



Institute for Jewish Policy Research

European Jewish Identity at the Dawn of the 21st Century: A Working Paper

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EUROPEAN JEWISH IDENTITY AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Executive summary

Contemporary European Jewish identity has been uniquely influenced by three key developments:

1. The rise and fall of Communism
2. The Holocaust
3. The increasing secularisation of European society at large

Various studies of Jewish communities have been carried out in recent years in different European countries. Each study notes the impact of at least one of these influences on contemporary European Jewish identity. In this report I present an analysis of the findings of these studies.

First, in Part 1, I describe three themes relating to European Jewish identity that have arisen in recent social surveys: the European Jewish *revival*, the significance of *ambiance* and the common uniting *threads*:

1. The European Jewish '**revival**' noted in several surveys, it is argued here, is as much a result of *new meanings* being attached to traditional Jewish practices as it is evidence of a renewed interest in Judaism
2. Every European Jewish population has been strongly influenced by the society and culture within which it dwells. Since the trend towards secularism is near universal in Europe, each community has been affected to varying degrees. The concept of '**ambiance**' is employed here to describe this impact
3. The surveys have shown that Jewish communities within Europe share commonalities, here referred to as '**threads**' reflecting shared attitudes, values, and practices. These suggest there is a trend towards a form of international Jewish identity

Second, in Part 2, I describe the many different ways in which scholars have attempted to model and summarise key determinants of Jewish identity. A synopsis of the typologies, scales and so on, which have been created are presented here in five sub-categories:

1. Typologies of biological and ethnic origin
2. Scales of religiosity and observance
3. Historical and generational typologies
4. Identity and characterisation typologies
5. Typologies of ties, engagement and process

Recommendations

The following proposals are made in light of the findings of this report:

1. That a set of **standardised measures** to analyse Jewish identity in Europe should be developed
2. That a **pan-European social survey** incorporating demographic, social and attitudinal components should be carried out
3. That existing **census data** relating to religion should be collated and analysed and that a campaign for the inclusion of religion and ethnicity questions in future national European censuses should be promoted
4. That a pan-European **social survey** of non-Jewish attitudes towards Jews and Judaism, including antisemitism should be carried out

In order that coordinated progress can now be made in these areas the following recommendations need to be addressed:

Infrastructure

1. The establishment of a European Jewish **databank** to collate and store data procured from European social surveys
2. The establishment of a **question bank** consisting of key questions that should be included in all surveys of European communities in order to aid comparative analysis
3. Work on devising suitable **methodologies** for data collection in the European context (telephone surveys, mail surveys, face to face interviews etc) directed at both the affiliated and the unaffiliated populations
4. The creation of a **committee** to oversee these recommendations and to coordinate multi-state surveys within Europe

Communication

5. A **publicity campaign** for this databank for the benefit of researchers in the areas of Jewish identity, demography, history, sociology etc
6. An annual **conference** of European researchers working in the areas of Jewish identity and Jewish demography
7. A brief annual **report** compiled for, and presented to, the ECJC highlighting work in progress with suggestions for future areas or topics for study to the benefit of scholars in the field

Education and training

8. Training and recruitment of a new generation of academics and researchers to work on these topics
9. The organisation of special sessions on the latest research findings at all gatherings of European Jewish leadership

Map – Jewish population of Europe

Maximum and minimum estimates of the size of the European Jewish population (various dates 1997-2002)



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Introduction

Is there such a thing as a *European Jewish identity*? Are there any truly unique characteristics that illuminate Jewish populations against the background of the general population amongst whom they live? Oddly, the answers to these two questions seem to be ‘no’ – or at least very few. Except for the strictly orthodox *Haredim*, **there is no single European Jewish identity, common to all.**¹ In fact, it seems as if the only genuinely common Jewish characteristic is the propensity for a ‘Jewish’ person to self-identify as such. As Konrád states ‘what makes a person a Jew is saying they are one’.² Being identifiably Jewish then implies, by definition, that a person has a Jewish *identity*. But in trying to deconstruct this identity one finds few commonalities:

- Faith or belief in the divine is not universal
- Observing Yom Kippur or any other Jewish festival is not universal
- Having a mezuzah is not universal
- Circumcision of boys is not universal

Pinto notes that it is ‘virtually impossible to work out a tidy definition of “Jewish identity”’.³ Indeed, no amount of surveys, studies, interviews and so on will lead to unanimity on what makes a person Jewish.⁴

Notwithstanding these philosophical difficulties, it would be a misrepresentation of reality to conclude that Europe’s Jewish population of well over 1.5 million people, residing in over 30 nation states, have nothing more in common with each other, other than the fact that they are all labelled ‘Jewish’. The connecting ‘threads’, which weave the fabric of European (and indeed, global) Jewishness, common to significant proportions of this population, are in fact many. However, these threads are unlikely to be black and white, commonly identifiable and universally recognised Jewish practices. In fact, it may not be within traditions rooted in the past, that the commonality of Jewish European identity lies. Rather, it is more likely that greyer concepts such a ‘concern for the future of the Jewish people’ or a ‘belief in the education ethic’ may be more valid universals.

Kosmin has described several such characteristics which he sees as typifying the Jewish population in Europe; affluence, low fertility, high levels of education, emancipated women, low religiosity, strong communitarian values, tolerant social attitudes, centre-left voting habits.⁵ These may be common characteristics but they are hardly what is traditionally understood as ‘Jewish identity’. Nor for that matter are they especially Jewish or even especially European. But Pinto also notes that identity can take on different dimensions and that ‘...one can be Jewish in a religious, cultural, intellectual, ethnic, and political sense.’⁶

European Jews are identifiable as such because of two characteristics: they live in Europe and, in doing so, have had their identities forged in uniquely European ways. Unlike states within America, the nation states of Europe are differentiated; they have unique histories, languages, economies, and social and political systems. Jews rarely live in total isolation from non-Jews in the host country; they are affected by political and economic conditions in the wider society.⁷ Any population living within the European states (whether Jewish or not) will have been exposed to national idiosyncrasies and have been uniquely affected by them. For example, the Jewish populations of countries as diverse as Sweden, Moldova, France, and Poland differ

from each other in many ways more than they do from the national populations within which they live.

Two examples highlight the point. In Sweden, the Jews were protected from the Holocaust by the state and today Swedish Jews find themselves living in a very liberal and open society. However somewhat ironically, that same state today outlaws circumcision and *shechita* (ritual animal slaughter). In Poland on the other hand, the Jewish population was virtually wiped out by the Holocaust and the few that remained then endured 50 years of Communist repression of religious expression, and shut off from the outside world. Only in recent years has the Polish Jewish population been able to 'revive' its Jewish identity. Such differences in historical and societal experiences have forged two very different groups of Jews.

Highlighting these types of differences allows the complexity of European Jewish identity to slowly reveal itself. The term I wish to use to describe the influence that the outside world has on domestic Jewish populations (and which is expanded upon later in this report) is ***ambiance***, a concept proposed by Rosenson that refers to the **'input of outside groups' and the 'impact [that] national historical, political and socio-economic environments have on the Jewish identity of populations living in uniquely identifiable nation states'**.⁸ This helps explain why it is difficult to pin down specific common identity *threads* uniting all European Jewish populations.

However, common threads do exist uniting Europe's Jews. Three factors in particular, have forged, and are still forging, common European Jewish identity. They are a) the rise and subsequent collapse of Communism, b) the experience of the Holocaust and c) the steady emergence of a secular or ethnic Jewish identity as distinct from one based primarily on faith. The first two are specifically European whilst the third is universal to all Jewish populations.

Communism

The experience of Communism divides the European continent very crudely into two parts – East and West. In the East, state Communism suppressed Jewish identities by outlawing or impeding religious practice and customs. It also involved the closing of Jewish newspapers and the general restriction of access to the free flow of information and contact with Jewish populations abroad. 'Jewish' became a pejorative label attached by others (for example, USSR and Romania internal passports recorded 'Jewish' as a nationality).⁹ For many, being Jewish was not something to be proud of, or to identify with willingly.

Following the collapse of Communism, these Jewish populations discovered that half a century of relative isolation and systematic suppression of ethnicity and religion had significantly damaged the richness of their Jewish identities. The extent of the impact depended on the experience of the particular state in question (Communism was more enthusiastically administered in some states than others – for example, Hungarian identity cards did not require 'Jewish' to be recorded as a nationality). Today, significant identity differences also exist *within* these Jewish populations between the young, whose recollection of Communism is weak, and the middle aged and old who lived through the Communist period.¹⁰ Whereas for the young, who have no recollection of living open Jewish lives, an opportunity to claim an ethnicity has arisen, an identity that has evolved rapidly in a new and freer environment. This new,

ethnic '(re)-identity' is the basis for the somewhat illusory claims to a religious Jewish 'revival'.

The Holocaust

The eradication of two-thirds of all European Jews makes the experience of the Holocaust the second major factor to impact on European Jewish identity. Whereas once Europe was home to the world's largest population of Jews, there are now fewer Jews in all of Europe than either the USA or Israel. In some states, such as Poland and the Netherlands, the population was almost annihilated. Dutch Jewry, unique amongst the western European nations, lost 75 per cent of its Jewish population. In comparison, Jews in other states suffered less severely, with Norway losing 40 per cent and France 25 per cent of its Jews.¹¹ Such losses left the surviving Jewish populations deeply traumatised, often too small to provide even the most basic of communal services for themselves.

But also in contemporary Europe there are communities of Jews who largely escaped any direct involvement, either because they were all saved, such as the community of Denmark in the 'October rescue',¹² or because either they did not live in Europe at the time of the Holocaust or were sheltered by a state. For example, the North African Jews in France, the Libyan and Lebanese Jews in Italy, those Jews who were fortunate enough to be living in Switzerland, Sweden, the UK, Ireland and Denmark also experienced a limited impact.¹³ Further, and somewhat ironically, the significant number of Jews from the Former Soviet Union now living in Germany also has little first or second hand memory of this tragedy. However, for the majority of European Jewry, the Holocaust added a new dimension to people's Jewish identity, as it was, more or less, a Jewish experience common to all.

Secularisation

The third and final factor I am proposing here, that affects European Jewish identity, is the steady rise in secularism amongst Jewish populations almost everywhere. The repression of recent history is over; nation states and religious institutions have encouraged Jewish emancipation and whether intentional or not, this has enabled Europe's Jews to assimilate into the general 'ambient' populations amongst whom they live. From a sociological perspective, these Jewish populations are 'modern'. They have low birth rates and low marriage rates; they are economically successful and socially highly mobile; above all they are *free to choose* their own religious identity.¹⁴ Because of this new ability to choose, identity has become more flexible and fluid and the importance of individualism has grown at the expense of collective identity.¹⁵ Jews can now decide for themselves what it means to be a member of a particular ethnic group. Increasingly many have chosen to identify with, but not affiliate with, Jewish organisations. Increasingly the choice they make regarding identity is not 'religious' at all; religious faith has tended to be replaced by a feeling of belonging to an ethnic group. This trend was galvanised in 1967 with the Six Day War, enhancing a sense of attachment with the State of Israel. **By changing the meanings attached to Jewish traditions these Jewish populations are choosing for themselves, a type of Jewishness with which they are most comfortable.**

The European research

In the last decade many independent studies of Jewish communities across Europe have been carried out. This profusion is in part due to the abrupt collapse of

Communist barriers which had seriously impeded scholarly attempts to study these populations. Some of the studies are based on surveys using postal questionnaires and some on brief household interviews, whilst others are based on more in-depth interviews.

The main studies referred to in this report include:

Country	Study date	Author	Details of study
France	2002	Eric Cohen	<i>Based on a sample of 1,132 French households. It follows on from, and adds to a 1991 study. The text is in French.</i>
Hungary	1999	Andras Kovács	<i>Based on a sample of 2,015 people.</i>
Moldova	2002	Malka Korazim, Esther Katz and Bruter Vladimir	<i>Based on a sample of 791 people in three cities, Kishinev, Beltsy and Bendery</i>
Israelis in the Netherlands	1996	Chris Kooyman and J Almagor	<i>Sample of 700 people</i>
Netherlands	2000/1	H Van Solinge and M de Vries	<i>Sample of 1,036 two-hour interviews. Text in Dutch.</i>
Sweden	2003	Lars Dencik	<i>Sample size of 2,581</i>
UK (London)	2002	H Becher, S Waterman, B Kosmin and K Thomson	<i>Sample size of 2,965 households</i>
UK (Leeds)	2003	S Waterman	<i>Sample of 1,496 households</i>

All of these studies have attempted to glean information relating to people's Jewish identity, including aspects of their behaviour and practice and in many instances the authors have attempted to create summary profiles and typologies of their findings.

In Part 1 of this paper the key findings of these studies are synthesised and presented as three themes.¹⁶ First, I examine the popular idea of a Jewish *revival*, looking at the evidence in order to establish the validity of its proponents' claims. I develop the findings to show how the idea of revival actually reveals a new, 'modern' propensity for Jews to attach new meanings to old practices. Second, the impact of *ambient* European societies upon Jewish identity will be described with specific reference to the increasing trend towards a more secularised Judaism. Third, the common themes or *threads* reflected in the idea of an internationalisation of Jewish identity, common to all, will be explored.

In Part 2, the profiles and typologies that various surveys have developed in recent years are collated into five categories:

1. Typologies of biological and ethnic origin
2. Scales of religiosity and observance
3. Historical and generational typologies
4. Identity and characterisation typologies
5. Typologies of ties, engagement and process

A wealth of data and approaches are presented which, above all, highlight the lack of coordinated analysis and methodology in the area of Jewish identity analysis.

I hope that this presentation will contribute to a better understanding of European Jewish identity at the beginning of the 21st Century.

Demographic data

Table 1 shows Jewish population estimates for all the countries of the European continent. In most cases at least three or four separate estimates are presented from various sources. This table is not meant to be definitive – in fact it is debatable whether such a table is even theoretically possible. Even in states such as the UK, where population statistics are regularly calculated and a national census that includes religion data is available, the exact Jewish population size is still very much a moot point.¹⁷

It should also be noted that Table 1 lacks sub-national detail. This is important because Jews overwhelmingly tend to concentrate in major urban areas, such as London, Paris, Budapest, and Copenhagen, and a Jewish plurality usually lives in such locations. It also fails to highlight the complex ethnic and religious makeup of many of the communities. It also ignores levels of affiliation and attachment.

Table 2 summarises the maximum and minimum Jewish population estimates by political region as well as contextualising the data with figures for the rest of the world. It shows that the minimum Jewish population estimate for EU member states only is about 1 million Jews and the maximum estimate for the widest definition of Europe is 2.87 million Jews. The difference between maximum and minimum estimates however varies wildly with the EU members' estimates differing by 36 per cent but FSU states differing by 199 per cent.

Table 1 – Jewish Population in Europe

Country	AJYB, 2002	Accuracy Rating, AJYB 2002	Enlarged Population (estimates) DellaPergola	Jewish Year Book (UK) 2002 - Various sources	Population 1/1/2001 AJYB vol 101 2001 p28	Total Population 2002 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/38/2698549.pdf ; http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbsum?cty=KZ	Jews per 1,000 Population 1/1/2001 AJYB vol 101 2001 p28	Survey sources - various
Austria	9,000	C 1995	15,000	12,000	-	8,080,000	1.1	
Azerbaijan	7,900	C 1999	-	6,000	-	7,831,000	-	
Belarus	24,300	B 1999	50,000	28,000	25,000	10,187,000	2.5	
Belgium	31,400	C 1987	35,000	30,000	-	10,269,000	3.1	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	300	C 1996	600	1,100	300	3,977,000	0.1	
Bulgaria	2,300	B 1992	5,000	6,500	2,500	7,949,000	0.3	
Croatia	1,300	C 1996	2,600	1,300	1,300	4,654,000	0.3	JTA 2001 Census 475 by religion, 576 by ethnicity. 2,000 registered members of the community
Czech Republic	2,800	B 1998	5,000	10,000	-	10,201,000	0.3	
Denmark	6,400	C 1990	8,000	9,000	-	5,374,000	1.2	Dencik 2001 6,400 (min) 8,000 (max); Buckser 2000 p731: 7,000 is the preferred figure but other population estimates range from 5,000 to 12,000
Estonia	1,900	B 2001	4,000	2,000	-	1,393,000	1.4	
Finland	1,100	B 1999	1,500	1,500	-	5,201,000	0.2	Dencik 2001 1,100 (min) 1,500 (max)
France (+Monaco)	519,000	C 1990	600,000	650,000	520,000	59,482,000	8.8	Cohen p10 2002 500,000 (min) 575,000 (max)
Georgia	5,000	C 2000	-	-	-	4,910,000	0.1	
Germany	103,000	B 2001	170,000	91,000	98,000	81,568,000	1.2	According to German Government data, in 2002 there were 180,000 Jews in Germany of which 87% had arrived since 1989 (Bensimon p20). However the community (ZWF) only recognises halakically Jewish members so it counts 93,326 in 2001 (Bensimon p27).
Gibraltar	600	B 1991	-	600	600	25,000	24.0	
Greece	4,500	B 1995	6,000	4,800	-	10,656,000	0.4	
Hungary	51,300	C 1999	100,000	100,000	51,500	10,161,000	5.2	Kovacs estimate for 2000 was 64,000 people (min) and 118,000 (max)
Iceland	-	-	200	90	-	288,000 Ice	0.1	Dencik 2001 Iceland = 100
Ireland	1,000	B 1993	1,200	1,300	-	3,917,203	0.3	1,790 Census 2002
Italy	29,400	B 1995	35,000	30,000	29,500	57,474,000	0.5	
Kazakhstan	4,500	B1999	-	7,000	-	16,764,000	-	
Kyrgyzstan	900	B1999	-	-	-	4,893,000	-	1,600 (1999)
Latvia	9,600	B 2001	17,000	10,800	10,000	2,421,000	4.1	
Lithuania	3,700	B 2001	9,000	11,000	4,000	3,696,000	1.1	
Luxembourg	600	B 2000	700	1,000	-	444,000	1.4	
Macedonia	100	C 1996	200	90	100	2,034,000	0.0	
Malta	-	-	-	50	-	400,000	-	
Moldova	5,500	B 2000	12,000	40,000	6,000	4,295,000	1.4	Korazim et al 2002 25,000 (min) 40,000 (max)
Netherlands	28,000	B 1999	40,000	25,000	28,000	16,105,000	1.8	Solinge et al 2000 41,000 (min) 45,000 (max) 30,000 halachic. 5,000 and Israeli; Brasz 2001 p151 30,000 (min) 45,000 (max) 7,000 Israelis
Norway	1,200	B 1995	1,500	1,200	-	4,538,000	0.3	Dencik 2001 1,200 (min) 1,500 (max)
Poland	3,500	D	8,000	3,500	-	38,623,000	0.1	
Portugal	500	C 1999	400	500	500	10,380,000	0.0	
Romania	10,800	B 1997	15,000	12,500	11,000	22,438,000	0.5	
Russia	265,000	B 2000	600,000	440,000	275,000	145,491,000	1.9	
Serbia & Montenegro	1,700	C 1996	-	1,800	1,700	10,552,000	0.2	
Slovak Republic	3,300	D	5,000	6,000	-	5,379,000	0.6	
Slovenia	100	C 1996	200	90	-	1,988,000	0.1	
Spain (+Gibraltar)	12,000	D	14,000	25,000	12,000	40,546,000	0.3	
Sweden	15,000	C 1990	19,000	18,000	-	8,925,000	1.7	Dencik 2001 15,000 (min) 19,000 (max)
Switzerland	17,700	B 1990	22,000	17,600	17,800	7,291,000	2.5	
Turkey (+Asian regions)	17,000	B2001	21,000	25,000	18,900	66,668,000	0.3	
Ukraine	100,000	C 1997	260,000	300,000	112,000	49,568,000	2.3	JTA Census 2001 = 103,591 Jews. 250,000 (min) and 500,000 (max)
United Kingdom	273,500	B 1995	300,000	285,000	-	59,415,000	4.6	Graham 2003 296,000 (min) 342,000 (max)
Uzbekistan	6,000	C 1999	-	35,000	-	25,982,000	-	

Table 2 – Maximum/Minimum Jewish Population Summary

Status	State	Min est.	Min	Max est.	Max	% Max>Min
EU	Austria	9,000		15,000		67
EU	Belgium	30,000		36,000		17
EU	Denmark	6,400		12,000		88
EU	Finland	1,100		1,500		36
EU	France	500,000		650,000		30
EU	Germany	93,300		180,000		93
EU	Greece	4,500		6,000		33
EU	Ireland	1,000		1,790		79
EU	Italy	29,400		35,000		19
EU	Luxembourg	600		1,000		67
EU	Netherlands	28,000		45,000		61
EU	Portugal	400		500		25
EU	Spain (+Gibraltar)	12,000		25,000		108
EU	Sweden	15,000		19,000		27
EU	United Kingdom	273,500		342,000		25
Total EU			1,004,200		1,368,790	36
EU Candidate	Czech Republic	2,800		10,000		257
EU Candidate	Estonia	1,900		4,000		111
EU Candidate	Hungary	51,300		118,000		130
EU Candidate	Latvia	9,600		17,000		77
EU Candidate	Lithuania	3,700		11,000		197
EU Candidate	Malta	50		50		0
EU Candidate	Poland	3,500		8,000		129
EU Candidate	Slovak Republic	3,300		6,000		82
EU Candidate/FYR	Slovenia	90		200		122
Total EU candidate			76,240		174,250	129
EU Applicant	Bulgaria	2,300		6,500		183
EU Applicant	Romania	10,800		15,000		39
EU Applicant	Turkey (+Asian regions)	17,000		25,000		47
Total EU Applicant			30,100		46,500	54
FSU	Azerbaijan	6,000		7,900		32
FSU	Belarus	24,300		50,000		106
FSU	Georgia	5,000		5,000		0
FSU	Kazakhstan	4,500		7,000		56
FSU	Kyrgyzstan	900		1,600		78
FSU	Moldova	5,500		40,000		627
FSU	Russia	265,000		600,000		126
FSU	Ukraine	100,000		500,000		400
FSU	Uzbekistan	6,000		35,000		483
Total FSU			417,200		1,246,500	199
FYR	Bosnia-Herzegovina	300		1,100		267
FYR	Croatia	480		2,600		442
FYR	Macedonia	90		200		122
FYR	Serbia & Montenegro	1,700		1,800		6
Total FYR**			2,570		5,700	122
Other Europe	Gibraltar	600		600		0
Other Europe	Iceland	90		200		122
Other Europe	Norway	1,200		1,500		25
Other Europe	Switzerland	17,600		22,000		25
Total Other Europe			19,490		24,300	25
All Europe			1,549,800		2,866,040	85
Other*	Israel	5,025,000				
Other	USA	6,000,000				
Other	Africa	88,000				
Other	Canada	364,000				
Other	Oceania	100,000				
Other	South America	363,000				
Total Other			11,940,000		11,940,000	
World total			13,489,800		14,806,040	10
* All sources are noted in Table 1 except 'Other': DellaPergola S, World Jewish Population 2002, American Jewish Year Book, New York, 2002.						
** Not including Slovenia						

PART 1

REVIVAL, SECULARISATION AND THREADS

Jewish ‘revival’ and new attached meanings

In several recent studies, the notion of a Jewish ‘revival’ has been highlighted. In particular, increased levels of Jewish practice have been observed especially amongst younger people. And this is the case in both post-communist and western Jewish populations. For example, in the Netherlands, Brasz describes the impact of the baby boomers of the immediate postwar period, people who are now in their 50s, as infusing the community with ‘a feeling of energy and revival’.¹⁸ The nature of this type of ‘infusion’ will be examined in this section.

The impression that European Jewry is undergoing a revival should not be seen as a religious renaissance, a return to the ‘halcyon days’. What appears to be happening is a general *redefinition* of what being Jewish is all about. People are finding new ways to express their identity as Jews by adapting traditional practices, customs, and behaviours to fit in with their new social realities. For example, rather than a synagogue being used to express religious devotion, it is increasingly taking on the role of local Jewish social club. Attendance at a seder night meal is increasingly viewed as a way of expressing belonging rather than a specific religious (obligatory) experience. Both examples are uniquely *Jewish* in nature but what *motivates* people to partake in these behaviours is not what was originally the case – people have redefined the meanings of these behaviours to make them fit into their new lifestyles.

Moreover, the actual meaning of being Jewish, (the *Jewishness* people are consciously ascribing themselves to), also seems to be changing. For example, most people in the past, Jews and non-Jews alike, saw Judaism as an expression of religious belief; today by contrast it is increasingly seen as an expression of ethnic belonging. But the particular redefinitions (new meanings) that are attached seem to depend crucially on the specific European state in which a person lives (e.g. east or west) and the age of a person (the historical context of their upbringing). Continuing with the seder example, in Sweden, this is increasingly seen as an opportunity to express and experience, or *feel*, a sense of belonging, whereas in Moldova, it might also represent an opportunity to obtain a decent meal. Also the young seem to be more willing to attach new meanings than the more conservative older groups, a pattern noted in several countries. I will attempt to illustrate these new meanings and thereby explain why revival is not the correct description of the social process in action on European Jewish identity.

Changed meanings in Western Europe

In the United Kingdom, Miller notes that the young are increasingly less concerned with *religious* practice, whilst at the same time many of those describing themselves as a ‘Secular/Non-practising’ Jew in fact do carry out Jewish customs.¹⁹ This he

explains, is because observance in Britain is seen increasingly as an expression of belonging rather than an act of religious faith, 'Tougher practices are dying out'.²⁰ Liebman would agree with this. He notes that for many people a Jewish religious holiday is now more about belonging than a religious experience.²¹

The British tendency to give Jewish practices some new ethnic meaning rather than to provide strictly religious meanings is also evident in Sweden. There, 'a simultaneous transformation of and revival in Jewish identities' has emerged in which there is a positive Jewish self-awareness of being a distinct ethno-cultural group.²² However this 'revival' is 'symbolic Judaism'; traditional customs are given 'new and symbolic meanings'.²³ This is especially so amongst younger adults, who are more likely to say that they are *more* observant now compared with their level of observance during their upbringing. In contrast, many older people in Sweden (over the age of 60) are more likely to have abandoned Jewish traditions altogether.

Nevertheless, there is a considerable amount of Jewish activity in Sweden. In his sample, Dencik found 84 per cent attending a Passover seder and 84 per cent celebrating Chanukah 'regularly without exception'.²⁴ In addition 75 per cent light Friday night candles 'once in a while'. He notes that 'These practices are certainly not religiously the most significant in [normative] Judaism, but they are 'national' [*sic*] in character' and serve as a marker of belonging.²⁵

The importance of the age or generational variable in this trend towards attaching new meanings has also been noted in France. A study by Cohen in 2002 revealed a new vitality, including a certain revival of religious practice.²⁶ This is highlighted in that 30 per cent of household heads reported greater levels of religious practice now compared with their homes of upbringing (with a further 51 per cent reporting that there was no such difference). According to Cohen, parents aged 30-50 seem to be returning to the traditions of Judaism. The study found that parents felt that 'community life is a defence against assimilation'. They were of the opinion that it brings together close relatives for Friday evening meals and prayers. They also observe the major Jewish festivals and attend the synagogue together, not because attending the synagogue is particularly sacred, but because it is 'a social place'. Similarly, many people now attend a synagogue for communal and social aspects of the experience rather than for spiritual matters.²⁷ Hence we can see how attached meanings have changed for British Jews in terms of synagogue attendance.

In their study of the Netherlands, van Solinge and de Vries also noted this theme whereby Jews were observed to change previously attached meanings to practices within 'traditional' Judaism. For example, the meanings attached to the celebration of Jewish holidays have changed from an expression of religious commitment to an expression of 'a bond with Jewish tradition'.²⁸ This is especially the case regarding reasons given for attending the Passover seder. Further, the Dutch are even changing the definition of who qualifies for the label 'Jewish' and thereby altering its meaning: they tend increasingly to consider a person is Jewish if at least one parent is Jewish (mother or father) and crucially if they '*feel*' Jewish.²⁹ In fact Brasz notes that although not explicit, the Dutch currently use a variation of the Israeli Law of Return definition of 'Jewish' (i.e. a person with one Jewish grandparent). This broad definition means that in addition to the estimated 25,560 Jews who are halachically Jewish there is a wider 'open community' of up to 45,000.³⁰

Bensimon has also noted the important role that social services can play in Germany. Here she determines that large numbers of Jewish immigrants from the Former Soviet Union are mainly interested in what the community can offer them in terms of social service benefits, cultural activities, and opportunities to meet fellow Russian Jews. They are less interested in carrying out Jewish rituals or attending synagogue services.³¹ I.e. the motivation to identify Jewishly here is socio-economic rather than religious or political.

Buckser suggests that open societies, such as Denmark's, call for a different understanding of the meaning of ethnic community – i.e. that the Jews of Denmark are even changing the meaning of what *Jewish community* stands for. In their search for a separate and distinct cultural identity, Danish Jews implicitly describe their community as 'symbolic space' where individual identities are chosen and displayed. In effect, they have reconceptualised the 'nature of ethnic community, as well as the set of institutional structures which can accommodate it.'³² This is their response to the open and secular society in which they live and provides a 'realm within which [Jewish] ethnicity continues to function'.³³

Changed meanings in Eastern Europe

The picture of 'revival' and new attached meanings is slightly different in the Eastern European countries. In Hungary, for example, following the collapse of Communism, a process of 'identity reconstruction' has occurred within a new, open environment, with its totally different pressures of assimilation, mobility and expectations.³⁴ Kovács found that in the Hungarian sample, the majority currently carried out less 'tradition' compared with their homes of upbringing, suggesting weak ties to tradition. However, his 'younger' age group (those under 54 years old) exhibited clear signs of a return to 'tradition' – i.e. they carry out more in their current families than they did during their upbringing.³⁵

It is important to clarify the *motivation* behind this resurgence. Kovács states that it is not because Judaism (the religion) has suddenly become popular once again, but that 'the main motive behind the new identity [search] has been the desire to throw off the stigmatised identity of the older generation'.³⁶ As for the older group, especially those who were adults during the Holocaust, they have 'abandoned tradition'.³⁷

Mars also disputes the idea of a return to religious Judaism in Hungary. As he states 'I do not think that we have a religious revival, nor a political, ethnic revival among Hungarian Jews. What we do see is a manifestation of cultural ethnicity characterised by a burgeoning interest in Jewish history, culture and tradition...'³⁸ There is, he says, 'a burgeoning manifestation of cultural ethnicity; an interest in Jewish history, culture, tradition and an increasing demand to learn Hebrew e.g. conferences, exhibitions and music festivals.'³⁹ Mars describes 'secular rituals' in Hungary in which Jewishness is celebrated by the participants, who come together as Jews to acknowledge one another and their heritage in public – something that they have historically been unwilling to do. For example, there is surprisingly little circumcision in Hungary because the 'collective memory of Jews' traditionally viewed the world as hazardous, and consequently abandoned the practice.⁴⁰ Mars says that the new willingness of Hungarian Jews to publicly assert their Jewish identity, is akin to them having 'come out of the closet'.⁴¹

Mars notes that to identify publicly as a Jew in Hungary is to have access to educational resources from abroad and that non-Jews are seeking admission to Jewish schools because of the perception of better education. He also notes that being Jewish can offer other benefits too in terms of meals-on-wheels, a supplement to the state pension, and sheltered accommodation.⁴²

The idea of a ‘revival’, especially among the young, has also been discussed in relation to Ukraine and Russia, where Gitelman has noted large differences. He observed that age differentiates respondents most powerfully.⁴³ Also in Russia, in 1992, it was the young who exhibited the highest propensity of ‘observance of Jewish traditions’ (such as Hanukah and Purim) and who had the greatest number of Jewish objects in the home.⁴⁴

In Ukraine the youth in particular, found themselves suddenly presented with the opportunities of an open world that was simply not there not before 1989. Golbert notes that this ‘shrinkage of distance’ means that young people now have a larger number of foreign connections with new and varied notions of belonging available to them.⁴⁵

In Moldova, Korazim and Katz found that even here, a distinct level of Jewish ritual and cultural activity was in evidence, as shown in the table.⁴⁶

Jewish activities in Moldova	Per cent of sample
Celebrate Purim ‘often or always’	54
Fast on Yom Kippur	35
Read a Jewish newspaper	78
Read a Jewish book	70
Carry out at least one ritual practice	62

As in other countries the identity significance of these activities is more in terms of ‘a cultural activity’, ‘an expression of belonging’, ‘links with other Jews’, or ‘maintenance of culture and tradition’ rather than an expression of religion per se. Only 55 per cent said that these events were religious to some extent.⁴⁷ And they observed again a difference in terms of age group; younger respondents were more likely to participate in activities outside the home and older groups inside the home.⁴⁸

However the most intriguing aspect of Korazim and Katz’s analysis in Moldova, in terms of the attachment of new meanings to Jewish practices relates to the Moldavan utilisation of Jewish social services. They analysed the relationship between the utilisation of Jewish social services and the observance of Jewish holidays and participation in non-religious Jewish activities. This is summarised here.⁴⁹

		Utilisation of Jewish social services (%)	
		None	At least one
Observe Jewish holidays (%)	None	15	23
	At least one	16	46
Participate in non-religious Jewish activities (%)	None	9	27
	At least one	21	43

They were interested to know whether the utilisation of social services counted as an indicator of Jewish identity, thereby totally changing the meaning (and motivation) for carrying out such activities. The table shows that almost half (46 per cent) of social service users also observe Jewish holidays and that two fifths (43 per cent) are involved in non-religious but nevertheless, Jewish, activities.

There are variations in the perceptions of celebrating Jewish holidays. In being of a collective nature, and by providing a meal, they therefore offer a dual function both as a service and as a social, participatory event. Unlike, say, in France, where the majority of the Jewish population has a certain amount of ‘buying power’ requiring service providers, including non-Jewish providers, to compete with one another, Moldovan Jews are people in need who have no such luxury of choice. They must take whatever is offered. The fact that a Jewish organisation is offering the service may be of little significance if there is no alternative available.⁵⁰

The Moldovan data also showed that 23 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively, of service users do not observe holidays and are not involved in non-religious Jewish activities. If utilisation of Jewish social services had not been included as an aspect of Jewish identity, this group would lack any behavioural dimension to their identity. A crucial question then poses itself; once material needs are satisfied would these people suddenly lose their ‘Jewish identity’? Other questions arise. What are the key motivations for seeking to obtain these free services? What meanings are now being attached by Moldovan Jews to this practice? Nevertheless, this process of incentivising Judaism as a recruitment device can create habits and ties that may persist once the actual material need has been satisfied.

A European Jewish revival?

Commentators such as Wasserstein also question the validity of the notion of a ‘Jewish revival’. In his book *Vanishing Diaspora* he argues that in the near future there will be few Jews left in Europe except small pockets of the very orthodox. The remainder, he says will have a vague sense of having had Jewish ancestors but little other significant identification.⁵¹ Liebman too suggests that this revival lacks the ‘traditional’ dimension of being Jewish which, for him, is the most important aspect of Jewish identity.⁵² Of course on this ‘traditional’ level, Liebman is correct, as clearly the revival witnessed in several European countries is not a revival of traditional Judaism in any strict sense. But others take a more optimistic and perhaps constructive approach to the new identities being described here. For example, Goldschneider and Zuckerman describe the current phenomena less as revival but

more as a period of transition from a *traditional* to a more secularised form of being Jewish.⁵³

What is consequently being witnessed in Europe is part of an ongoing process of identity development, what Jonathan Webber has termed ‘a reconstruction of identity’ especially by the young.⁵⁴ Dencik uses the term ‘ethno-cultural smorgasbord’.⁵⁵ As early as 1977, Stein and Hill coined the term ‘dime store ethnicity’ in which individuals pick and choose from a variety of ethnic identities.⁵⁶ Using these observations I would use a more generalised term such as *Pick ‘n’ mix* Judaism. In principle, *Pick ‘n’ mix Judaism* would be recognised by rabbis of the Middle Ages in terms of its ability to adapt and evolve but, in terms of actual content, would otherwise be alien. Clearly this is no revival. Rather it has more to do with the fact that the environment in which European Jewry now finds itself is open and welcoming and encourages choice and personal preference above rules and dictates – *Pick ‘n’ mix Judaism* is European Jewry’s adaptive response to this new environment. **Today, people have to choose not only *to be Jewish* but *how they wish to be Jewish*. People who exhibit different religious identities are simply offering different justifications for the source of their religious behaviour – i.e. they are motivated in different ways.**⁵⁷ In this way it is easier to understand the many peculiarities observed in contemporary European Jewish identity such as secular people attending religious services. The next section examines the mechanism by which European nation states impact upon the identity of European Jewry.

Ambiance and the new secularisation

Alongside the idea of a Jewish ‘revival’, a second prominent theme that has emerged from the surveys in Europe is the increasing prominence of secular/cultural Jewish identities. This phenomenon can be seen in every one of the countries examined and this phenomenon impacts upon all aspects of Jewish behaviour. **One of the major driving forces behind the increased propensity of secular identification is the concept of *ambiance*. This refers to the impact that the surrounding ‘environment’ has on the identity of minority groups within that environment.** Rosenson uses the term in her model of influences on the evolution of ethnic identity in Poland.⁵⁸ She describes one of these influences as ‘the input of outside groups’ and she notes that ‘the *ambient* Polish culture affects the individual Polish Jew’s general affect towards his or her Jewishness, providing both positive and negative stereotypes to draw upon’ [my italics].⁵⁹ In this context the term *ambiance* is a very useful concept, as it goes some way towards explaining the differences between the profusion of ethnic Jewish identities in different European communities. It is also useful in the way it emphasises the interrelationship between Jews and the people amongst whom they live – for example, use of the term ‘general population’ is suggestive of independence whereas ‘ambient population’ is suggestive of interrelationships;⁶⁰ this I think is a more accurate description of reality.

Without using the word itself, Liebman also makes reference to the impact of the concept of *ambiance* by noting that ‘in no instance does one find patterns of behaviour among Jews that differ markedly from patterns found in the general society’.⁶¹ To describe the secularising impact of *ambiance*, Gitelman distinguishes between thick and thin culture. Thick culture means commitments of a communal, ethical and

emotional nature. It is multi-layered, imposing, often inherited and time-consuming and comprehensively fills one's life. The alternative is Thin culture where choice is the order of the day and where Thin means 'symbolic' ethnicity. Miller would use the term *mental ethnicity* (see below). Other terms such as 'easy' Judaism, Judaism lite, intermittent Judaism, pick 'n' mix Judaism and Judaism 'a la carte' have also been suggested as descriptors of what is going on in contemporary Europe.⁶² Examples of where this has been studied either intentionally or otherwise now follow.

The increased secularisation of Jewishness in Western Europe is exemplified by Sweden.⁶³ Dencik notes how Jews consider themselves to be a distinctive 'ethnic' group on the one hand but on the other, to be equal to the general Swedish population; they are '*equal yet different*'.⁶⁴ In short, most Swedish Jews have rejected religion as such and embraced secularity. To explain this, it is important to look at the wider society in which they live. Swedish society is interventionist, modern, and pluralistic and since 1999 Sweden has viewed its Jews as a *national minority*.⁶⁵ This is a country that saved Jews during the Holocaust (Sweden has twice as many Jews as the combined total of all the other Scandinavian countries), yet outlaws *shehita* (ritual slaughter of animals) and circumcision, both of which are obligatory to observant Jews.⁶⁶ Dencik calls this a 'post-modern society' where the *ambient* population is continually secularising. This means that the ambient secular trends of increased equality and individualism are at the expense of 'community' and 'tradition',⁶⁷ and impact upon Jewish identity in significant ways.

Sweden's Jewish population is consequently placed in a position of 'cultural release / freewheeling'.⁶⁸ Dencik's survey found that, on the whole, the Jews of Sweden exhibit a strong *feeling* of Jewishness, that they are or feel 'Jewish in essence'.⁶⁹ The majority feel either more Jewish than Swedish (49 per cent) or equally Jewish and Swedish (39 per cent). They have primarily an 'ethno-cultural conception' of what it means to be Jewish and tend to moderate the religious aspect of being Jewish; only 3 per cent of Dencik's respondents stated that they were orthodox. Furthermore, many think that a person with a Jewish father should be eligible to join the community.⁷⁰

In a separate Swedish study it was found that 80 per cent of Jewish respondents think that the future of Swedish Jewry could be insured by consciously investing in Jewish cultural and social activities.⁷¹ A specific increased interest in Jewish films, many relating to the themes of exile, immigration and the Holocaust was noted.

The case of Denmark is a useful example of how a small, highly assimilated and fragmented Jewish community has maintained what Buckser refers to as 'a strikingly active religious and social organisation' in which 'a variety of understandings of Jewish identity coexist and articulate with one another'.⁷² Quoting from sociological fieldwork carried out between 1996 and 1998, Buckser describes Danish ambient society as 'aggressively secular' and ironically this ambient environment has actually helped maintain Denmark's central Jewish institution – the synagogue.⁷³ The synagogue provides a location for Jews to assert a feeling of differentiation from ambient Danish society where unique symbols and traditions such as the use of Hebrew texts, the separation of men and women, distinctive garments etc. contribute to the formation of a unique identity. Buckser notes that Jews attend services not out of faith but because of its ability to afford 'distinction from the Christian world' like 'a spice in a soup, something that provided flavour and character...in a bland

society.’⁷⁴ The synagogue is, for Danish Jews, a place to meet and socialise with other Jews and at times the service is akin to an ‘American political convention’.⁷⁵

Buckser ascribes the popularity of the synagogue to a distinctive Danish Jewish approach to community. With a population of only 7,000, most of whom live in Copenhagen, the community provides, through the synagogue ‘a space within which a variety of different identities can articulate with one another.’⁷⁶ No particular forms of Judaism or Jewish ideas are promoted above any others. Rather, the community provides conceptual ‘space’ – a domain within which individuals are able to construct and express their own identity.⁷⁷

Another example of increased secularity in Western Europe is in Britain. Kosmin noted that the British Jews tend to be ‘inherently mainstream’, in that their attitudes and opinions were closely allied with that of the national populace. Consequently they tended to be ‘moderately non-judgemental’ (their opinions tended to be mostly conservative) similar to the ambient group.⁷⁸ Dividing the community into an Orthodox/Progressive duality, he found little evidence to suggest that separate Orthodox and Progressive Jewish worldviews were emerging in Britain, suggesting a ‘salience of secularisation’.⁷⁹ He notes the significance of national trends towards pluralism, multiculturalism and the growth of secularism in society at large. Here again, although without using the term, the impact of the ambient society is suggested as a reason for the shifting identity trends.


The extent to which Jews in Britain are secularising was made clear from data in JPR’s 2001 survey of Greater London. This study found that 58 per cent of the Jews considered their Outlook to be Secular or Somewhat secular; only nine per cent considered themselves to be Religious.⁸⁰

Miller investigated these trends and concluded that there was a difference between younger and older age groups in Britain. The young, he says, exhibit a less strong *religious* dimension to their Jewish identity and a more differentiated *ethnic* dimension. They are also more likely to express the importance of a *feeling* of Jewishness (what he calls *mental ethnicity*) and reduced *behavioural ethnicity* (this term is used by Miller to describe the tendency of Jews to exhibit social attachments). He suggests that this is problematic from the point of view of continuity since *behavioural ethnicity* is a good predictor of transmission whereas *feeling* Jewish is not.⁸¹

The importance of this trans-European trend towards Jewish secularity should not be underestimated and at least two European national censuses have picked it up. In Scotland, respondents were asked to report not only their ‘current religion’ but also their ‘religion of upbringing’. The 2001 Scottish Census reported 6,448 ‘currently Jewish’ people in Scotland. However, it also reported 7,446 people of ‘Jewish upbringing’, a negative difference of 998.⁸² In addition, the Scottish Census informs us that only 88 per cent of the current Jewish population in Scotland reported having had a Jewish upbringing. The Scottish data therefore hint at *joiners* and *leavers*. Twelve percent of the current Jewish population were not brought up as Jews and as many as 24 per cent of those who reported that they were brought up Jewish did not report that they were currently Jewish. (See Scotland Census Graphic on the next page.)

Graphic – Current religion and upbringing in Scotland

2001 Census Results: Jews in Scotland



A similar trend has been picked up in Croatia, which, admittedly, has a very small Jewish population. In Croatia 475 people reported that they were Jewish by religion whilst 576 reported that they were Jews by ethnicity (this difference of 21 per cent is only apparent due to potential double counting).^{83, 84}

In France, too, the trend towards secularisation has been noted. The French data suggest a socio-economic division. Cohen says that among the wealthier and better-educated French Jews in particular, there are clear signs that they carry out less Jewish practice compared with the less well-off and less well-educated groups. In addition, the young are more secular than the old but Cohen notes that although they don't fulfil all religious obligations strictly, young people (18 to 29 year olds) remain very much 'attached to their roots'.⁸⁵

Identity or Jewish 'habit' in France	Per cent of sample
Non-practising	29
Liberal	15
Traditional	51
Orthodox	5

Keep kosher kitchens at home	42
Attend Jewish schools	25 (school-aged children)

In East European countries at the beginning of the 1990s, Jewish populations were already in the midst of Thin culture as a result of the impact of 40 years of Communism. However with the collapse of the Communist regimes, the populations of these countries have witnessed rises in the expression of individualism and freedom of choice.⁸⁶ In Hungary, for example, following the transition to democratic government, a process of 'identity reconstruction' occurred. In part, this was due to the fact that within ambient Hungarian society, there emerged a demand for ethnic and religious identities. Likewise, in Poland the rise of individualism and consumerism promoted the importance of the concept of choice that was previously suppressed.⁸⁷

For the majority of Jews in Ukraine, Judaism and related religious values do not play a significant role in the formation of contemporary ethnic identities. Here too, components of Jewish identity are essentially secular in nature and consist of 'the historic memory of the people, a feeling of 'ethnic dignity', ethnic consolidation in the face of contemporary problems and the exploration of the national, cultural heritage'.⁸⁸

One possible outcome of these changes in Eastern Europe is a state of confusion. For example, in Hungary, Kende has suggested that upbringing has created a confused identity in which children are educated as Hungarian, whereas their parents insist they only marry Jews, where they have minimalist religious upbringing but are expected to attend a synagogue on High Holy Days.⁸⁹

The clearest example of the way in which European secularisation has impacted upon European Jewry is evidenced by marriage patterns. Many surveys have reported on the increase not only in the number of marriages involving Jews and non-Jews, but also a more liberal and tolerant attitude towards accepting the reality of these unions. Shapiro *et al.* note that increasing proportions of the Jews in Ukraine come from mixed ethnic backgrounds.⁹⁰ They estimated that in 1993 the proportion of mixed marriages was 35 per cent but by 1998 this had risen to 56 per cent and this was combined with a parallel rise of those who thought such marriages to be acceptable.

There have been many mixed marriages in Germany since 1945,⁹¹ and today it is estimated that perhaps half of identifiably Jewish couples consist of mixed (Jewish/non-Jewish) relationships.⁹²

These patterns are also prominent in Western Europe. In France, Cohen has noted the continuing trend towards mixed marriage which now represent about 30 per cent of all unions involving a Jew, and up to 40 per cent of those marrying aged under 30. Only 35 per cent of parents with children of school age said that they would try to prevent a non-Jewish union and only a quarter (26 per cent) would ‘endeavour to dissuade them’. For the wealthier and better educated people the proportions were even smaller.

In the Netherlands, 59 per cent of married or cohabiting adults have a non-Jewish partner,⁹³ and according to Kooyman up to 70 per cent of younger Jews marry non-Jewish partners, though 50 per cent of all marriages since WWII have been between two halachically Jewish people. Men are more likely to marry a non-Jewish partner than women.^{94, 95} This tendency amongst Jewish males was also noted in Hungary.⁹⁶ In Sweden, 33 per cent of the respondents had non-Jewish spouses and only half agreed in principle that mixed marriages should be avoided.⁹⁷ A very high proportion of even the ‘religious’ in Sweden said that they would consider marrying a non-Jew. Yet this liberal attitude does appear to have its limits since, as Dencik notes, whereas secularisation (merely) means abandoning *religion*, assimilation means abandoning *Jewishness*, an important distinction, which attributes a negative connotation to assimilation.⁹⁸ In Britain, Miller notes that even Jews with non-Jewish partners often exhibit high levels of ‘mental ethnicity’ i.e. they *feel* Jewish.⁹⁹ Goldberg and Kosmin found that over one-third of a sub-sample of young British Jews ‘appeared to approve of intermarriage in theory’ and that 68 per cent had been in a relationship previously with a non-Jewish person.¹⁰⁰ Over half felt that rabbis should be more welcoming to non-Jewish partners.

In conclusion, I have described how, as Europe in general has moved towards secularisation, the Jews, through the mechanism of ambience, have also secularised. This is evidenced by new ‘secular’ trends in Jewish patterns of behaviour and practice.

Common ‘threads’ and the new internationalisation of Jewish identity

As already discussed in the introduction, it is difficult to identify those items and habits that are common to all Jews. Yet there are clearly common traits to which a majority of Jews ascribe, consciously or otherwise. These traits or ‘threads’ emerge from the survey work, time and again, suggesting an identifiable type of global Jewish identity applicable to a significant proportion of individuals who claim to be Jewish. This section will review these traits and suggest that they represent amongst other things, a common European Jewish ‘value system’.

First, based on evidence from the surveys, the Jews of Europe show similar **demographic trends**. Apart from the increasing tendency to intermarry, they are increasingly cohabiting, marrying later (if at all) and having fewer children.

The sum effect of these patterns is that the age profile of European Jews is increasingly old. Bensimon notes that in Germany, the Jewish population is ageing.¹⁰¹ Data from the ZWST suggest that this is indeed the case. Similarly, in Britain, the Jewish population age profile is older than the ambient population, as was highlighted in the 2001 Census of England and Wales:¹⁰²

England & Wales 2001 Census data	Jewish population (%)	UK Total population (%)	German Jewish population (%) [†]
Percent of population below 15 years	16.1	18.9	12.0*
Percent of population above 64 years	22.3	16.0	35.1 [‡]
% of all households: one person	36.1	30.0	-
% of all households: one pensioner	19.2	14.4	-
% of all households: more than one pensioner	11.6	9.0	-
% of all households: cohabiting couple	4.6	8.3	-

[†]Source: ZWST data 2002; *16 years or younger; [‡]61 years or above

As can be seen, a wealth of comparative material is available from the 2001 Census. Jews in England and Wales have fewer young people and more older people compared with the ambient population. In terms of household composition they have a greater proportion of pensioner households and single person households. However, Jews have a smaller proportion of cohabiting households.¹⁰³

In the Netherlands, van Solinge and de Vries noted an increased tendency to cohabit, and to do so at an increasingly later age; many respondents also lived alone, a feature that produces an unusually high feeling of loneliness compared with the Dutch average.¹⁰⁴ They have a small number of children and are having them at a later age. Kooyman has noted that the divorce rate among Jews is over twice the national average.¹⁰⁵ On top of this there is an increasing tendency to postpone or even shun marriage altogether. With reduced and delayed marriage the number of children born has declined.¹⁰⁶ As Brasz puts it ‘the [demographic] reality is not promising.’¹⁰⁷ In Sweden the Jewish population shows similar propensities to the very liberal ambient population to cohabit.

There is also a common tendency to live in specific spaces, especially in large cities. This was noted in the UK, Hungary, France and Sweden. Kosmin and Waterman and results from the 2001 Census also suggest that Jewish residential location is spatially unique within urban areas – Jews are concentrated but not segregated.¹⁰⁸

Second, **economically**, there are also traits common to many European Jews, which also act to distinguish them from the wider populations. Jews tend to work in professional roles as has been noted by Bensimon regarding the FSU immigrants to Germany; they tended to be engineers, scientists, doctors, pharmacists etc.¹⁰⁹ The 2001 Census of England and Wales provided a very clear indication of how significant this tendency is. The proportion of Jews in managerial and professional occupations is almost twice that for the ambient British population as a whole:

Profession by category – England and Wales 2001	All people (%)	Jewish population (%)
Managers and Senior Officials	15.1	25.1
Professional Occupations	11.2	22.9
Associate Professional and Technical Occupations	13.8	18.8
Administrative and Secretarial Occupations	13.3	13.8
Skilled Trades Occupations	11.6	3.2
Personal Service Occupations	6.9	4.1
Sales and Customer Service Occupations	7.7	5.6
Process; Plant and Machine Operatives	8.5	3.3
Elementary Occupations	11.9	3.3

Source: ONS 2003

However the most interesting common feature of Jewish European employment is the roles that women play in the host economies. In the Netherlands, for example, Jewish women work more than the ambient female Dutch population and most Jews are found to work in professional occupations. This was found to be the case in England and Wales where the 2001 Census produced the following results for female occupations by religion:

Socio-economic class by profession – England and Wales 2001 Census	% Jewish females	% all females
Higher managerial and professional occupations	10.0	4.8
Lower managerial and professional occupations	25.3	18.9
Small employers and own account workers	6.8	3.8
Lower supervisory and technical occupations	1.5	3.9
Semi-routine occupations	7.1	14.6
Routine occupations	1.6	7.3

Clearly the proportions of females in professional jobs in the workforce are higher in all categories and lower for all routine roles. This was also found to be the case in Hungary,¹¹⁰ and the following data from the Netherlands show a similar trend:

Economic traits ¹¹¹	Dutch Jews	Ambient Dutch population
Completed university	53	22
Women employed (and work longer)	64	47
‘Scholarly profession’ (esp law, medicine, economics, the arts and trade)	24	9

Another key socio-economic indicator is income. In Hungary, the Jews are socio-economically wealthier than the ambient population and this was also found to be the case in the Netherlands and in Britain. The majority of European Jews today belong to the urban middle classes.¹¹²

Socialising habits constitute a third area of the European Jewish commonality. A clear and often noted peculiarity relates to smoking and drinking habits. Gitelman

notes that in Russia, the Jews are less likely than the ambient population to drink alcohol. Liebman notes that low consumption of alcohol is ‘peculiarly Jewish’.¹¹³ In JPR’s 2001 survey of London and the Southeast, 73 per cent of the Jewish population said they drank ‘occasionally’ and 15 per cent ‘regularly’. Direct comparisons with the ambient population are difficult but in 1998, mean weekly alcohol consumption for men was 8 pints (3 pints for women).¹¹⁴ Similarly the survey found that the Jews smoke much less than the population at large.¹¹⁵

In the UK survey of Leeds, Waterman notes that 62 per cent of respondents (including Jews with a secular outlook) said that ‘either all or nearly all’ of their close friends are Jewish and a further 20 per cent that ‘most’ of their friends were Jewish.¹¹⁶ Jews were also found to mix extensively in Jewish social circles in several of the other European surveys.

Moreover, Jews exhibit common traits in terms of secular **education**. This trait also replicates itself in many of the surveys of Jewish populations in Europe. In the Netherlands, Jews were found to be better educated than the ambient Dutch population with 53 per cent having completed university compared with 22 per cent for all Dutch people.¹¹⁷ In Sweden, the Jews have spent more years in formal education than have Swedes in general.¹¹⁸ Similarly in Russia the Jews were generally highly educated,¹¹⁹ and this fact is of great significance in Germany. Nearly three quarters of those who settled in Germany since 1990 had a university or higher qualification from their native (FSU) countries. However, because of language difficulties and differences in educational standards, German authorities often ignore the qualifications gained in Russia.¹²⁰ In France, Cohen noted that educational attainment was higher amongst the Jews than for the general French population: 60 per cent of the sample had obtained the Bac qualification compared with 24 per cent for the ambient French population,¹²¹ as was also the case in Sweden.¹²² In Hungary Kovács reaches a similar conclusion.¹²³

Qualification	Per cent of French sample
Less than Bac	34
Bac	18
Bac +2	17
Bac +4	31

Source: Cohen quoted in *L'Arche* p64

In the 2001 Census of England and Wales data also show the Jews to be higher educational achievers than the ambient population. This can be seen from the table below, where the Jewish population outperforms the ambient population on the higher educational indicators.

Educational attainment England and Wales ¹²⁴	All People	Jewish
No qualifications	29.1	18.6
Level 1 (GCSE any grade)	16.6	10.6
Level 2 (5+ GCSE passes)	19.4	18.8
Level 3 (2+ Alevels)	8.3	11.7
Level 4/5 (First degree or above)	19.8	35.8

A fifth common ‘thread’ relates to **Jewishness**. These commonalities are not specific forms of practice or Jewish observance of Jewish religious rites, but rather are less clear values and concerns. They relate to all Jews and the welfare of Jewish people in general, a type of ‘philo-Semitism’ (i.e. the opposite of antisemitism). Such threads unite large proportions of Jews in Europe and express themselves in issues such as concern for the future of the Jewish people or desire to be reborn as Jewish when asked such a hypothetical question. Most surveys found that for most people, the issue of mixed partnerships was in general just that – i.e. an issue. Although not necessarily a concern for the individual him or herself, they did tend to represent a concern from the perspective of the ‘Jewish people’ as a whole. Kosmin and Goldberg found that for the majority of people ‘it was important that the Jews survive as a people and that an unbreakable bond unites Jews all over the world’.¹²⁵ In the Netherlands a clear majority ‘would regret the decline of the Jewish community’.¹²⁶ In Ukraine, people expressed a ‘sense of pride’ about being Jewish and (given the choice) most would like to be reborn as Jews.¹²⁷

Similarly, Jews, as Miller has indicated, tend to express a *feeling* of Jewishness. JPR’s surveys of London and Leeds elicited the following data regarding Jewish consciousness:

Level of Jewish consciousness - 2001	% London	% Leeds
<i>Although I was born Jewish I do not think of myself as being Jewish</i>	0.5	0.8
<i>I am aware of my Jewishness but I do not think about it very often</i>	11.3	12.1
<i>I feel quite strongly Jewish but I am equally conscious of other identities</i>	53.6	55.1
<i>I feel extremely conscious of being Jewish and it is very important to me</i>	33.6	30.4
<i>None of these</i>	0.9	1.6

As can be seen, over 85 per cent of Jews in both cities feel quite or extremely conscious of their Jewishness.

These surveys also found that Outlook highlighted the items that secular and religious Jews had in common.¹²⁸ **The items of ‘Unity’ were found to be those that were on the one hand Jewish in nature, but on the other, essentially un-religious.** For example, being a member of a Jewish sports club, reading Jewish newspapers and books, listening to radio programmes with specifically Jewish content, watching TV programmes with specifically Jewish content, taking an interest in and visiting Israel, and finally socialising in Jewish circles.¹²⁹

Similarly, Buckser found that in Denmark, even non-observant Jews expressed considerable concern for, and interest in, the Jewish Community.¹³⁰ The extent to which secular Danish Jews cared about Judaism and Jews was highlighted by reference to an attempt in 1997 by animal rights groups to outlaw *shechita* ritual slaughter. Buckser found that even the most secular Jews ‘followed the controversy closely and expressed serious concerns about its implications.’¹³¹ This tendency to

care about Jews and their welfare, regardless of one's own levels of participation in Jewish practice and communal life is a further common Jewish thread.

There is also a common element of unconscious Jewishness in evidence; a type of unwritten 'Jewish value system' to which most Jewish populations (unconsciously or otherwise) aspire. For example in France, Cohen summarises the following values as being essentially universal in a Jewish sense: honouring one's parents, building a family, studying, and helping others.¹³²

Finally, and indirectly linked to the survey findings, is the idea of a Jewish **globalisation** as suggested by Pinto.¹³³ She argues that there is increasingly a 'Jewish global culture' rapidly developing with a 'transnational globalisation of Jewish life'.¹³⁴ For example pan-European Jewish organisations are setting homogeneous agendas. The Holocaust reparation agenda is similar across all European States. There is a 'collective identity' including such tangibles as Jewish museums, memorials, study programme faculties, publications, and meeting places.

Golbert has carried out a qualitative study of this 'transnationalisation of Jewish identity' amongst Ukrainian Jewish youth. She argues that they are *transnationals* i.e. they have an identity based not just on the local but also on the international. This is in spite of the fact that the majority have never lived abroad or travelled in any significant way.¹³⁵ She observes that since the fall of Communism, local, young, Ukrainian Jewish identities have been transformed by the presence of transnational Jewish institutions (such as the Joint Distribution Committee, the Jewish Agency for Israel (the *Sokhnut*), a global Zionist NGO, and Jewish youth organisations such as *Aish ha-Torah*). These 'actors' have differing social, cultural, religious, ideological and, at times, political agendas which are maintained through institutional and interpersonal relationships.¹³⁶ Mars uses the term 'cultural brokers' to describe international Zionist youth groups, such as *Habonim-Dror* and *Hashomer Hatsair*, which are popular in Budapest.¹³⁷

The Jewish youth of Ukraine, Golbert argues, also exhibit a form of syncretism (an amalgamation of different cultures and identities) specifically related to their experiences abroad, and specifically in Israel. For example, through the 'powerful narratives of returnees' they discuss their experiences in the Israel Defence Force, and in *yeshivot*.¹³⁸ By retelling anecdotes about these experiences they 'compete for the right to claim cultural authority' amongst themselves whether or not they were personally involved.¹³⁹ Golbert says that Ukrainian Jewish youth can now be cosmopolitan without even going abroad.

But the Ukrainian youth also concern themselves with local matters (Ukrainian politics, economics and social affairs) and how they affect Jews living in Ukraine. This produces what Golbert describes as 'double consciousness', a hybrid of identities in which 'the local and the global are inseparable'.¹⁴⁰ This is maintained through a complex institutional and interpersonal web of cross-border relationships and transnational networks, with transnational entities, communities, friends and relatives abroad. In this way the youth are forming their own new and unique, international Jewish identity.

PART 2

TYPOLOGIES OF JEWISH IDENTITY

Typologies, scales and models: the search for a standardised measure

Clearly Jews are tapping into a common set of themes, causes, concerns and ideas that are of value to all. Part 2 of this paper examines the quantitative evidence of Jewish identity and the various ways in which scholars have attempted to describe it as well as reporting some of the results they have found.

In general, researchers have endeavoured to simplify large quantities of complex information by developing typologies. In some cases, they go further and develop scales, indices and models. One thing becomes very clear: there are a great many different approaches to what is basically the same problem – how to describe accurately Jewish identity in Europe today, i.e. describing something that is essentially qualitative, in a quantitative way. The multitude of approaches presented in this section highlights the fact that there does not seem to be an agreement or continuity as to how European Jewish identity should best be measured – in other words there is no *standardisation*. This is in part explained by the new reality of an increasingly complex ethnic makeup among European Jews with ‘half Jews’ and ‘quarter Jews’ forming increasingly larger proportions of the populations. This complexity has contributed to confusion about what comprises the key determinants of European Jewish identity. Indeed, who should be surveyed in the first place?

To help simplify the many typologies that have been developed, I have classified them into five categories, according to the area of Jewish identity with which they deal:

1. Typologies of racial and ethnic origin
2. Scales of religiosity and observance
3. Historical and generational typologies
4. Identity and characterisation typologies
5. Typologies of ties, engagement and process

A) Typologies of Biological and Ethnic Origin

One of the simplest categorisations of Jewish population used in the literature has been to classify people on the basis of ancestry or biological origins. The themes that emerge are well known: there has been an increase in the number of Jews of mixed descent and a parallel increase in the acceptance of patrilineal Jews (father-Jews) as being Jewish. In the Netherlands, Kooyman used the following typology, where more than half the Jews are of mixed ancestry:¹⁴¹

Type of decent	Per cent of Dutch survey sample
Both parents Jewish	47
Only mother Jewish	24
Only father Jewish	29

Kooyman *et al.* 1996

In Hungary, Kovács developed an ‘index of religious and ethnic homogeneity’, based on descent from grandparents.¹⁴² Using this ‘index’ he found that the younger the person the fewer Jewish ancestors they had.¹⁴³

Group name	Definition based on number of Jewish grandparents
Homogeneous	All four grandparents Jewish (72% of the sample)
Partially homogeneous	Three grandparents Jewish
Mixed descent	One or two grandparents Jewish

Kovács 2004

Using this ‘index’ Kovács was able to establish which groups were more likely to ‘abandon traditions’. He found that having a *Homogeneous* background slows down the process of abandonment of tradition or flattens what he calls the ‘assimilation gradient’.¹⁴⁴

In Sweden the typology used by Dencik was a variation on this theme. It was based not on parentage, but on nationality and describes ethnic origin. It is an attempt to measure how Swedish a person is based on the number of relatives that were born in that country.¹⁴⁵

Name of ethnic descent group	Definition	Per cent of sample
Immigrants (non-Swedish)	<i>Either respondent not Swedish born and/or both parents not Swedish born</i>	44
Vikings (pure Swedish)	<i>Respondent and parents of respondent Swedish born</i>	33
Half-Vikings (half Swedish)	<i>One of respondents parents Swedish-born</i>	23

Dencik 2003

In describing the original Jewish immigrants to Denmark in the 1790s, Buckser also uses the term ‘Viking Jews’. Here he is referring to the relatively affluent and well-educated ‘original’ Danish Jewish community, who had come from Germany.¹⁴⁶

These typologies could be applied elsewhere. For instance, as already mentioned, it is known that many ‘Jewish’ immigrants in Germany (mostly of Russian descent) are not halachically Jewish.¹⁴⁷ The reason this matters at all is that people with two Jewish parents are much more likely than those of ‘mixed descent’, to form homogenous relationships themselves. Gitelman has noted this in Russia as well as Ukraine.¹⁴⁸

B) Scales of Religiosity and Observance

The second area in which scholars have attempted to summarise Jewish identity is that of religious practice and commitment. With the development of simple scales measuring, for example, how often certain practices are carried out or the presentation of categories of different levels of religiosity, an indication of how religious a Jewish population sees itself as being, can be gathered. Here I present as many as nine different scales, all of which purport to measure religiosity and observance with various conclusions drawn for each

In 1995, JPR carried out a survey of the social and political attitudes of British Jews and used the following typology of religious practice to analyse group differences.¹⁴⁹ This tool was used again in the UK in the JPR surveys of Leeds (2001) and London and the Southeast (2002) and therefore allows for a certain level of longitudinal analysis.¹⁵⁰

In terms of Jewish religious practice, which of the following best describes your position?	1995 (weighted data) %	London 2002 %	Leeds 2001 %
Non-Practising (i.e. secular) Jew	23	12	7
Just Jewish	20	22	23
Progressive Jew (e.g. Liberal, Reform)	15	16	6
Traditional (not strictly orthodox)	32	41	57
Strictly orthodox (e.g. would not turn on a light on Shabbat)	10	7	6

Miller 1996, Becher *et al.* 2002, Waterman 2003

Using findings from the British 1992 Kalms Report (‘A Time for Change’), a review of the activities of the United Synagogue,¹⁵¹ Miller investigated the relationship between ethnicity (how Jewish you feel), belief and observance. He used the following three-way typology:¹⁵²

Type of observance	Type of Jewish identity
Weak observers	<i>Ethnic identity</i>
Traditional	<i>Ethnic identity</i>
Orthodox	<i>Have dimensions of belief and practice</i>

Miller concluded, contrary to expectations, that there was a stronger connection between a person's observance and their ethnic Jewish identity than between their observance and religious belief, the latter relationship being almost independent.¹⁵³ In other words, if a person said that they *felt* particularly Jewish they were much more likely to carry out Jewish religious obligations than if they said they believed in God. For example, you do not need to go to a synagogue service in order to believe in God.

To find out how religious Swedish respondents considered themselves to be, Dencik used the following typology:

How would you describe your relationship to Jewish religious practice?	Per cent of sample 2003
I am non-observant	9
I am Jewish but just 'in general'	28
I am 'liberal' ('reform'/'conservative')	26
I am 'traditional', but not orthodox	34
I am orthodox	3

Dencik 2003

Several other observance scales have also been used in different European countries. In the Netherlands, van Solinge and de Vries draw similar conclusions to Miller. They note that ties to Judaism have more of a cultural than a religious significance.¹⁵⁴

Type of observance	Per cent of sample
Orthodox	5
Religious	20
Not religious but keep some traditions	17
Not observant at all	57

They produced the following profiles for each observance type:¹⁵⁵

Type of observance	Per cent of sample	Characteristics
Orthodox	6	<i>Jewish partner; involved in and affiliated with the community; most friends are Jewish; observe Sabbath and Jewish holidays</i>
Traditional	9	<i>Mostly have a Jewish partner; mostly affiliated to the community; most friends are Jewish, observe Sabbath and Jewish holidays to a lesser extent than Orthodox</i>
Reform	12	<i>40% one Jewish parent, partner Jewish, religion less prominent in upbringing of children, most friends Jewish, observe Sabbath and Jewish holidays</i>
Non-Religious,	16	<i>40% one Jewish parent, 50%+ Jewish partner, 60% unaffiliated to community, 'Most have Jewish circle of friends', average or strong commitment to the community, 'most celebrate Jewish holidays'</i>
Non-practising	57	<i>Non-Jewish partner, not affiliated, not really involved or committed to community, and few Jewish friends</i>

van Solinge de Vries 2001

A separate Dutch study surveyed the substantial Israeli population living in the Netherlands, and used a different observance scale based on the secular to religious spectrum with the following results:¹⁵⁶

Religious self-definition of the Israelis	Per cent of sample
Secular	70
Traditional	26
Religious	4

In Hungary, Kovács also used an observance scale which he has called a ‘Model of observance of intensity’. Using this model of identity and the bi-generational breakdown, Kovács developed a typology of strategies for the acceptance/rejection of ‘tradition’ by Hungarian Jews.¹⁵⁷

Type of ‘Observance Intensity’	Salience of ‘identity factors’*
Strong	<i>Both positive and negative factors strongly salient in person’s identity</i>
Traditional	<i>Positive and ‘traditional’ factors salient</i>
Moderate	<i>Both positive and negative factors weakly salient</i>
Aggrieved	<i>Only negative identity factors salient</i>
Assimilated	<i>No salient identity factors</i>

* Positive factors like tradition, religion, historical memory, negative like antisemitism.

A religiosity scale was used in Israel in 2000 by Levy *et al.* and comparisons have been made with a similar survey carried out in Israel almost a decade earlier:¹⁵⁸

Religious self-definition scale Israeli responses	Per cent of sample (1999)	Percentage difference from 1991
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	5	+ 2
Religious	12	--
Traditional	35	- 7
Non-religious	43	+ 5
Anti-religious	5	--

Observance was also analysed in the Israeli study with respondents being asked whether they ‘observe the religious tradition’. This produced the following results:¹⁵⁹

Self-defined religious observance	% 1999 ¹⁶⁰	Per cent of sample 2001
Strictly observe	16	14
Observe to a great extent	20	24
Observe Somewhat	43	41
Totally non-observant	21	21

The conclusion Levy draws is that there are patterns of ‘selective observance’.¹⁶¹ They also applied the following Guttman Scale of Religious Identity to classify religious identity.¹⁶²

Identity type	Sub categories	Israeli responses % 1999
Anti-religious	<i>Totally non-observant</i>	4
Non-religious	<i>Totally non-observant</i>	18
	<i>Somewhat observant</i>	29
Traditional	<i>Somewhat observant</i>	17
	<i>Observant to a great extent</i>	16
Religious	<i>Observant to a great extent</i>	4
	<i>Strictly observant</i>	7
Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi)	-	5

Levy *et al.* 2000

An interesting finding here is that 29 per cent of respondents said that they were Somewhat observant even though they had also classified themselves as Non-religious. This finding is similar to Miller’s, as noted above.

C) Historical and Generational Typologies

A third type of identity typology that regularly emerges in the literature relates to the impact of historical events on identity of Jewish people. Historians tend to emphasise the importance of the past in shaping the present and in many cases have tried to summarise the identity-shaping events in phases, periods, moments etc. Pinto also divides history into three key segments or ‘phases’, she says impact upon Jewish identity. She applies this to all of Europe:¹⁶³

Three phases affecting Jewish identity	Characteristics
Post war WWII politics	<i>Israel, Communism, Holocaust legacy</i>
The Jewish decade	<i>The 1990s with a coming to the fore of a ‘Jewish historical consciousness’ and general acceptance of Jews by Europeans, increased ethnic Jewish identity</i>
Globalisation	<i>Transnational globalisation of Jewish life – pan-European organisations develop, Holocaust commemoration, decreased focus on Israel as uniting factor, world wide religious Jewish movements</i>

Pinto also cites four ‘crucial events’ or ‘watersheds’ which have shaped the post-1989 sea change in Europe: the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Oslo Accords, the Vatican’s openness to Israel and 50th anniversary of the Holocaust.¹⁶⁴ Her suggestion is that these events have, and will continue to shape European Jewish identity.

The following set of typologies are country specific. In Poland, Rosenson concludes that identity is affected by the era in which a person grew up. She concludes therefore that the ‘young operate in a different market to the older groups.’¹⁶⁵ According to Rosenson, the three key identity-shaping eras for Poles were:

Era grown up in	Attributes of Era - Poland
First	Holocaust generation
Second	1968 antisemitism riots (in Poland)
Third	Post-communist era

The history of Hungary has also had a significant effect on the identity of that country’s Jewish population. Kovács has identified four groups based on when they were born. This basic supposition is that the generation in which you were born has a great influence on Jewish identity ‘strategies’.¹⁶⁶

Significant Hungarian events. Those who were adults during:	Date of Birth	Age in 1999
The Holocaust	Pre 1930	Over 70
The Stalin period	1930-1944	55-69
Consolidated Communism	1945-1965	35-54
Communism’s collapse	Post 1965	18-34

Meanwhile, Mars suggests the following different Hungarian historical typology including four separate periods each of which affected general societal attitudes towards the Hungarian Jewish community:¹⁶⁷

Period	Dates	Societal attitude towards the Jews
Habsburg	1867-1919	Jews as a religion – inclusion
Horthy/Nazi	1920-1945	Jews as aliens – exclusion
Communist	1945-1989	Suppression and isolation
Post-communist	1990- present	Jewish diversity – choice

Azria suggests that the history of the Jews of France can also be divided into what she calls three distinct periods or ‘moments’. In each ‘moment’ the identity of the French Jewish population was shaped by ambient politics (such as the policy of *laïcité*) and external events (such as the creation of the State of Israel):¹⁶⁸

Moment / Period	Characteristics of period ¹⁶⁹
Pre-modern	<i>Separatism and confinement, Jews had to live with other Jews, rigid boundaries</i>
Enlightenment and emancipation	<i>Invitation for Jews to join civil society – in the late 1960’s the concept of laïc. Church-State separation</i>
Disenchantment	<i>Six Day War, end of Communism, globalisation, individualism, secularism. Consistoire lost its monopoly, immigrants from North Africa. Increased exogamous marriage. Rapid ‘hollowing out’ of Jewish identity. There is a renewal of interest in ‘things Jewish’ in parallel with continued integration</i>

Also in Western Europe, Brasz suggests that there are two distinguishable postwar periods in contemporary Dutch history. The first of these she labels ‘postwar history’ referring to the immediate postwar period of reconstruction in Holland and the establishment of the State of Israel. The second she labels ‘contemporary Jewish history’ which refers to the 1960s, 70s, and 80s.¹⁷⁰ The period between these, at the end of the 1950s and early 1960s, was a time of crisis for the Dutch Jewish community. Those that had survived the Holocaust tended to be highly assimilated and Dutch Jewry has had to struggle for its survival over the past 55 years.¹⁷¹

D) Identity and Characterisation Typologies

The next set of typologies has been developed in order to assess or ‘characterise’ Jewish identity itself. This has been attempted in a variety of ways either by use of a tool (such as Outlook) or by analysing commonalities within different Jewish groups in each country. Both Miller (using factor analysis) and Cohen have taken this latter approach.

In Ukraine, Gitelman uses the following simple typology of identity to emphasise how Jews see themselves. In this context ‘Jewish’ is being used as a national label and is sometimes referred to as hyphenation (as in Irish-American):¹⁷²

Self-identity of Ukrainian Jews	Per cent of sample
Russian Jewish	24
Ukrainian Jewish	19
Jewish (only)	29

Golbert has also noted the potential for complex and mixed notions of identity containing, as she found in her analysis of the discourse of Jewish Ukrainian youth, elements of Jewishness, Ukrainianness, Russianness, Sovietness, and Israeliness. Not only were these identities all interwoven, but they were also simultaneously based on a local and transnational perspective.¹⁷³ Shapiro concludes that there has been ‘an intensive erosion of Jewish ethnicity in Ukraine’.¹⁷⁴ He notes that Judaism and its related religious values do not play a significant role in the formation of contemporary ethnic identity for most Jews in Ukraine, and presents the following ‘components’ of Jewish identity:¹⁷⁵

Core Jewish identity typology
Historic memory of the people
A feeling of ethnic dignity
Ethnic consolidation in the face of contemporary problems
Exploration of national cultural heritage

In Poland, Gudonis took a different approach. He used qualitative data to develop a ‘four-dimensional conceptual framework’ of Jewish identity:¹⁷⁶

Dimension of identity	Description of dimension
Communal	<i>Setting boundaries by formal membership</i>
Cultural	<i>Group knowledge and memory</i>
Ethical	<i>Shared value system</i>
Emotional	<i>Sense feeling of belongingness</i>

The JPR surveys of London and Leeds used the concept of Outlook to describe the identity of respondents, with the following results:^{177, 178}

Outlook type	Per cent of London sample	Per cent of Leeds sample
Secular	25	20
Somewhat secular	33	27
Somewhat religious	34	44
Religious	9	9

Outlook is a way of measuring Jewishness. It attempts to quantify and measure what is a notoriously enigmatic, qualitative concept – identity. It allows people to say how they see themselves as Jews, divorced from the chains of their actual beliefs, sense of belonging and behaviours. By using Outlook, it is possible to not only illuminate the complexity of being Jewish by also make direct comparisons between different Jewish communities. For example, this tool shows that the Outlook of Leeds Jews is more religious than that of London Jews. But Outlook also shows that people who see themselves as Secular nevertheless carried out essentially religious ritual practices.¹⁷⁹

Also in Britain, Miller used factor analysis to create a model of Jewish identity.^{180, 181} His analysis uses an arbitrary division of respondents by age – those 50 and over and those under 50.

For the older generation of British Jews, those over 50, Miller’s identity model shows four main dimensions of Jewish identity (note the ethnicity dimension has two aspects to it):

Factor/Dimension of Jewish identity		Description of dimension
Practice		<i>Degree of involvement in simple rituals and synagogue life (lights, attending synagogue)</i>
Religiosity/ Belief		<i>Degree of faith/belief in God and observances of more demanding rituals</i>
Ethnicity	a) Social/ Behavioural ethnicity	<i>Strength of belonging/affiliations expressed via social behaviour and attitudes (social involvement)</i>
	b) Mental ethnicity	<i>Strength of belonging expressed as personal Jewish feelings</i>

Simple rituals form a factor Miller calls *Practice*. More time-consuming / demanding rituals and practices (based on the survey questionnaire) load onto a single factor that he calls *Religiosity*. For the factor he terms *Ethnicity*, Miller finds a division between *Behavioural ethnicity*, describing the extent of involvement of individuals, and *Mental ethnicity* expressed as an inner feeling of Jewishness. The idea of mental ethnicity has been addressed by Liebman who suggests that it emphasises how one *feels* about being Jewish rather than what one *does* in terms of Jewish participation and practice. Liebman concludes that in terms of transmitting Jewish identity from one generation to the next, mental ethnicity leads to assimilation since feeling Jewish is not as communicable, generation to generation, as copying religious practices.¹⁸²

The identity model for Miller's younger group, those under 50, was similar but not identical. However here there are three, not four, dimensions:

Factor/Dimension of Jewish identity	Description of the dimension
Religiosity	<i>Degree of faith/belief in God and observance of demanding rituals</i>
Behavioural ethnicity	<i>Strength of involvement expressed through social and synagogal activity/affiliation and the performance of 'light' rituals</i>
Mental ethnicity	<i>Feeling Jewish inside Strength of belonging as personal Jewish feelings</i>

An interesting question arises. Are the data showing that the differences between the older and younger groups are due to lifecycle shifts in identity (meaning that the younger group would presumably acquire the identity of the older group in due course) or that the British Jewish population is experiencing a 'modernisation of identity' whereby a more permanent shift in Jewish identity has been acquired?

Although the behavioural ethnicity (i.e. the extent of parental investment, which includes biographical factors such as what was experienced Jewishly during upbringing) is a key transmission determinant, it does not explain the whole identity picture: the simple example of differences that exist in the Jewish identity of siblings suggests upbringing alone cannot explain identity in later life. Consequently, Miller argues that we need a better understanding of 'subtle family characteristics' to gain a better understanding of the main underlying dimensions to Jewish identity.¹⁸³ Further, I would suggest that this requires a more coordinated approach to research in this area.

In the Netherlands, Brasz notes the following typology to describe Jewish identity and the proportion of the Jewish population that subscribes to each:¹⁸⁴

Type of Jewish identity	Per cent of Dutch Jews
I am Jewish	54
I have a Jewish background	35
I am Jewish depending on the situation	8
I do not consider myself to be Jewish	3


As Brasz notes during the 1980s Dutch Jews became more confident and more 'visible'. Various social and cultural groups, which include many 'half-Jews' or people who define themselves as 'having a Jewish background', have grown existence outside the 'traditional' Jewish community. These secular networks form an extended community and this has replaced the old structures. They want a wide, pluralistic umbrella organisation within which 'everybody' can more or less identify.¹⁸⁵

Taking a completely different approach, Azria has created the following five-point 'typology of Jewish involvement' to help in the assessment of contemporary French Jewish identities.¹⁸⁶ She divides the community into different groups or 'types' depending on how she sees their connection.

Group name	Characteristics of the identity of people within the French group ¹⁸⁷
The Professionals	<i>Communal workers</i>
The Faithful	<i>The religiously attached</i>
Volunteers or Militants	<i>'Militancy' involved because of a deep concern for Jews and Judaism</i>
Consumers	<i>Those that take occasional interest in order to consume e.g. to have a Jewish burial.</i>
Seekers	<i>Disenchanted soul-searchers looking for a Jewish experience</i>

Azria 2003

Cohen has developed a second French identity typology.¹⁸⁸ He suggests that there are four identity 'profiles' within French Jewry; Individualists, Universalists, Traditionalists and Revivalists.¹⁸⁹ Further, Cohen highlights the key differences between these four identity groups by plotting their 'positions' on an 'axiological' grid. This grid has two axes, one denoting 'Political' characteristics (how altruistic/selfish a person is) and the other denoting 'Social' characteristics (how individualistic/authoritarian a person is), as shown in the diagram:¹⁹⁰



Cohen describes how the four profiles (or 'constructs') line up along the two axes providing an indication of the 'character' of group members. It should be noted that no profile lies close to the Altruism pole in the diagram because this trait is not the most significant in any of the four types. The following tables summarises some of the key attributes found by Cohen in the French study of the four Jewish identity profiles.¹⁹¹

French Attributes	Les Individualistes (The Individualists - 22%)	Les Universalistes (The Universalists - 24%)
Characteristics / personalities	Selfish, pleasure seekers	Autonomous
Pastimes	Holidays, play sport, look after appearance	Fun with friends
Religion	41% non-practising 40% traditionalists	59% non-practising
Jewish school	-	Against Jewish schools
Community closeness	47% 'far periphery'	57% 'far periphery'
Ashkenazi/Sephardi	34% Ashkenazi	-
Family	Few children	Very few children
Marriage	-	22% never married (highest)
Jewish friends	Some	Very few
Age	50 and above	40-49
Temperament / outlook	Not anxious, nervous or worried	Not at all anxious
Incomes	Good / reasonable (second highest)	Very good (highest)
Politics	42% left wing	47% left wing
Education	Second best	Highest (49% Bac+4)
Charity	Least likely to donate to Jewish charities	Most likely to donate to non-Jewish charities
Israel (closeness)	Far	Far
Land for peace?	Yes	Definitely Yes

French Attributes	Les Traditionalistes – The Traditionalists (31%)	Les Revivalistes – The Revivalists (23%)
Characteristics/ personalities	Value authority, belief in God, importance of family, honour parents	Belief in God, importance of family, honour parents
Pastimes	-	Fun with friends
Religion	64% Traditional, 10% Orthodox	70% Traditional
Jewish school	In favour	In favour
Community closeness	41% close	45% close
Ashkenazi/Sephardi	80% Sephardi	80% Sephardi
Family	Many children	Quite a few children
Marriage	65% married (highest)	-
Jewish friends	Mostly Jewish friends	Mostly Jewish friends
Age	50 and above	29-39
Temperament outlook	Fairly nervous and worried	Very nervous and worried
Incomes	Weak (second lowest)	Lowest
Politics	46% left wing	18% right wing (highest proportion)
Education	Least educated (44% less than BAC)	Second worst
Charity	Prioritise Jewish charities at expense of non-Jewish charities	Most likely to donate to Jewish charities
Israel (closeness)	Quite close	Very closest (most interested in aliyah)
Land for peace?	Possibly Yes	No

E) Typologies of Ties, Engagement and Process

The final set of measures relate to two aspects of identity. First, some scholars have produced typologies, which attempt to show how closely people are bound to Jewish communities. Second, attempts have been made to characterise the ever changing/developing nature of Jewish identity itself, i.e. its fluidity.

In the Netherlands, Van Solinge and de Vries have investigated the idea that people can be tied to a Jewish community in different ways and to different extents. They used factor analysis to reveal two significant and one less significant dimension of Dutch Jewish ties.¹⁹² The main point is that some people feel a connection in a positive way (such as having many Jewish friends) whilst others feel connected in a negative way (essentially antisemitism labels them as Jewish):

Dimensions/ Factors	Traits of dimension	Main influenced
Factor 1 - Positive ties (18% of variance explained)	More socio- cultural than religious	<i>Number of Jewish parents, whether father and/or mother Jewish, extent of Jewish education, whether Jewish partner, age, location of residence, youth groups, socialisation, affiliated or not...</i>
Factor 2 - Negative ties (18% of variance explained)	WWII and antisemitism	<i>This produces a feeling of Jewishness in the less attached population.</i>

They found that these ‘ties’ are deeply influenced by having a Jewish partner, which in turn relates to being raised with Jewish traditions and having two Jewish parents.¹⁹³

Also in the Netherlands, Kooyman *et al.* looked at levels of attachment of Israelis living there to Judaism and to Israel itself.¹⁹⁴ They did this by quantifying attachment based on a scale from 0-6 where 0 suggests low levels of attachment. They noted that for these Israelis in Holland, there was high interaction between them and the ambient Dutch population, but 50 per cent of the Israelis said that they had no contact with the Dutch Jewish population.¹⁹⁵ In terms of their attachment to Israel only 14 per cent were seriously expecting to return there.

A different approach to measuring ties to community was taken by Goldberg in her analysis of the results to a question in JPR’s 1995 survey asking about the proportions of Jewish friends a person had. The results were as follows:¹⁹⁶

How many of your friends are Jewish?	Per cent of (weighted) sample
All or nearly all	41
More than half	17
About half	13
Less than half	12
None or very few	17

With this data, Goldberg derived three levels or ‘types’ of closeness based on the proportion of friends reported to be Jewish by the respondent. These are ‘social network groups’. The higher the proportion, the ‘closer’ that respondent was deemed to be to the community:¹⁹⁷

Closeness label	Group comprising:	Per cent of sub-sample
Close group	All or nearly all, More than half	38
Halfway group	About half, Less than half	31
Distant group	None or very few	32

This typology enabled Goldberg to examine differences between the different groups; an attempt to measure the ‘tight-knittedness’ of a community. She found for example, that the ‘close group’ were more at ease in the company of strictly orthodox Jews. She was also able to show that there was a ‘strong age divide... those over the age of 60 were more likely than other [younger] age groups to have closer Jewish social circles’.¹⁹⁸

Apart from ties and general indicators of connectedness, another way to analyse a Jewish populations’ attachment is to look at the extent to which different groups have accepted or rejected a Jewish identity. This has been done in Hungary by Kovács who derived a set of strategies which define the acceptance / rejection of what he terms ‘tradition’. He says that there are six identity strategy ‘types’ ranging from total rejectionists to those who wholeheartedly embrace ‘Tradition’.¹⁹⁹

Type of identity strategy (per cent of sample)	Attributes (based on above Model of intensity observance, ²⁰⁰ see above)
No tradition (18%)	<i>Young are 'Assimilated'; Old are 'Aggrieved' or 'Moderate'</i> <i>No tradition during upbringing, and complete absence of tradition in current family.</i> <i>Tend to be well educated, higher socio-economic groups, Socialist Party members, mobile</i>
Abandonment of tradition (28%)	<i>Young are 'Assimilated'; Old are 'Aggrieved' or 'Moderate'</i> <i>Parents observed traditions but their children do not. Generally older ages.</i> <i>Parents poorly educated, poorer, many Jewish friends but in favour of mixed marriage</i>
Secularising (15%)	<i>Old are 'Traditional'</i> <i>Breaking away from tradition gradually.</i> <i>Three quarters of group are older and differ from the younger people in the group</i> <i>Tend to live in Jewish environments, strong identity</i>
Tradition as a symbol (15%)	<i>Old are 'Traditional'</i> <i>Symbolic tradition preservation. (First stage of secularisation)</i> <i>Two-thirds of this group are younger generations.</i> <i>Traditions were much more alive among the parental generation.</i>
Reverting to tradition (13%)	<i>Tradition is stronger in the current family than in the parental family.</i> <i>Four in five are young. Live in Budapest and experienced the collapse of communism. They are not religious but do more than their parents.</i> <i>They oppose assimilation and strongly identify with Israel.</i>
Preserving traditions (11%)	<i>Both old and young groups exhibit 'Traditional' and 'Strong' intensities.</i> <i>In the parental home and the current home traditions were observed.</i> <i>Split 50:50 young and old, low social status</i>

The people within these identity groups are not homogeneous in terms of age, education etc. so Kovács suggests that the employment (*acceptance* or *rejection*) of these 'identity strategies' depends on three factors: age, 'mobility within the family', and strength of Jewish tradition at the time of generational changes.²⁰¹

Horowitz has taken a different approach, in an attempt to describe the fluid nature of Jewish identity. Using data derived from the US, she has derived three modes or ‘patterns’ of Jewish identity.²⁰² These range from the ‘unengaged’ through to ‘mixed patterns’ (what Miller would categorise as mental ethnicity) to the ‘intensively engaged’:²⁰³

‘Mode of Jewishness’	Produces seven distinct ‘patterns of Jewish engagement’
Steady or low involvement Indifferent to their Jewish identity, ‘my background is Jewish’ Assimilated otherwise engaged (34%)	<i>Really indifferent (the youngest)</i>
	<i>Some ‘modicum’ of interest</i>
Being Jewish matters but only when it fits into their lifestyle Mixed patterns of engagement (33%)	<i>Strong subjective involvement/ engagement. Feel proud but no practice (7%)</i>
	<i>Strong cultural communal involvement (14%) Not so religious, wealthy</i>
	<i>Tradition oriented (18%)</i>
Intensively engaged More Jewish than American, ‘see the world through “Jewish eyes”’)’ Intensive Jewish engagement (34%)	<i>Orthodox</i>
	<i>Non-orthodox</i>

Horowitz develops this analysis to suggest that there are five types of ‘journeys’ or patterns of identity change that a person may experience during their lifetime; two stable, three dynamic. This idea assumes that identity is dynamic and fluid, that sometimes one closely identifies with being Jewish and at others one feels distant.²⁰⁴

Type of dynamic	Pattern of change
Stable patterns (40%)	Steady low Non-engagement with Jewishness
	Steady high Intense engagement
Dynamic patterns (Those that change over a lifetime)	Lapsing Moving away
	Increasing Moving closer, increasing intensity of Jewish involvement
	Interior (33%) Subjective commitment intensifies whilst practice remains low or decreases

In conclusion, Part 2 categorises the research findings in the following way. This structure is a good starting point for the skeleton of future research work.

First, we use typologies of ethnic origin in an attempt to categorise people based on descent – i.e. what they inherited. Second, we need to understand where they grew up, the households they lived in and what political climate was experienced nationally; basically what is the impact of history? Third, we need to categorise levels of religiosity and observance. What do people believe and where do they stand religiously? Linked to this is the way in which they are connected to the community, how immersed they are within its structures. Finally, we need to define their Jewish identity. Is it nationalistic, emotional, religious etc? This is the most challenging area for researchers.

Concluding remarks

By gathering together key findings from several European studies on Jewish identity, this paper has discussed the key themes, which have emerged (Part 1) and presented a summary of the various typologies that scholars produced whilst attempting to summarise their findings (Part 2).

I concluded that the Jewish ‘revival’ witnessed in most of the study areas is somewhat illusory and can generally be explained not as a resurgence of Jewish religiosity, but as a spin-off of people attaching new meanings to old practices. In short, people are redefining their Jewish identity. Understanding the differences observed between Jewish populations from state to state is helped by using the concept of ‘ambiance’, whereby the surrounding environment impacts upon the identity of minority groups within that environment. With the increasing trend towards secularisation in Europe in general, it is therefore unsurprising that Jewish populations are also secularising. Finally, in Part 1, I took a closer look at what commonalities or *threads* existed between the various Jewish populations studied, to tentatively conclude that a sort of globalisation of Jewish identity is developing, connecting Jews not only across Europe but also throughout the world.

In Part 2 I looked at the varied ways in which Jewish identity has been summarised. What emerges is a very large and diverse set of analytical typologies each investigating Jewish identity in slightly different ways. Demographers, sociologists and historians have each developed their own ways of analysing and summarising Jewish identity. This has produced a bewildering number of approaches with which to measure essentially the same thing, i.e. the key determinants of European Jewish identity. A useful analogy is perhaps the Tower of Babel: with so many different ‘languages’ spoken, it becomes almost impossible to draw up useful comparative conclusions. The following proposals are recommended to aid future research work on European Jewish Identity.

Proposals

To further improve our understanding of European Jewry as a coherent whole, the following steps are recommended. First, there is a need to **standardise measures** of Jewish identity. Just as all items measured in kilograms can be accurately compared with each other, so too can Jewish populations residing in different European countries. But this is only possible if common questions are asked in each survey and standard measures are used; the proverbial ‘Jewish kilo’. What this amounts to is a matter for discussion and debate but the Secular-Religious Outlook scale is a useful starting point. Ultimately, this ‘Jewish kilo’ may consist of universally accepted questions and questionnaire structures that would be inserted into all future, large-scale Jewish surveys as suggested in the conclusion to Part 2.

The second step is to conceive, plan and execute a **pan-European survey**. This does not mean there should be a single, Europe-wide, blanket sample survey. Rather, the intention would be to identify between five and eight European cities containing significant numbers of Jews and carry out parallel surveys in them.

The third proposal stresses the value of, and the need for, **Census information**. One of the most important, yet little publicised, problems facing the European Jewish population is its demographic age structure and profile. With a rapidly ageing population, understanding the age composition and key demographic indicators (such as birth and marriage rates) will be crucial for any future planning. It is necessary for a serious study to take place that analyses the census data already available in various European countries but which also calls upon those countries to lobby for the inclusion of questions on religion in national Censuses to aid their planning of social and educational services.

The benefit is highlighted by the abundance of information that is now available in the UK on the Jewish population living there. It represents an unparalleled opportunity to view a large, European Jewish population. This information could only have been obtained through a national Census. Table 3 summarises the current picture of available data in different European nations.

Table 3 - Censuses and Surveys carried out by country

Country	Census C (Register = permanent national population reg)	Jewish Community Central Register R, Vital statistics V	Jewish Population Surveys	EU Status	Capital city/Main Jewish concentration http://www.what-is-the-capital-of.com/europe-capitals.html	Size of largest concentration Jewish Year Book UK 2002	GDP/capita in PPP 2002 (EU=100) source Eurostat	Communism?	Data Gathering organisations
Albania					Tirane			Yes	
Austria	C	R, V		EU member	Vienna	1,000	110.3		
Azerbaijan	1999			Asia	Baku			Yes	
Belarus	1999			Neither EU member nor candidate - Baltic	Minsk	45,000			
Belgium				EU member	Brussels/(Antwerp)	23,000	108.2		
Bosnia-Herzegovina				Neither EU member nor candidate	Sarajevo	1,090			
Bulgaria	1992			EU candidate	Sofia	3,200	25.4	Yes	
Croatia	2001	R		Neither EU member nor candidate	Zagreb	1,500			
Czech Republic	1991	R		EU candidate	Prague	1,400	59.2	Yes	
Denmark		R, V	1968, 2000	EU member	Copenhagen	8,500	114.0		Mosaiske Troessamfund (Office of the Jewish Community)
Estonia	Register			EU candidate - Baltic	Tallinn	-	41.4	Yes	
Finland	1970 Register			EU member	Helsinki	1,200	103.5		
France (+Monaco)		V	1972-78, 1988, Cohen 2002	EU member	Paris (Greater)	350,000	102.9		Fonds social juif unifié (FSJU); Conseil Représentatif des Institutions Juives en France (CRIF)
Georgia				Asia	Tbilisi			Yes	
Germany	C	R, V		EU member	Berlin	10,000	102.7	East Germany	Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in Deutschland (ZWST)
Greece		R, V		EU member	Athens	2,800	66.0		
Hungary			1999, (Kovacs 2003)	EU candidate	Budapest	40,000	55.1	Yes	
Iceland, *Malta				EU candidate	Reykjavik	-	110.1 Ice		
Ireland	1991, 2002			EU member	Dublin	1,300	124.5		
Israel	1995, Register		2000 Levy et al	Neither EU member nor candidate	(Jerusalem)/Tel Aviv	308,700			
Italy		R, V	1965, 1988 Milano, 1995 Roma	EU member	Rome	15,000	102.5		
Kazakhstan	1999			Asia	Astana (formerly Almaty)			Yes	
Kyrgyzstan	1999			Asia	Bishtek			Yes	
Latvia	2000, Register			EU candidate - Baltic	Riga	15,000	34.6	Yes	
Lithuania	Register		1993	EU candidate - Baltic	Vilnius	4,500	38.4	Yes	
Luxembourg				EU member	Luxembourg		189.3		
Macedonia	1994			Neither EU member nor candidate	Skopje				
Malta				EU candidate	Valletta				
Moldova	C		2000 (Korazim et al)	Neither EU member nor candidate	Chisinau	50,000		Yes	
Netherlands	1809-1930	R, V	1954, 1966, 1996 - Israelis, 2000 - Kooyman	EU member	Amsterdam (The Hague)	15,000 / 2,500	112.7		Stichting Joods Maatschappelijk Werk (JMW the Dutch Jewish Social Services); Joodse Coördinatie Commissie (JCC)
Norway	C, Register	V		Neither EU member nor candidate	Oslo	900	141.4		
Poland		R, V		EU candidate	Warsaw	2,000	38.7	Yes	ZGWZ Union of the Mosaic faith
Portugal		R, V		EU member	Lisbon	300	68.8		
Romania	1992	R, V		EU candidate	Bucharest	11,000	24.4	Yes	
Russia	1994, 2002 (All-Soviet 1989)			Neither EU member nor candidate	Moscow	200,000		Yes	
Serbia & Montenegro		R	1971, 1986	Neither EU member nor candidate	Belgrade	1,600			
Slovakia		R		EU candidate	Bratislava	-	47.8	Yes	
Slovenia		R		EU candidate	Ljubljana	-	72.6		
Spain (+Gibraltar)				EU member	Madrid	3,500	84.3		
Sweden		R, V	2000 Dencik	EU member	Stockholm	9,500	102.3		
Switzerland	1990, 2000?, Register	R, V		Neither EU member nor candidate	Bern				
Turkey (+Asian regions)		R, V		EU candidate	Ankara / Istanbul		22.5		
Ukraine	1989, 2001		2000? Cherwayakov et al	Neither EU member nor candidate	Kiev	50,000		Yes	
United Kingdom	2001 optional	V	1995 Miller et al, 2001 London, 2002 Leeds	EU member	London		102.7		JPR, Board of Deputies
Uzbekistan				Asia	Tashkent	50,000		Yes	

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The following bibliography is a comprehensive survey of literature available on European Jewish Demography. Many titles included here are not discussed in the accompanying report but neither is this an exhaustive list and the entries for Israel and the USA are particularly thin. However it is hope that as summary it will be a useful starting point.

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Endnotes

¹ Webber 1994 p6

² Konrád 1998 in Mars 2001 p235

³ Pinto 1996 p9

⁴ In Catholicism you are Catholic only if you were baptised. In Judaism, tradition dictates that you are Jewish only through matrilineal descent, i.e. your mother's mother was Jewish or through approved conversion. But the reality of contemporary European Jewry muddies the waters with complex ethnic structures containing self-identifying 'half-Jews' and so on, that would not be regarded as Jewish under this definition. The reality of the existence of large numbers of such groups with European Jewry makes this definition at the very least, unhelpful.

⁵ Kosmin 2002 p48

⁶ Pinto 1996 p6

⁷ Bensimon 2003 p21

⁸ Rosenson 2003 p268-9. Here, Rosenson is referring to the influence that outside groups (including Jews from other countries) have on 'the evolution of ethnic identity' with a specific reference to Poland. In this paper the meaning of the term is widened to incorporate the influence of history, economics and societal norms of individual nation states.

⁹ Mars 2000 p85

¹⁰ Kovács 2004

¹¹ Brasz 2001 p150. During the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands 105,000 out of 140,000 registered 'full' Jews were murdered.

¹² Buckser 2000 p731

¹³ Pinto, 1996 p14

¹⁴ Pinto uses the term 'voluntary Jews' to describe this freedom and notes that 'a significant proportion of Jews has chosen not to disappear in [this] free society...'. *Ibid.* p5-6

¹⁵ Anthony Giddens is quoted several times in the theoretical literature regarding modernity and identity with many commentators relating his work to the case of European Jewry. See for example Giddens A 1991 *Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age*, Cambridge: Polity

¹⁶ This report does not claim that these are the only important themes relating to the development of contemporary European Jewish identity. Given the complexity of the subject this would be absurd. However, they are the most salient to have emerged from the most recent research work.

¹⁷ Graham and Waterman 2004 forthcoming

¹⁸ Brasz 2001 p156

¹⁹ Miller 2003 p47

²⁰ *ibid.* p50

²¹ Liebman 2003b p298 With specific reference to the United States.

²² Liebman 2003a p344

²³ Dencik 2003b p97 and p99

²⁴ Dencik 2003a p33

²⁵ Dencik 2003b p89

²⁶ Cohen, 2002 Based on a sample of 1,132 Jewish household heads. The survey was carried out in January 2002.

²⁷ It is not necessarily the case that this particular phenomenon is in fact so new. However historical social data of this nature are rare.

²⁸ Kooyman quoting from van Solinge and de Vries, from a translation by Mitzman L., 2002 JMW unpublished notes, no page numbers

²⁹ *ibid.*

³⁰ Brasz 2001 p163

³¹ Bensimon 2003 p31

³² Buckser 2000 p715

³³ *ibid.* p729

³⁴ Kovács 2004 forthcoming. Data based on survey findings from of 2,015 individual interviews carried out by the Institute for Minority Research at the Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest

³⁵ Kovács (forthcoming) May 2004

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ *ibid.*

³⁸ Mars 2000 p93

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- ³⁹ Mars 2001 p235
- ⁴⁰ Mars 2000 p89
- ⁴¹ Mars 2001 p234
- ⁴² Mars 2000 p89
- ⁴³ Gitelman 2003 p121
- ⁴⁴ *ibid.* p128
- ⁴⁵ Golbert 2001 p716
- ⁴⁶ Korazim and Katz, Patterns of Jewish identity in the Jewish community of Moldova: the behavioural dimension, in Gitelman *et al.* This survey was carried out in 1999.
- ⁴⁷ Korazim and Katz 2003 p166
- ⁴⁸ *ibid.* p168
- ⁴⁹ *ibid.* p169
- ⁵⁰ *ibid.* p171
- ⁵¹ Wasserstein 1996
- ⁵² Liebman 2003 p298
- ⁵³ Quoted in Brasz 2001 p151
- ⁵⁴ Webber 1994 p22
- ⁵⁵ Dencik 2003a p54
- ⁵⁶ Stein H and Hill R F 1977 *The ethnic imperative: Examining the New White Ethnic Movement*, University Park, PA Pennsylvania State University Press, in Buckser 2000 p715
- ⁵⁷ Lazar *et al* p518
- ⁵⁸ It is not clear whether Rosenson invented the term ‘ambiance’ or whether it has been used in a similar context elsewhere. This notwithstanding, its usage here somewhat redefines the meaning Rosenson herself gives to it as already discussed in the Introduction to this report.
- ⁵⁹ Rosenson 2003 p269
- ⁶⁰ It is interesting to note that the impact of the ambient culture can actually work in the opposite direction where the ambient society itself embraces Jewish cultural practices. In their study of European Jewish culture, Schishca and Berenstein note how the high incidence of European Jewish cultural festivals that they recorded having taken place in Italy, Belgium, Poland and Sweden would not only attract significant numbers of non-Jewish audiences but in some cases even the performers were themselves non-Jewish. See Schishca and Berenstein 2002 p10 and p26
- ⁶¹ Liebman 2003 p343
- ⁶² Gitelman 2003 p239
- ⁶³ A report on the Jewish communities of Norway and Finland will be available, in English, in the spring of 2004. This will also include comparative data from Sweden. Dencik: personal communication.
- ⁶⁴ Dencik 2003b p89
- ⁶⁵ *ibid.* p81
- ⁶⁶ *ibid.* p81
- ⁶⁷ Giddens A 1990 *The consequences of Modernity* Cambridge: Polity Press cited by Dencik 2003 p77
- ⁶⁸ Dencik 2003b p79
- ⁶⁹ *ibid.* p88 and p89
- ⁷⁰ *ibid.* p95
- ⁷¹ Dencik and Marosi quoted in Schischa and Berenstein 2003 p16
- ⁷² Buckser p719
- ⁷³ *ibid.* p720
- ⁷⁴ *ibid.* p720
- ⁷⁵ *ibid.* p721
- ⁷⁶ *ibid.* p725
- ⁷⁷ *ibid.* p730
- ⁷⁸ Kosmin 2003 p28 and p43
- ⁷⁹ *ibid* p43
- ⁸⁰ Graham 2003 p5
- ⁸¹ Miller 2003 p58
- ⁸² General Register Office for Scotland, Scotland’s Census 2001 (On CD)
- ⁸³ Kovac July 2003
- ⁸⁴ This trend is also seen in the Canadian Census. See Gladstone, B., Canadian Census data will provide detailed picture of Jewish community 8 July 2003
http://www.jta.org/page_view_story.asp?intarticleid=12979&intcategoryid=2

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- ⁸⁵ *L'Arche* 2002 p56
- ⁸⁶ To use Pinto's words this represents the development of a 'civil society' in which all forms of expression are allowed. 1996 p5
- ⁸⁷ Gudonis 2003 p250
- ⁸⁸ Shapiro 2001 p7. Taken from a paper presented at the Budapest conference of 2001
- ⁸⁹ Kende 1989 in Mars 2000
- ⁹⁰ Shapiro 2001 p7
- ⁹¹ Bensimon 2003 p22
- ⁹² *Ha'aretz* May 28 2003
- ⁹³ Brasz 2001 p164
- ⁹⁴ Kooyman quoting from van Solinge *et al.* from a translation by Mitzman L., 2002 JMW
- ⁹⁵ It is well known that men and women exhibit differing propensities towards religiosity in general – women being more religious than men. Evidence for this, and possible reasons why, are discussed in Stark, R 2002 Physiology and Faith: Addressing the 'Universal' Gender Difference in Religious Commitment, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41 3 pp495-507
- ⁹⁶ Kovács (forthcoming) May 2004
- ⁹⁷ Dencik 2003 p92
- ⁹⁸ *ibid.* p98
- ⁹⁹ Graham, (JPR) in work as yet unpublished, estimates that about 14 per cent (almost 40,000 people) of those that said they were Jewish in the UK 2001 Census do not reside in any previously known or recognised Jewish concentration; i.e. these are 'rural Jews'. Few, if any, studies have been carried out on these people, because until the Census, it was virtually impossible to know for sure that they were even there. Some live in established communities such as Milton Keynes and Eastbourne or close to major concentrations such as Fylde in Lancashire. But the others are more disparate and remote, and a prudent assumption would be that they are less involved in Jewish communal life, though they nevertheless identify as Jews and were picked by the Census on this basis.
- ¹⁰⁰ Goldberg and Kosmin 1997 p2
- ¹⁰¹ Bensimon 2003 p27
- ¹⁰² ONS 2003. Census 2001 CAS for Output Areas, Wards, and higher administrative geographies: DVD 07 Wards, and higher administrative geographies in England and Wales, and Output Areas in London DVD 7, ONS: London
- ¹⁰³ *ibid* 2003
- ¹⁰⁴ This was based on an 'Assessment of Satisfaction' scale measured from 1-10. The mean score for Jews was 7.3 similar to the mean Dutch score. Van Solinge *et al.* from a translation by Mitzman L., 2002 JMW
- ¹⁰⁵ Netherlands/ Holland Jews in the Netherlands in 2000 (Kooyman C., The sample was based on DJNs in telephone directory, and snowballing. This produced 1,036 interviews.
- ¹⁰⁶ Kooyman, C Some remarks concerning the feasibility of socio-demographic surveys (JMW)
- ¹⁰⁷ Brasz 2001 p164
- ¹⁰⁸ Waterman and Kosmin 1986; ONS 2003
- ¹⁰⁹ Bensimon 2003 p28
- ¹¹⁰ Kovács (forthcoming) May 2004
- ¹¹¹ Van Solinge, H and de Vries M 2001
- ¹¹² Pinto 1996 p14
- ¹¹³ Liebman 2003 p346
- ¹¹⁴ Becher, H., Waterman, S., Kosmin B and Thomson K., 2002 p26
- ¹¹⁵ *ibid.* p27
- ¹¹⁶ Waterman 2003 p9
- ¹¹⁷ Kooyman quoting from van Solinge *et al.* from a translation by Mitzman L., 2002 JMW
- ¹¹⁸ Dencik 2003 p23
- ¹¹⁹ (UPI) *Ha'aretz* May 28 2003
- ¹²⁰ Bensimon 2003 p28
- ¹²¹ <http://perso.wanadoo.fr/hebreunet/jufra.html>
- ¹²² Dencik 2003 p23
- ¹²³ Kovács (forthcoming) May 2004
- ¹²⁴ In the table: Level 1= 1+ 'O' levels/CSE/GCSE (any grade); NVQ level 1; Foundation GNVQ. Level 2 = 5+ 'O' levels; 5+ CSEs (grade 1); 5+ GCSEs (grade *A - C); School Certificate; 1+ A levels/AS levels; NVQ level 2; Intermediate GNVQ or equivalents. Level 3 = 2+ 'A' levels; 4+ AS levels; Higher School Certificate; NVQ level 3; Advanced GNVQ. Level 4/5 = First degree; Higher

Degree; NVQ levels 4 - 5; HND; HNC; Qualified Teacher Status; Qualified Medical Doctor; Qualified Dentist; Qualified Nurse; Midwife; Health Visitor.

¹²⁵ Goldberg and Kosmin, 1997

¹²⁶ Kooyman quoting from van Solinge *et al.* from a translation by Mitzman L., 2002 JMW

¹²⁷ Gitelman 2003 p124

¹²⁸ Graham 2003 p39

¹²⁹ *ibid.* p25-26

¹³⁰ Buckser 2000 p718

¹³¹ *ibid.* p719

¹³² *L'Arche* p59. Results from a study by Cohen.

¹³³ Pinto, D. Jews in Europe today: the end of the East-West ethnic/religious divide? p1. Date unknown.

¹³⁴ *ibid.* p1

¹³⁵ Golbert 2001 p725

¹³⁶ Golbert 2001 p714

¹³⁷ Mars 2000 p93

¹³⁸ *ibid.* p718

¹³⁹ *ibid.* p717

¹⁴⁰ *ibid.* p725

¹⁴¹ Kooyman quoting from van Solinge *et al.* from a translation by Mitzman L., 2002 JMW. The survey consisted of 1,036 interviews and was carried out in 1999.

¹⁴² Kovács (forthcoming) May 2004

¹⁴³ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ Dencik 2003 p86

¹⁴⁶ Buckser 2000 p717

¹⁴⁷ Bensimon 2003 p27

¹⁴⁸ Gitelman 2003 p128

¹⁴⁹ Miller *at al* 1996

¹⁵⁰ There are significant problems with this classification as discussed by Graham (2003)

¹⁵¹ For example, using questions about who eats kosher meat outside of the home and how often they attend a synagogue service.

¹⁵² Miller in Webber 1994 p196

¹⁵³ *ibid.* p198

¹⁵⁴ van Solinge and de Vries 2001

¹⁵⁵ Translated by Hans Vuijsje – Sept 2002 (received from Mario Izcovich, personal correspondence)

¹⁵⁶ Kooyman and Almagor 1996 p63. This survey also found that 49 per cent of the Israelis never go to synagogue services.

¹⁵⁷ Kovács (forthcoming) May 2004

¹⁵⁸ Levy, S., Levinsohn, H., & Katz, E. 2000 p5 Highlights of report for the Avi Chai Foundation, Israel

¹⁵⁹ Levy, S., 2001 p18-36

¹⁶⁰ *ibid.* p6 and p18

¹⁶¹ *ibid.* p24

¹⁶² Levy *et al.* 2000 p6

¹⁶³ Pinto, Jews in Europe today. The end of the East-West ethnic/religious divide? Date Unknown

¹⁶⁴ Pinto 1996 p2-3

¹⁶⁵ Rosenson 2003 p276

¹⁶⁶ Kovács (forthcoming) May 2004

¹⁶⁷ Mars 2001 p229 Table adapted from the text.

¹⁶⁸ Azria A Typological Approach to French Jewry 2003

¹⁶⁹ *ibid.* p64-68

¹⁷⁰ Brasz 2001 p150

¹⁷¹ *ibid.* p151

¹⁷² Shapiro 2001 p7

¹⁷³ Golbert 2001 p715

¹⁷⁴ Shapiro p7

¹⁷⁵ *ibid.* p7

¹⁷⁶ Gudonis 2003 p252

¹⁷⁷ Graham 2003 p5

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- ¹⁷⁸ Waterman 2003
- ¹⁷⁹ Graham 2003
- ¹⁸⁰ Factor analysis is a statistical technique that locates groups of factors which elicit similar response patterns and produces ‘macro variables’ or dimensions. For example variables about synagogue attendance and keeping kosher might be grouped by the method to produce a single variable that might be called *Practice*. By carrying out a factor analysis on the data from the JPR 1995 survey, Miller produced factors that contributed towards the creation of Jewish identity. The importance of each factor is based upon the proportion of variance between identities that it explains.
- ¹⁸¹ Miller 2003 p48
- ¹⁸² Liebman 2003 p349
- ¹⁸³ Miller 2003 p60
- ¹⁸⁴ Adapted from Brasz 2001 p163
- ¹⁸⁵ *ibid.* p161
- ¹⁸⁶ Azria 2003 p68
- ¹⁸⁷ *ibid.* p73-5
- ¹⁸⁸ Cohen with Ifergan 2002
- ¹⁸⁹ *ibid.* p37
- ¹⁹⁰ *ibid.* p38
- ¹⁹¹ Data from various sources: Portrait-robot des juifs de France: Une étude constate le renforcement du lien communautaire. By Alain Auffray November 19, 2002; <http://www.col.fr/judeotheque/archive.web/Portrait-robot%20des%20juifs%20de%20France.htm>); The Barber of November 18, 2002; Saada, D., (2002) L’Arche
- ¹⁹² van Solinge and de Vries 2001 p202
- ¹⁹³ Chapter 16 of van Solinge and de Vries 2001 outlines (in Dutch) the factor analysis used to create these dimensions
- ¹⁹⁴ Kooyman and Almagor 1996
- ¹⁹⁵ *ibid.* p87-8
- ¹⁹⁶ Goldberg 2003 p20
- ¹⁹⁷ Goldberg and Kosmin 1997 p6-7
- ¹⁹⁸ Goldberg 2003 p16
- ¹⁹⁹ Kovács (forthcoming) May 2004
- ²⁰⁰ There are five types of ‘Observance Intensity’ according to Kovács. They are Strong, Traditional, Moderate, Aggrieved, Assimilated
- ²⁰¹ Kovács (forthcoming) May 2004
- ²⁰² Horowitz 2000 p186. Survey of 1,504 American respondents aged 22-52 carried out in 1998
- ²⁰³ *ibid.* pV
- ²⁰⁴ Horowitz 2000 p189-90. Based on a combination of individual indicators