. However, 90 per cent agreed with the statement, 'A man can be a good Jew and still not follow the observances and rituals previously considered necessary.' The most frequent replies to the question of why respondents belonged to a synagogue were, 'To continue the rituals and observances of my forefathers' and 'To provide a Jewish education for my children.' Asked if the synagogue was fulfilling their expectations, 74 per cent replied that it was.

During the second year, as a first step towards a 'middle ground', the Rabbi decided to combine the traditional Shavuot service with Confirmation. The result was a service which even some Conservative parents found to be more lengthy and repetitious than they thought necessary. For Rosh Hashanah, he compiled a new prayer-book, based on the theme of a celebration of life, and consisting of modern prayers (most of which were original) interspersed with the traditional Hebrew chants—an undertaking which required many hours of preparation. Congregational reaction was difficult to assess, but the general comments which reached the Rabbi were favourable. All members were accommodated at one service on both Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. Both the Reform and the Conservative prayer-books were used

on Yom Kippur. Primarily because of the Cantor Emeritus (who had been prevailed upon to return for the High Holy Days), the service remained traditional.

If current payment of dues is taken as the criterion for allegiance to the new synagogue, Beth Israel-Judea has (June 1972) 413 member units. Of these, 125 are affiliated with the Conservative Synagogue body, United Synagogue, and 288 with the Reform Union of Hebrew American Congregations. Loss of the older Beth Israel contingent is bound to entail a decrease of Conservative influence. At the present time, approximately fifty persons attend Saturday services, but almost half that number are not members. Informal discussions with former Beth Israel leaders disclose that they expected that loss; their desire to move away from an undesirable location and to build a younger and more viable group necessitated their turning their backs on those who were not adaptable. One man said, 'I made a plea to old Beth Israel because I saw two children being threatened with a knife.' However, considerable guilt exists over this abandonment, and much unease over the fact that parts of the merger agreement have not been carried out. Board members always defended the kasher kitchen on this basis rather than on that of adherence to Jewish law.

Two issues, important at the outset, are scarcely mentioned now: change to Saturday B'nai Mitzvah and Torah reading on Friday nights. On the former, the Rabbi is continuing with the policy of giving parents the option; regarding the latter, the Rabbi Emeritus stated that any contact the Jew has with the Torah is to the good, and the Cantor Emeritus has acknowledged that he has become accustomed to the practice and no longer finds it objectionable. Most board members are relieved that these matters are no longer seriously debated. As for the issue of mixed marriage, one woman commented on the congregation's capitulation, 'They've learned they can't beat their heads against the wall, and as their children get older they realize they may be next!' Moreover, to the laymen, occupational, familial, and other secular matters are of far greater importance than the synagogue, and some willingly admit that they are tired of fighting battles and that 'those with persistence always win'. They are no match for the Rabbi and the President, who give the synagogue their full attention. When the Beth Israel board members were most exercised about the mixed marriage issue, a special meeting was called which specifically excluded the Rabbi, and strong resolutions of censure were prepared. But it is difficult for most board members to stand up to the Rabbi's determination and assurance; they know how dependent they are on his leadership for the success of the merger. While it is true that the people no longer look to the *rebbe* for guidance in all decisions, he nevertheless has considerable influence, especially when the laymen are so much less knowledgeable about Jewish law and observance than their forbears were.

VII

Since the settlement of the mixed marriage issue, the Rabbi has devoted much time to fence-mending, and has reduced a good deal of the tension; but continuous mollification seems to be an occupational requirement. Rabbi Eugene Borowitz, reporting on a seminar held at the Hebrew Union College, summed up one of the areas of great unhappiness among rabbis in this way: 'How could one give moral leadership to people who control one's salary?'[22] There has been a slight decline in back-stage manipulation, with the resignation of some of Beth Israel's more prestigious families, but some attempts at exerting influence will continue to be part of synagogue life. Both sides now realize that they were too eager to effect the merger, and should have insisted on more detailed agreements, although some problems were difficult to foresee. For instance, one member commented, 'At Beth Israel we didn't need a sign saying No Smoking—every one knew.' One of the principal causes of the early misunderstandings was the fact that three of the prime movers in (and of the few witnesses to) the negotiations withdrew from active synagogue participation immediately after the merger.

Time has convinced most of those who are still members that all Conservatives are not stubborn fanatics and all Reformers are not pseudo-Protestant minimalists. With religion in general losing influence among younger Jews, there is an awareness of the need to be more flexible. Rabbi Goldstein has suggested that the banner of the synagogue is likely to be different in the future, since there are many Jews whose needs are not being met by its present form: 'This will manifest itself by a change in the programming of the synagogue, and there may even be a perceptible change in the synagogue's "raison d'etre".'[23] And Rabbi Borowitz reported from his seminar that 'of all rabbinic activities only one was the focus of universal discontent: the Friday night services'. While these services were 'somehow expected to show the reality of Jewishness in the life of the congregation', what actually happened was that the weekly event made it evident to the rabbi how little Judaism meant to the congregants. However, according to Rabbi Borowitz, none of the participants felt that it could be abandoned 'because no one knew what to replace it with'.[24] Unfortunately, the kind of experimental programming favoured by the Rabbi and the President, such as purchase of a camp site for family seminars and Jewish-living experience, are dependent on financing, which will be difficult. Many of the new families will probably come from Daly City, an area with a mobile population and one which is a stepping-stone to the suburbs. Approximately half of the current dues-paying members are those with children in the religious school; they are not likely to make additional donations.

Time will also be needed to allay suspicions which have built up. A simple form, mailed to members in order to bring the records up to date during the first year, prompted some to ask, 'What are they really looking for?', just as members, questioned on the telephone about their preference of location for the High Holy Days services, asked, 'Now what's really on your mind?' Few marriages based purely on a money attraction are blissful unions; a marriage based on distrust is even more precarious. All churches and synagogues are blessed with a small but vocal proportion of members who work out their personal hostilities by being perennial critics and keeping the rumour mill active, and it seemed at one time that the merger had, by its nature, increased the size of that group. But most of those who were, as one anonymous caller put it, 'waiting to see if the temple is going to become completely Unitarian', have probably resigned.

The congregation seems to be reaching a point of stability in which most members fall within the category of those, generally apathetic, who attend synagogue twice a year. Nevertheless, the opportunity still exists to capitalize upon the tension between divergent viewpoints. In spite of the decrease in Conservative members, seven former Beth Israelites were still on the board in the summer of 1972, and at least two Beth Israel Past Presidents continued their involvement in the synagogue. It will be up to the leadership either to drift into the complacency engendered by a balanced budget, or to spur this unique merged congregation to re-examine the role and functions of the synagogue.

NOTES

[1] See Moshe Davis, *The Emergence of Conservative Judaism*, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 228; David Rudavsky, *Emancipation and Adjustment*, New York, 1967, p. 300, and Howard Sachar, *The Course of Modern Jewish History*, Cleveland and New York, 1958, p. 177.

[2] Rudavsky, op. cit., p. 402.

[3] *Aliyah* is the 'calling up', during worship in the synagogue, to read the Scroll of the Law.

[4] Confirmation was originally introduced by the Reform movement to provide a ceremony similar to Bar Mitzvah for girls. It has since been adopted by the Conservative movement and now includes 15- and 16-year old boys and girls in a public acknowledgement that, having reached the age of religious maturity, they are willing to accept their Jewish duties and responsibilities.

[5] Albert I. Gordon, *Jews in Transition*, Minnesota, 1949, p. 167.

[6] A compilation of rabbinic commentaries on the Torah.

[7] The Yiddish word for synagogue; it suggests more piety than the English word connotes.

[8] See especially Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider, eds., *Jewish Americans, Three Generations in a Jewish Community*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1968; Judith Kramer and Seymour Leventman, *Children of the Gilded Ghetto*, New Haven, Conn., 1961; Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor*, Garden City, N.Y., 1963; Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier*, New York, 1967; and Albert I. Gordon, *Jews in Suburbia*, Boston, 1959.

[9] Ronald M. Goldstein, 'American Jewish Population Studies Since World War II', *American Jewish Archives*, vol. 22, no. 1, April, 1970, p. 44.

[10] Gordon, *Jews in Transition*, op. cit., pp. 125–6.

[11] See Rudavsky, op. cit., p. 335.

[12] C. Bezalel Sherman, *The Jew Within American Society, A Study in Ethnic Individuality*, Detroit, Mich., 1965, p. 127.

[13] Hyman B. Grinstein, *The Rise of the Jewish Community in New York, 1654–1860*, as quoted by Sherman, op. cit., p. 379.

[14] Until then, most Judean board members had not even realized that a proscription against smoking in the synagogue on the Sabbath had been agreed upon by the merger committee. They were completely unaware of the displeasure they were provoking by lighting up cigars and cigarettes during the social hour which followed the Friday night service.

[15] Arthur Hertzberg, 'The Changing American Rabbinate', *Midstream*, vol. 12, no. 1, January, 1966, p. 24.

[16] Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond The Melting Pot*, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, p. 163.

[17] This is a Yiddish word, difficult to translate. A close approximation would be warm, unpretentious, comfortingly familiar.

[18] The membership list was divided into three groups: former Beth Israel, former Judea, and new members. The list totalled 503 member units. No attempt was made to distinguish between family and single memberships. I totalled each group to establish the ratio of former Beth Israel, former Judea, and new members; 185 were former Beth Israel, 283 former Judea, and 35 new. I wanted a 20 per cent sample, or 100 respondents; my projected sample was divided as follows: 36 Beth Israel, 56 Judea, and 8 new. These were chosen on a random basis by taking every fifth Judean, counting from the beginning of the membership list until I reached the required 56. I did the same with the Beth Israelites, counting from the end of the list until I reached 36; and I used the same method for the new members, starting at the middle of the list. I telephoned the 100 'units' chosen, asking only if they would agree to consider answering a questionnaire, which I would mail to them. If they refused, I substituted the next closest name on the list; 13 such substitutions were made. Returned questionnaires were as follows:

Former Beth Israel
16 out of 36 or 44 per cent

Former Judea
37 out of 56 or 66 per cent

New Members
8 out of 8 or 100 per cent

Total
61 out of 100 or 61 per cent.

[19] Sklare and Greenblum op. cit., p. 74.

[20] Herbert Gans, 'Park Forest: Birth of a Jewish Community', *Commentary*, vol. 11, no. 4, April 1951, p. 335.

[21] Anniversary of the death of a close relative.

[22] As quoted in the *San Francisco Jewish Bulletin*, vol. 120, no. 47, 20 November 1970, p. 19.

[23] Ronald Goldstein, op. cit., p. 46.

[24] *San Francisco Jewish Bulletin*, loc. cit.

A NOTE ON MARRIAGE TRENDS AMONG JEWS IN ITALY

Sergio Della Pergola

THE Jewish community of Italy numbers about 35,000 in 1972. It is the fourth largest in Western Europe, after France, the United Kingdom, and Belgium. Italian Jewry has a long tradition of communal organization, which in some cities dates back three or four centuries.

A law enacted in Italy in 1930 made it compulsory for Jews to register with their community, which was given the standing of a state-recognized public body. The existence of these registers means that each community has a list of members and often also some demographic data. Records are kept of synagogue marriages, of births, and of burials; in some cases, the records have been kept continuously over a period of three or four hundred years. This collection of data is without parallel in Jewish communal life in other countries, and has enabled demographers in the past to carry out valuable research.[1] In 1965 communal lists were used as a sampling frame for a national sample survey of 25 per cent of Jewish households in Italy; a large body of information was collected.[2]

This article deals with demographic data relating to marriage among Italian Jews. It is based on current communal records and on the results of the 1965 survey; it also presents information concerning mixed marriages in cases where the Jewish partner has not severed his links with Jewry.[3]

Synagogue marriages

Before the Emancipation (in the second half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries), the Jewish crude marriage rate was close to (only slightly lower than) that of the general Italian population: about 7–8 per thousand.[4]

Two generations after the Emancipation, towards the end of the nineteenth century, and even more so at the beginning of the twentieth, Jewish nuptiality decreased in most communities. Synagogue marriages settled around 4–5 per mille, which was only about 60 per cent of the crude marriage rate of the general population in the same localities.

There were several main reasons for the low rate of synagogue marriages: (1) a prolonged pattern of low fertility had resulted in the aging of the Jewish population; (2) there was an unusually large proportion of old bachelors and spinsters; and (3) an increasing number of Jews did not marry in a synagogue often because they had chosen a non-Jewish spouse.

In 1938 the so-called 'Racial Laws', intended (among other things) to forbid mixed marriages, were imposed by the Fascist government. In the brief period before they were put into effect, Jews who were considering marrying Gentiles hastened to marry out; others, under the mistaken impression that all Jews would be forbidden to marry at all, also hastened to take Jewish spouses. The result was a decrease in nuptiality after the laws were put into effect. During the Second World War, the number of Jewish marriages and of Jewish births showed a sharp decline.

After the war there was a short marriage boom in Italy, especially in the areas where refugee camps had been established: these camps housed large numbers of displaced Jews. As the refugees left Italy, so did the country's Jewish nuptiality rate decrease. In some of the smaller communities, a Jewish wedding was an uncommon event, celebrated only once every few years.

The picture was different in Rome. In the course of the last hundred years Roman Jews have had a higher marriage rate than elsewhere in Italy, until in the 1960s the average rate was 6·3 per mille, which is not much lower than that of the general population; this contrasts with the rate in provincial communities, which was 2·9 per mille in the 1960s. In 1969 Roman Jews accounted for 44·5 per cent of the total Jewish population; but in 1966–69 61·9 per cent of all Italian Jewish weddings were celebrated in Rome, and 69·3 per cent of all Jewish births were recorded in Rome. Moreover, Jews living in Rome have been increasingly marrying within the faith, and have also shown an increase in fertile unions. The 1965 sample consisted of 2,983 households in the country; 34·9 per cent lived in Rome. But 47·9 per cent of all Jewish households (both parents Jewish) with children living at home were recorded in the capital. The Roman community accounted for 42·2 per cent of the total Jewish population and for more than half (52·6 per cent) the Jewish children aged under fifteen years.

Evaluation of Jewish marriage rates

So far, we have looked at the data relating to endogamous unions. However, as we know, many Italian Jews marry Gentiles. Bachi has shown that in 1930–33 there were so many Jews marrying out that if the number of mixed unions were taken into account, the Italian Jewish marriage rate would have approximated that of the general population living in the same areas.[5]

Let us now consider the Jewish population of Rome and Milan in the mid-sixties, when Jews in those two cities accounted for some 70 per cent of the total community in the country. The records of both cities relating to sex and age were examined with a view to establishing Jewish marriage rates; these rates were then combined with the age structure of the general population of the two cities. When we added the number of Jews who contracted only a civil marriage to those who had married according to Jewish religious rites, the Jewish nuptiality rate was almost identical with that of the general population. Thus the 'enlarged' Jewish rate was 7·8 in Rome (compared with 8 per mille for the general population of the capital), while in Milan it was 7·7 (compared with 7·1 for the general population); in Milan, therefore, the 'enlarged' or 'corrected' Jewish rate is higher than that of the general population of the city.

When we examine the data more closely, we note that significantly larger numbers of Jewish men than women are registered as married. This is particularly true of Milan, where male nuptiality about 1965 was 19·5 per mille and female nuptiality, 11·5. The explanation is simple: many more men than women marry out of the faith. As a corollary, there is a higher percentage of celibacy among Milanese Jewish women.

It is likely that similar marriage patterns occur in other Italian communities—and perhaps in other Jewish communities of Western Europe. On the other hand, out-marriages alone do not account for the very low rate of synagogue weddings in Italy. The aging of the Jewish population is more likely to be a crucial factor in the general trend of the country's Jewish community not to reproduce itself. The continued existence of Italian Jewry as a distinct and viable community is threatened.

Out-marriage

Italian Jews have been marrying out of their faith at an increasing rate in the course of this century. Bachi states[6] that in the decade 1930–1940,

> Some 30 per cent at least of the Jewish brides and grooms married partners of a different religion. The true percentage may have been even higher because the statistics do not show cases where one of the two partners changed his or her religion before the marriage.

The 1965 survey revealed that 28·5 per cent of the couples in the sample included only one Jewish partner. (It will be remembered that the sample was based on Jewish communal lists, which included those Jews who, although they had married out, had not severed their links with Jewry.) There were striking geographical variations: out-marriage was less frequent in Rome (15·4 per cent); and significantly so when the

husband's birthplace was Rome. The 1965 rate for Rome is similar to the 1928 rate for that city: 13·3 per cent.[7] In Milan in 1965 the percentage of mixed marriages was very nearly double that of Rome: 29·5. When we look at other provincial communities, we see that the rates soared to 44·5 per cent in six medium-sized, and to 41·9 per cent in fifteen small communities.

When we examine the data for all Jewish married males in the country, we find that 22·5 per cent have taken a Gentile wife. In medium-sized communities, 35·9 per cent of men who were born in Italy (but elsewhere than in Rome) have married out; 17 per cent of men born in the Middle East have done so; but only 10·3 per cent of those born in Rome have taken a Gentile wife. The situation of Jewish married women is very different: only 9·8 per cent of the total have married out. In Rome the percentage is 5·9, while in medium-sized communities it is 19·5. The lowest rate of female out-marriage in the whole country is in respect of women who were born in eastern Europe: 2·9 per cent; while 15·4 per cent of women born in Italy (but elsewhere than in Rome) have taken a Gentile husband.

Clearly, out-marriage has been less common in many of the countries of origin of immigrants to Italy. However, there is evidence that the immigrants themselves, and especially their children, show an increasing tendency to marry out the longer they reside in Italy. After the Suez campaign of 1956 several thousand Jews from Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries settled in Milan; and in the late 1950s and early 1960s there was a reduction in the rate of Milanese Jewish residents marrying out.[8] But by 1965 Milanese Jews were again marrying out at an accelerating rate; it seems that the immigrants and their children were following the pattern of the indigenous Jewish population.

Rome has also been recently affected by immigration from abroad. After the Six-Day War of 1967, some 3,000 Libyan Jews (who were Italian-speaking) settled in the capital; many unions were celebrated between a Roman-born and a Libyan-born partner.[9] Until then, most marriages in Rome were between partners who had both been born in the capital. We have yet to see whether the influx of immigrants into the city (still a minority of the total local population) will have any long-term effect on marriage patterns.

Age at marriage

There are not enough historical data in Italy's Jewish communal records to ascertain whether, in earlier centuries, the country's Jews exhibited the same characteristics said to prevail in Jewish communities in other European countries: marriage at an early age and virtual non-existence of permanent celibacy. On the other hand, there is evidence that in some parts of Western Europe the Gentile poorer classes married later in life than was the practice among the well-to-do; the evidence

has been systematically gathered from parish registers in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries.[10] It might not be unreasonable to assume that in the past Italian Jews who were poor also married late in life. The necessity for parents to provide a dowry almost certainly led many to delay their daughter's marriage. Recorded cases in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of Jewish brides aged 14 to 17 years show that they usually belonged to rich families.[11]

The 1965 sample survey showed that the average age at which Jewish men had married was 29·3 years, while for women it was 24·7 years. The comparable figures for the general population in Italy in the period 1900–65 were very similar: 29·4 years for men and 25·2 years for women. However, there are two reservations: the sample survey figures are in respect of people who were alive in 1965; and they include Jews who married outside Italy.

The 1965 survey also revealed that when both partners were Jews, the average age at marriage was 28·6 years for men and 23·8 years for women; but in cases of mixed marriage the Jewish male spouse was on average 3·1 years older, and the Jewish female spouse 4·4 years older, than the grooms and brides who married within the Jewish community.

The evidence from the 1965 survey and from communal records is that the age of marriage in Rome is lower than elsewhere in Italy. That may be due to the younger age composition of the Roman Jewish population and to the larger size of the community. It is clearly more difficult for Jews living in smaller communities, with an irregular age and sex structure, to find marriage partners.

I referred earlier to the fact that there were great numbers of Jewish displaced persons in Italy after the Second World War. Many of them were unmarried young adults, and some of them entered into unions with Italian-born Jews. In all the Jewish marriages which were celebrated shortly after the war, the bridegroom's average age was higher than it had been before the war—probably because many had been unable, or reluctant, to marry during the war. On the other hand, the brides were not on average older than they had been before the war; it seems that some of the women who would have married in normal circumstances had remained spinsters.[12]

Marital status

There is a higher age-specific rate of celibacy among Italian Jews than in the general population. However, in 1965, among Jews aged 15 years and over, 30 per cent of males and 27·8 per cent of females were single, compared with 35·9 per cent of men and 30·7 of women in the general population. This was due to the lower proportion, among Jews, of younger—largely unmarried—people. There was also a higher percentage of widowed persons among Jews in that age group: 6·2 per cent of the men (compared with 3·5 in the general population) and

21·8 per cent of the women (compared with 12·5 per cent in the general population) were widowed.[13]

In 1965 a substantial percentage of Jewish men and women had never married by the end of their fecund age: 14·5 per cent of the men in the age group 50–64 years and 17·3 per cent of the women aged 45–59 years had never contracted marriage. These rates are nearly twice as high as those in the general Italian population, which are not low by international standards; the high rate of Jewish celibacy in those age groups in 1965 was probably a consequence of the upheavals of the Second World War. The celibacy rates among younger Jews were lower in 1965: only 9·3 per cent of men aged 45–49 years and 9·4 per cent of women aged 35–39 years had never married. There seems to have been a gradual normalization after the war.

We have compiled nuptiality tables for Italian Jews on the basis of data relating to age, sex, and marital status.[14] These tables make the contrast between the marriage patterns of the Jews of Rome and of Milan very clear. On the basis of the data for 1961–67, 96·9 per cent of men and 92·3 per cent of women in Rome are expected to have married by the age of fifty; for Milan, the percentages are 88 for men and 83·2 for women. Among Jews in the capital, a man aged twenty can expect to remain single for 10·1 years and a woman of the same age 7·3 years. For Milanese Jews the comparable figures are 11·4 years for a man and 11·9 years for a woman. But the late age of marriage does not, in fact, greatly reduce the number of children since Italian Jews generally plan their families and prefer to have a small number of children.

Choice of partners

The 1965 survey revealed that 21 per cent of the Italian Jewish population were foreign-born; 7·4 per cent of Jewish couples and 18·4 per cent of mixed couples consisted of a foreign-born and an Italian-born partner. When both partners were Jewish, they tended to have similar educational and occupational characteristics; there was also a smaller age gap between husband and wife. Among mixed couples, on the other hand, the age gap was far wider: either the wife or the husband was considerably older. As for education, men as a rule reach higher levels than women, but the Jews as a whole have more years of education then the Gentiles, and in mixed marriages the Jewish partner is generally the more educated.

Among Jewish couples, 81 per cent of the husbands are gainfully occupied; but the percentage falls to 65 of husbands in mixed unions. On the other hand, the rate of women gainfully occupied is the same in both types of union: about 12 per cent. When both partners are gainfully occupied, there is more disparity between the occupations of the partners in a mixed union than there is when both husband and wife are Jewish.

We tried to discover whether Jewish religious education was a significant factor, that is, whether those who had gone to religious classes over a period of years tended to marry within the faith. But we found that the majority of persons who had so married had not received any formal Jewish education.

Italian Jews began to assimilate after the Emancipation, but it is mainly in the last fifty years that the rate of assimilation has shown a marked increase. Mixed marriages became more frequent; many Jews preferred a mixed marriage where the partners came from similar social backgrounds to a marriage between Jews whose social status was incompatible.

In larger cities the Jewish population often consists of several small heterogeneous groups. Milanese Jewry, for example, which used to be a more compact community, is now split into a number of sub-groups. The range of marriage partners within each sub-group is limited. In 1965 there were in Italy, in the age group 20–34 years, 1,563 Jewish males and 936 Jewish females who had never married. They were spread over the whole country and belonged to various socio-economic classes. Within that group, there were 718 males aged 25–34 years and 804 females aged 20–29 years; 46 of the men and 41 of the women were scattered in fifteen different small communities. Thus in those areas each spinster or bachelor was limited to a choice of about three eligible Jewish partners. Admittedly, they could seek a Jewish partner from another locality, but Jewish cultural and religious ties are not generally strong in Italy, and many find it easier to marry a Gentile from their immediate circle. Some others remain permanently single.

Another factor in the situation is the fluctuation of the Jewish birth rate in the 1940s and early 1950s. Since grooms are usually older than brides by some years, there can be considerable variation in the sizes of Jewish male and female marital cohorts. In 1965 the 'baby boom' generation born after the end of the war was reaching marriageable age; there were 845 single males aged 20–24 years and 1,201 single females aged 15–19 years. This imbalance may be expected to have led either to a new temporary increase in the celibacy rate of Jewish females (such as occurred after the Second World War), or to an increase in the number of women marrying out. The position might be reversed some years later, when there should be a surplus of Jewish males. But there might be other developments—such as an increase in the rate of out-marriage of Jewish men or in the number of Jewish bridegrooms marrying slightly older women. Another possibility is a large wave of Jewish immigrants from abroad, who might again alter the demographic structure of Italian Jewry.

Conclusion

There have been radical changes in the structure of Italian Jewry in this century: (1) a change in the geographical distribution of Jewish

communities; (2) a considerable social and economic upward mobility; (3) physical destruction in the Second World War and losses through conversion and emigration; and (4) a substantial immigration from various countries.

With the exception of Roman Jewry and of some immigrant groups, Italy's Jews have a weak Jewish identity. Moreover, the community as a whole has a low reproduction rate; mixed marriages are increasing; and there is a general aging of the population. Young men and women remain economically dependent upon their parents over a long period because of the comparatively large number of Jewish students in institutions of higher learning; but the home background generally does not seem greatly to stress Jewish values, and the young mix socially with non-Jews and tend to acquire the general culture of the wider society.

NOTES

[1] For previous research on Jewish marriage in Italy, see especially Roberto Bachi, 'La demografia degli ebrei italiani negli ultimi cento anni', in *Atti del Congresso Internazionale per gli Studi sulla Popolazione, Roma, Settembre 1931*, vol. VI, Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, Rome, 1934; Roberto Bachi, *L'evoluzione demografica degli ebrei italiani dal 1600 al 1937*, Florence, 1939, unpublished but available from The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Roberto Bachi, 'The Demographic Development of Italian Jewry from the Seventeenth Century', in *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. IV, no. 2, December 1962; Gianbruno Ghidoli, 'Ricerca antropologica e demografica su un gruppo di ebrei milanesi', in *Statistica*, anno 11, no. 2, Bologna, April–June 1951; Corrado Gini, 'Alcune ricerche demografiche sugli Israeliti in Padova', in *Atti e Memorie R. Accademia di Scienze, Lettere e Arti*, vol. xxxii, Dispensa IV, Padua, 1916; Livio Livi, *Gli ebrei alla luce della statistica*, vol. II, Florence, 1920; Livio Livi, 'Spunti di demografia ebraica', in *Atti del Congresso Internazionale . . .*, op. cit.; Alfredo Sarano, 'Demografia di Milano ebraica negli ultimi cento anni', in *Bollettino della Comunità Israelitica di Milano*, December 1956; Israele Zoller, 'La Comunità Israelitica di Trieste (Saggio di Demografia storica)', in *Metron*, vol. III, nos. 3–4, Ferrara, February 1924.

[2] The research was carried out on the initiative of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and was sponsored by the Unione delle Comunità Israelitiche Italiane. It was directed by Professor Roberto Bachi, for whose suggestions and criticisms I am deeply indebted; two Ph.D. theses arising from this research were completed in 1972 under his direction: Sergio Della Pergola, *The Demography of Italian Jews* and Eytan Franco Sabatello, *The Social and Economic Development of Italian Jewry, 1870–1970*.

[3] For more details about mixed marriage among Italian Jews, see my 'Marriages and Mixed Marriages among the Jews of Milan', in *Proceedings of the Fifth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, August 1969*, in press.

[4] See Bachi, 'The Demographic Development . . .', op. cit., pp. 178–79.

[5] See Bachi, *L'evoluzione demografica . . .*, op. cit., pp. 129–54.

[6] See Bachi, 'The Demographic Development . . .', op. cit., p. 180.

[7] See Roberto Bachi, *Censimento degli ebrei di Roma, 1928*, unpublished monograph available at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Jerusalem, p. 144. See also Adriana Terracina, *Le caratteristiche demografiche della Comunità israelitica di Roma prima delle leggi razziali e la situazione demografica attuale*, unpublished dissertation, University of Rome, 1963, p. 130; available at the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Jerusalem.

[8] See my 'I matrimoni degli ebrei a Milano', in *Hatikwà*, vol. X, nos. 3–4 and 8–9, March–April and August–September 1962, and my 'Marriages and Mixed Marriages . . .', op. cit. See also Comune di Milano, *Annuario Statistico*, Milan, issues for single or grouped years after 1934.

[9] Jewish marriages are reported in *Shalom* (formerly *La Voce della Comunità Israelitica di Roma*), a monthly publication of the Jewish community of Rome. Surnames often reveal the country of origin of the bride and groom.

[10] See J. Hajnal, 'European Marriage Patterns in Perspective', in D. V. Glass and D. E. D. Eversley, eds, *Population in History*, London and Chicago, 1965, pp. 101–43, and E. A. Wrigley, *Population and History*, London, 1969, p. 256.

[11] See: Attilio Milano, *Il Ghetto di Roma*, Rome, 1964, pp. 350–56; and for an earlier source, L. Serristori, *Statistica dell' Italia*, Florence, 1842, p. 372.

[12] A somewhat different adjustment to a post-war shortage of male partners is described by Louis Henry in a series of articles in *Population*: 'Perturbations de la nuptialité résultant de la guerre 1914–1918', vol. 21, no. 2, March–April 1966, pp. 273–332; 'Schémas de nuptialité: déséquilibre des sexes et célibat', vol. 24, no. 3, May–June 1969, pp. 457–486; 'Schémas de nuptialité: déséquilibre des sexes et âge au mariage', vol. 24, no. 6, November–December 1969, pp. 1067–1122.

[13] These figures include a slight percentage of divorced persons.

[14] A nuptiality table is a set of mathematically linked bio-statistical functions, similar in its structure to a life table. For the method of calculation, see Roberto Bachi, *An Introduction to Demography* (in Hebrew, compiled by Joseph Yam), vol. III, Jerusalem, 1968, pp. 339–63. The tables for Rome and Milan are based on the assumption that all recorded marriages were contracted by single Jewish persons. The bias introduced here is very small, owing to the low incidence of re-marriage in Italy.

IS ANTISEMITISM A COGNITIVE SIMPLIFICATION? SOME OBSERVATIONS ON AUSTRALIAN NEO-NAZIS

John J. Ray

IF we can advance our objective understanding of antisemitism, the service we do to the world may potentially be as extensive as prejudice itself. If some of the conclusions we are led to along the way upset congenial prejudices of our own, the price will have been worth paying. To understand and to condemn are not contradictory operations but phenomena of entirely different and potentially independent orders.

The by now classical social-scientific account of antisemitism[1] has been given by the California authors, Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford.[2] In that work the antisemite was presented as a sick, paranoid deviant. It will be submitted here that this conception is fundamentally mistaken. Even if the conception was true of the Americans Adorno *et al.* interviewed, it is hard to believe that it was true of the troops who enforced the grisly will of the antisemite Hitler. For a nation of sick, paranoid deviants, Nazi Germany produced a remarkable military performance that nations putatively more in tune with the realities of the world could not in fact at any point by themselves emulate. On any reckoning, Nazi Germany was crushed more by weight of numbers than by any *comparative* inadequacy in itself. Equally today, any effort to characterize the indisputably antisemitic (in the narrow sense) followers of Anwar Sadat as suffering from any sort of modal psychological inadequacy would be a vicious non-solution of the problem.

The work of Adorno *et al.* does already stand contradicted on many points by subsequent writers in the psychological literature. The central explanatory concept and 'the villain of the piece' in the California work was of course the 'authoritarian' personality type. That the person of authoritarian or ethnocentric attitudes is psychologically sick has been disputed by Elms,[3] Schmuck and Chesler,[4] Eckhardt,[5] Schoenberger,[6] Martin and Ray,[7] and Ray.[8] That authoritarian and ethnocentric

attitudes are related to authoritarian and ethnocentric behaviour has been disputed by Titus,[9] LaPiere,[10] Hynes,[11] Hollander,[12] and Ray.[13] Even the association between prejudice and authoritarianism is not certain (see Brown,[14] Perlmutter,[15] Knöpfelmacher and Armstrong,[16] and Ray[17]). Reasons for all these failures to confirm the conclusions of Adorno *et al.* may perhaps be found in the book by Christie and Jahoda.[18]

One point, however, that even writers whose findings contradict the California work[19] have no difficulty with, and even affirm, is that antisemitism may be explained as providing a cognitive simplification for those who accept it. By identifying Jews as the source of all things evil, the antisemite can order his subjective world more easily. It is this point that the present brief paper will call into question.

By the method of 'participant observation',[20] I have for some years been engaged in a study of Australian neo-Nazis. Several of the ideas deriving from this work have been supported by subsequent studies in the traditionally objective, behaviouralistic mould.[21] As should become apparent, however, such treatment does not seem appropriate on this occasion.

The Australian neo-Nazis in many respects fit quite well the pattern that Adorno *et al.* and Elms have led us to expect.[22] In public they are 'anti-Zionist'; in private they sing: 'Gas 'em all, gas 'em all, the blacks and the Jews and the small . . .' They seldom tell Jewish jokes: Jews are too much an object of execration even to be laughed at. In the half-world of the extreme Right, to 'know the score' (a laudatory description) is to have read and accepted as authentic and relevant the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*—a work detailing the alleged international Jewish conspiracy. It is perhaps a sad fact that the chief element of confirmation seen for this view of Jewry is the fairly obvious success and influence of local Zionist bodies. In fact, the single thing most crippling to any enterprise among 'the Right' (as they prefer to be known) is the suspicion that one's comrade may be 'a Zionist spy'. Parenthetically, this suspicion cannot be equated with paranoia. It is obviously a realistic enough sort of response for *any* group with illegal and violent aims. Such a response is doubly warranted in the present case (a) by the tendency to fragmentation of any extremist political movement (Right or Left)—which does make it likely that members may be willing from time to time to 'sell one another out', and (b) by the fact that Zionist intelligence of their doings *is* from time to time startlingly good and can only be explained by regular betrayals of some sort.

A very commonly enjoyed and almost devotional activity in those circles is listening to old tapes of Hitler's speeches (with or without translations) and Nazi marching songs. One can see the listeners almost reduced to tears at the thought that something as 'beautiful' as German Nazism was defeated.

The detailed 'field report' on these people is available elsewhere,[23] but it seems appropriate here to give some demographic background on them in a summary fashion to place what follows in context: Australian neo-Nazis in any sort of contact with one another are very few in number. Although Nazis themselves give inflated estimates of their numbers, I was for several years accepted in their midst and met personally no more than fifteen Nazis in Brisbane and about twice that number in Sydney. Perhaps half of them have at least some German ancestry, but German Nazis proper are generally not to be found among them. There are quite substantial numbers of German migrants (young and old) who sing 'the old songs' among themselves and communally celebrate Hitler's birthday—complete with flags, swastika armbands, and antisemitic speeches—but they have no respect for, or association with, the Australian Nazis and largely lie outside the scope of the present discussion.

The Australian Nazis are not exclusively of working-class origin but are very largely so—with a sprinkling of clerical workers of various sorts. They are in general atheists or perhaps the most nominal of religious believers. They are mostly of Protestant nominal background, but this is probably merely a reflection of the general distribution of Protestants (roughly three-quarters of the population) in Australia. As there are several reasonably clear types of neo-Nazi in Australia, further generalizations that would cover all types would have little point. The field report referred to does nevertheless give further demographic detail, type by type. All, however, believe that 'Hitler was right'.

In one sense, then, what these people believe *is* simple. There is only one enemy to their kind of civilization—the Jews of Wall Street who control the United States and the Bolshevik Jews who control Soviet Russia. On the Australian scene, too, this picture is replicated. On the one hand the State Governor and the Prime Minister are to be seen attending Jewish public functions, and on the other the leader of the Communist Party of Australia bears the hardly ambiguous name of Aarons. This view of the world, however, is simple only in a rather trivial sense: it is simple in so far as it is a belief that there is only *one* enemy. In that sense and for that reason Dr. Goebbels provided beleaguered Germany with a single focus for its fear and hate—and thus enabled a readily intelligible explanation for the actions of his own regime.

When Goebbels and Hitler first spoke, however, their contention that there was only *one* enemy was a plausible one. Germany had just waged a world war with herself on one side and Russia and the 'allies' on the other. France, Britain, and the U.S.A. were disliked because they were the gloating victors, while Russia was disliked not only for historical reasons but also because it was Bolshevik. All were united in opposing

Germany. In the need to find a connecting link between two disparate enemies who, on any obvious criterion, should not be allied, Jewry represented a godsent and accessible solution. By the one stroke the shame of Weimar could be expunged and Germany could be portrayed to its people as the aggrieved victim—not the aggressor. Russia and the West were in fact united against Germany; the 'Jew-controlled' thesis provided a palatable explanation for that unity.

In the modern-day world the situation is vastly different. To see Israel, Russia, and the United States as unified is in fact perverse and necessitates an extraordinarily complex and devious view of world affairs—a view that not only receives no support but is violently contradicted by almost every news bulletin and information source. And yet among 'the Right', the slogan 'Communism is a Jewish plot' rings out as bravely as ever. If it is comforting to unify the twin enemies of Communism and Jewry, this comfort is bought *at the expense of simplicity* —not in furtherance of it. The most devious and implausible explanations are needed to support such a belief, given the present state of world affairs.

This point can perhaps be seen most vividly in the neo-Nazi response to the Arab–Israeli conflict. The Nazis naturally support the Arabs (although this goes against the grain: the Arabs would normally be regarded as 'degenerate' if they were not anti-Jewish). In so doing, however, the Nazis find themselves aligned with Communists, Trotskyists, and others of the more 'revolutionary' Left—whom they otherwise oppose violently. Antisemitism may have had some simplifying effect in Hitler's Germany (though even there its effect was to *explain* a unity, palatably, not to create one), but for the modern neo-Nazi the effect is the opposite. For him it does create a unity but only at the expense of great complications in the interpretation of world affairs. Antisemitism in fact requires great *tolerance* of contradictory information and a capacity for complicated explanations—even a 'need for complexity'.

How indeed does the neo-Nazi fit world events into his theory that Wall Street, Israel, and the Kremlin are all but aspects of one masterful, single-minded Jewish conspiracy? He sees international politics as a charade 'to fool the masses' (cf. George Orwell's *1984*)—the Nazi alone 'knows the score' about what is going on behind the scenes. Perhaps only outright war between East and West would convince him that there is in fact any real conflict between the two sides. But what about Korea and Vietnam? These conflicts he sees as confirming his view of Jewry. In explanation of this it must be said that he regards Jews themselves as being the real racists (the 'chosen people') bent ultimately on openly enslaving or eliminating all others. 'The Right' thus see themselves as engaged in a battle of 'the white race' versus the Jews. The relevant slogans are: 'The first race-laws in history were passed by Nehemiah', and 'Israel is a racist state'. The Jews are in fact somewhat

admired for 'getting away with' their racism so successfully. Thus Korea and Vietnam are seen as rather brilliant subterfuges whose main effect is to stimulate Asians towards the highly desirable goal of wiping one another out. 'There's too many of those yellow bastards anyway.' Given the extent to which politics *is* a charade and given its perceived distance from people in their everyday life, one does not have to be unintelligent to accept this neo-Nazi explanation—one simply has to assume that others are as conspiratorial and racist as oneself.

An observation that one might make at this point is that the Nazi has been said by Adorno *et al.* to be paranoid.[24] But does not any sort of paranoia entail complex systems of delusion and the accommodation of contradictory information? This is perfectly true and it does show that Adorno *et al.* were trying to have it both ways to at least some extent. On the one hand they wished to say that the authoritarian was over-simplifying his world, and on the other that he was introducing needless and devious complexity. As it happens, however, it would seem that Australian neo-Nazis at least are *not* in fact paranoid.[25] Neither of the contradictory characterizations given by Adorno *et al.* is supported.

What then is the motivation for the Nazi's antisemitism? If it makes his world more complex rather than more simple, what does he get out of it? Why is he a racist? Let us first dismiss the now discredited view that the Rightist is mentally ill. The neo-Nazis who are discussed here, so far from being psychotic, often appear very well adjusted. So much so that their social skills are well enough developed to make them good confidence men. They are anything but gibbering deviates. Even the fact mentioned above that they regard Jews as being 'the real racists' is unlike the Freudian 'projection'. It is advanced as a reasoned justification of their own position (sometimes including Biblical references such as 'the chosen people') and is *not* accompanied by any denial that they of 'the Right' are themselves racists. If they are 'sick' it is only in that their beliefs themselves are sick (that is, destructive). If psychopathology then cannot explain Nazism, what can?

All successful explanations of course only push the need for explanation back one step further. Nevertheless an attempt to take one such single step seems worthwhile here. My impression is that there *is* such a thing as a Fascist personality. It would also seem that it is natural for anyone, Fascist or not, to think well of his own group. The prime features of this Fascist personality would be a lack of empathy for suffering in others, and in fact a positive enjoyment of seeing others suffer (particularly where this is caused by successful human aggression). These are normal enough tendencies (witness the attendances at professional boxing matches) but are presumably either more extreme in, or more openly acknowledged and accepted by, the Fascist. Given this personality, then, what more natural to express one's positive regard for one's own group in the form of racism? And what more

natural, in turn, to be attracted to such a salient recent example of aggression and racism as Hitler's Germany? The Fascist can in fact *identify* with Nazism. This being so, he will of course be extraordinarily receptive to anything associated with Nazism. Since conventional historical treatment of Nazism has made antisemitism almost its defining characteristic, the Fascist will systematically and resolutely give an antisemitic expression to his racism.

There are certainly antisemites who are not Fascists and there are even more certainly people who are generally ethnocentric but who are yet not Fascists,[26] but these would appear to represent a different (perhaps older) phenomenon and at least lie outside the scope of this paper.

To be metaphorical, one might say that the neo-Nazi has failed to throw out the bathwater of antisemitism in his desire to keep the baby of aggressiveness. Antisemitism has value not as a rewarding simplification but rather as being a (complex) aspect of something rewarding in itself. Just as Eckhardt[27] spoke of general ethnocentrism as being simply a mythology, so for modern Nazis antisemitism is a mythology originally fostered by Goebbels's propaganda machine for immediate ends but carried on for reasons other than its original usefulness.

The point must be made, however, that aggression need not have a racial object; the neo-Nazi uses all the objects Hitler did (communists, 'plutocrats'—meaning big business—and 'useless eaters')—plus some newer ones such as 'hippies' and 'peace-creeps'. Hitler's use of the Jews as an object for aggression was certainly not original. Indeed, it was conservative. Christians had been plaguing Jewry with charges of deicide for nearly 2,000 years. Thus Jews were convenient; Fascism does not *need* to have them as its object. Mussolini and Franco showed little if any enmity on their own initiative. Hitler's use of the Jews, however, would seem to have made antisemitism a fashion for those aggressively inclined.

The outcome of all the above is then that we must not underestimate the Fascist as a poor chap who needs vast simplifications to sort out his conceptual world. For better or for worse, antisemitism has become associated with the Fascist outlook and any institutional resurgence of Fascism (on *either* side of the iron curtain) is highly likely to see antisemitism as proper (if not always prudent) policy.

NOTES

[1] I follow here the convention of referring to people of anti-Jewish sentiments as 'antisemitic'—even though the term is on several heads actually a rather inappropriate description.

[2] Theodore Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford, *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York, 1950.

[3] Allan C. Elms, 'Those Little Old Ladies in Tennis Shoes Aren't so Nutty after all: It turns out', *Psychology Today*, vol. 3, February 1970, pp. 27–59.

[4] Richard Schmuck and Mark Ches-

ler, 'Superpatriot Opposition to Community Health Programs', *Community Mental Health Journal*, vol. 3, no. 4, 1967, pp. 382–88.

[5] William Eckhardt, 'Prejudice: Fear, Hate or Mythology?', *Journal of Human Relations*, vol. 16, no. 1, 1968, pp. 32–41.

[6] Robert A. Schoenberger, 'Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism', *American Political Science Review*, vol. 62, no. 3, 1968, pp. 868–77.

[7] John Martin and John J. Ray, 'Anti-authoritarianism: An Indicator of Pathology', *Australian Journal of Psychology*, vol. 24, no. 1, 1972.

[8] John J. Ray, 'An "attitude to authority" Scale', *Australian Psychologist*, vol. 6, no. 1, 1971, pp. 31–50.

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SYNAGOGUE STATISTICS AND THE JEWISH POPULATION OF GREAT BRITAIN, 1900–70

S. J. Prais*

1. *Introduction*

AS part of its programme of establishing a basic statistical reporting system for the Anglo-Jewish community, the Research Unit of the Board of Deputies has been compiling information on synagogue membership and synagogue buildings. Much of this information had been gathered with the help of the Board's administrative returns, and in the course of the Unit's earlier work on population statistics;[1] as the value of this source of information became apparent a number of additional inquiries were undertaken in order to prepare the present account.

Synagogues are, of course, the central institution of Jewish life, and changes in their number and character are bound to reflect important developments in the community. In this paper, apart from surveying the number, size, and geographical distribution of synagogues, so providing a synoptic view of the community, we use this source of information in an attempt to cast light on a number of topics of more general interest. First, we have been able to obtain a distribution of the Jewish population among London boroughs on the basis of synagogue membership; from this the density of the Jewish population in the various areas has been calculated. Such knowledge is of obvious value to Jewish synagogal, educational, and welfare organizations; it is also of no little importance to local government authorities who, in making provisions out of general rates and taxation to support Jewish institutions, need to know to what extent the Jewish population within their boundaries justifies separate facilities. Second, our survey provides some indication of how the community as a whole has allocated its capital budget in the past decade to synagogue building as compared,

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for example, with school building. As is known, communal financing of such capital projects is not co-ordinated in the United Kingdom, but is the result of independent decisions by numerous more or less independent committees. It should be of interest both to the student of communal affairs, and to those who participate in those decisions, to see how the total sums are allocated, and how this may relate to communal priorities. Third, we examine the trends in this century of the total number of synagogues; the Registrar General in his annual reports has indicated that the number of synagogues reached a peak in 1952 and has since declined by some 22 per cent. We examine whether this recorded decline is to be relied upon, and whether it can be regarded as indicating a decline in the community's size.

It is hoped to maintain (and to bring up to date) our register of synagogues, their membership and seating capacity, and to issue reports on developments from time to time. This register may also facilitate future analyses of population movements within the country.

2. *Number, size, and distribution of synagogues*

According to our inquiries there were 375 synagogues in Britain in 1970, of which 199, or 53 per cent, were in London. About two-thirds of the Jewish population live in London, and since synagogues on average have approximately the same number of seats in London and in the provincial centres, it appears that London has also fewer synagogue seats in relation to its population than have the provincial centres.

While there are a number of very large synagogues—there are a score in Britain with over a thousand seats—the average synagogue has only 337 seats, of which 194 are for men and 143 for women (these are rounded figures). At the other extreme, our inquiries show that there are about a hundred synagogues in Britain with less than a hundred seats each, and that these are predominantly to be found in the provinces. Our records at this lower end are probably not entirely complete in that some of the smaller *minyanim*, which meet mostly in private houses and are situated predominantly in the London area, have not sent in returns; but in our view it is unlikely that more than one per cent of the country's synagogue seating is involved. It has also to be noted that our survey related to the 'seating capacity' of synagogues, and it is conceivable that a more detailed inquiry, in which permanent and temporary seating were distinguished, might yield a slightly different picture.[2]

In London the average synagogue has 337 seats; in the provinces the average is only slightly lower at 335 seats (counting places for men and women together). In terms of membership, London synagogues are nearly twice as large as provincial synagogues; they have an average of 300 male members, compared with 160 in the provinces.

Britain as a whole has 126,000 synagogue seats. In relation to our

estimated population total of 410,000, there are seats for only one person in three—if all wished to come at the same time. But that, no doubt, is not a realistic statement; women are not generally regarded as being under a strict obligation to attend, and it may therefore be better to confine the calculation to men and, in addition, to make an allowance for those who are too young or too infirm to attend (say, 15 per cent). But even on this more limited basis, there are male seats for only one man in every $2\frac{1}{2}$.

TABLE 1. *Synagogue seating for men in comparison with the Jewish population, London and main provincial centres, 1970*

	Jewish population[a]	*No. of synagogues*	*Synagogue seats for men*	*Seats per 100 men in population*[b]
London	280,000	199	40,476	29
Manchester	36,000	30	7,482	42
Leeds	19,400	10	4,285	44
Glasgow	13,400	11	3,658	55
Liverpool	7,500	9	1,878	50
Brighton and Hove	7,500	5	1,108	30
Birmingham	6,300	5	1,413	45
Southend and Westcliff	4,500	3	908	40
Other provincial centres	35,400	103	11,635	66
Total	410,000	375	72,843	36

Notes: [a] The population estimates are taken from the calculations prepared for our previous paper (Prais and Schmool, op. cit., p. 15).
[b] The male population has been taken as half the total population.

In Table 1 (see last column) we compare the number of seats for men with the estimated male population in the major towns. It appears that at present the provinces are very much better provided with synagogue seating than London is, there being nearly twice as many seats in relation to the population in the provinces as there are in London. No doubt this reflects the declining nature of many provincial communities—especially of the smaller communities which are grouped together in the table as 'other provincial centres'—for whom synagogues were built many years ago when their Jewish populations were larger; but it also seems likely that London, as any large metropolis, has a higher proportion of unattached persons whose visits to a synagogue are relatively infrequent. Consequently there may be a greater reliance on temporary seating, which has usually not been included in our returns.

The relative paucity of seats in the metropolis and their relative general excess in the provinces appear also in the comparison of seating with *membership* shown in Table 2 (instead of comparing seats with *population*, as in Table 1). In London there are seats for only 67 per cent

of male members; in the smaller towns ('other provincial centres' in Table 2) there are on the contrary more seats than members and, on average, in these towns there are one-and-a-third seats per male member. The larger provincial towns distinguished in the table fall between these extremes: Manchester, Leeds, Glasgow, and Liverpool have an excess of seats; Birmingham has a small deficiency, and the two coastal centres in the South-East—Brighton and Southend—have deficiencies of seats in proportions similar to London.[3]

Each town, of course, has individual characteristics and problems which cannot be discussed in detail within the confines of a general survey such as this. The picture is complex, but the following appear to be the main factors to be kept in mind in comparisons of this kind. An excess of seats over membership in some towns indicates a declining

TABLE 2. *Synagogue seating for men in comparison with male synagogue membership, London and main provincial centres, 1970*

	Synagogue seats for men	*Male membership*	*Seats for 100 members*
London	40,476	60,066	67
Manchester	7,482	6,702	112
Leeds	4,285	3,817	112
Glasgow	3,658	2,769	132
Liverpool	1,878	1,674	112
Brighton and Hove	1,108	1,704	65
Birmingham	1,413	1,635	87
Southend and Westcliff	908	1,289	70
Other provincial centres	11,635	8,778	133
Total	72,843	88,434	82

community; but elsewhere such an excess may arise following the transfer of an established congregation to a new suburb (the old synagogue having been closed down), with too many seats being provided in the new building in the hope—not always justified—of eventual communal expansion. A deficiency of seating in relation to membership will be recorded where a new congregation has not yet acquired a permanent building or permanent seating, and will generally be accompanied by a reliance on temporary seating during High Holy Days when attendance is fuller. There are some towns where an excess of seating in some congregations is accompanied by a deficiency in others.

The drift of the general population from the rest of the country to London and the South-East in recent decades is one in which the Jewish community has undoubtedly participated; and it would not be surprising if the Jewish population, being traditionally more mobile, has moved more rapidly. In an earlier paper we suggested, on the basis of comparisons of marriages and deaths, that the provincial communities were declining in relation to London;[4] the present com-

parisons of synagogue seating and membership, showing a general excess of seating in the provinces and a deficiency in London and in the South-East, are consistent with that view. The argument for emphasizing the London area in planning future communal facilities is thus re-inforced by those latest comparisons; but, of course, the statistics should not be taken as suggesting that the nature of the facilities in the provinces is adequate in all respects.

Having regard to the great deficiency of seating in London (a deficiency that is both absolutely and relatively great), a further analysis of the London returns has been made according to synagogue grouping. This shows (Table 3) that there is a low seating-ratio for all the groups distinguished, with the exception of right-wing orthodox synagogues.

TABLE 3. *Synagogue seating for men in comparison with male membership in London, by synagogue groups, 1970*

	Synagogue seats for men	*Male membership*	*Seats per 100 members*
Central Orthodox			
United Synagogue	21,494	30,111	72
Federation	7,498	10,058	75
Independent	2,011	3,283	61
Right-wing Orthodox	2,971	1,564	190
Sephardi	1,412	2,691	53
Total Orthodox	35,386	47,707	74
Reform	2,320*	7,150	29
Liberal	2,770*	5,209	53
Total Progressive	5,090	12,359	41
Total London	40,476	60,066	67

Note: * Male seats taken as half the total number of seats; see text.

As is well known, synagogues in the latter group are well attended not only by heads of families—who are registered members of the synagogue—but also by their children (who, of course, are not registered as members); consequently in those synagogues it is usual to find more seats than there are registered members.

For the progressive synagogues (Reform and Liberal), seating is not segregated by sex; for purposes of comparison with other synagogue groups we show the male membership, and against that figure we show half the total number of seats in the synagogue—on the assumption that men and women are equally provided for. On this basis, there are seats for only 41 per cent of male members. Even if it were thought that in progressive synagogues two-thirds of the seats may be regarded as male seats (for the purposes of the present comparisons), there would still be seats for only 53 per cent of members. Both these proportions

fall below those for the Central Orthodox groups; however, many of the Reform synagogues are relatively new and will not yet have acquired seating for all their members, so contributing to the low average shown for this group.

The Sephardi community is shown as having relatively few seats, and this is to be attributed to the heavy immigration in the past fifteen years. Here, too, a number of new communities have recently established synagogues in temporary premises which as yet have no permanent seating.

3. *Density of the Jewish population of London*

Two-thirds of the Jewish community of Great Britain is to be found in the Greater London area, but there is little precise information about where, in that vast area, the community currently resides. In a previous generation there may have been no need to rely on anything other than general impressions: the East End was then the centre of the community (the Great Synagogue, the Beth Din, and other institutions were all to be found there), and the few outlying centres were well known and relatively small. Subsequently, as the community grew and spread, more careful studies have been made of synagogue membership to show the evolution of the London community and its diffusion into 'suburbia';[5] the present paper goes somewhat further and provides current estimates for each of the London boroughs on the basis of synagogue affiliation.

These new estimates, while based on synagogue membership, embody other information as well. First, we have taken into account the fact that not all members today live near the synagogue to which they belong; this is especially true for many East End synagogues, and for some of the larger metropolitan synagogues. Ideally, all synagogue membership lists should be analysed, and any members living outside the synagogue's immediate vicinity should be allocated to their place of residence. Owing to limitation of resources, we were obliged to confine ourselves to a restricted number of such analyses, but we believe we have taken into account most of the synagogues for which this factor is important.[6] In total, we redistributed 19·8 per cent of synagogue members to other boroughs. While we believe our results give a correct overall impression, full geographical accuracy cannot be claimed. This is especially so if a synagogue is near the border between two boroughs; in such cases we have treated the members of both boroughs as if they were resident in that borough in which the synagogue is situated (for example, the synagogue for the Bromley–Lewisham region is situated in Lewisham and, though many members live in Bromley, we have not counted them among those redistributed).

Second, we have transformed these adjusted statistics of synagogue membership in each area into estimates of the total Jewish population

in that area. It should be emphasized that these estimates are approximate, being based on the ratio of population to membership found in an earlier study for London as a whole; but for most planning purposes approximate population figures are more useful than are precise membership figures. The estimated population is intended to include both those who are affiliated to synagogues through 'family membership' and those not affiliated to a synagogue but whose sole attachment to Judaism would be an eventual Jewish burial.[7]

No doubt the assumption that the non-affiliated population is geographically distributed in the same way as the affiliated population is not entirely correct, but there is no easy way of improving upon it. It may be thought more realistic to assume that non-affiliated Jews would reside in areas of lower Jewish density, where the scope and social pressure making for affiliation are more limited. On that ground it could be argued that we have over-estimated the Jewish population in the denser areas, and under-estimated it elsewhere. On the other hand, there is an off-setting factor in that family size is likely to be greater among the more affiliated sections of the community,[8] and, since these tend to live in the denser areas, our procedure (of using a common ratio of population to membership) would lead to a relative under-estimate of the population in denser areas. On balance, we suspect the first factor may be more important, but it is clearly not possible to be certain about the matter. We doubt very much whether more precise estimates of the Jewish population by boroughs is possible in the absence of an official census, or of an intensive sample survey of the non-affiliated section of the community which—it hardly needs saying—would be both a difficult and an expensive task.

The results of our calculations are set out in Table 4. The greater part of the Jewish population, it will be noted, lives in the outer London area (158,600 out of the total of 273,000). In this it reflects the distribution of the general population, which has 67 per cent living in outer London; but the Jewish proportion is somewhat lower, at 58 per cent. Thus, notwithstanding the well-known drift of the Jewish population in recent decades towards the suburbs, the Jewish population remains somewhat less 'suburbanized' than the general population.

Certain regions, of course, have a very much heavier concentration of Jews than have others. The greatest Jewish density (taken as the proportion of the Jewish to the general population) is to be found in the borough of Barnet, where it appears that as much as 19 per cent of the population is Jewish. Taken together with the adjacent areas of Brent, Harrow, and Camden, where the densities are about 7 per cent, these 'north-western' boroughs account for an estimated Jewish population of 110,000.

The second densest borough is Hackney (in North London), at 16 per cent, but even with the adjacent boroughs of Islington, Haringey,

TABLE 4. *Estimated distribution of the Jewish population in relation to the general population of London, by boroughs (in order of density)*

	Estimated Jewish population, 1970	*General populat on, 1967*	*Proportion Jewish/ general*
		Thousands	%
Inner London			
Hackney*	41,100	249	16·5
Westminster*	24,600	259	9·5
Tower Hamlets and City*	15,700	203	7·7
Camden*	14,400	238	6·1
Kensington and Chelsea*	4,500	213	2·1
Lambeth	5,600	338	1·7
Hammersmith*	2,600	212	1·2
Lewisham	2,100	290	0·7
Wandsworth	1,700	330	0·5
Islington*	1,100	255	0·5
Greenwich	700	231	0·3
Southwark	300	301	0·1
Total (Inner London)	114,400	3,119	3·7
Outer London			
Barnet*	58,900	315	18·6
Redbridge*	18,900	245	7·7
Brent*	20,200	293	6·9
Harrow*	14,400	208	6·9
Enfield*	11,400	267	4·3
Waltham Forest*	8,900	238	3·7
Haringey*	7,600	254	3·0
Newham*	4,200	183	1·6
Kingston	1,400	145	1·0
Ealing*	2,500	303	0·8
Merton	1,900	257	0·7
Richmond	1,300	179	0·7
Havering*	1,600	251	0·6
Barking*	1,100	170	0·6
Hounslow*	800	207	0·6
Sutton	900	165	0·5
Hillingdon*	900	234	0·4
Croydon	1,000	328	0·3
Bromley	700	302	0·2
Bexley	—	215	—
Total (Outer London)	158,600	4,762	3·3
Grand total	273,000	7,811	3·5

* Boroughs north of river Thames.

and Waltham Forest, the total Jewish population in these North London boroughs amounts to only 59,000. This represents a considerable decline from the estimate made less than twenty years ago of 85,000–100,000 Jews in North London.[9]

The old centre of London Jewry consisting of the East End and its extensions, which at its peak two generations ago had a population of 125,000 Jews,[10] is today to be compared with the population of 39,000 resident in Tower Hamlets, Newham, and Redbridge. Notwithstanding

this sharp decline in numbers, the density in that region remains fairly high, at about 6 per cent.

The only other centre of Jewry with a high density (10 per cent) is Westminster, which includes St. John's Wood and Maida Vale, and has a Jewish population of 25,000.

These four centres—the North-West, North, East, and Westminster —account for 85 per cent of London Jewry; the remaining 15 per cent are spread rather thinly over the other twenty boroughs, with a median density of only about half of one per cent. The low densities south of the river also deserve notice: the average density in all boroughs south of the Thames is no more than half of one per cent, compared with an average of 5 per cent on the north side.

4. *The age of synagogues and the number built in the last decade*

Almost all synagogues (88 per cent) were able to give us the year in which their present building was acquired or built; it appears that half of the synagogue buildings have been acquired or built since the end of the Second World War. In other words, the median age of synagogue buildings in 1970 was twenty-five years. It is curious that in 1851, when the official Census included questions relating to religion and to synagogues, the median age of the fifty-three synagogues then in existence was found to be very similar, at twenty-three years. (Incidentally, five of the synagogue buildings included in the 1851 Census are still in use: Bevis Marks, Plymouth, Exeter, Cheltenham, and Ramsgate.)

The age of the synagogue *building* has to be distinguished from the age of the *congregation* to which the synagogue building belongs. The congregation is generally founded first, but it takes time until its resources are adequate to make proper arrangements for a synagogue. We found that the average congregation was established some twenty years before its present building was acquired (the median year of foundation of the congregations now in existence is 1926). Some of this interval is associated with the post-war restoration of synagogues damaged during the war, and with the postponement of synagogue building during and immediately after the war; but no doubt the general replanning of city centres, and the movement of the population towards the suburbs, have also been significant factors.

No fewer than 67 new synagogues, a fifth of the present number, have been built or acquired in the last decade; they provide seats for 26,000 persons. These new synagogues are on average slightly larger (having 7 per cent more seats) than the older synagogues still in existence. Of the total new seating provided, 85 per cent has been for Orthodox congregations, 11 per cent for Reform congregations, and 4 per cent for Liberal congregations; these proportions are similar to those found previously for the distribution of marriages and population by synagogue group.[11]

For purposes of comparison we collected information on the number of new places provided at Jewish day schools during that period. Our figures included new buildings and extensions which augmented or replaced older buildings; we arrived at a total of 5,100 new places. This is under a fifth of the number of new synagogue seats provided in that period. Nearly half the new school places were provided as substitutes for the older accommodation, and the net increase in school capacity in the decade 1961–71 was only 2,800 places.[12]

It is tempting to convert these figures into money terms but, in the absence of a much more detailed inquiry than we have been able to undertake, only the grossest of comparisons is possible; the figures that follow are therefore quoted with considerable reserve. We understand that the average capital expenditure in providing a 'synagogue seat' (with all that goes with it) in that decade has been roughly in the region of £250; the total cost of providing 26,000 synagogue seats has therefore been some £6½ million, corresponding to an expenditure of about £1·50 for each year in the past decade for each member of the community.

The capital expenditure involved in providing a 'school desk' (with all that goes with it) on average has probably not differed very much from that of providing the average synagogue seat. For schools meeting official standards, the total capital expenditure may well have been higher (perhaps by 50 per cent, or even more in special cases); but for the many private schools (opened in converted houses, etc.) the cost may have been only about half that level. There are great variations, but we suspect that the average was close to £250. The total capital expenditure incurred in the past decade may therefore be estimated to be in the region of £1½–2 million. It must not be forgotten, however, that the government makes substantial grants (at present up to 80 per cent) for those schools that receive its approval, and many of the larger schools fell into that category; the net amount met by the community out of its *own* resources for capital expenditure on day schools (apart, of course, from its contributions by way of general taxation) we therefore think has in all likelihood been under £1 million, or, say, under 25p per person per year.

It must also be kept in mind, if a stricter comparison is to be made, that synagogue buildings often include classrooms and reception halls, and hence the determination of the net expenditure on educational facilities of all types (day schools, synagogue classes, etc.) is not a straightforward matter. Account would also have to be taken, in a fuller calculation, of the payment made for the repair of war damage to synagogue buildings. But in the end we suspect it would hardly be surprising if a detailed calculation showed that the community's net capital expenditure on synagogues in the past decade was between five and ten times that on day schools.

For some years there has been a grave shortage of places at Jewish day schools, especially in London. In the light of the above estimates, one can only wonder whether the correct decisions have been taken; and, indeed, whether the authority of the community's central institutions has been adequate to ensure the best use of available resources, and to take full advantage of the opportunities for the creation of day schools under the provisions of the Education Acts.

5. *The rise and decline in the number of synagogues*

The number of synagogues in England and Wales apparently reached a peak in the 1940s, but it is difficult today to be sure exactly when the peak occurred and the precise number of synagogues then in existence. We have two sources of information: the first, provided by the Registrar General and relating to buildings certified as synagogues, gives 428

TABLE 5. *Number of synagogues in England and Wales according to the Registrar General and* The Jewish Year Book *(selected years 1901–71)*

	Registrar General	*Year Book*
1901	151[a]	142
1911	203	238
1921	259	254[b]
1931	295	305
1941	373	333[c]
1947	410	415
1952	428	392
1957	377	382
1962	400	374
1967	332	373
1968	—	377
1969	—	371
1970	—	368
1971	—	367

Notes: [a] Relates to 1903 (the Registrar General's figure for 1901 appears doubtful to us).
[b] Relates to 1916 (no *Year Book* was published for 1921).
[c] Relates to 1940 (no *Year Book* was published for 1941).

as the highest number of synagogues, and that number was reached in 1952; the second source is provided by the lists of communities and their synagogues in *The Jewish Year Book*, according to which there was a peak of 415 synagogues in 1947.

As will be seen from Table 5, there are considerable discrepancies between the two sources: in some years one source gives a higher figure, and in other years the other. It will, however, be understood that the compilers of these statistics have to rely on returns from synagogues, many of which do not employ secretarial staff, while some have no paid staff at all. Consequently, notification and certification of new synagogues tend to be delayed, in some cases perhaps by several years;

and when a synagogue is closed, often it will not be removed by the compiler from his records until some years have passed without a return having been received. In years when the number of synagogues is increasing (for example, following a period of heavy immigration) both sources will tend to understate the true number; and when the number is declining both will tend to overstate the true number. It is therefore likely that the true peak was reached somewhat earlier than shown by either of the two sources. In our view, the peak probably occurred in the early or mid-1940s and is largely to be attributed to the many temporary communities that were set up following the population dispersion from the main conurbations at the beginning of the war. Most of these communities were subsequently disbanded.

There were some 150 synagogues at the beginning of the century (see Table 5) and the growth in the subsequent half-century parallels in an approximate way what is known of the growth of the Jewish population. For 1901, the total Jewish population of Great Britain was estimated at 230,000,[13] and bore a roughly similar relation to the number of synagogues as does the present population. However, for earlier years, little is known about the size of synagogues and total synagogue seating, and the comparison is not necessarily very meaningful.[14]

According to the Registrar General, the decline in synagogue numbers since 1947 was followed by a short-lived rise in 1962; but we find it difficult to believe that this is more than an aberration in the compilation process to which we have referred. The smoother decline shown by the *Year Book* is more likely to be true.

To cast light on the nature of the decline in the number of synagogues in the last twenty years or so, we compared our list for 1971 with that in the *Year Book* for the peak year 1947. It was found that the net decline of some fifty synagogues between 1947 and 1971 consisted of 140 synagogues that were closed during that period, offset by some ninety new synagogues. A study of the names of the synagogues in the two groups casts a very clear light on the geographical movements of the population in the past generation, and on the changes in the religious complexion of the community. These changes may be summarized as follows.

(*a*) The great mass of small synagogues in the East End have gone; some forty have closed (mostly affiliated to the Federation of Synagogues). This is the single most substantial change during the period.

(*b*) Some sixty provincial synagogues have been closed. Many of them were in the 'evacuation areas' (such as Amersham, Chesham, Hinckley, Walsall), but others had been established for longer periods and have suffered from the long-term drift away from the outlying regions (for instance, Durham, Huddersfield, North Shields, and West Hartlepool).

(*c*) In London the new trends in the community are mirrored by

some twenty or so new right-wing orthodox synagogues (mostly in the Stamford Hill area, and generally small), five new Sephardi synagogues, eleven new Reform synagogues, and eight new Liberal synagogues. But the community is still dominated by its traditional Ashkenazi–Central–Orthodox complexion, as is shown by the establishment of twenty new United synagogues (mainly in the Outer London area) and nine new Federation synagogues (partly in North-West London, and partly in Outer London).

(*d*) In the provinces (outside the Home Counties), the proportion of new progressive congregations is striking. Seventeen new synagogues have appeared and, of these, twelve term themselves Progressive, Reform, or Liberal.

These manifold changes indicate that the community's institutions in the last twenty years have adapted in a lively way to changing circumstances. While there has been a net decline in the number of synagogues, those which have been closed have probably been of smaller average size than those which have been opened.[15] In terms of seating capacity, if there has been a change in the post-war period, it seems probable that it has not been very great.

6. *Conclusions*

The main conclusions of this survey are as follows.

(*a*) There were 375 synagogues in Great Britain in 1970 with, on average, 240 male members and 337 seats (of which 194 were for men and 143 for women).

(*b*) London has relatively fewer synagogue seats in relation to its Jewish population than have the provincial centres. In relation to male membership, London has fewer seats than male members, whereas in the provincial centres there are generally more male seats than male members. This pattern is consistent with a general reduction in the size of provincial communities, and with the long-term general drift of the population towards London and the South-East.

(*c*) On the basis of the addresses of synagogue members, estimates have been prepared of the distribution of the London community according to boroughs. The North-Western boroughs of Barnet, Brent, Harrow, and Camden now account for the largest concentration of the community (an estimated 110,000 out of 280,000 in the Greater London area); the proportion of Jews to the general population is highest in the borough of Barnet, where it is estimated to be 19 per cent.

(*d*) Half the synagogue buildings now in use have been built since the war ended. In the last decade 67 new synagogues have been built; the capital expenditure on these by the community was many times greater than that on Jewish day schools.

(*e*) While the total number of synagogues has declined in the past twenty years, many of those closed were either in evacuation areas or in the East End of London, and were probably of smaller size than the new synagogues opened during that period. The total number of synagogue seats has therefore probably not changed very much.

NOTES

[1] The main results have been published in earlier issues of *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*. See, especially, S. J. Prais and Marlena Schmool, 'The Size and Structure of the Anglo-Jewish Population, 1960–65', vol. X, no. 1, June 1968.

[2] The synagogue with the largest permanent seating capacity in London is St. John's Wood Synagogue with 1,500 seats; but Edgware may claim a larger total of 1,900 if temporary seating under the same roof is included. The largest synagogue in the provinces is the Holy Law Synagogue in Manchester with 1,300 seats.

[3] No account has been taken in this inquiry of the small degree of multiple membership that is known to exist; but it is not thought to be of substantial dimensions (perhaps 5 per cent) and is unlikely to affect the argument.

[4] Prais and Schmool, op. cit., p. 16.

[5] See V. D. Lipman, *Social History of the Jews in England, 1850–1950*, London, 1954; and his 'The Rise of Jewish Suburbia', *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, vol. XXI, 1967.

[6] The membership of the following synagogues was analysed and redistributed: Liberal Synagogue (St. John's Wood); West London Synagogue (Reform); Bevis Marks and Lauderdale Road (Sephardi); Central and New West End (United); and New London (Central Orthodox). In addition, the membership of fourteen Central Orthodox synagogues in the East End (Tower Hamlets) was redistributed on the basis of the membership of five of them. The basis for redistribution was the postal district given against the member's address.

[7] These matters are discussed more fully in an earlier paper (Prais and Schmool, op. cit., pp. 6, 19); the ratio of population to synagogue membership was there found to be 4·6.

[8] This is confirmed by the preliminary results of a study in progress in the London region of Jewish fertility by religious grouping.

[9] See Lipman, *Social History* . . ., op. cit., p. 169.

[10] ibid.

[11] See Prais and Schmool, op. cit., p. 17.

[12] Dr. J. Braude's figures in the *Jewish Chronicle*, 30 July 1971.

[13] See S. Rosenbaum, 'A contribution to the study of vital and other statistics of the Jews in the United Kingdom', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, vol. 68, 1905, p. 526.

[14] Returns of synagogue membership made to the Board of Deputies at the beginning of each session are available from the middle of the nineteenth century, but are not helpful for our present purposes since (*a*) not all synagogues were affiliated to the Board; and (*b*) the practice of being a seat-holder or member was not so widespread in earlier days, many free seats being normally provided for the poorer members of the community. Thus in 1901 only 108 synagogues were affiliated out of 142 recorded in the *Year Book*; the average membership for these synagogues was only 150, which may be compared with a present-day average male membership of 230. For the reasons given, it cannot be concluded that synagogues were smaller at the beginning of the century, but equally, that possibility cannot be rejected.

[15] No statistics are available on the seating capacity of the synagogues that have closed in this period, and no precise comparison is possible.

THE JEWISH VOTE IN ROMANIA BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

Bela Vago

I

THE problem of Jewish electoral attitudes and behaviour first appeared in the form of a paradox. Under the obligations assumed by Romania's representatives at the Paris Peace Conference, as well as in conformity with the resolutions of Alba-Iulia (December 1918), the Jews of the annexed territories—Transylvania, Bucovina and Bessarabia—were to enjoy all political rights, including the right to vote and to stand for election. But in the first post-war elections tens of thousands of Jews from the Old Kingdom (Romania before the First World War, which consisted of Vallachia, Moldavia, and Dobruja) had not yet been registered on the electoral rolls and various categories of Jews had not yet obtained naturalization. At the same time, the Jews of the annexed territories, though alien to Romanian political life, their majority even ignorant of the Romanian language, were allowed to participate—in principle—in the elections.

Following the enactment of the Constitution of 1923, virtually all Jewish citizens enjoyed all political rights; but now thousands of Jews, precisely from the annexed territories, were not entered on the electoral rolls owing to the obstacles that the several nationalist governments were putting in the way of the naturalization of the Jewish 'newcomers'. However, in the early twenties an approximate 160,000–165,000 Jews, out of a total of roughly 800,000, were entitled to vote.[1] In the early thirties their number neared the 185,000 mark. Owing to the fragmentation of the Romanian political arena (in 1932 as many as seventeen different political parties and groupings appeared at the elections), the Jewish vote was not only not spurned, but on the contrary, with the exception of the ultranationalistic extreme-Right, the political parties curried favour with the Jewish voters. Romanian parliamentary democracy after 1919 attracted into political life millions of citizens who had no political education and were incapable of mature political decisions, for lack of a democratic parliamentary tradition and because of the high rate of illiteracy (in 1930 the rate was 44 per cent in the Old Kingdom).

The overall situation of the Jewish masses, with the exception of a bourgeois minority, did not differ essentially from that of the Romanian population.[2] The Jews from the annexed territories were better acquainted with parliamentary life than were their co-religionists from the Old Kingdom, but Romanian political conditions in the immediate post-war period were utterly alien to them.

Statistical data on the breakdown of Jewish votes among the different parties are not available. However, we may be justified in making certain assessments of the electoral attitudes of the Jews. It is possible to reconstruct the pattern of Jewish electoral behaviour from the following: (a) the correlation of electoral results in the various constituencies with their ethnic composition; (b) the study of contemporary electoral analyses made by leading Jewish and non-Jewish politicians; and (c) the study of a number of statements made by former leaders of Romanian Jewry. Data available on the Jewish membership of various political clubs (belonging to political parties) have also been used in this analysis.

I shall not review the communal and municipal elections, but shall limit myself to the parliamentary elections, mainly to those that seem characteristic of the whole period under study.

II

A considerable part of the Jews of the Old Kingdom did not go to the polls in the first post-war elections (1919 and 1920), while the majority of the Jews in the annexed territories abstained from voting owing to their lack of orientation in the political life of the enlarged state.[3] The question of a common political stand did not arise in the first elections because of the heterogeneous character and the lack of political organization of the Jewish population. There was hardly any common basis for a unified political attitude among the Jewish population made up of at least four distinct groups in respect of their cultural background, language, and political experience. The political divergences among 'Romanian' (living in the Old Kingdom), Transylvanian, Bucovinan, and Bessarabian Jews were conspicuous in the first years of Greater Romania.

The Jews could choose among several voting possiblities. They could favour a number of parties considered democratic, including the peasant groupings; they were tempted to support the workers' parties; in Transylvania they could rally around the Magyar lists, and, as a matter of course, were entitled to organize themselves in a party of their own, or within the framework of Jewish groupings on the model of Jewish political life in Poland. In the mid-twenties Jewish public opinion was chiefly preoccupied with the debate about whether the 'social determinant' or the 'political determinant' should be given primacy. The defining feature of the debate was formulated by a Zionist publication

in these terms: should the Jews participate in the political struggle among those political parties that represent class interests, or should they organize themselves into a Jewish-national political framework?[4]

Beyond all doubt, the 'social determinant' had an important role to play in Jewish political attitudes in the first post-War years. In the first elections in Greater Romania, the socialist left—several socialist groups and the communists—enjoyed strong Jewish support, especially in the annexed provinces. Yet it was only a minority of the Jewish population that cast their votes for the working left, contrary to the cliché of the Romanian extreme Right who identified communism in Romania with the Jews. The analysis of one of the best known and most influential contemporary publicists deserves attention in this respect. Dr. C. Blumenfeld ('Scrutator') wrote in his memorandum drawn up in July 1926 and addressed to I. G. Duca (the liberal leader) that the Jews, like the non-Jewish population, voted in conformity with their class interests. 'The Jewish proletariat will not go in any other direction than the one in which it is driven by its class interests . . . It should be noted in passing', Blumenfeld points out, 'that the number of Jewish workers is not too large . . . The Jewish productive class [*sic*] is largely made up of craftsmen.' He stressed the difference between 'the class of the craftsmen and that of the factory workers', drawing the conclusion that the craftsmen were not as 'receptive to the progressive ideologies' as the proletarians proper. 'The Jewish craftsmen,' Blumenfeld wrote, 'have a highly developed individualistic sense. They have no natural relationship with those socially advanced parties that are based on a class substratum. They may at most have a feeling of sympathy [towards the socialist parties] originating in their belief that they might find some day a defence and support in their desire for a better future.'[5]

The majority of the Jews—according to Blumenfeld—'are closer to the bourgeois parties through their environment [*sic*], education, occupation and their interests' and they are drawn towards them by their 'class instinct and instinct of preservation'.[6]

Even if we may not accept Blumenfeld's analysis and conclusions without reserve, it is a fact that the majority of the Jewish voters did orient themselves towards the bourgeois parties, including the bourgeois rightist parties, whereas only a minority supported the socialist left.

It is worth noting that the 'class' or 'social' determinant appears in a peculiar form even in the rivalry between the Zionists on the one hand and the so-called 'Romanian Jews' on the other—more precisely, in the struggle between the leaders of the two opposed camps. On the occasion of the founding of the Zionist 'National-Jewish Club' at the beginning of 1926, an article appeared in the Jewish-nationalist *Renasterea Noastra* about the striking fact that at the founding meeting 'the [Jewish]

élite, the repository of all the political wisdom and the leadership of the philanthropic societies, were absent. Our "boyards" were absent. But instead were present the young . . .'[7]

In an analysis of the National-Jewish electoral failure in 1926, appearing in the same publication, the author attacked the 'financial parvenus' and the 'Jewish parvenu nobility' at the head of that political camp which chose the way of collaboration with Romanian parties to the detriment of national Jewish interests.[8]

It would be erroneous to claim that the 'Romanian-Jewish' camp was headed by the high bourgeoisie, while the nationalist camp was led by working-class or petty bourgeois elements. Yet it is a fact that the leaders of those who favoured the political integration of the Jews belonged mainly to the higher, well-to-do strata, which upheld the 'establishment', whereas the majority of the Zionist leaders were democratically minded young men who were opposed to conservatism. Nevertheless, the conservative-minded petty bourgeois Jewish masses—the great majority of the Jewish population—did not solidly align themselves either with the socialist Left or with the Zionist camp. With the exception of two elections (1931 and 1932), the majority of the Jewish votes were reaped by the bourgeois nationalist Romanian parties.[9]

All the elections up to the one held in June 1931 prove the dispersion of the Jewish votes over a wide and variegated political spectrum. A commentary in the democratic daily newspaper *Dimineata* in May 1931 came close to the truth when it remarked that 'a large number of Jews, instinctively driven by their class interests . . . are active in different political parties; we find Jews among the Liberals, the National Peasants, in the ranks of Iorga's party,[10] in those of the Lupu-party,[11] among the socialists, the communists, etc.'[12] One should add to this list Marshal Averescu's People's Party and even the dissident rightist Liberal faction led by Professor George Bratianu.[13]

III

As to the organized political activity of the Jewish population, two principal bodies emerged from the very first, rallying the majority of the Jews: the 'Union of Romanian Jews' (until 1923 'Union of Native Jews') on the one hand and the national Jewish camp on the other. The latter had been agitating from the early twenties for the setting up of a Jewish party. The URJ opposed the creation of a separate Jewish party, aiming at the political integration of the Jews in the life of the country. Not committing itself to any particular party, the URJ upheld the view that every member of the Union should be free to decide his political affiliation for himself. While this tolerance was fully applied to its members' opting for one or another Romanian party, the Union showed far less understanding towards the supporters of the

Jewish party, or towards the Zionists. 'The policy of the URJ is one of conscious realism, which excludes chimeras'—proclaimed a URJ declaration in the thirties. 'It is the policy on the basis of which every Jew is free to keep his own intimate beliefs, but in which all the Jews are united and determined to adapt themselves to the needs of life.' Therefore the duty of the URJ was to struggle against the 'policy of separation, isolation and incitement of the Jewish party and of the Zionists'.[14] The URJ leaders accused the 'National Jews' of 'chauvinistic nationalism', of a policy of national isolation, and of the creation of a political ghetto under the pretext of the existence of a Jewish ethnic minority.[15] The 'Nationals' on the other hand attacked the URJ and those Jewish leaders who were active in the Romanian parties for betraying Jewish interests.[16]

The URJ leaders were convinced that the most efficacious way of safeguarding the rights of the Jews and of keeping antisemitic movements in check was to co-operate with the principal Romanian parties that had chances of coming to power. For years on end they lent their support to the National Liberal Party, a rightist, strongly nationalist party, representing industrial, commercial, and financial circles. In several elections the URJ brought into Parliament quite a number of deputies and senators on Liberal lists. In spite of its 'moderate' antisemitism, the Liberal party seemed to constitute a guarantee against extreme antisemitic movements and for the maintenance of order and internal security, which would facilitate the integration of the Jews in the life of the state.

Apart from the Liberal Party, the National Peasant Party also intermittently enjoyed the support of the URJ. The NPP was founded in 1926 by the fusion of the Peasant Party with the Transylvanian National Party; and under the leadership of I. Mihalache and I. Maniu it was considered a democratic party, representing agrarian and petty bourgeois masses. In 1931 the URJ supported an ephemeral 'National Union' headed by Professor Iorga and in the early twenties it collaborated for a short period with the nationalist, rightist, and 'populist' People's Party led by Marshal Averescu. The motives that induced the URJ to oscillate between the different leading bourgeois parties should be sought in opportunistic considerations. Its orientation was naturally and often admittedly influenced by the chances of the various parties of coming to power. However, an important criterion for the URJ in its relations with one or another party was that party's attitude towards the Jewish problem at a given moment.

It is indisputable that the Peasant Party's nationalism was more tolerant towards the minorities than that of the Liberals, and that the Agrarians were more democratic in character than the Liberals. As a matter of course, the Union's place ought to have been close to the Peasant Party. In the thirties the URJ leaders justified their partnership

with the Liberals with proofs of the Peasants' anti-democratic and anti-minority practices when in power.[17]

As to the 'National Jews', their plan for the organization of a Jewish party, opposed to the URJ, was put up in the early twenties, but it only materialized relatively late, in 1928. The Jewish Party was to present itself independently for the elections only from 1931.

A brief survey of Jewish participation in the parliamentary elections in the inter-War period shows the lack of a common Jewish political attitude and orientation in political life; it also reveals the futility of the struggle between the 'Union of Romanian Jews' and the 'Jewish Party', and the lack of an authoritative Jewish leadership in Parliament and in the political arena.

In the November 1919 elections the Jewish electoral factor had not yet made its appearance and there are no available data on the political affiliation of the Jews in the early days of the shaping of Greater Romania.

A 'Jewish Bloc' first emerged in November 1920 at the elections organized by the Averescu Government. The first attempt to mobilize a large number of Jewish votes in favour of a separate list ended in failure, although the 'Bloc' obtained an impressively great number of votes in Ilfov, Botosani, Iasi, and Chisinau.[18] Averescu's People's Party polled quite a number of Jewish votes; however, from the evidence of contemporary press commentaries and the testimonies of some socialist leaders it can be asserted that the Jewish vote made a significant contribution to the relative success of the socialists.[19] B. Strauchner (Cernauti) was outstanding among the few Jewish deputies elected on bourgeois lists; he was an independent.

Two years later, in 1922, the National Liberal party organized the elections, and—owing to the peculiar Romanian circumstances which enabled those in power to 'make' elections with the aid of the administrative apparatus—assured for itself an absolute majority.[20] The 'Union of Native Jews' (which a year later, in 1923, was to change its name to 'Union of Romanian Jews') lent its support to the most likely winners, namely to the Liberal Party. The Liberals also enjoyed the backing of some local Jewish groupings, other than the UNJ; for instance, the so-called 'Rabbinical Party', an orthodox religious grouping in Maramures county, gave them its support for years.[21] The 'Jewish Bloc' (an ephemeral fusion of some Bessarabian Jewish groupings, known also as the 'Jewish National Democratic Bloc') obtained one seat in the Chamber. This was the first time that a deputy entered Parliament on a Jewish list. The 'Bloc' put candidates up in no more than three Bessarabian constituencies, but it achieved enough votes to elect one deputy.[22]

The National-Jewish trend grew stronger on the eve of the 1926 elections, pressing for the setting up of a Jewish party. A number of Jewish groups and associations conducted their propagandist activity

along these lines, among them the 'Renasterea' ('Renaissance') group in the Old Kingdom, the 'Transylvanian Jewish National Union', and the strong Zionist organization of Bucovina, under the leadership of Dr. M. Ebner. At the end of 1925 Dr. Ebner suggested the setting up of a 'Jewish National Union of Romania', while the Transylvanian Zionists contented themselves with the aim of organizing a 'Jewish Electoral Bloc', although as early as December 1925, the Tg.-Mures Conference of the 'Transylvanian Jewish National Union' adopted a resolution in favour of a Jewish party. However, the plan for setting up a Jewish party was not feasible, primarily owing to the intransigence of the URJ, which opposed any common front on a Jewish national basis. Under the circumstances, on the eve of the new elections, all Jewish groups endeavoured to curry favour with the main Romanian parties. Even the militant Transylvanian Zionists decided to support in the elections those democratic parties that pledged 'maximal guarantees on behalf of the Jews'.[23]

The winner of the May 1926 elections was Marshal Averescu, the Prime Minister in the outgoing government which organized the elections. The results disappointed both the URJ and the National Jewish camp: the two parties (the Liberals and the Agrarians of the Old Kingdom) favoured by the main Jewish organizations were defeated.[24] A few Jewish deputies were elected on different lists. Dr. M. Ebner, the only deputy from the beginning representing expressly Jewish interests, won his seat owing to an electoral agreement with Averescu's People's Party. In addition to him, two other Jewish members of Parliament were listed as independents, fighting also for Jewish rights.[25] In these elections Jewish votes were again dispersed on a large scale. The 'National Jews' did in fact admit that they had 'lost a battle', and dissatisfaction was obvious in URJ circles because of the miscalculation over co-operation with the Liberals and Agrarians.

After the May 1926 elections, the 'National Jews' put forward the idea of setting up a Jewish parliamentary club with a view to co-ordinating the parliamentary activity of the few Jewish deputies.[26] This initiative was from the very first doomed to failure owing to the lack of a common political basis acceptable to all factions. Moreover, a number of political leaders of Jewish origin, among them the socialists, refused any collaboration with their fellow deputies on a Jewish basis.

The local elections of the same year likewise reflected the fragmentation of the Jewish vote. 'Jewish National Blocs' were formed in a number of Jewish centres, but they achieved only modest results, failing to attract the majority of the Jewish votes. The URJ did not adopt a firm line, so that some of the local Union leaders figured on the Liberal lists, while others concluded electoral agreements with the Agrarians or with other parties. Jews active in the local URJ were elected on different lists, bitterly opposed to one another. It should be noted at this point that

as a rule the local electoral agreements favoured only the Romanian parties and groups, while the number of seats offered for Jewish candidates was disproportionate to the number of local Jewish voters. For example, in 1926 the Liberals pledged that they would assure four seats for UJR leaders on their lists in Iasi, as compared with 26 non-Jewish candidates—in a town in which at least 35 per cent of the voters were Jewish. On the other hand, in the towns where independent Jewish lists competed, the relative number of Jewish municipal councillors was much larger than in centres where Jews contented themselves with the seats promised by Romanian parties.[27]

In the chronically unstable internal situation, Averescu's Government, in spite of its parliamentary majority, turned out to be unviable. In July 1927 the citizens were once more called to the polls, this time by the Liberals, who secured for themselves an absolute majority (318 seats out of 387). The URJ now concluded an electoral pact with the successful partner, while the Transylvanian 'nationals' allied themselves with the National Peasant Party.[28] No Jewish lists proper were presented in these elections. The attempts of the 'national Jews' to ally themselves at the elections with the other national minorities (for example, the Minorities' Bloc which included the Germans and the Ruthenians) did not prove effective. No Jewish deputy with a Jewish programme got into the short-lived 1927 Parliament. It can be asserted that in no other elections was the Jewish vote more fragmented and more ineffective, in spite of the UJR–Liberal agreement, than in 1927. Although there were some ten Jewish deputies and a few senators of Jewish origin in Parliament, mostly on Liberal lists,[29] Romanian Jewry was practically deprived of an effective representation.

In the 1928 elections, the URJ changed its policy of collaboration with the Liberals for an electoral pact with the National Peasant Party. This time an absolute majority was won by the NPP, the organizers of the elections. A number of URJ leaders won seats, as did several Transylvanian and Bucovinan Zionists. Owing to electoral agreements with several parties, mainly with the National Peasants, three deputies representing Jewish minority interests were elected. The overall number of Jewish deputies rose to about a dozen. The number of Jewish senators was five, just one below the number of senators representing the large Hungarian minority of about one and a half million.

The prevailing trend of supporting the candidates with a Jewish national programme proved that the political atmosphere had become propitious for the creation of a Jewish Party. This tendency coincided with an intensification of Zionist activity throughout the country, mostly in the new territories. The initiative for the creation of the party—as already mentioned—came from the Transylvanian and Bucovinan 'National Jews'. Bessarabian Jewry occupied third place in the support given to the idea, while only a minority of Jews in the Old Kingdom

were in favour. The actual foundation of the party was the work of the Transylvanian 'national' leaders, supported by Dr. Ebner's Bucovinan Zionist camp.

In 1926, the 'Transylvanian Jewish National Union' formed an electoral bloc with both Zionists and non-Zionists. This bloc was to become the nucleus from which the Jewish Party sprang in 1928, as the outcome of joint efforts of the founding leadership,[30] in co-operation with National-Jewish leaders from other parts of the country.

The strife between the 'nationals' and the 'integrationists' was exacerbated after the creation of the Jewish Party. The party became the target for attacks from three different sides: the URJ; the socialist left; and the Jews who were active either in the framework of different Romanian parties, or in the minorities' parties (for instance, the Hungarian Party). The arguments concerning the different political orientations brought about a tense atmosphere of mutual invective and reciprocal calumny. On the eve of the 1931 elections the URJ published a manifesto against the Jewish Party, invoking arguments and accusations that were to become part and parcel of the polemic between the two camps. 'The Jewish votes will be given where they are required by the superior interests of the state and where the legitimate demands of the Jews, Romanian citizens, are taken into consideration with a view to their realization. *But under no circumstance will votes be cast in favour of the so-called Jewish party.*'[31]

The reasoning of the URJ was also based on the experience of Jewish politics in Poland, Austria, and other eastern European countries, where —according to the URJ—the Jewish nationalists and the Jewish parties utterly failed and indeed only harmed the Jewish cause. One of the URJ pamphlets blamed the Jewish national parties for 'disrupting the unity of Jewry and disintegrating the whole of Jewish public life.'[32]

Characteristic of the tone of the polemic against the Zionist 'isolationists' and against the 'unpatriotic' Jewish Party was a 1928 manifesto which declared: 'Jews! If you want to snatch the daily bread from your children's mouths, cast your votes for the Jewish Party, which will drive us to ruin and misery through isolation and stirring up hatred.'[33] Neither the manifesto's author nor its publisher is identifiable. The Jewish Party first participated in the elections in 1931, scoring a relative success, 64,175 votes (that is, 2·19 per cent of valid votes), and obtaining four seats. The number of seats was smaller than that which would have been allotted proportionally.[34] Two of the four deputies were Transylvanian and the other two were Bucovinan. The number of votes by constituencies showed that their majority was cast in the 'new provinces' (Transylvania, Bucovina, and Bessarabia), while in the Old Kingdom the Party won only 20 per cent of its votes. The four electoral districts which polled the heaviest Jewish votes were Maramures (Transylvania), Cernauti and Storojineti (Bucovina), and Soroca (Bessarabia).

The 'Union of Romanian Jews' appeared in these 1931 elections in an electoral agreement with the so-called National Union led by Nicolae Iorga, the main force of the Union being the Liberal Party. The Peasant Party and two or three other parties secured, as in the past, a comparatively large number of Jewish votes in the Old Kingdom, but the majority of the Jewish votes in that region went to the rightist, strongly nationalist Government 'Union', in accordance with the URJ's slogan. Thus, whereas the majority of the Jews in the annexed territories lent their support to the Jewish Party, most of the Jewish votes in the Old Kingdom were dispersed among at least five lists (the Liberal Party—within the framework of the 'National Union'—the Peasant Party, the Social Democrats, Dr. Lupu's Agrarian Party, and the Hungarians). The Social Democratic Party, which was relatively successful (3·25 per cent of the votes, being represented by six deputies in the Chamber), probably also enjoyed Jewish votes, mainly in Cernauti, Chisinau, and Bucharest.

The emergence of the Jewish Party widened even more the gap between the 'national' Jews and the 'Romanian' Jews; at the same time, it brought to light the failure of the attempts to merge the Jews from the Old Kingdom with those from the new provinces. The URJ leaders, all of them from the Old Kingdom, bewailed the 'nefarious policy of national isolation' of the 'national' Jews, while almost all the Transylvanian and Bucovinan leaders deplored the 'non-Jewish, bankrupt' policy of the URJ, and feared the 'catastrophe of Regatization',[35] meaning the 'Balkanization' of Jewish political life under the influence of the 'Balkanized' Union of Romanian Jewish leadership. Jewish public life was thus broken up not only along the lines of ideological and political divergences but on a peculiar regional-political basis as well.

One should stress certain characteristic features of Jewish politics in Transylvania, the most complex province of the country in ethnic structure, culture, and politics. The nearly 200,000 strong Transylvanian Jewish population was divided from an electoral point of view into three distinct camps: after 1928 their majority supported the Jewish Party, a minority was enlisted in the Hungarian Party, and an insignificant minority aligned itself with the few and weak URJ organizations in Transylvania. Without forming clear-cut 'camps', a large number of workers, craftsmen, and young intellectuals supported the socialist left, providing the Social Democrats and the crypto-Communist organizations with able leaders. At the same time, the Liberals and Maniu's Peasants also found adherents among Transylvanian Jews. The most 'Jewish' county of Transylvania, Maramures, massively supported the Jewish Party, but at the same time gave thousands of votes both to the Liberals[36] and to the National Peasants.[37]

As regards the electoral tactics of the Jewish Party, it consistently

strove for an agreement with the National Peasants. On the whole, the relations between the Transylvanian Jewish leaders and the Transylvanian leaders of the National Peasants were cordial throughout the inter-War period.

The 'Hungarian Jews', who supported the Hungarian Party, were bitterly opposed to Zionism and to the Jewish Party. Some of them were active in the national leadership of the rightist chauvinist Hungarian Party, while twenty or so among them were brought into the leadership of local organizations of the Party.[38] Two of the 'Hungarian Jews' were elected on a Hungarian Party list on several occasions, and exerted a strong influence upon the Hungarian parliamentary faction.[39]

Besides creating a Jewish parliamentary faction, the 1931 elections also brought into the Upper House a group of seven Jewish senators, at least three of them identifying themselves with the struggle of the Jews against discrimination of any kind.[40] Thus these elections could have meant a turning point in the movement towards the creation of an important parliamentary body aimed at preventing the spread of the antisemitic extreme Right. However, because of the underlying instability of Romanian political life, the 1931 legislature was to be short-lived. In July 1932 the citizens were once again called to the polls. In these elections, too, the URJ and the Jewish Party stood at opposite poles. The URJ concluded an electoral agreement doomed to failure with the 'Economic Front'—an unimportant group of the so-called Merchants' Councils. At the same time the Union supported the Liberal candidates in quite a few of the constituencies.[41] The Jewish Party presented itself independently, fostering its friendly ties with the National Peasants. This time the Peasants succeeded in obtaining an absolute majority (274 seats out of 387). The Liberals suffered a crushing set-back (they won only 28 places), affecting the URJ badly. The 'Economic Front', linked to Dr. Filderman, failed to reach the minimum of 2 per cent of the votes, whereas the Jewish Party increased its votes to 67,582 (2·48 per cent of the votes), and the number of its seats to five. This time, too, the majority of the votes cast for the Jewish Party—over 80 per cent—were provided by the annexed provinces, where about 70 per cent of the Jews voted for the party. Characteristically, one of the deputies represented Maramures, another Transylvanian represented the Bucovinan constituency of Storojineti, a Bucovinan Zionist was elected in Cernauti, a Bessarabian represented Soroca (Bessarabia), and only one deputy from the Old Kingdom joined the Jewish parliamentary group and even he represented the Bessarabian county of Hotin.

Again, the 1932 Parliament was short-lived and the Peasants' Government did not survive the intrigues, the scandals, and the growing terror characteristic of political life. New elections were called for December 1933, this time by the Liberals. The Iron Guard terror and

the emergence of other antisemitic extreme right groupings paradoxically weakened the position of the Jewish Party; the party lost the confidence of a section of its voters, who were convinced that only a strong democratic front, not a tiny Jewish party, could stop the emergence of Nazism in Romania. Many Jews concluded that the small group of 'National-Jewish' deputies did not have a real chance of keeping in check the increasingly overt antisemitic trend in Romanian political life and legislation. On the other hand, a great number of Jews thought that Jewish deputies, linked to democratic Romanian parties, could more usefully serve the Jewish cause.

On the eve of the December 1933 elections, the Liberals exerted a considerable pressure upon the Jews to give up their independent lists and to support the Liberal Party. The Liberals sought the unconditional support of the Jews with a view to re-establishing 'order' against Iron Guard terror.[42]

This time even the URJ leaders were in favour of independent Jewish lists, 'or else the Jews would be compelled to give up their right of representation in Parliament'.[43] For several months negotiations went on between the Liberals, the URJ leaders, and the Jewish Party to reach a formula that would guarantee a Jewish representation acceptable to the majority of the Jews. An agreement was signed between the URJ and the Liberals which was, however, annulled by the Government party shortly before the elections. In these elections the Jews were even more disunited than in the past. The Jewish Party obtained only 38,565 votes (1·3 per cent), losing its Parliamentary representation. The number of Jewish deputies who got in on other lists (Liberal, Peasant, and Hungarian) likewise decreased.[44]

The political isolation of the Jews increased and the failure of the Jewish Party was most marked at the December 1937 elections—the last ones of the inter-War period. The Liberal Party no longer wished to conclude an electoral pact with any Jewish group. The National Peasant Party (favoured by the Transylvanian 'National Jews' and supported occasionally by the URJ) deeply disappointed its Jewish sympathizers: by the end of 1937 any sort of electoral co-operation between that party and the Jews was completely out of the question, owing to the 'non-aggression pact' concluded between Iuliu Maniu and Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the Iron Guard leader.

Since the Hungarian Party was identifying itself ever more with the pro-German and antisemitic policies of Budapest, the 'Magyar Jews' started abandoning it. Under the circumstances, the idea of a minority group which was to include the Jews was discarded. As George Bratianu's Liberal dissidents sought a rapprochement with the Axis powers, they lost the support—albeit insignificant—of a certain section of the Jewish bourgeoisie in Bucharest and elsewhere in the Old Kingdom.[45]

The extreme-right agitation urged that during the elections the Jews

'remain in their homes or put up their own lists of candidates and vote among themselves'.[46]

The Jewish Party presented itself at the elections in the hope of massive support precisely because of the political isolation of the Jews. The results were most disappointing for all those who were eager to see a 'national' Jewish presence in Parliament again. The failure was the more surprising because there had been a rapprochement in 1936 between the URJ leaders and those of the Jewish Party.[47]

Shortly before the elections the URJ had launched an appeal calling upon the Jews to cast their votes for those parties 'which safeguard the maintenance of freedom and equality . . . for all the citizens, irrespective of ethnic origin or religion'.[48] This was once again an appeal in favour of the big 'democratic' parties, but at least without an additional clause against the Jewish Party, as in the past.

The Jewish Party came off with a mere 43,681 votes (1·4 per cent), without obtaining the necessary minimum of 2 per cent required for Parliamentary representation. It is to be assumed that a considerable number of Jewish votes was cast for the Liberal Party, while the Jewish votes in favour of the Peasant Party must have been quite numerous notwithstanding the Maniu–Codreanu pact. The Jewish abstention from the elections was more noticeable than at any other election, excepting that of 1919. The 'National Jews' could have found 'consolation' in the fact that even if the Jewish Party had obtained more than 2 per cent of the votes, it would have been of no avail, as the whole parliamentary system broke down in the wake of these elections. The new elections, fixed for March 1938, for which the Goga–Cuza Government was preparing itself, did not take place in the end, while the pseudo-parliamentary system of representation of the royal dictatorship, established in February 1938, excluded the Jewish minority from the group of minorities entitled to be represented.

IV

Romanian Jewish political life in the inter-War period had little in common with that of other central and eastern European countries. Unlike the situation in Hungary, where the Jews in general gave their support to the social democrats and to some liberal and radical parties, in Romania the Jewish support for the weak socialist left was not important as a whole and was only effective in the early twenties. There did not exist in Romania either liberal bourgeois parties in the western sense of the term, or radical parties—except Grigore Iunian's short-lived Radical Party.

In contrast to the situation in Czechoslovakia, the Jewish Party did not succeed in securing the majority of Jewish votes, with the exception only of the 1931 and 1932 elections, when the party won over 50 per

cent of the Jewish votes. Thus, the Jewish Party was very far from attaining the majority (80 per cent) upon which the Jewish Party of Czechoslovakia could pride itself.[49]

Unlike the situation in Poland, the Jews of Romania did not endeavour to set up Jewish socialist organizations, and unlike the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia, neither was the religious camp capable of forming a political organization of its own. In most of the parliamentary elections the Jewish votes were dispersed among many parties and groups, including right wing parties. These phenomena cannot be accounted for by an analysis of the social structure of Romanian Jews. The economic conditions and the social structure do not explain, for instance, why in some elections the Liberal Party obtained so massive a support in Maramures, of all places (which had a mostly rural, poor, and observant Jewish population). Neither do these conditions account for the fact that for years on end the socialists enjoyed a considerable Jewish backing in Bucovina, while in Bucharest the Jewish support for the socialist left was quite insignificant. Nor do they provide an explanation of the Hungarian chauvinism that manifested itself in some Transylvanian Jewish centres up to the mid-thirties. However, some paradoxical phenomena of Jewish political life, the specific features of Jewish electoral behaviour as well as the inefficiency of the independent Jewish lists and the failure of attempts to unify Romanian Jewry politically, can be explained by the following circumstances:

1. the extremely heterogeneous composition of the Jews, in respect of their language, culture, as well as their past;
2. the lack of political maturity and orientation of the Jewish masses, especially in the Old Kingdom;
3. the atmosphere of corruption and terror and the fraudulent character of the elections;
4. the lack of Jewish leaders with authority and political ability enjoying the confidence of the Jewish masses.

In such circumstances, opportunism, improvisation, local temporary interests, as well as chance events were bound to play a more important role in the electoral behaviour of Romanian Jewry than in that of Jews of other eastern and central European countries.

NOTES

[1] The number of those entitled to vote was in 1922 close to 3 million out of a population of 16·5 million; and in 1926, nearly 3·5 million out of a population of 17 million.

[2] About 70 per cent of Romanian Jewry lived in a semi-rural environment and in small backward towns. Only in Transylvania was the proportion of urban Jewish elements relatively high (about 50 per cent).

[3] For instance, while 65·4 per cent participated in the 1922 elections in the Old Kingdom, the percentage in Transylvania was only 53·3. In both regions Jewish participation was lower than that

of the general population. (Statistical data, unless otherwise stated, are extracted from *Buletinul Statistic al Romaniei*, for 1920–38.)

[4] *Renasterea Noastra* (Bucharest), 8 May 1926.

[5] *Memoriul Scrutator* (Scrutator Memorandum) addressed to Mr. I. G. Duca by Dr. C. Blumenfeld, Bucharest, July 1926; the Archives of the Historical Society, Jerusalem (AHS), RM 62.

[6] ibid.

[7] *Renasterea Noastra*, 10 February 1926.

[8] ibid., 29 May 1926.

[9] The results of the 1929 elections for the Jewish Community Council in Cernauti may throw light on the political division of an important sector of Romanian Jewry in the late twenties: the Zionists polled 1,461 votes; Dr. B. Straucher (independent in 1929, but sometimes standing in parliamentary elections with the Liberals), 1,449 votes; the National Peasants' list, 1,297; the Socialist Bund, 1,011; the National Liberals' list, 531; five other lists together, 1,634 votes. See *Neue Jüdische Rundschau*, Cernauti, 23 May 1930.

[10] Professor Nicolae Iorga stood for decades at the head of the extreme nationalist camp. Before the First World War he organized with Professor Cuza the first anti-Jewish political party.

[11] Nicolae Lupu's Peasant Party had a radical character; Dr. Lupu was one of the few Romanian politicians who fought against antisemitism.

[12] Quoted in *Curierul Israelit*, Bucharest, 20 May 1931.

[13] On George Bratianu's Jewish followers, see *Egalitatea*, Bucharest, 16 April 1936. Cf. *Renasterea Noastra*, 24 April 1937.

[14] AHS, RM 127.

[15] See the article by Dr. J. Berkovitz, vice-president of the URJ, published in *Viitorul*, the official Liberal daily (reprinted in *Curierul Israelit*, 28 June 1931).

[16] *Renasterea Noastra*, 15 May 1926.

[17] Concluding an electoral pact in 1930 with the Liberal Party, the URJ bitterly denounced the Peasant Party when in power for its anti-Jewish practices (cf. *Curierul Israelit*, 2 March 1930).

[18] Among the candidates were Dr. W. Filderman and A. Stern, leaders of the 'Union of Native Jews'.

[19] In 1926 the socialists won 19 seats out of 369. Prominent among the socialist leaders were Dr. J. Pistiner (M.P. for many years, representing the Bucovina faction of the socialist movement) and Ilie Moscovici (Old Kingdom).

[20] Henry L. Roberts, author of one of the best works written on modern Romania, writes about morals in Romanian political life: 'Rumanian elections were notorious for their corruption, ballot stuffing, and general unreliability as measures of public sentiment . . . In most cases elections were "made" in advance.' (*Rumania, Political Problems of an Agrarian State*, New Haven, Conn., 1951.)

[21] *Uj Kelet*, Cluj, 20 November 1925.

[22] In the electoral districts of Balti, Chisinau, and Hotin the 'Bloc' polled 12,496 votes (3 per cent of all Bessarabian votes).

[23] *Neue Zeit—Uj Kor*, Timisoara, 12 February 1926.

[24] Marshal Averescu's party won 292 seats out of 387; the National Peasant Bloc won 46; and the Liberals, 16.

[25] The Bessarabian Rabbi Tzirelson and Karl Klüger, elected in Bucovina.

[26] *Renasterea Noastra*, 3 July 1926.

[27] In Cluj, Oradea, Sighet (in Transylvania), Chisinau, and Cernauti, for example, where independent Jewish lists were presented, the number of Jewish local councillors was proportionally larger than in those towns in which the Jews, influenced mainly by the URJ leaders, figured on Liberal or other Romanian 'bourgeois' lists.

[28] The National Peasant Party was formed in October 1926 by the merger of the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom and the Transylvanian National Party; led by I. Mihalache and I. Maniu, the NPP became the main democratic opposition party after 1932. An agreement between the Transylvanian Jewish 'Electoral Bloc' and the NPP was signed on the eve of the 1927 elections (*Neue Zeit—Uj Kor*, 24 June 1927).

[29] According to Joseph S. Roucek, the 298 Liberal deputies included 10 Jewish deputies, who made a political agreement with the National Liberal Party. See Joseph S. Roucek, *Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 1932, reprinted New York, 1971, p. 114.

[30] Prominent among the founders were Dr. Theodore Fischer and Dr. J. Fischer (both from Cluj) and Dr. M. Ebner (from Cernauti). The Bessarabian wing of the Party was led by M. Landau.

[31] *URJ Manifesto*, 28 May 1931 (AHS,

RM 127); my italics. In one of its manifestos the URJ expressed its conviction that 'a Jewish political party is detrimental to the political, cultural and economic development of the Jewish population . . .' *Curierul Israelit*, 30 May 1931.

[32] AHS, RM 127.

[33] The *Ostjüdische Zeitung*, Cernauti, had published in its issue of 23 November 1928 an article in favour of the Jewish Party; the manifesto was an answer to that article (AHS, RM 127).

[34] In conformity with the electoral law of 1926 enacted by the Liberals, the party (or list) that obtained 40 per cent of the votes got 50 per cent of the seats, the remaining 50 per cent being proportionally shared by the parties that achieved 2 per cent or more of the total number of votes; the majority party also enjoyed this proportional distribution. Consequently, the Jewish Party got only four seats instead of obtaining the 8 or 9 seats to which it was entitled proportionally (out of a total of 387 seats).

[35] 'Vechiul Regat' is the Romanian for Old Kingdom. 'Regatization' is used in the sense of bringing down moral standards of political life to the notoriously low level of pre-war Romania.

[36] One of the Liberals' Jewish candidates, Michael Szmuk, for years enjoyed great Jewish support in Maramures.

[37] Ilie Lazar, one of the National Peasant leaders, of Maramures origin, had many Jewish followers, mainly in the villages (*Uj Kelet*, Tel-Aviv, 31 March 1972).

[38] For example, in the strong organizations of Cluj, Oradea, and Timisoara.

[39] Nandor Hegedüs (Oradea) and Sandor Weisz (Cluj). Benö Gombos was one of the publicists active against Zionism and against the Jewish Party, as well as against the 'Romanian integration' of the Jews. Dr. H. Roth was one of the leading personalities of the Hungarian Party in Cluj. Rabbi Dr. Kecskeméti (Oradea) was an outspoken supporter of the Hungarian Party.

[40] Four of the Jewish senators were elected on Liberal lists; the fifth Jewish senator (the Chief Rabbi, Dr. Niemirover) was an *ex officio* senator, while the two other Jewish senators were listed as 'independents'.

[41] Apart from the URJ, the Bucovinan B. Straucher was elected on the Liberals' list. Aureliu Weiss entered Parliament on the Peasants' list.

[42] *Renasterea Noastra*, 5 December 1933.

[43] ibid.

[44] The socialists obtained 1·3 per cent of the votes, losing their representation in Parliament which for years had included one or more Jewish deputies.

[45] *Egalitatea*, 16 April 1936.

[46] Octavian Goga, the leader of the extreme Right and antisemitic 'National-Christian Party', quoted in *Curierul Israelit*, 12 December 1937.

[47] The URJ leader Dr. W. Filderman and the leader of the Jewish Party, Dr. Theodore Fischer, worked together in the 'Supreme Jewish Council', established in 1936.

[48] *Curierul Israelit*, 12 December 1937.

[49] In the 1920 Parliamentary election the Jewish Party (of Czechoslovakia) polled 80,000 votes; in the 1925 election the Party polled 98,845, while the second Jewish party, the 'Jewish Economic Party' attained 16,936 votes. The Jewish population of Czechoslovakia was close to 340,000 in the early twenties. See A. M. Rabinowicz, 'The Jewish Minority', in *The Jews of Czechoslovakia*, ed. by the Society for the History of Czechoslovak Jews, New York, vol. I, New York, 1968, pp. 209–10.

BOOK REVIEWS

JOSEPH BRANDES in association with MARTIN DOUGLAS, *Immigrants to Freedom, Jewish Communities in Rural New Jersey since 1882*, xiii+424 pp., Regional History Series, The American Jewish History Center of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, and Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1971, £6·00.

This book is an informative study of those small Jewish settlements in Southern New Jersey which were such an exception to the general pattern of Jewish immigration to America. They were settled as colonies with the support, among others, of the Alliance Israélite, the Jewish Agricultural Society, and Baron Maurice de Hirsch (who also supported Jewish agricultural settlement in Argentina). At the root of this movement were thoughts and sentiments held by a variety of groups not only in America and western Europe but in Russia itself, that it would be good for Jews to return to the land. One line of thought was that in this way Jews would rid themselves of the age-old stereotype of the petty trader and, hence, find it easier to be assimilated into American society. As the author points out, people holding this view tended to forget that there were 100,000 Jewish farmers in Russia during the period of persecution. Then there was the view—evident in the Zionist movement—that the return to the land, and ideally in a collective framework, was the necessary basis of national freedom and revival. In America the former rather than the latter consideration coalesced with a Jeffersonian view about the evils of life in the big city, particularly for the immigrant poor. Under the influence of this idealism Jewish rural colonization was promoted in a number of places throughout the United States. There was a project in Utah which failed, as the author touchingly points out, because the idealistic sponsors overlooked the fact that the site did not possess water. In fact the colonies in New Jersey, which were close to New York and Philadelphia and yet had relatively cheap land, were the only ones which have survived. They did not engage in collective enterprise (for which they were opposed by the Jewish socialist press) and were not exclusively agricultural. In this respect they are to be contrasted with all those non-Jewish utopian communist colonies in the United States, which failed, as well as with the success of genuinely collective agricultural settlements in Israel where the context, of course, was altogether different. None the less, as the author contends, they were of no strategic importance, either in Jewish life or in the American economy. At their peak in 1901 the total Jewish population of these South Jersey colonies was 3,527 (p. 276).

On the whole one is bound to note that regional or local social histories of this kind, whether they be of Jews or of other groups, exhibit a characteristic defect, but one which could be overcome. Unless the community is really distinctive in some way, the basis of a thesis or of instructive generalizations

is not immediately clear and present. And even if it is, as is manifestly the case in this study, the nerve of what makes it different or interesting can become obscured by the chronological account of all that happened to that community. In fact the account tends to become a kind of social history of the times. All this would be in contrast, for example, with a sociological or historical study guided explicitly by a question about the viability of planned settlements in a capitalistic economy. These qualifications apply to this book where one has to pull together for oneself what is really the nerve of the study. But it is there and the author's range comprehends a wide variety of important events and topics: changes in immigration policy, the rise of Zionism, the resurgence of nativism (the Ku Klux Klan) after the First World War, etc. One curiosity, which it was of interest to learn, is that when Woodbine, one of these New Jersey communities, was incorporated as a borough in 1903, it became the first all-Jewish political entity in the modern world.

H. M. BROTZ

HENRI DESROCHE and JEAN SÉGUY, eds., *Introduction aux sciences humaines des religions*, 280 pp., Editions Cujas, Paris, 1970, 30F.

It is a little difficult to review such a collection as this. The collection is dedicated to the exposition of the historical growth and the appropriate methods of the various disciplines which bear on the 'science of religions'. It involves the collaboration of theologians and non-theologians, but is primarily concerned with placing the 'science of religions' in the broader context of the whole enterprise of social science. The first article is 'La Science des religions en France', originally written by Peuch and Vignaux in 1937 and revised for this symposium. The rest were largely begotten in the discussions following an ad hoc interdisciplinary seminar in the university year 1965–66. Their aim was mutual illumination by comparison among disciplines. Perhaps the best-known names contributing to the collection are Jean Séguy (who contributes a panoramic overview and a piece called 'Ecumenisms and Ecumenology'), R. Bastide (on the present condition of ethnology), E. Poulat (on the institutional development of the sciences of religion in France), H. Desroche (on the particular role of the sociology of religion), and N. Birnbaum (on the transition from the philosophy to the sociology of religion).

Norman Birnbaum's piece concludes the whole by suggesting that the theological advance guard has understood the phenomenon of secularization better than the sociologists. The latter are separated from reality by the absence of praxis and emasculated by either functionalist tautology or positivist superficiality. This is a bit unfair and ignores much of the debate, but he is surely right in his call for a more profound appreciation of the historical role of religion in multiple contexts and the richness of its contribution to conceptions of human potential. One must end on a critical note: I have never read a book where the (non-French) citations have been so frequently inaccurate.

DAVID MARTIN

A. S. DIAMOND, *Primitive Law, Past and Present*, xxv + 410 pp., Methuen & Co., London, 1971, £5·00.

When I began my studies in social anthropology, Diamond on primitive law was an established part of the literature; and I approach this completely rewritten version with a long-standing respect augmented by my admiration for the skill and industry with which the older argument has been refreshed by up-to-date knowledge. I do not suppose that Dr. Diamond's non-anthropological readers will be able to understand what a feat of anthropological erudition and analysis he has achieved in this new edition of his classic. I am sure that my anthropological colleagues, while for the most part being unreceptive of the evolutionary ideas upon which he relies, will greatly respect his anthropological scholarship—they will certainly be overawed by the historical scholarship, which few of them could match. The more perceptive among them may also reflect upon the sadness of the fact that, by reason of the professionalization of social anthropology and its almost total incarceration within the universities, the sort of research done by Dr. Diamond becomes less and less feasible. It is even possible that Dr. Diamond is the last of a distinguished line of lawyers to have made their mark in anthropology—most present-day anthropologists think of their fellows as making their mark in law.

Whatever the impact of functionalist and structuralist ideas and prejudices on social anthropology, that discipline is shot through with evolutionist notions; and it is the precise nature of Dr. Diamond's evolutionary ideas, not the fact that they are evolutionary, that will make his new book look strange to most of my colleagues. At the very least, all social anthropologists introduce their subject by playing with the contrast between primitive (preliterate, simple, tribal, small-scale . . .) and advanced (literate, complex, developed, large-scale . . .) societies, and the institutional consequences of the presumed division. In a word, we may say that most contemporary social anthropology is committed to a two-stage theory of social evolution. Against that background Dr. Diamond's evolutionary scheme is more refined and interesting. Despite what some writers appear to think, Dr. Diamond stands less in the tradition of Lewis H. Morgan than in that of Hobhouse (and therefore in that of the first Editor of this *Journal*). If anyone doubts the point, let him pay close attention to what Dr. Diamond says (p. 6) about his following the 'methods of Nieboer and Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg' in defining 'economic grades of peoples'. 'The purpose of this book', he writes (p. 3), 'is to attempt an account of the general course of development of law from its beginnings until maturity. In some part or other of the world all stages of the development can be seen either in history or in recent times.' The 'economic grades', within which in the course of the book a great variety of historical and primitive societies are arranged, are used because 'we can see in history a correlation between the economic development and the legal . . .' (p. 4). But 'We must not expect to find by this means a unilinear course of legal development. In detail it is too much to expect always to find that each step was reached from the same step in the scale. The scale is not a ladder but a tree with branches, or perhaps a forest' (ibid.). Compare, as a matter of interest, what Ginsberg wrote in his Introduction to the 1965 reprint of *The Material Culture and Social*

Institutions of the Simpler Peoples: 'The book was in no way committed to a view of social evolution which implied that institutions everywhere passed through the same sequence of stages, or even that particular forms of institutions were invariably correlated with given stages of culture. . . . Why anyone ever thought that a theory of social evolution must necessarily assume that all peoples developed in a uniform manner it is now difficult to say' (p. vii).

Dr. Diamond considers (and rightly) that he offers materials 'which may help in some degree to answer a number of difficult questions of legal and sociological importance. What are the factors that cause change in the law? . . . Can law be recognized as existing where there are no courts . . .? And what rules of conduct preceded the rise of law and what sanctions enforced them?' (p. 5). The anthropological attack upon evolutionary ideas has in some quarters not lost its sharpness; and in the field of law Professor Sally Moore has recently scored some good hits in her essay 'Legal Liability and Evolutionary Interpretation . . .' in the newly published *The Allocation of Responsibility*, edited by Max Gluckman. But I do not think that the evolutionary case has been demolished: in some sense there obviously has been a movement towards greater complexity and centralization in human affairs, and the problem really becomes how best to study and refine our formulations of that movement. But even if we repose little confidence in the evolutionary sequences and scale within which Dr. Diamond arranges his data, the method is still capable of raising the sorts of problem to which he refers at p. 5, some of which I have quoted at the beginning of this paragraph. It would be a grievous mistake to ignore this book because one objected to detailed evolutionary arguments about law; one may end up unconvinced by them, but one will have been alerted to many important questions in legal analysis—not to speak of the general education one will gain from Dr. Diamond's distillation of the massive literature on the history and anthropology of law the world over.

My major criticism of the study is not that it is evolutionary but that it rests upon what seems to me to be an oversimplified view of religion. To Dr. Diamond, as I understand him, religion is always clearly separable from law (and perhaps too from all else in society). We encounter this (to me) strange idea early on (p. 19) when we are told that there 'is an ancient code of true law (that is, of secular law) embedded in the Pentateuch'; and (p. 47) Maine is trounced for being responsible for the 'misconception . . . that law is derived from pre-existing rules of conduct which are at the same time legal, moral and religious in nature'. Dr. Diamond says: 'There is no reason why anyone, who does not desire to do so, should confuse religion with law . . .' Who is 'anyone'? If it is another Dr. Diamond, examining the evidence from outside and from the point of view of someone used to the dichotomy of sacred and profane, religious and secular, then well and good. But most of mankind have not been members of societies where the religious is a demarcated area of belief and action. I note what Dr. Diamond writes at p. 90: 'In China, where religion in the usual sense of that word hardly existed . . .' If I now say that law and religion in traditional China were almost inextricably intertwined, shall I be told that what the Chinese believed/did was not really religion?

The difficulty comes fascinatingly to the fore in Chapter 11, 'The law of the Hebrews', of which the opening words are (p. 124): 'The Pentateuch is not

specifically referred to by Maine as one of the ancient bodies of rules thought by him to yield evidence in support of the view that law originates as a mixture of legal, religious and ethical rules . . . yet legal historians and others have been predisposed in favour of such a theory by the confusion of law and religion which the Bible appears to them to disclose. In fact there is no sufficient reason to believe that there was any such confusion in the mind of the Hebrew, and nothing in the Bible shows it.' Now, I should not wish to measure my biblical knowledge against Dr. Diamond's; but I suspect that he is here reading the modern Jew into the ancient Hebrew. In the next chapter, Exodus xxi. 1 to xxii. 22 are analysed in order to separate what Dr. Diamond calls the main code from additions and amendments. It is a remarkable regrouping of the biblical texts, but one's eye may rest upon xxii. 18: 'A sorceress thou shalt not suffer to live'. Since this statement appears in the column of 'Additions and amendments' it falls among 'the rules . . . concerned with topics that figure in the religious writings of the rest of the Pentateuch' (p. 147). Certainly, by the criterion adopted in the study, it cannot be a law, for law is never couched in the second person singular (p. 125). But (we may ask) is it really less of a law than the other rules? It seems to say that sorcery is an offence punishable by execution: religion and law in close association.

And similarly when he turns to the evidence from primitive societies, Dr. Diamond says (in the context of the 'early hunters and agriculturalists') that magic and religion are rarely involved in a 'description of these legal, pre-legal and para-legal phenomena' (p. 196). Again (p. 204), 'Magic increasingly shows itself as pseudo-science . . .' And in the same chapter (15), 'religion and magic have hardly been mentioned, and this is because he who begins to describe the usages and practices that are in the field of law or precede the field of law does not find himself in the field of magic and religion and their usages and practices, except that there is contact on the frontier at the same points as always, namely in certain offences of a criminal nature, and especially sacral offences, and also offences where the law cannot operate, namely within the family. . . . If one looks for rules of conduct sanctioned by religious or magical as well as legal or secular sanctions, there are few of these, for magic and religion (except in the most advanced peoples) have little ethical content' (pp. 223 ff.). And cf. p. 297.

Well, one may wonder whether the importance of religion to law lies less in the field of sanctions than in the determination of that very order upon which the legal rules rest. We (that is, Dr. Diamond and those around him) may look out upon a world where the secular and the religious may be plausibly argued to exclude each other. But most of the world has not been so divisible. One is not saying bluntly that Dr. Diamond is wrong and Maine right; the latter may well have erred in his formulations; but most social anthropologists would, I fancy, want to consider the legal rules of a non-industrial society as the possible outcome of the general principles of universal order and fitness subscribed to in that society; and those general principles (unless one takes a very narrow view of the matter) are religious.

MAURICE FREEDMAN

JOSEPH W. EATON in collaboration with MICHAEL CHEN, *Influencing the Youth Culture—A Study of Youth Organizations in Israel*, 256 pp., Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, Calif., 1970, $8.95.

There can be little doubt that this book by Eaton and Chen constitutes a very important contribution to the general literature on youth cultures and to the systematic analysis of youth cultures in Israel in particular. In spite of the authors' success in conveying the sense of the great centrality of youth culture in the fabric of Israeli life, a glance at their bibliography attests to the very limited materials available on that subject. The special interest they have taken in youth leadership (the madrich) is in fact a pioneering effort. Aimed mainly at a non-Israeli audience, the book skilfully fuses a theoretical statement, a background description of some of the main features of the Israeli society (particularly its youth), and data analysis. One of the central theoretical assumptions of the book is that informal educational procedures and frameworks are probably the best suited 'adult-making' mechanisms, in that they may produce normative commitments among the young, mainly due to the spontaneity and voluntarism which are among their main characteristics (p. 40). This assumption merits the careful attention of both researchers and policy-makers.

Three main types of Israeli youth culture were investigated: (a) ideologically oriented and mostly political-partisan Youth Movements; (b) the pre-military, mostly school-based Youth Corps—the 'Gadna'; and (c) for the most part extra-curricular Beyond School Programmes.

The data for the investigation which is the core of the book were elicited from two main types of subject: (a) about 20 per cent (2,201) of Israel's youth leaders were surveyed by questionnaires; (b) four samples of adolescents were either so surveyed, or else pre-existing data about them were re-examined.

The book's central theme is that 'Most young people seem to be co-opted by the existing adult-making agencies to work within the system' (p. 17). The 'action program for drastic change . . . of one generation . . . cannot be transmitted to the . . . native born children, once many of the objectives of the parental social movement have been achieved. The youth programs, therefore, face the complex task of motivating young people to accept the status quo, while finding a new basis for public concern . . .' (pp. 16–17). Over 90 per cent of the surveyed adolescents have at one time or another been affiliated with one of the youth programmes. In general, it was found, as hypothesized, that 'organizational affiliations tended to increase the likelihood' that a youngster will display a general social concern and give a 'priority to public service needs' (p. 99). Youth organization activity was found to be highly correlated with schooling: academically oriented students were over-represented in youth movements, other types of students were active but less so, and for those working without studying the rate of youth organization membership was the lowest.

The main problem one encounters in reading the book is the use of terminology. Take, for instance, the concepts 'youth culture' and 'informal education'. It is not entirely clear whether the Israeli case is one of 'influencing the youth culture', as implied by the title of the book and its analysis,

or whether, rather, it is one in which institutionalized norms and the central societal value system are congruent with the norms and values of the main expressions of its youth culture. The Israeli model of 'influencing the youth culture' is thus not easily transferable to other societies, not necessarily because of Israel's particular security conditions (pp. 236–38). The uniqueness of the Israeli case, rather, lies in the fact that as a post-revolutionary social system (the revolutionary ideology of which—that is, Zionism—has not yet been fully realized and accomplished), the types of youth culture dealt with here symbolize and represent that revolution. Israel thus differs from many other societies, in which youth cultures tend to emerge outside of, and often in opposition to, both formal and informal frameworks of education.

Consequently the central theme of co-optation of youth through these youth cultures remains somewhat undefined. It is not enough to claim that Israeli youth are not generally alienated as a result of the existence of such youth programmes (p. 233). Would not the question be, why are these programmes acceptable to young people and why do they seem to satisfy their needs and aspirations? It thus seems that the youth organizations studied are not merely 'adult-making' in conditions of 'nation building', but constitute a crystallization and symbolic expression of the unfinished revolution referred to above, and are consequently channels of mobility towards the centre of society, performing a function of élite recruitment.

One of the most interesting features of the book is the authors' analysis of informal educational techniques as tools for the development of wider social commitment, which are so crucially needed in conditions of modernization and change. Yet at the same time one ought to consider the possibility that the fact that members of youth organizations (and youth movements in particular) identify with society's central normative ethos is not necessarily a proof of the success of those educational frameworks. In line with the previous argument, it might well be that these predominantly middle-class youngsters (pp. 135–37) absorb and internalize the society's ultimate values as a consequence of their pre-élite position in society; youth organizations would thus be arenas for role-training for mobility-oriented youth. Consequently it might well be that certain segments of Israel's youth turn to informal educational frameworks since they already 'are co-opted'. In fact, the authors themselves write, 'The overwhelming mood of the youth is not alienation but identification with the country's past, its complex present and its uncertain future . . .' (p. 17).

In spite of these reservations, Eaton and Chen's *Influencing the Youth Culture* is an important book, which skilfully shows how the cross-pressures of an ongoing revolution on the one hand, and the people's tendency to seek comfort and privacy under the impact of social and national success on the other hand, impinge on the different types of youth culture.

CHAIM ADLER

SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET and EARL RAAB, *The Politics of Unreason, Right-Wing Extremism in America, 1790–1970*, xxiv + 547 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1971, £3·80.

YONATHAN SHAPIRO, *Leadership of the American Zionist Organization 1897–1930*, xiv + 295 pp., University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Ill., 1971, $9.50.

GIBSON GRAY, *The Lobbying Game, A Study of the 1953 Campaign of the State Council for Pennsylvania Fair Employment Practice Commission*, xiii + 226 pp., Gibson Hendrix Gray, 403 West First Street, Tyler, Texas, 1970, $7.50.

'Unreason' in American politics is particularly interesting to the student of comparative values for two important reasons. First, American political values are rooted in ideas of optimism about man's nature, reason, and progress and supported by the public materials of American rhetoric; and second, in contrast to other nations' irrationalities, no religious, military, or literary-philosophical establishment exists to twist rationality in undesirable directions. Where, in other words, Unreason raises its head it is almost invariably for the purpose of defending or returning to an idealized democracy which is becoming polluted by un-American persons or practices. For liberals and radicals it is an uncomfortable fact that the politically progressive (in American terms) have often made peace with and sometimes led the forces of unreason in their efforts to forward American democracy. It could be argued that if this is the case conservatives in America are the best defenders of rationality and human dignity. But alas, on inspection such a proposition is not without flaws. If McCarthysism, as Shils has most convincingly argued, is rooted in American populism it does not follow that those who heartily disliked political populism sprang to the defence of McCarthy's victims. The sad fact is that almost nobody came forward to organize that defence—certainly not conservatives. Those who did oppose McCarthy were leftists, whose political acts and ideas were likely to be more, not less, of a populist type—which makes the Shils thesis most suggestive but not completely proven.

The 'Right Wing Extremism' of the subtitle of the Lipset and Raab book relates to those ideas and phobias held and publicized by those who fear that the status quo is being (or already has been) subverted. This is the only really important sense in which the ideas analysed in this volume can be labelled right-wing, for many of these right-wing publicists genuinely believed themselves to be leaders of popular, egalitarian, anti-establishment sentiment whose fears related to those hidden forces and sinister persons who wished to deprive the common man of his property or damage his legitimate expectations. On occasions—today it may be urban renewal—conservatives who deplore modernization and feel that poverty is not curable can unite with the poor who would wish to remain where they are rather than be decanted into new impersonal 'public housing'.

The continuity of right-wing unreason in the U.S.A. is very pronounced; it is continuity which gains coherence from the perpetual harping on the evil influence of the foreigner. It is an elaborate set of exercises on the xenophobic theme, sometimes emphasizing the foreigner's religion, sometimes his morals,

sometimes his evil ideas. It began before 1789 and has fed upon every scrap of so-called fact that could give it sustenance. In the mid-twentieth century American right-wing publicists could still refer to the secret machinations of the 'Illuminati', a Bavarian Masonic society founded in 1776 to oppose the Jesuits and advocate Enlightenment ideas!

America is a Protestant country and its first fears were about Catholics, then about French revolutionaries, then about the Irish; rather late in the nineteenth century Jews became the scapegoats, then in the 1920–30s Russian-Jewish-Communists. Whatever evils befall the great American nation it is not Americans who are to blame—or if it is Americans it is unrepresentative upper-class Americans who are out of touch with the real middle America—Alger Hiss and his sort were the targets of the McCarthy period. Today Vice-President Agnew rails against 'effete snobs'—i.e. those who are rich, well educated, and dislike the Nixon–Agnew political posture

Politics based on hatreds and fears are often difficult to follow, for those whose motivations arise from strong hatreds will have an unfortunate tendency to hate indiscriminately. This tendency must be arbitrarily curbed in order that the hater can win some allies for his campaigns.

Take the case of Tom Watson of Georgia. He started out as a fighter for the rural poor in the South—as clean a populist as one could want. But his political ambition was strong—he dumped the blacks and became a racialist red-neck leader of Georgia's poor whites. He supported Debs, the Socialist candidate for President, and opposed America's entry into the First World War. He also re-established the Ku Klux Klan in the south, defended the lynching of Leo Frank (a Jewish victim of American justice)—and warned that other Jewish libertines would be similarly dealt with; re-published that famous piece of anti-Catholic pornography 'Maria Monk', entered the U.S. Senate and called for the immediate recognition of the U.S.S.R. in 1920, and died in 1922. Another quiz for the student of American social history: when, if ever, did the K.K.K. support militant trades unionism? When blacks were used as strike breakers in railway disputes in the South. The Lipset and Raab book is a wonderfully interesting volume of historical sociology which surpasses even those levels of excellence we have come to expect from the two authors.

Shapiro's book centres upon the problem of Zionism and its friends and foes within the American Jewish community. While the scholarly detail provided by the author is most admirably laid out, the pattern might be difficult for the layman to read were it not for two salient guiding features: the conflict between 'old' American Jewry—almost entirely German in origin—and the post-1890 immigrant Jews from Eastern Europe; and second, the central role in Zionist affairs in the U.S. of Mr Justice Brandeis. The first salient feature is of interest because there were two conflicts/incompatibilities, the one being the feelings aroused in the hearts of old-established more-than-half-assimilated German Jews by the arrival of poor, illiterate Eastern European Jews (who in fact proved the occasion for a rapid growth of antisemitism), and the need the newly arrived had for the guidance, wealth and influence of the old-established. Time and again in American Jewish organizations the old guard after being criticized and upbraided

were voted once again into positions of power, for the new immigrants felt quite unable to operate without them. Another aspect of the antipathy which is very well established by Shapiro is the differences between the old and the new in Jewishness. The old had money, social position, and higher education; the new illiteracy, manual labour, and squalid living, but in Jewish scholarship, lore, and traditions the socially superior were the culturally inferior, for the great reservoir of zeal for Jewish values and rights was the mass of déclassé Jews from Eastern Europe—they increasingly provided the agitators, the journalists, and the political leaders of the community. The Yiddish press was the carrier of Jewish culture, a press that the established 'German' Jews did not, or could not, read.

Louis Brandeis's role to a considerable extent reflected this tension in the community. He brought to his task great talents, and also some of his own ideas which had nothing to do with Zionism. He fell out with Chaim Weizmann on more than one issue, but the issue of the business efficiency of Weizmann's organization which he criticized very publicly does not seem now to be a criticism which he *had* to make. In addition, Brandeis's hostility to bigness in business led him to propose that Zionists should not encourage large foreign (Jewish) investment in Palestine, yet at the same time he wanted successful business men rather than intellectuals in charge of American Zionists' efforts. Brandeis's two positions can no doubt be logically reconciled, for what he wanted for Palestine did not have to agree with what he wanted in America. It must have confused many; but his wish to have Palestine remain under British administration as against Weizmann's desire to have Jews involved in administering every aspect of Palestine's public affairs was not confusing, though many must have considered it wrong. Yonathan Shapiro's book is a sociological study in which the conceptual framework is constructed of light materials—well chosen to indicate certain general theoretical problems but not to get in the way of the story in a most readable book.

Professor Gray's book *The Lobbying Game* is a very thorough study of the 1953 Campaign for a Pennsylvania Fair Employments Practices Commission. The author was himself involved in the activity which led in 1955 to the enactment of a strong state F.E.P.C. law. His detailed account of the tactics, personalities, and organizations involved in the game is a useful addition to pressure group literature.

R. H. PEAR

BEN HALPERN, *The Idea of the Jewish State*, 2nd. edn., xix + 493 pp., Harvard Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge Mass., and Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1969. £7·25.

The Idea of the Jewish State is concerned with sovereignty. It is not a general history of Zionism, nor a diplomatic history of the Palestine problem; neither is it a history of the State of Israel, although its theme is closely concerned with all these topics, as well as with much else. But the main purpose is to trace the complex and tortuous paths leading from dream-

stuff to reality—to demonstrate how the myth of Jewish sovereignty developed an elaborate ideology before becoming an institutional reality.

The process demands the skilful unravelling of a tangled mass of social, economic, political, and religious threads, as well as the careful analysis of emotional and national pressures. The study traces the impact of Jewish nationalism upon both Jews and Gentiles, the sympathies and antipathies it aroused, and the twists and turns in ideology and the modifications in approach engendered by experience, expediency, or the shifting balance of forces. The factors which gave rise to the Zionist movement as well as to the anti-Zionist factions both inside and outside the Jewish camp are analysed with care and insight. But most impressive is the account taken of the often neglected element of 'self-image' which has played so important a role in both the concept of the return to Zion and the political attitudes of the State of Israel. Self-image is as important a factor in the thinking and behaviour of peoples as of individuals. It is a factor to be ignored at peril.

In the extraordinary pattern of circumstances resulting in the establishment of the State of Israel, two aspects deserve particular emphasis. One was the romantic vision of *Eretz Yisrael*, the Land of Israel, which was rekindled in the second half of the nineteenth century among the Jewish community, particularly in Russia, against the background of Tsarist oppression:

'. . . the real reasons for the unbending Zionist fixation on Palestine were mythic and historic attachments, taken over by the Zionists from other parts of the Jewish community. For there were pre-existing connections which bound not only Zionists but their opponents, and Western as well as Eastern Jews, in a practical as well as sentimental, contemporary as well as inherited, involvement with the Land of Israel' (p. 94).

Certainly, Zionists tended to look at Palestine through a rose-coloured monocle which reflected a glowing image of the Jewish people re-established in its ancestral home, and exerted the hypnotic appeal of a 'land without a people for a people without a land'. The power of this vision coupled with a passionate desire for self-determination, provided much of the driving force behind the Zionist movement.

The second factor bolstering the national resolve was of cataclysmic proportions. The atrocities of Nazi persecution culminating in the deliberate destruction of more than a third of the total Jewish population in the world gave rise to a national resolve which underpins the very existence of the Jewish State. The lessons of the Holocaust for Israel's Jewish population were so overriding that the insistence on the prerogatives of sovereignty was as fierce as it was determined: 'In the exercise of its sovereignty . . . Israel was prepared to risk all extremities and to stake its very existence on an all-or-nothing choice' (p. 439). The Hitler era had demonstrated that Jews could rely on no one but themselves. Hence, although the Jewish State had arisen as a revolt against the Diaspora condition, resistance to the whole world, even in Israel, seemed a logical continuation of that condition: 'In a formula used repeatedly at the time of the Sinai campaign, Mrs. Meir, Israel's Foreign Secretary, said that the Jews had survived in the exile by asserting their right to survive even when it was denied by all others; and, if necessary, they would survive as a sovereign state in Israel by asserting their sovereign

freedom even when it was denied by all others' (p. 440). This tenet of Israel's political philosophy is not, perhaps, as widely understood as it deserves. It is one of the chief merits of this important book that it leaves the reader in no doubt that such is the case.

The study is divided into three parts, of which the first delineates the setting of Zionism in modern Jewish history, and outlines the Zionist conceptions of sovereignty. The second section is concerned with the rise and reception of Zionism in the nineteenth century, and the Jewish attachment to Zion. This is followed by a discussion of anti-Zionism and non-Zionism, and an analysis of the relations between the Jewish Agency and the Jewish State, and between Israel and the Diaspora. The final section deals with Zionism and the international community from the time of Napoleon to the aftermath of the Six-Day War.

In spite of the comprehensive nature of its theme, this study is carefully argued and skilfully organized throughout. It demonstrates a thorough grasp of the complex issues involved, and the analysis is both imaginative and rigorous. Although the second edition differs little, apart from the final section, from the first edition published in 1961, and indeed omits an interesting appendix devoted to assumptions, methods, and terms, it remains essential reading for the serious student of the Zionist movement and the state of Israel. It is scholarly, fair, meticulously annotated, and attractively produced.

DAVID PATTERSON

ERNEST KRAUSZ, *Ethnic Minorities in Britain*, MacGibbon and Kee, 175 pp., London, 1971, £2·25.

Recent years have seen an increasing preoccupation with colour and race in majority-minority relations in Britain, and with the apparent similarities between the British situation and black–white situations of longer standing elsewhere in the world.

This has distracted attention from other at least equally important aspects of overall minority–majority relations in Britain, notably their historical and diachronic evolution, the ways in which they are related to British systems of stratification, and the similarities and differences of background, goals, and experiences of the various immigrant and older minority groups, of whatever pigmentation, which are to be found in Britain today.

In his compact and stimulating study Ernest Krausz sets out to provide this broader comparative perspective. His first chapters describe briefly eight major ethnic groups: Cypriots, West Indians, African Negroes, Indians and Pakistanis, Chinese, Irish, Jews, Poles and other East Europeans. British attitudes and minority reactions to prejudice and discrimination (not clearly differentiated) are outlined in the third chapter, and the fourth examines the vital areas of jobs and housing in 'the urban maelstrom'.

While this section provides a useful summary of the situation of different ethnic groups, the overview is somewhat uneven, largely reflecting the uneven amount and quality of research material available in each case. There are also some minor errors of fact or interpretation relating to, for

instance, the Poles and West Indians. As one would expect of the author of *Leeds Jewry*, however, the rich material on the Jewish minority is well presented, and its development gives him an opportunity to review briefly the inconsistent but long-standing British combination of official tolerance towards refugees and the oppressed and popular resentment towards newcomers.

In this final section, Dr. Krausz re-examines his empirical material in the light of certain theoretical approaches to race and ethnic relations. He finds the 'race relations cycles' and 'ultimate assimilation' theories inadequate and turns to consider 'pluralism' and the 'power-conflict' approaches. Pluralism, which he equates with pluralistic integration, he finds useful as describing a static picture but ineffective for analysing the dynamic aspects of inter-ethnic relations.

For the latter purpose the author turns to power-conflict theory, postulating 'an overall social system within which conflicts and tensions are managed by various organizational means'. Conflict is not limitless but carried on by the use of power, in the sense of resources and their mobilization in the interests of the different groups.

Resources include economic means, political rights, education and expertise, of which the dominant majority has far more than any of the ethnic minorities. Most recently arrived coloured minorities have fewer resources than minorities such as the Jews and Poles, but Krausz here questions the view of John Rex that there is a generic difference between the social situations of coloured and white minorities. He cites the Kenya Asians and Oriental Jews to support his view that minorities achieve faster socio-economic advancement because of their greater degree of 'urbanism' (skills and attitudes suited to life in an urban-industrial society), and that colour alone need not prevent upward mobility.

Since the publication of this study more evidence has come to light on the progress of such groups as East African Asians, Chinese, and Ismailis which suggests that this line of analysis is well worth pursuing further.

SHEILA PATTERSON

JACOB R. MARCUS, *The Colonial American Jew 1492–1776*, 3 vols. xxxiv + xi + ix + 1650 pp., Wayne State Univ. Press, Detroit, 1970, $45.00.

This work, massive in size yet written in a sprightly attractive style, is probably the largest work about so small a group known to Jewish historiography. Professor Marcus has lived as close to colonial American Jewry as an historian ever may with a subject antedating his lifetime. His minute view of the approximately 2,500 Jews who, he reckons, lived in the Thirteen Colonies by 1776 is based upon decades of exhaustive search among books, manuscripts, and monuments in three continents. He devotes the first 200 pages to Latin American and West Indian Jewry, and then, like many of those Jews, moves to North America. The balance of the work is divided into large separate sections on the beginnings of settlement in each colony, legal and political status, economic activity, religious and cultural affairs, and Jews

in the wider community. *The Colonial American Jew* focuses upon individuals and shows a shrewd humane appraisal of men's motives and their foibles—qualities which make it pleasant to read.

Professor Marcus sets the work in the general framework of the great Jewish migration westward, of which North America was then the remotest frontier. The least professional of readers must be often astonished at the author's skill in tracing the movement of minor little-known figures within the colonies and back and forth across the Atlantic. While this is history in the classic manner and is not oriented towards the social sciences, the social scientist should find here abundant material on such interesting questions as the Jewish family and its habits, Jewish population, interaction between family and business ties, and the Jew as a colonial.

To one who may wonder why there is so vast a work about so few persons, all but a few among them of humble estate, the answer seems clear that these are the earliest generations of a vast, fortunate, and in many ways unique Diaspora community. They merit such close, detailed study. Professor Marcus has done this to the king's taste, and has written what is certain to be the standard work for decades and even generations.

LLOYD P. GARTNER

C. A. MOSER and G. KALTON, *Survey Methods in Social Investigation*, 2nd. edn., xvii + 549 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1971, £3·50.

Thirteen years, and eight reprints, have passed since the appearance of the first edition of this textbook. With that contribution Moser has virtually single-handed raised the social sciences in Britain, and sociology in particular, from a philosophical discipline into an empirical enterprise. Even those who have argued against unnecessarily and misleadingly 'scientizing' the study of social phenomena and social behaviour will agree that Moser has maintained a sensible and balanced view in the guidance he has given in his work on matters of research design, quantification, the use of statistical tests, and generally the interpretation of empirical data.

This fair balance is aptly maintained in the new edition in which Kalton, another specialist in presenting statistical principles in an easy form to social scientists, has joined. The nearly 200 extra pages added are well distributed in relation to three main aims: 1, up-dating the book; 2, multiplying the examples further to clarify the exposition of methodological principles and research techniques; and 3, enlarging some topics which previously were very thinly covered.

The last point is best seen in Chapter 9 on experiments, where the vital aspects of causality, validity, control for extraneous variables, and factorial design are now adequately covered. The wider coverage of some topics does mean, however, that the narrower title of the book no longer represents its contents as well as it did for the first edition. It is true that the book is still dominated by survey and correlational techniques, but *Methods of Social Investigation* would by no means have been a misleading title.

Overall, there can be little doubt that this edition, the only comprehensive and up-to-date British text and one which compares very favourably with the American methodology books, will adequately serve another generation of social science undergraduates in Britain.

ERNEST KRAUSZ

NATHAN ROTENSTREICH, *Tradition and Reality, The Impact of History on Modern Jewish Thought*, xii + 145 pp., Contemporary Jewish Civilization Series, Moshe Davis, ed., Random House, New York, 1972, $1.95.

The word 'History' in the sub-title of this book does not refer to the story of the past but to the methods by which the past has been investigated in modern times, to the idea of history and its methodological discipline. In the work of the practitioners of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* or the 'Science of Judaism', and, through them, in the writings of later thinkers, the examination of the Jewish past objectively yielded an approach to Jewish tradition different in kind from anything known before the nineteenth century. Indeed, the very notion of tradition acquired an entirely new connotation. The basic shift in meaning was from that of an interpretation of revelation to a demand for the past to have a binding character of its own, a voice in the affairs of the present independent of any external authority. It is revealing in this connexion that the opening song in 'Fiddler on the Roof' substitutes the English word 'tradition' for the 'Torah' hailed in the original Yiddish version. A secular process in time becomes the alternative for the timeless word of God. Apart from the danger of ancestor worship in the new conception, the great question left unanswered is why the tradition should enjoy authority in an age of universalistic values in which the scientific approach scorns subjectivity or the particularistic.

After devoting a chapter each to Zunz, Krochmal, Graetz, Dubnow, Ahad Ha-am, and Bialik, Professor Rotenstreich considers the problematic situation of the present. Holding that the erosion of tradition has run its course, he looks forward to a renaissance of tradition, which, he observes, calls for the renaissance of principles underlying that tradition. This principle he finds in the Biblical idea that man is a responsible being and as such is judged by God Who created man in His image.

This is a stimulating and closely reasoned book, but it is somewhat surprising that neither Zechariah Frankel nor Solomon Schechter is so much as mentioned, although both, and especially the latter, wrote extensively on the problem to which the author addresses himself. In fact, Schechter's Introduction to his *Studies in Judaism* is a much clearer statement of the problem with more than a hint at its solution.

LOUIS JACOBS

MARSHALL SKLARE, *America's Jews*, xiv + 235 pp., Ethnic Groups in Comparative Perspective, Gen. Ed. Peter I. Rose, Random House, New York, 1971, n.p.

Studies of intergroup relations have concentrated on the misdeeds of the powerful majorities as if the chief social problems lay on their side. Assimilation seemed to be the logical goal for the minorities. Now there is new interest in the problems of minorities which want to preserve their distinctiveness while enjoying the civil rights of the majority society, and non-Jews are asking fresh questions about the Jewish experience. The idea of 'pluralism' within industrial societies, which is enjoying a certain vogue, has a special appeal to Jews as enabling them to get the best of both worlds. Professor Sklare's exemplary little book therefore comes at an opportune moment. It is addressed to a general sociological audience rather than to Jews, and it brings a sociological mind to bear on a series of questions which Jewish writers have preferred to overlook. Why they have avoided them is a problem to which Sklare may return on some other occasion, but he is sure that there are many more investigators digging at ancient sites of Jewish civilization than are engaged in unearthing the story of contemporary Jewry.

Professor Sklare begins with a condensed account of how the early Jewish immigrants tended to be from the less religious, more politically radical, and lower status sections of the east European groups, and how they found a country which regarded Jewishness as irrelevant to civil rights. 'The Jew was free, free at last. And his history meant that freedom had a special meaning for him which it did not hold for the Italian, the Pole or the Irishman.' He responded eagerly to the duties of citizenship and accepted the principle of public education as an article of faith. This was the social contract between America and the Jew: accommodation in return for freedom. Sectarian groups subsequently challenged that contract, and later events have changed it.

In the chapters that follow Sklare reviews the more familiar questions of United States Jewish demography, urbanization, education, occupation, norms of family relationships, community organizations, religious observance, and social services. Many of these topics reveal the strength of the assimilative forces, with the dilemma of intermarriage as the most acute. To an outsider, Sklare is persuasive when he maintains that the barmitzvah indicates the importance that the parent attaches to what should follow: an endogamous marriage. It is a rehearsal for a wedding. Rabbinical attempts to restrain these celebrations are unavailing (note the parallel with Lloyd Warner's analysis of the growth of Mother's Day in the Protestant calendar). If Jewish children do decide to marry out, parents try hard to find a rabbi prepared to officiate, and in this way to show that the marriage is not so different after all and that therefore the parents have not failed. Parents of children who have married out stress what they have done to give their children a Jewish education: they have employed the best talent to immunize the child against out-marriage, so the responsibility for this deviation must be the rabbi's or the school's.

Jewish educational institutions have been ill-prepared to shoulder the burden of reinforcing the Jewish identity which parents seek to put upon

them. Because every male Jew was supposed to be capable of teaching the basic principles of Judaism, the role was not honoured, and men preferred more rewarding employment. Initially Hebrew schools were established to teach Jewish subjects on Sundays or after the children had completed their studies in the public school. Since 1940 the major trend has been to establish day schools as alternatives to the public schools. Sklare considers this a dramatic shift only understandable if we remember that by the post-Second World War era there had emerged a sufficient group of first, second, and third generation Jews who felt secure enough in their identity as Americans to reject public education and to revoke one of the terms of the original Jewish-American contract.

That contract meant eventual assimilation, but the establishment of Israel gave the Jewish identity new meaning. Defeat in 1967 would have been psychologically devastating for American Jewry. The annual 'Salute to Israel' parades in New York now rival those on St. Patrick's Day and Columbus Day. Israel has given people the psychological freedom to appear in public as Jews. Effective pluralism seems to require a shadow citizenship which can be a counterbalance to the power relations within United States society. A distinctive identity cannot be preserved if its expression is confined to the private sector of the citizens' lives. The United States can recognize ethnicity in its public relations, so perhaps the early Jewish immigrants were not obliged to accommodate so thoroughly. In opening up these issues in so lucid and succinct a manner, Marshall Sklare has contributed stimulating ideas that deserve a wide audience.

MICHAEL BANTON

CHRONICLE

According to preliminary census results issued at the end of August, the population of Israel totalled 3,124,000 on 20 May 1972. This figure represents an increase of 43 per cent over the population enumerated at the census of May 1961: 2,179,500. But the 1972 total includes two categories not counted in 1961: potential immigrants (formerly known as 'temporary residents') and the population of East Jerusalem. Natural increase accounted for 568,000 out of the total increase of 944,500; while the surplus of immigration over emigration was 315,000. The balance was made up of potential immigrants and the inhabitants of East Jerusalem.

Three categories of residents were not enumerated: diplomatic and consular personnel; U.N staff; and tourists who had been in the country for less than twelve month

The preliminary census results also revealed that population growth was most marked in the south. Ashdod, for example, has grown from 4,600 in 1961 to 40,500 in 1972—a 780 per cent increase. Dimona's percentage growth has been 374; Yerusham's, 271; Eilat's, 140; Sderot's, 112; Beersheba's, 93; and Ashkelon's, 77. On the other hand, the population of Tel Aviv–Jaffa declined from 386,100 in 1961 to 362,000 in 1972. Throughout the country, however, there has been more urbanization: in 1961, 77·9 per cent of the total population lived in urban areas, but in 1972 the figure had risen to 84·4 per cent.

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In July the Hebrew University conferred nine honorary doctorates and 125 doctorates. There were 52 Ph.D. degrees in the Faculty of Science, 18 in the Faculty of Medicine, and 15 in the Faculty of Agriculture. The Faculty of Humanities conferred 26 and of the Social Sciences, eight. The remaining six doctorates were in the Faculty of Law.

At the same ceremony, the Solomon Bublick Prize was awarded to Professor Roberto Bachi, who is Professor of Statistics and Demography at the University. Until recently Professor Bachi was also Scientific Director of the Government Bureau of Statistics.

A total of 2,604 degrees were awarded by the Hebrew University at the end of the academic year. In June 810 Bachelor's degrees were conferred in the Faculty of Humanities; 416 in the Faculty of Social Sciences; 328 in the Faculty of Science; 192 in the Faculty of Law; 68 in the School of Social Work; and 37 in the School of Pharmacy. The remaining 628 awards were Master's, M.D.s, D.M.D.s, and graduate diplomas.

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In August the Hebrew University inaugurated its School of Pharmacy building. The School was established in 1953 but was dispersed in various

locations; the new building is its first permanent home. A group of American Jewish pharmaceutical industrialists raised three million dollars to erect the seven-storey building.

Israel needs new pharmacists; it has 1,835 practising licensed pharmacists, but 60 per cent of these are over fifty years old. The School of Pharmacy has 200 undergraduate and 30 graduate students, among whom there are 20 Arabs and 12 newly arrived Russians.

*

It was announced in July that the American Joint Distribution Committee (J.D.C.) and the Hebrew University are engaged in an extensive programme to train top echelon personnel for community centres in Israel. The Paul Baerwald School of Social Work of the Hebrew University is responsible for the major part of the training programme; some twenty students have already completed a year's graduate course and are to serve as directors, counsellors, and field workers in the existing 19 community centres in the country. An additional 60 centres are planned by the government.

*

In May, Bar Ilan University awarded Bachelor's degrees and certificates to 820 students: 228 degrees were in the social sciences; 169 in the humanities and Judaic studies, and 168 in the natural sciences: school teaching certificates were awarded to 195 students. It was a record graduation ceremony. Three Ph.D. and 78 M.A. degrees were also conferred. Bar Ilan began 17 years ago with 70 students; it now has nearly 6,500.

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An official of the Ministry of Education in Israel is reported to have stated that 840,000 children are enrolled in kindergartens, primary schools, and high schools for 1972–73. More than 42,000 three- and four-year-olds from low-income groups will be in kindergartens. About 500 new kindergartens were built in the first eight months of 1972; 400 were due for completion in the course of the 1972–73 school year, and the building of a further 400 would be put in hand.

As for primary and secondary schools, the Ministry has a programme for about 8,000 new classrooms in the next two years, and for 25 comprehensive schools, mainly in development towns.

A new comprehensive high school will be opened this year for Druze children in Western Galilee, as well as a high school in Haifa and two other high schools in Jerusalem for Arab pupils. At the beginning of September, about 130,000 Arab pupils went back to school; they account for 95 per cent of boys and 80 per cent of girls of school age.

*

It was announced last September in Tel Aviv that the Municipal Education Department has erected 83 new classrooms, mainly in the suburbs; a total of 63,000 pupils will attend 348 schools; these include 165 kindergartens

for 7,300 children; 101 primary schools for 36,250; 21 special schools for 2,150; 26 high schools for 11,920; and 15 technical schools for 4,100. There are also 15 evening schools and four boarding schools.

The newly built classrooms consist of 10 for use in kindergartens, 30 for primary schools, and 43 for secondary schools.

Bat Yam's school population has grown by 14 per cent since 1971: the total is now 20,112. Sixty-one new classrooms have been built: 35 for primary schools, 19 for kindergartens, two for high schools, and five for technical schools.

Petah Tikva has announced that it will build 15 new kindergartens to cater for an increase of 500 children over 1971; it has already 95 kindergartens for three- to five-year olds; there has also been an increase of 800 pupils in its primary schools.

*

The Absorption Minister, Israel, is reported to have stated in the Knesset in May that some 185,000 immigrants had come to Israel since 1967; 80,000 had come from Europe; 53,000 from Asia and Africa; 35,000 from the U.S.A. and Canada; and 17,000 from Latin America. A survey by the Central Bureau of Statistics had found that nine per cent of immigrants leave during the first year of their residence, but only three per cent leave in the second year.

The Minister noted that Georgians accounted for a third of all immigrants from the Soviet Union; they had been settled in 14 main centres in Israel; five of the centres have concentrations of more than one hundred families; while no centre has fewer than 50 families.

In July the Minister said that there were a total of 27,500 immigrants in the first six months of 1972, an increase of about 50 per cent over the same period in the previous year, when the total was 17,900.

Commenting on the occupations of Russian immigrants, he said that 68 per cent were professionals; the qualifications of 81 per cent of them were recognized in Israel.

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It was announced in August that 466 persons had emigrated from Britain to Israel in the first 7 months of 1972; 600 had done so in the same period in the previous year. In 1968 a total of 1,035 had emigrated: 159 families (518 persons), 204 single males, and 313 single females. British emigration to Israel declined in 1970 when the total was 1,291: 234 families (763 persons), 228 single males, and 300 single females; while in 1971 there was a further decline to a total of 1,110: 201 families (580 persons), 205 single males, and 325 single females.

In every year from 1968 to 1971 the age-group 18–29 accounted for about half the total number of immigrants, and only 5 per cent or less were aged over 65 years: 28 in 1968, 19 in 1969, and 52 in 1970 and 1971.

During these four years there were a total of 133 engineers among the immigrants, 248 teachers, 254 medical personnel, and 492 students.

*

An official of the Ministry of Absorption was reported to have stated in September that of 5,500 immigrants who came to Jerusalem in the last fiscal year, 30 per cent were from North America, 10 per cent from South America, 30 per cent from eastern and western Europe, and 25 per cent from Asia and Africa. Thirty per cent of the new immigrants to Jerusalem were Orthodox. Whereas earlier immigrants to Jerusalem had been welfare cases, about 40 per cent of the new arrivals consist of professionals and their households. The official is quoted as saying: 'We can already feel their contribution to the city. They're absorbed quickly in work—in the university, the hospitals, government offices and social work. In the San Simon quarter, a group of immigrants, mostly from English-speaking countries, has formed an organization to assist deprived families living across the road in Katamonim. . . . It shows their alertness to problems and their willingness to become involved.'

*

Jerusalem Municipality inaugurated a new seven-storey library building in September; it is to house 120,000 books on open shelves, about 12 per cent in the English language. This new central library and other branch libraries in East and West Jerusalem have a total of 260,000 books.

There was a 'reading library' in East Jerusalem before the Six-day War; it contained about 4,000 volumes; it is now a lending library with some 27,000 books, two-thirds of which are in Arabic and the remainder mainly in English. The Arab librarian is reported to have stated that books and magazines published in Arab countries are bought regularly either from Jordan or by mail order from Paris; the branch library has 3,500 members including 1,000 women. Two other branch libraries have been opened for Arab residents of Jerusalem since the Six-day War, and there is a book mobile which visits outlying Arab communities. Three new branch libraries have also been recently opened in West Jerusalem.

A municipal councillor commented that it was thought that television would kill reading habits; in fact, membership of public libraries had gone up by 10 per cent since the introduction of television.

*

Israel Book World, no. 8, June 1972, states that, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, Israeli publishers printed 3,353 titles in 1970–71; this represented an increase of 195 titles over the previous year, and of 278 titles over 1968–69.

There were 275 different publishers in 1970–71; but 168 published only one title each. Of the 52 full-time publishers, 14 were responsible for more than half (54·3 per cent) of all the titles; eight published one hundred or more titles each and accounted for 1,306; while the remaining six issued between 51 and 99 titles each and together accounted for 434 titles.

About two-thirds of the books were written in Hebrew; English was the language of 16·5 per cent, followed by Russian (7 per cent), Yiddish (2·3 per cent), Arabic (2·2 per cent), French (also 2·2 per cent), and German (1·9 per cent). Other languages together accounted for the remaining 1·9 per cent.

In 1968–69, 994 titles were reprinted; in 1969–70 the figure was 1,022, while in 1970–71 there was a sharp increase, to 1,449 titles.

*

It was reported in September that in the first seven months of 1972 more than 450,000 tourists had visited Israel—an increase of about 20 per cent over the same period last year. The figure did not include the 150,000 Arab summer visitors.

The Minister of Tourism stated that about five million tourists had visited Israel since the establishment of the State; three million of these had come since the Six-Day War of June 1967. Five years ago the total number of tourists had been 291,000; the figure for 1971 had been 657,000.

The tourist industry earned $178 million in 1971 and is expected to reach $250 million in 1972. There are now 300 recommended hotels with a total of 16,700 rooms; on the eve of the Six-Day War there were 10,000 rooms. There are plans to build 12,000 hotel rooms over the next five years; the Ministry of Tourism will advance loans amounting to half the cost.

These figures do not include the thousands of beds available in youth hostels, camping sites, church hostels, etc.

*

The London School of Economics and Political Science has announced the establishment of a Morris Ginsberg Fellowship in Sociology. Financial provision for the fellowship was made in Mrs. Ethel Ginsberg's will. She died in 1962, her will providing for the fellowship to be established after the death of her husband.

Professor Morris Ginsberg was Martin White Professor of Sociology at the L.S.E. from 1929 to 1954. He died in August 1970. He was the Founding Editor of *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*.

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(Books listed here may be reviewed later)

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O'Neill, John, *Sociology as a Skin Trade, Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology*, xiv + 274 pp., Heinemann Educ. Books, London, 1972, £3·00 hardback, £1·50 paperback.

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

DELLA PERGOLA, Sergio; Ph.D., Instructor, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Chief publications: 'Identificazione e osservanza ebraica in Italia', in *Annuario di Studi Ebraici, 1970–1971*, Rome, 1971; *Jewish and Mixed Marriages in Milan, 1901–1968*, Jerusalem, 1972; 'Israel Population Projections, 1970–2000', in N. Lichfield, ed., *New Towns in Israel*, Tel Aviv, 1972; 'Quelques données sur les caractéristiques démographiques sociales et communautaires des Juifs en Italie', in W. Bok and U. O. Schmelz, eds., *Démographie et identité juives dans l'Europe contemporaine*, Brussels, 1972; 'Gli ebrei nell 'URSS secondo il censimento del 1970', in *La Rassegna Mensile di Israel*, vol. 38, no. 3, March 1972. Currently engaged in research on mixed marriage.

FEUER, Lewis S.; Ph.D., Professor of Sociology, University of Toronto. Formerly Professor of Philosophy and Social Science, University of California, Berkeley. Chief publications: *Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism*, Boston, 1958; *The Scientific Intellectual*, New York, 1963; *Marx and Intellectuals*, New York, 1969; *The Conflict of Generations*, New York, 1969. Currently engaged in research on the sociology of scientific ideas and a forthcoming book entitled *Einstein and Scientific Generations*.

PRAIS, S. J.; M.Com., Ph.D., Consultant to the Statistical and Demographic Research Unit, Board of Deputies of British Jews; Visiting Professor at the City University, London. Formerly, Economist, International Monetary Fund; Adviser to the Government of Israel on economic statistics; Assistant Lecturer in the University of Cambridge. Chief publications: (co-author) *The Analysis of Family Budgets*, Cambridge, 1955; 'Measuring Social Mobility', *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 1955; 'The Measurement of Changes in the Cost of Living', *J.R.S.S.*, 1958; Contributor to Tew and Henderson, eds., *Studies in Company Finance*, Cambridge, 1959; 'Statistics of Milah and the Jewish Birth-rate in Britain', *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, vol. 12, no. 2, December 1970.

RAY, John J.; M.A., Lecturer in Sociology, University of New South Wales. Formerly, Tutor in Psychology, School of Behavioural Sciences, Macquarie University. Chief publications: 'The Development and Validation of a Balanced Dogmatism Scale', *Australian Journal of Psychology*, vol. 22, no. 3, 1970; 'Christianism—The Protestant Ethic among Unbelievers', *Journal of Christian Education*, vol. 13, no. 3, 1970; 'Ethnocentrism—Attitudes and Behaviour', *Australian Quarterly*, vol. 43, June 1971; 'A Psycholinguistic Account of Causality', *Bulletin of the British Psychological Society*, vol. 25, no. 1, 1972; 'Acceptance of Aggression and Australian Voting Preference', *Australian Quarterly*, vol. 44, March 1972. Currently engaged in research on moralism, its measurement and its effects.

VAGO, Bela; Ph.D., Head of the General History Department, University of Haifa. Chief publications: 'Le Second Diktat de Vienne', *East European*

Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 4, 1969; 'Germany and the Jewish Policy of the Kallay Government', *Hungarian-Jewish Studies*, vol. 5, no. 3, 1970; 'Budapest Jewry in the Summer of 1944', *Yad Vashem Studies*, vol. 8, Jerusalem, 1970. Currently engaged in research on the Arrow Cross Movement in Hungary.

WIENER, Carolyn L.; B.A., author of *San Francisco and the Un-American Activities Committee*, San Francisco, 1961. Currently engaged in research on nursing care.