


INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAIRS



**RESEARCH
REPORTS**

NUMBER 6, MAY 1994

Antisemitism in
the Former
Soviet Union:
Recent Survey
Results

ROBERT J. BRYM

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Summary

This report is based mainly on a survey of 989 Muscovites conducted in October 1992 and a survey of 1,000 Jews conducted in Moscow, Kiev and Minsk from February to April 1993. The major findings of the surveys are:

- By North American standards negative attitudes towards Jews are widespread in Moscow. For example, 18 per cent of Muscovites agree or are inclined to agree that there exists a global "Zionist" conspiracy against Russia and another 24 per cent are undecided. This does not, however, suggest that Jews are in imminent physical danger.

- In Moscow negative attitudes towards Jews are more widespread among older people, low-income earners and non-Russian Slavs.

- Nearly 40 per cent of Jews in Moscow, Kiev and Minsk regard popular hostility as the major source of antisemitism. A quarter of the respondents mention nationalist organizations, another quarter regard state policy, and a tenth view anti-Jewish articles in the press as the taproot of anti-Jewish feeling.

- These perceptions vary from city to city. Muscovites regard organized group antisemitism as more of a problem than do Jews in the other two cities. Kievans are most inclined to think that popular hostility against Jews is highly problematic. Minskans are most likely to view the state apparatus as the main source of antisemitism in their country.

- While over 90 per cent of respondents in Moscow, Kiev and Minsk believe that antisemitism exists in their respective countries, 15 per cent more Muscovites than Kievans and Minskans believe that pogroms are likely or certain to break out. Ten per cent more Minskans than Kievans and Muscovites have personally experienced antisemitism. And Jews in Moscow perceive by far the largest decline in antisemitism since the rise of Gorbachev.

- Nearly a third of Jews in Moscow, Kiev and Minsk express a great deal of apprehension about antisemitism. Heightened fear is most strongly associated with witnessing antisemitism in the mass media, being a woman, having a strong Jewish identity, lacking confidence in one's future and being in one's thirties, forties or fifties.

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Antisemitism in the Former Soviet Union: Recent Survey Results

Introduction

The following report is based mainly on two recent surveys. The first was conducted between 9 and 11 October 1992 with the assistance of Dr Andrei Degtyarev of Moscow State University. It involved telephone interviews with 989 residents of Moscow. Methodological details are given in the text below.

The second survey was conducted in Moscow, Kiev and Minsk between February and April 1993 with the assistance of Professor Rozalina Ryvkina of the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research in Moscow. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 1,000 Jews in their homes, a third of them in each city. In order to ensure that the sample was representative of the Jews in those three cities a professor of linguistics in Moscow who specializes in the study of surnames was asked to compose a list of over 400 of the most common Jewish surnames in the Slavic states of the CIS. The list was given to the police offices in Moscow, Kiev and Minsk which are responsible for keeping records of all city residents. The head of the police office in each city was paid to have his computer generate at random a list of 1,110 households with family surnames corresponding to those on the list of 405. Households were systematically sampled from those lists and adults randomly selected from each household for interviewing.¹

Eighty-three per cent of people contacted agreed to be interviewed. On average, each interview lasted thirty-six minutes. Responses were weighted to reflect the number of Jews in each of the three cities. The weighted sample consists of about 55 per cent Muscovites, 33 per cent Kievans and 12 per cent Minskans.

The sampling procedure just described ensures that the results of the second survey are generalizable to the Jewish population of the three cities, who represent 28 per cent of the Jews in the Slavic republics of the former USSR. Specifically, if one were to draw twenty random samples of 1,000 people each, and report results from each of those twenty samples, nineteen of them would be at most within 3.1 per cent of the results reported here.

Antisemitism as a Reaction to Post-Communism²

Imagine a country in which only 12 per cent of the adult population are satisfied with their lives, 71 per cent find it a financial strain even to clothe their families, 61 per cent report a deterioration in living standards over the past three months, 67 per cent report a decline in the political situation over the same period, and 41 per cent think

1 Jews by any criterion whose surnames are not found in the sample. Are they Jews? Consider the following anecdote, related by Aleksandr Burakovsky, chairman of the Kiev Sholem Aleichem Society, in 1992. Burakovsky relates that during business trips to Chelyabinsk, Russia, where many Ukrainian Jews fled the Nazis, "I see young men with Jewish features, and I ask them, and their names are Ivanov and Petrov, good Russian names. And I ask them about their parents and their grandparents, and they're all Ukrainian", Steven Erlanger, "As Ukraine loses Jews, the Jews lose a tradition", *The New York Times*, 27 August 1992.

2 This section is a revised version of Robert J. Brym and Andrei Degtyarev, "Anti-semitism in Moscow: Results of an October 1992 survey", *Slavic Review*, vol. 52, no. 1, 1993, 1-12.

that the country runs a high risk of complete anarchy. In the same country, only 13 per cent of adults trust the head of state—3 per cent fewer than distrust him—while 71 per cent express little or no trust in the parliament and 57 per cent express little or no trust in the government. Meanwhile, a mere 2 per cent of the adult population belong to a political party or movement and 53 per cent believe that mass disturbances, anti-government riots and bloodshed are likely to break out. That was the situation in Russia in March 1993 according to a country-wide public opinion poll of 2,000 people conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences.³ The poll and others like it show that in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus there is widespread despair, pessimism and political mistrust but no widely perceived economic and political alternative to the status quo. It also suggests potential danger. As Václav Havel recently put it:

In a situation where one system has collapsed and a new one does not yet exist, many people feel empty and frustrated. This condition is fertile ground for radicalism of all kinds, for the hunt for scapegoats, and for the need to hide behind the anonymity of a group, be it socially or ethnically based. . . . It gives rise to the search for a common and easily identifiable enemy, to political extremism. . . .⁴

Or in the words of Nikolai Popov, one of Russia's leading public opinion pollsters, "people . . . seem ready to support political demagogues or opportunists . . . who promise the quick salvation of the country, and a way out of the economic chaos."⁵

In this volatile context the question of antisemitism—its level, social distribution, and possible political uses—takes on special significance. Antisemites have often blamed Jews for the ills of their societies. The former Soviet Union has a long tradition of antisemitism and the largest combined number of Jews and people with negative attitudes towards Jews of any region in the world. The potential for casting Jews in their traditional role of scapegoat thus appears large.

Antisemitism and Public Opinion Polls

Despite the obvious significance of the subject, survey data on antisemitism in the region are meagre. In a 1991 overview of the subject, Gitelman was able to cite only two survey-based studies.⁶ The first study reviews the results of a December 1988 telephone poll of 1,006 randomly-selected Muscovites and an April 1989 telephone poll of 1,000 randomly-selected Muscovites.⁷ These polls provide evidence that

3 A. Komozin (ed.), *Monitoring: The 1993 Russian Citizens' Opinion Poll Results* (Moscow: Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences, 1993).

4 "The post-Communist nightmare", *The New York Review of Books*, 27 May 1993.

5 Nikolai P. Popov, "Political views of the Russian public", *The International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, vol. 4, no. 4, 1992, 330.

6 Zvi Gitelman, "Glasnost, perestroika and antisemitism", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 2, 1991, 155-6. A more detailed report on one of these studies was published after Gitelman's article was written. See James L. Gibson and Raymond M. Duch, "Anti-semitic attitudes of the mass public: Estimates and explanations based on a survey of the Moscow oblast", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, no. 56, 1992, 1-28. In addition, a few surveys of perceptions of antisemitism among Jewish community leaders in Russia and among Russian Jewish immigrants have been conducted. See Alexander Benifand, "Jewish emigration from the USSR in the 1990s" in Tanya Basok and Robert J. Brym (eds.), *Soviet-Jewish Emigration and Resettlement in the 1990s* (Toronto: York Lanes Press, York University, 1991), 38-41.

7 Robert J. Brym, "Perestroika, public opinion, and *pamyat*", *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, vol. 19, no. 3, 1989, 23-32.

people with negative attitudes towards Jews tend to be older, less educated people with lower socioeconomic status who share various anti-Western, authoritarian and Russian nationalist opinions. They suggest that people who give "undecided" responses tend to be "closet" antisemites. On that basis it was concluded that about a third of Muscovites hold a set of beliefs that include negative attitudes towards Jews.

The second study was conducted in February-March 1990. It was based on a small random sample of 504 Muscovites. The researchers asked respondents numerous questions about their attitudes towards Jews during in-home, face-to-face surveys. They concluded that negative attitudes towards Jews were concentrated among less educated people whose financial condition was deteriorating and who opposed democratization. However, the level of antisemitism discovered by the researchers was less than they expected, probably because they arbitrarily decided that the large number of "uncertain" responses necessarily indicated neutrality rather than a cover-up of negative attitudes.⁸

Since Gitelman's article was written, the results of a third study of antisemitism in the former Soviet Union have been published. L. D. Gudkov and A. G. Levinson conducted a large survey of nearly 8,000 randomly-selected people in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Moldova, Azerbaydzhan, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan under the auspices of VTsIOM, the Moscow-based All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research, in October 1990 and March 1992.⁹ They asked a wide range of questions concerning respondents' attitudes towards Jews. The authors judged that in these republics a "feeling of tolerance [towards Jews] remains predominant."¹⁰ Because the findings which are to be reported here lead to quite different conclusions, the Gudkov-Levinson survey will be discussed in detail in the context of the data analysis below.

Between 9 and 11 October 1992 I conducted a brief telephone poll in Moscow with the assistance of Professor Andrei Degtyarev of the Department of Political Science and Sociology of Politics at Moscow State University. The poll consisted of seventeen questions, two of which dealt with Jews. The interviewers had one to one-and-a-half years of interview training and experience. The survey was based on a randomly generated list of 1,060 residential telephone numbers in metropolitan Moscow. Interviews were completed with 989 respondents, yielding a very high 93 per cent response rate. Once Jews and respondents under eighteen years of age were deleted from the data set, 946 respondents remained. They are the respondents we analyze here. The maximum margin of error for a sample of this size is ± 3.2 per cent, nineteen times out of twenty.

Telephone polls in Moscow are able to tap the opinions of just over three-quarters of the population. The rest have no telephones in their places of residence. Young couples, people living in recently constructed buildings and recently settled neighbourhoods, migrant workers and refugees are necessarily underrepresented in telephone surveys. Individuals living in communal apartments are also less likely than people

8 Gibson and Duch. This issue is discussed at greater length below.

9 L. D. Gudkov and A. G. Levinson, "Attitudes towards Jews", *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, no. 12, 1992, 108-11.

10 *Ibid.*, 111.

living in single-family apartments to be interviewed in a telephone poll because many residents share a single telephone in communal apartments and only one respondent per telephone was allowed. These factors introduce unknown biases in estimates of distributions. In order to control for some of those unknown biases, the sample was weighted to match the age and gender distributions of the Moscow population according to the 1989 census. Strictly speaking, however, findings about the proportion of people expressing an attitude should be understood to apply only to people with telephones in their places of residence. On the other hand, sample bias does not usually affect relationships among variables: one may be reasonably confident that the relationship found between, say, income and antisemitism is accurate within sampling error.

Before reporting the results of the survey we must emphasize three points that will help place the findings in social context. First, when we discuss antisemitism we refer only to negative attitudes towards Jews, not to a highly articulated ideological system. There are some Muscovites who are antisemites in the strict ideological sense, people for whom anti-Jewish beliefs constitute a worldview. Such people represent only a small minority of the city's population. A much larger proportion simply hold negative attitudes towards Jews, as we will see. Second, although negative attitudes towards Jews are widespread in Moscow, contradictory trends are also evident. Among some categories of the population tolerance towards Jews is growing. Nonetheless, the data show that negative attitudes towards Jews are common. Finally, Jews are not the most disliked ethnic group in Moscow. A survey of 1,009 Muscovites conducted at the end of 1992 showed that various groups of so-called *chernye* (blacks) are least liked. Azeris are the most disliked ethnic group in Moscow, followed by Chechens, Gypsies, Georgians, and Armenians. Jews rank above the *chernye*—but well below Slavic groups such as Ukrainians.¹¹

The Frequency of Antisemitic Attitudes in Moscow

With these qualifications in mind, I begin by reporting the distribution of responses to a question regarding belief in the existence of a global plot against Russia organized by "Zionists" (i.e. Jews). The myth of an international Jewish conspiracy as manifested in the Tsarist secret police forgery *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* has become an established element in the ideological makeup of hardcore antisemites the world over. Hardcore antisemites constituted roughly 3 per cent of the US population in 1981 and 4 per cent of the Canadian population outside Quebec in 1984.¹² If, in the Russian context, one is prepared to view hardcore antisemites as people who are inclined to agree that an international Jewish (or "Zionist") plot against Russia exists, then Table 1 suggests that the corresponding figure in Moscow is much higher—and

11 Vladimir Zotov, "The Chechen problem as seen by Muscovites", *Moskovskiy komsomolets*, 12 January 1993.

12 Geraldine Rosenfield, "The polls: Attitudes toward American Jews", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, no. 46, 1982, 443; Robert J. Brym and Rhonda L. Lenton, "The distribution of antisemitism in Canada in 1984", *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, vol. 16, no. 4, 1991, 411-18. Here, hardcore antisemites are defined as those scoring in the bottom 25 per cent of a scale indicating positive or negative feelings towards Jews. Eight per cent of Americans and 10 per cent of Canadians outside Quebec had negative feelings towards Jews, i.e., they scored in the bottom half of the scale. The American figures come from a 1981 Gallup poll. I calculated the Canadian figures from the 1984 Canadian National Election Study.

Moscow, it must be remembered, is among the more liberal areas of Russia.¹³ Specifically, 18 per cent of the respondents agreed or were inclined to agree that a global "Zionist" plot against Russia exists. Of course, the atmosphere of rapid economic decline and political instability that characterizes Russia today is a natural breeding ground for conspiracy theories. Many such theories coexist, and belief in a "Zionist" plot is not necessarily the most widespread of them.¹⁴ Our respondents may have been reacting to the word "plot" as much as to the word "Zionist". That said, the proportion of Muscovites open to the possibility that a "Zionist" plot is responsible for Russia's predicament is very high by North American standards.

TABLE 1
"Do you believe that there is a global plot against Russia organized by 'Zionists'?"

	frequency	per cent
yes	128	14
inclined to agree	39	4
undecided	229	24
inclined to disagree	53	6
no	492	52
total	940	100

Nearly a quarter of the respondents said that they were "undecided" as to whether a "Zionist" plot against Russia existed. Do such responses indicate real indecision and neutrality or do they mask the attitudes of antisemites who simply do not want to express their opinions openly? The answer to this question is critically important. If the "undecideds" are in fact antisemites, then one is entitled to reach the shocking conclusion that negative attitudes towards Jews were displayed by more than 40 per cent of Muscovites.

Table 2 suggests that such an alarming conclusion is *not* warranted. Respondents were asked whether they preferred the old or new political order and whether they held the West responsible for Russia's crisis. For both items clearly reactionary responses were possible. We reasoned that if the "undecideds" on the "Zionist" plot question tended to prefer the old political order and held the West responsible for Russia's crisis at least as much as did those who expressed belief in the existence of a "Zionist" plot, then that would constitute evidence for the view that the "undecideds" are in fact closet antisemites. As Table 2 shows, however, the percentage of those who prefer the old order and of those who blame the West for Russia's crisis both decline

13 V. B. Koltsov and V. A. Mansurov, "Political ideologies in the *perestroyka* era", *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, no. 10, 1991, 32; V. Yadov *et al.*, "The sociopolitical situation in Russia in mid-February 1992", *Sociological Research*, vol. 32, no. 2, 1993, 7; L. A. Sedov, "Yeltsin's rating", *Ekonomicheskiye i sotsialnye peremeny: monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniya*, Informatsionny byulleten, Intertsentr VTsIOM (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 1993), 15.

14 John F. Dunn, "Hard times in Russia foster conspiracy theories", Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Special Report, 23 September 1992.

TABLE 2
 Belief in Global "Zionist" Plot against Russia by Reactionary Attitudes
 (in per cent; n in parentheses)

	yes	belief in global plot		inclined to no	no
		inclined to yes	undecided		
political preference					
old	58	53	45	26	25
other	42	47	55	74	75
total	100 (119)	100 (32)	100 (199)	100 (47)	100 (448)
West responsible					
yes	70	46	21	10	7
other	30	54	79	90	93
total	100 (128)	100 (39)	100 (229)	100 (53)	100 (492)

smoothly as one moves horizontally across Table 2 from the "yes" to the "no" column, with "undecided" squarely in between.

Although the "undecideds" really do appear to be a neutral category between "yes" and "no", one should bear in mind the substantive meaning of this finding. Nearly a quarter of adult Muscovites are undecided on the question of whether there exists an international "Zionist" conspiracy. Together with the fact that nearly 18 per cent of the city's adult population have decided that such a conspiracy is probably afoot, it suggests that over 40 per cent of Moscow's adult population are open to this antisemitic canard.

The respondents were asked a second question about Jews—whether they had ever witnessed an infringement of Jewish rights. Table 3 sets out the responses to that question. Perhaps surprisingly, fewer than a fifth of the respondents said they had witnessed such an infringement, over three-quarters denied they had, and nearly five per cent were undecided. Here again we are confronted with a quandary: do the "never" and "undecided" responses indicate genuine ignorance of discrimination against Jews? Or do they suggest a refusal to view Jews as victims since Jews, as every antisemite knows, can only be advantaged. The evidence favours the latter interpretation, as Table 4 makes clear. Those who claim never to have witnessed an infringement of Jewish rights or to be undecided on the issue are more likely than others to believe in the existence of a global "Zionist" plot against Russia, to prefer the old political order, and to believe that the West is responsible for Russia's crisis. The fact that over 80 per cent of Muscovites claim ignorance of any violation of Jewish rights cannot therefore be taken as an indication of the absence of such violations since many of these people adhere to a set of reactionary ideas that includes negative attitudes towards Jews.

TABLE 3
 "Have you ever witnessed an infringement of the rights of Jews?"

	frequency	per cent
often	69	7
sometimes	114	12
never	712	76
undecided	45	5
total	940	100

TABLE 4
 Witnessing Infringement of Rights of Jews by Reactionary Attitudes
 (in per cent; n in parentheses)

	often	infringement of rights sometimes	never
global plot			
yes	16	18	19
don't know	14	10	26
no	70	73	56
total	100 (69)	101 (114)	101 (711)
political preference			
old	23	26	37
other	77	74	63
total	100 (62)	100 (108)	100 (632)
West responsible			
yes	14	17	20
other	86	83	80
total	100 (69)	100 (114)	100 (712)

Note: Percentages do not necessarily add up to 100 due to rounding.

Antisemitic Attitudes in the CIS

How can I reconcile my more dismal conclusion with the view of Gudkov and Levinson, noted above, that tolerance towards Jews predominates in Russia and other republics of the former Soviet Union? Quite easily: my standard of comparison apparently differs from theirs. Consider some of Gudkov's and Levinson's findings, reproduced in Table 5. The percentage of respondents who expressed negative attitudes towards Jews varies by attitude and by republic. By North American standards, however, all the proportions are large. For example, depending on republic, between 34 and 68 per cent of Gudkov and Levinson's respondents opposed Jews marrying into

their families. Polls conducted in the USA in 1981 and in Canada in 1984 show that the comparable figure for both North American countries was only 10 per cent. In Canada 21 per cent of respondents opposed blacks marrying whites; in the USA the figure was 33 per cent.¹⁵ Thus Gudkov's and Levinson's data convince me that there is considerably more opposition to Jewish-non-Jewish intermarriage in the former Soviet Union than there is opposition to black-white intermarriage in the USA. In general, the percentages in Table 5 portray a level of animosity against Jews that exceeds black-white animosities in the USA. Gudkov and Levinson are entitled to regard this as "tolerance", but most North Americans employ a different vocabulary to describe such a situation.¹⁶

TABLE 5
Attitudes Towards Jews in Ten Soviet Republics, March 1992
(in per cent)

	range	mean
percentage of respondents who . . .		
do not approve of Jews as workers	33-55	44.0
are unwilling to work in the same group with Jews	23-38	30.5
maintain that Jews avoid physical work	65-75	70.0
maintain that Jews value making money and profit above human relations	40-53	46.5
are not willing to have a Jew as their immediate boss at work	47-57	52.0
think it is necessary to limit the number of Jews in leading positions	19-33	26.0
are reluctant to see a Jew as president of their republic	53-76	64.5
maintain that Jews do not make good family men	35-56	45.5
have non-positive perceptions of neighbourliness of Jewish families	26-48	37.0
are unwilling to have Jews as members of one's family	34-68	51.0
do not support equal opportunity for ethnic group members to obtain work	17-35	26.0
do not support equal opportunity for ethnic group members to attend educational institutions	15-34	24.5
often have negative feelings towards Jewish parties and organizations	25-45	35.0


Source: Adapted from L. D. Gudkov and A. G. Levinson, "Attitudes towards Jews", *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya*, no. 12, 1992, 109.

Note: Scores for each republic were not reported by the authors. Thus in calculating the mean, republics could not be weighted for population size.

15 Ronald D. Lambert and James E. Curtis, "Québécois and English Canadian opposition to racial and religious intermarriage, 1968-1983", *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, vol. 16, no. 2, 1984, 44, note 9.

16 Gudkov and Levinson asked a question about a global "Zionist" conspiracy too. Within sampling error, their finding for the proportion of Russians who agree that a "Zionist" plot exists is nearly the same as my finding for Moscow. I am grateful to the authors for supplying some of their unpublished data to Andrei Degtyarev.

FIGURE 1
Level of Antisemitism in Ten Former Soviet Republics, 1992 (in per cent)



Source: Gudkov and Levinson, unpublished data.

Note: This figure shows the mean per cent of respondents who gave negative responses to fourteen questionnaire items concerning Jews. The overall average is based on republic means, not individual scores.

Figure 1 uses an unpublished republic-by-republic breakdown of the fourteen questions in Table 5 to construct a graph of the incidence of antisemitism by republic. It shows the average percentage of respondents in each republic who gave negative responses to Gudkov's and Levinson's fourteen questions about Jews in 1992. (Georgia was not polled in the 1992 wave of their study.) Of most interest here are the relative positions of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. While Russia and Ukraine rank near the bottom of the scale, Belarus ranks near the top. If I concluded on the basis of the Moscow telephone survey that antisemitic attitudes are widespread in that relatively liberal city, one is obliged to conclude from the Gudkov and Levinson survey that the situation is even more dire in Belarus and most of the rest of the former USSR.

The Social Determinants of Antisemitism

Let us now return to the Moscow telephone survey and examine some of the social determinants of negative attitudes towards Jews in that city. Table 6 sets out a

TABLE 6
Sociodemographic Correlates of Belief in Global "Zionist" Conspiracy against Russia
(in per cent; n in parentheses)

	belief in "Zionist" conspiracy		total
	yes; inclined to think so; undecided	inclined to think not; no	
age			
<31	32	68	100 (232)
31-59	38	62	100 (490)
60+	61	39	100 (218)
chi-square = 46.47, d.f. = 2, p<.001; tau-c = -0.213			
work status			
employer, student, white collar/ univ	32	68	100 (361)
unemployed, worker	43	57	100 (333)
retired/ homemaker	56	44	100 (246)
chi-square = 34.64, d.f. = 2, p<.001; tau-c = -0.204			
monthly income in roubles			
<3,000	50	50	100 (450)
3,000-10,000	36	64	100 (395)
>10,000	32	68	100 (95)
chi-square = 20.73, d.f. = 2, p<.001; tau-c = 0.152			
sector of employment			
state	42	58	100 (443)
mixed	29	71	100 (41)
private	29	71	100 (129)
chi-square = 8.46, d.f. = 2, p<.025; tau-c = 0.104			
gender			
male	38	62	100 (402)
female	45	55	100 (538)
chi-square = 5.46, d.f. = 2, p<.05; tau-c = -0.074			
nationality			
Russian	40	60	100 (826)
other	49	51	100 (35)
Ukr/Bel/Tat	59	41	101 (78)
chi-square = 11.12, d.f. = 2, p<.005; tau-c = -0.067			

Note: Percentages do not necessarily add up to 100 due to rounding.

series of statistically significant relationships between belief in the existence of a global "Zionist" conspiracy against Russia and various sociodemographic variables. All of these relationships are likely to occur by chance less than once in twenty times; the first three relationships described in Table 6 are likely to occur by chance less than once in 1,000 times.

Negative attitudes towards Jews are most strongly associated with age. Younger

Muscovites are less likely to express belief in a global "Zionist" conspiracy against Russia than older Muscovites. Work status also influences belief in this issue. Private employers, students, and white-collar workers with a university education are the least antisemitic groups. Unemployed people, blue-collar workers, and white-collar workers with middle-school education are next. Retired people and homemakers are the most antisemitic groups. Negative attitudes towards Jews also increase in lower income groups. They are more prevalent among people who work in the state sector. And they are more widespread among non-Russians in Moscow—especially Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Tatars—than among Russians.

The sociodemographic variables mentioned are themselves intercorrelated. Elderly people tend to be less educated, have particular work statuses, and so forth. It is therefore important to ask what are the statistically independent and combined effects of the sociodemographic variables on belief in a global "Zionist" conspiracy against Russia. The multiple regression analysis reported in Table 7 answers that question. In descending order of importance, age, nationality and income have independent effects on antisemitic belief.¹⁷

Belief in the existence of a global "Zionist" conspiracy against Russia is also correlated with other attitudes, as can be seen in Table 8. All of the relationships reported in Table 8 are likely to occur by chance less than once in 1,000 times. We already know that Muscovites with negative attitudes towards Jews are more inclined to believe that the West is responsible for the crisis in Russia, to prefer the old political system, and to deny witnessing any infringements of Jewish rights. Table 8 also demonstrates that people with negative attitudes towards Jews are more likely to expect living conditions to be the same or worse in five years. Moreover, and somewhat ominously, people with negative attitudes towards Jews are somewhat more likely than people with positive attitudes towards Jews to express willingness to protest their dissatisfaction openly by taking part in strikes, demonstrations, boycotts and even by destroying property. Specifically, among people who are prepared to protest actively their dissatisfaction with declining living conditions, 53 per cent believe in, or are undecided about, the existence of a global "Zionist" conspiracy against Russia, while 47 per cent are inclined to deny the existence of such a plot. In contrast, among those who are *not* prepared to protest declining living conditions openly, 35 per cent believe in, or are undecided about, the existence of a "Zionist" conspiracy and 65 per cent are inclined to deny the existence of such a plot.

The multiple regression analysis summarized in Table 9 may be interpreted to suggest the "distance" between belief in a global "Zionist" conspiracy against Russia and various attitudes that are independently and statistically significantly related to that belief at the .05 probability level. Blaming the West for Russia's ills is very strongly associated with belief in a "Zionist" conspiracy. In addition, preference for the pre-Gorbachev political order and belief that women's proper role is in the home rather than in the paid labour force are significantly and independently associated with

17 Together these variables account for only 6 per cent of the variation in antisemitic belief. R-square is sensitive to the distribution of cases across categories of the independent variables. If few cases fall into some categories of the independent variables, then the upper limit of R-square decreases. In the present case, this occurs with income and nationality. The low R-square does not therefore necessarily weaken my argument.

TABLE 7
Multiple Regression of Belief in Global "Zionist" Conspiracy against Russia on Sociodemographic Variables (weighted results)

variable	slope (b)	standard error	standardized slope (beta)	t
age	-0.27	0.04	-0.20	-6.09
Russian/ other	0.50	0.14	0.11	3.54
income	0.14	0.06	0.07	2.09

intercept = 4.04; n = 938; adjusted R² = .06

TABLE 8
Attitudinal Correlates of Belief in Global "Zionist" Conspiracy against Russia (in per cent; n in parentheses)

	belief in "Zionist" conspiracy		total
	yes; inclined to think so; undecided	inclined to think not; no	
West responsible for Russian crisis			
yes	68	32	100 (426)
no	21	79	100 (515)
	chi-square = 216.66, d.f. = 1, p<.001; tau-c = 0.471		
political preference			
old system	55	45	100 (455)
new system	26	74	100 (390)
	chi-square = 74.30, d.f. = 1, p<.001; tau-c = 0.291		
expected living conditions in 5 years			
same/worse	47	54	101 (401)
better	30	70	100 (242)
	chi-square = 19.09, d.f. = 1, p<.001; tau-c = -0.161		
protest if living conditions worsen			
yes	53	47	100 (215)
no	35	65	100 (560)
	chi-square = 25.85, d.f. = 1, p<.001; tau-c = -0.161		
witnessed infringement of rights of Jews			
often/ sometimes	28	72	100 (183)
undecided/ never	46	54	100 (755)
	chi-square = 18.65, d.f. = 1, p<.001; tau-c = -0.111		

Note: Percentages do not necessarily add up to 100 due to rounding.

TABLE 9
Multiple Regression of Belief in Global "Zionist" Conspiracy
against Russia on Attitudinal Variables

variable	slope (b)	standard error	standardized slope (beta)	t
West responsible	0.46	0.03	0.52	16.72
political preference	0.17	0.05	0.11	3.36
women's role	0.19	0.08	0.07	2.37

intercept= 1.49; n = 794; adjusted R² = 0.33

belief in the conspiracy theory.¹⁸ The evidence thus suggests that some large categories of Moscow's population hold attitudes that are authoritarian, xenophobic, illiberal on social issues and, of course, antisemitic.¹⁹ Given the prevalence of negative attitudes towards Jews in the city, and the even greater prevalence of negative attitudes towards Jews elsewhere in the former USSR, the Jews of the region have reason to be anxious.

Jewish Perceptions of Antisemitism

The survey of Jews in Moscow, Kiev and Minsk asked a battery of questions concerning perceptions of antisemitism. Not surprisingly in light of the findings summarized above, over 95 per cent of Jews responded "yes" when asked if they believed that antisemitism existed in their country.

Those who answered "yes" were also asked "What are the main manifestations of antisemitism in your country today?" Interviewers did not prompt respondents with a list of possible answers; they could reply in any way they wished. Respondents were, however, asked to rank their replies, that is, to state their opinion of the main manifestation of antisemitism, the second most important manifestation and so forth. Table 10 sets out their first choices.

Nearly 40 per cent of the respondents regard hostility on the part of ordinary people as the main source of antisemitism in their country today. A quarter of them think that the main source of antisemitism lies in the threat of ultra-nationalist organizations such as Pamyat and Otechestvo. About the same proportion view state policy as the main source of antisemitism. A tenth of the respondents perceive the ultra-nationalist press—publications such as *Molodaya gvardiya* and *Literaturnaya Rossiya*—as the chief manifestation of anti-Jewish feeling. And 5 per cent of them mention popular envy as the most important source of antisemitism in their country today.²⁰

18 Rhonda L. Lenton, "Home versus career: Attitudes towards women's work among Russian women and men, 1992", *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, vol. 18, no. 3, 1993, 325-31.

19 As Sonja Margolina recently put it, "[t]he equation of 'Jews' and the 'West' in the sense of agents of modernization remains until today one of the great ideological clichés of premodern consciousness in the East.", Sonja Margolina, *Das Ende der Lügen: Rußland und die Juden im 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1992), 8. For a similar conclusion regarding Slovakia see Zora Bútorová and Martin Bútor, "Wariness towards Jews as an expression of post-Communist panic: The case of Slovakia," *Czechoslovak Sociological Review*, Special Issue, no. 28, 1992, 92-106.

20 A few respondents gave other responses which we do not consider here. On the Russian far right see, for example, *Nationalities Papers*, Special Issue on *Pamyat*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1991.

TABLE 10
 Jewish Perceptions of Main Forms of Antisemitism (first choice in per cent)

	frequency	per cent
q118-people hostile	326	38
q119-nationalist organizations	212	25
q117-state policy	197	23
q120-articles in press	84	10
q121-people envious	40	5
total	859	100

The only real surprise here concerns state policy. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus no longer have a state-sponsored policy of discrimination against Jews. That nearly a quarter of the Jews in the three cities nonetheless believe the state to be the main locus of anti-Jewish discrimination probably indicates a combination of three things. First, some individual state officials presumably continue to discriminate against Jews in employment and in other spheres of life despite the abandonment of state-backed antisemitism. Second, since historical memories die hard, some Jews who feel disadvantaged are likely to attribute some or all of their disabilities to their Jewish origin, whether or not this is objectively justifiable. Blaming state authorities for blocking their mobility and making their professional lives unsatisfying is probably a sort of historical reflex for some Jews. Third, in all three cities, and in Moscow in particular, mass anti-Jewish demonstrations are held, antisemitic signs are posted and an active ultra-nationalist press publishes articles and cartoons worthy of *Der Stürmer*. The Ukrainian and, especially, Russian and Belarusian states do little to combat these openly antisemitic acts. Reluctance to put active antisemites out of business by passing tough laws banning the propagation of ethnic hatred and enforcing those laws by means of a police crackdown is perhaps viewed by some Jews as a form of state antisemitism. Just how important each of these three factors is cannot, however, be ascertained on the basis of the available data.

Examining city-to-city variations reveals that antisemitism is perceived differently and takes different forms in different places. Consider Figure 2. It shows the proportion of respondents in each city who (1) believe that antisemitism exists; (2) fear antisemitism very much; (3) say they feared antisemitism very much six or seven years ago; (4) feel that pogroms are likely or certain to break out; and (5) have personally experienced antisemitism. Note that about 5 per cent more Muscovites than Kievans and Minskans believe that antisemitism exists. Roughly 15 per cent more Muscovites than Kievans and Minskans believe that pogroms are likely or certain to break out. And approximately a third more Muscovites than Kievans and Minskans say they feared antisemitism very much six or seven years ago.

It would, however, be mistaken to conclude on the basis of this last batch of figures that Moscow is a more antisemitic city than Kiev and Minsk. After all, Figure 2 also shows that the proportion of Moscow Jews who fear antisemitism very much has been cut by more than half since the advent of Gorbachev so that today there is no inter-city difference in the level of fear. In addition, about 10 per cent more Minskans

FIGURE 2
Perceptions of Antisemitism by City
 (in per cent)





FIGURE 3
Forms of Antisemitism by City
 (first choice in per cent)



than Muscovites and Kievans have actually experienced antisemitism personally.

Why should more Moscow Jews feel that antisemitism exists and that they are likely to be attacked? Why should they hold such opinions despite experiencing by far the largest drop in fear of antisemitism and personally experiencing substantially less antisemitism than Minsk Jews? Figure 3 helps solve this puzzle. It shows the proportion of respondents in each city who ranked each form of antisemitism first. The Moscow profile is strikingly different from that of the other two cities. Moscow Jews are much more likely than Jews from Kiev and Minsk to believe that the main manifestation of antisemitism may be found in the activities of "patriotic" organizations and the "patriotic" press. That is undoubtedly because Moscow has a more active anti-Jewish press and larger and better-organized anti-Jewish organizations than Kiev and Minsk. Thus between August 1991 and August 1992 antisemitic materials appeared in twenty-two newspapers and five journals published in Moscow. Some of this material is exported to Kiev and Minsk, where antisemitic literature is produced on a far smaller scale.²¹ The ultra-nationalist press makes Moscow Jews feel that antisemitism is more widespread in their country. Rabidly nationalist organizations make Moscow Jews feel that they are more open to attack. If Moscow Jews have nonetheless experienced the greatest decline in fear of antisemitism over the past six or seven years, that may be attributed to the cessation of anti-Jewish activities on the part of the Russian state. Moscow is no longer the font of state-backed antisemitism, as it was in the pre-Gorbachev years. That has clearly brought most relief to the Jews located closest to the source of the problem.

If Moscow ranks first in the perception of what might be called organized group antisemitism then the view is most widespread in Minsk that antisemitism still resides chiefly in state practice. Over a quarter of Minsk Jews hold that opinion compared to fewer than a fifth of Kiev Jews and a sixth of Moscow Jews. Finally, Kiev ranks significantly ahead of the other two cities in the perception that antisemitism is based mainly in the population at large. Some 49 per cent of Kiev Jews think that the main locus of antisemitism lies in popular hostility towards, and envy of, Jews, compared to 45 per cent of Minsk Jews and 37 per cent of Moscow Jews.

I conclude that one cannot properly speak of a given locale being simply more or less antisemitic than another. Antisemitism is multi-dimensional, taking different forms in different places.²² To be sure, popular hostility towards, and envy of, Jews is perceived as the main source of antisemitism in Moscow, Kiev and Minsk. To that degree, educational and inter-communal programmes aimed at enlightening and liberalizing non-Jews are desperately needed in all three cities. But it is also evident that a distinctive policy mix is required to combat antisemitism in different cities.

In Kiev the government and the leading opposition movement, *Rukh*, have been most effective in combatting the organized-group and official forms of antisemitism. They have also taken meaningful steps to re-educate the public. For example, in 1991

21 *Antisemitism World Report 1993* (London: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1993), 100-102, 104.

22 I tried to create a uni-dimensional scale measuring the intensity of Jewish perceptions of antisemitism but failed. No matter what combination of questionnaire items I used in the scale I could not achieve a Cronbach's-alpha reliability coefficient greater than .465. This strongly suggests that perceptions of antisemitism are not uni-dimensional.

officials participated in ceremonies commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Nazi massacre of Ukrainian Jews at Babi Yar. They also organized a series of public events, including a memorial service in which President Kravchuk acknowledged the partial responsibility of Ukrainians for the massacre. Such measures apparently work: according to the Gudkov and Levinson poll, Ukraine was the only area of the former USSR apart from Moldova to experience a decline in hostility towards Jews between 1990 and 1992.²³ History, however, is long. According to our survey data, Kiev Jews think that popular hostility against them is more of a problem than do Jews in the other two cities. Popular education is still needed in Kiev more than elsewhere.

We learned from Figure 1 that Belarus suffers from a considerably higher level of popular antisemitism than either Ukraine or Russia. Indeed, the Gudkov and Levinson survey shows that Belarus registered one of the largest *increases* in antisemitic feeling in the former USSR between 1990 and 1992.²⁴ Popular education cannot therefore be neglected in Minsk. However, it is perhaps indicative of the higher level of residual state antisemitism that the Belarus government has been much less active than the government of Ukraine in re-educating its citizenry about the Jews. Minsk Jews are certainly more likely than Kiev and Moscow Jews to view the Belarusian state as still rife with antisemites. Therefore, a thorough housecleaning of antisemitic officials seems more needed in Minsk than in the other two cities.

Between 1990 and 1992 the level of antisemitic hostility among Russia's population remained just about constant. In Moscow, however, group antisemitism is especially prominent. There, political control of highly active and organized antisemitic Russian nationalists is needed more than in Kiev and Minsk.

Sociodemographic Variations

Fear is the only dimension of antisemitism in Figure 2 that does not vary from city to city: in Moscow, Kiev and Minsk, 31 per cent of Jews express a great deal of apprehension about antisemitism. Let us now examine the social bases of their fear.²⁵

Table 11 establishes that a host of factors are related to fear of antisemitism on the part of Jews. These factors fall into four groups:

- First are what might be called vulnerability factors. Jews who are most frightened of antisemitism tend to be middle-aged, female and employed in white-collar jobs the security of which is no longer assured now that the market is beginning to take slow root and the huge government bureaucracy is being inexorably cut back. They also tend to have a low standard of living and earn low incomes.²⁶ Indeed, the

23 *Antisemitism World Report 1992* (London: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1992), 68. See, however, *Antisemitism World Report 1993*, 104.

24 *Antisemitism World Report 1992*, 68.

25 For a more technical justification for examining a single dimension see note 21.

26 In general, however, the income of Jews is above average. For example, the average income in Moscow in February-March 1993 was 11,625 roubles per month, "The Socioeconomic Position of the Russian Federation from January to March 1993", Economic Survey no. 4, State Statistical Committee of Russia (Moscow: Informa-

people with the highest unemployment rate in the general population share many of these characteristics.²⁷ So far at least, manual workers, government administrators and people who own or manage private businesses—"others" in the crude occupational breakdown of Table 11—tend not to be threatened as much by unemployment, especially if they are men.²⁸

- Second are factors indicating dissatisfaction with one's economic prospects. Fear of antisemitism is associated with discontent concerning income and opportunities for upward mobility, with low expectations concerning one's standard of living in one to two years and with a general lack of confidence in one's future.

- Third are actual experiences of antisemitism. Fear of antisemitism is related to claiming that one witnessed antisemitism during the past year in one's place of work, in one's neighbourhood, in the mass media and in state policy.

- Last, fear of antisemitism is strongly related to strength of Jewishness: those with higher levels of Jewish identification and practice tend to fear antisemitism more. This suggests that the most Jewish Jews may be predisposed to perceive antisemitism and regard it as problematic.²⁹

Table 12 reduces this long list of factors to only five variables that continue to exercise independent and statistically significant effects when entered into a regression equation. At least one variable comes from each of the four groups of factors isolated above. In short, middle-aged and less assimilated women who lack confidence in their own future are most likely to be frightened by antisemitism, particularly when they witness such outrages in the mass media.

tion Publishing Centre, 1993), 145. All the Moscow Jews in my survey were interviewed in those two months. Their average monthly income was 27,218 roubles, more than two and a third times above the city average. This difference appears *not* to be the result of Jews being more involved in the private sector than non-Jews (Mordechai Altshuler, "Jews and Russians—1991", *Yehudei brit ha-moatsot* (The Jews of the Soviet Union), vol. 15, 1992, 33). Thus 28 per cent of non-Jewish respondents in the October 1992 survey I conducted with Andrei Degtyarev worked at least partly in the private sector, compared to 29 per cent of Moscow Jews in the February-April 1993 survey I conducted with Rozalina Ryvkina. The income difference between the two groups appears to be mainly due to the different occupational structure, higher educational attainment and seniority of Jews. Note also that the *median* income for Moscow Jews was only 13,800 roubles per month. This implies that there are relatively few extremely wealthy Jews who pull up the mean. Although the median income for the general population is unknown, the difference between Jewish and population medians is undoubtedly far less than the difference between the means.

27 In the general population, however, it is the young who are most vulnerable to unemployment. For details on the social composition of the unemployed see Sheila Marnie, "How prepared is Russia for mass unemployment?", Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Special Report, 11 November 1992. On the special case of scientists see the results of a poll conducted among 300 Moscow scientists during the summer of 1991 as reported in Nikolai Popov, Roussina Volkova and Vadim Sazonov, "Unemployment in Science: Executive Summary" (Moscow: VTsIOM, 1991).

28 In Table 11 I collapsed a more detailed occupational breakdown.

29 We suspect that there is a reciprocal relationship between Jewishness and fear of antisemitism but I have not explored that possibility here so as to avoid technical complications.

TABLE 11
Fear of Antisemitism by Correlates
(in per cent; n in parentheses)

question	very	fear of antisemitism not very	not at all	total
q7-sex				
male	21	43	36	100 (483)
female	41	38	21	100 (469)
chi-square = 50.90, d.f. = 2, sig. = .000, tau-c = .247				
q8-age				
18-29	15	40	45	100 (170)
30-39	32	39	29	100 (142)
40-49	35	43	22	100 (205)
50-59	38	39	24	100 (277)
60-90	31	42	27	100 (159)
chi-square = 42.3, d.f. = 8, sig. = .000, tau-c = .125				
q17-occupation				
white collar	35	43	22	100 (403)
other	19	39	42	100 (217)
chi-square = 33.42, d.f. = 2, sig. = .000, tau-c = .234				
q20-income satisfaction				
satisfied	19	43	37	100 (172)
not satisfied	35	39	25	100 (428)
chi-square = 17.07, d.f. = 2, sig. = .000, tau-c = .162				
q25-opportunity satisfaction				
satisfied	27	39	35	100 (202)
not satisfied	36	43	21	100 (264)
chi-square = 11.85, d.f. = 2, sig. = .003, tau-c = .161				
q29-total income				
low	35	41	24	100 (287)
medium	32	45	23	100 (258)
high	27	38	36	100 (288)
chi-square = 15.64, d.f. = 4, sig. = .004, tau-c = .096				
q38-standard of living				
satisfied	24	36	40	100 (198)
not satisfied	35	41	25	100 (671)
chi-square = 19.34, d.f. = 2, sig. = .000, tau-c = .128				
q39-expected standard of living				
better	20	36	45	100 (160)
same	28	47	25	100 (233)
worse	40	37	33	100 (372)
chi-square = 42.09, d.f. = 4, sig. = .000, tau-c = .178				
q41-upward mobility opportunities				
yes	22	37	41	100 (170)
no	35	41	24	100 (613)
chi-square = 20.71, d.f. = 2, sig. = .000, tau-c = .140				

TABLE 11 (cont'd)
Fear of Antisemitism by Correlates
(in per cent; n in parentheses)

question	fear of antisemitism			total
	very	not very	not at all	
q163-confidence in own future				
yes	18	31	51	100 (155)
no	38	41	21	100 (673)
chi-square = 62.26, d.f. = 2, sig. = .000, tau-c = .211				
q133-witness antisemitism at work				
none	25	41	34	100 (536)
little	44	37	20	100 (166)
lot	53	27	21	100 (42)
chi-square = 32.60, d.f. = 4, sig. = .000, tau-c = .146				
q134-witness antisemitism in neighbourhood				
none	29	40	31	100 (734)
little	37	43	20	100 (158)
lot	55	34	12	100 (38)
chi-square = 20.73, d.f. = 4, sig. = .000, tau-c = -.091				
q135-witness antisemitism in mass media				
none	20	32	48	100 (234)
little	29	48	24	100 (367)
lot	42	42	15	100 (300)
chi-square = 86.64, d.f. = 4, sig. = .000, tau-c = -.243				
q136-witness antisemitism in state policy				
none	26	40	35	100 (486)
little	35	45	20	100 (192)
lot	50	30	21	100 (104)
chi-square = 33.92, d.f. = 4, sig. = .000, tau-c = -.154				
Jewishness scale				
high	42	39	19	100 (324)
medium	33	44	39	100 (311)
low	19	38	43	100 (318)
chi-square = 64.65, d.f. = 4, sig. = .000, tau-c = -.219				

TABLE 12
Multiple Regression of Fear of Antisemitism

question	slope (b)	standard error	standardized slope (beta)	t
q135-wit. media	.22	.03	.22	6.80
q7-sex	.34	.05	.22	6.87
Jewishness scale	.01	.003	.17	5.28
q163-conf. future	.35	.07	.17	5.38
q8-age	.08	.02	.14	4.54
intercept = 3.77; n = 786; adjusted R ² = .217				

Conclusion

Not all Jews in Moscow, Kiev and Minsk regard antisemitism as a problem. Five per cent of them think that antisemitism does not even exist in their countries. A significant number of respondents think that it is *not* mainly nationalist groups and politicians who are behind the spread of antisemitism. Thus interviewers confronted respondents with the statement "The view is becoming widespread that antisemitism exists in your country. In your opinion, who has an interest in spreading this view?" Respondents were asked to rank their responses but they were not presented with a predetermined set of possible answers. Table 13 shows that a sixth of the respondents think that it is principally Jewish, Israeli and Western individuals and organizations who wish to spread the idea that antisemitism exists in their country. Finally, 29 per cent of the people in our sample say that they are "not at all" frightened of antisemitism.

All of these are minority opinions. The evidence assembled in this paper demonstrates that the great majority of Jews recognize antisemitism as a serious issue. The perceived dimensions of the problem vary by urban and national context. For example, Jews think that antisemitism is more an issue of popular hostility in Kiev than in Moscow and Minsk, more a problem of state policy in Minsk than in Kiev and Moscow, and more a question of organized anti-Jewish groups in Moscow than in Kiev and Minsk. But over 30 per cent of Jews in each city are very frightened of antisemitism and another 40 per cent are somewhat frightened. Particularly for women; people in their thirties, forties and fifties; less assimilated Jews; and those who regularly witness anti-Jewish excesses in the media, life is thus rendered extremely unsettling. In fact, as I show elsewhere,³⁰ the experience and fear of antisemitism are so intense and widespread that they are important factors prompting many Jews to want to leave their country.

TABLE 13
Parties Interested in Antisemitism
(first choice in per cent)

question	frequency	per cent
q147-nationalist parties	326	43
q141-political opposition	141	19
q142-certain govt. officials	61	8
subtotal	528	70
q146-Israel, USA & oth. West.	41	5
q143-Jews in country	32	4
q144-Jew. orgs. from ex-USSR	29	4
q145-Jew. orgs. abroad	23	3
subtotal	125	17
q148-misc'l. other responses	98	13
total	751	100

30 See Robert J. Brym, "The emigration potential of Jews in the former Soviet Union", *East European Jewish Affairs*, vol. 23, no. 2, winter 1993.

This *Research Report* also presents ample evidence that Jewish perceptions are solidly founded in reality. Many Russians and Ukrainians and proportionately even more Belarusians dislike Jews. Certainly the proportions involved are very considerably higher than in the West and amount to nothing like a situation of what Westerners commonly refer to as tolerance. This does not mean that many Jews are in imminent danger of being attacked by organized mobs or that the Slavic CIS states are systematically discriminating against Jews. On the other hand, as a group of Russian sociologists correctly concluded in a review of recent surveys, "there are no signs at the present that the influence of nationalist and ethnocentric ideas will diminish in the near future, and that consequently the significance and role of interethnic relations will decline as a factor in social tension."³¹ Or as Arthur Hertzberg recently stated, the "recurrent fear everywhere in the former USSR is that the worsening economic situation might bring with it an anti-Semitism increasing to serious proportions."³² As a result, most Jews in the region are in the historically familiar position of being caught between two worlds, feeling tremendous ambivalence about what, if anything, they should call home.

Postscript (15 April 1994)

In a survey conducted by the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research in Moscow in October 1993, 2,293 city residents were asked: "Do you agree that Jews abuse their rights?"

Eighteen per cent of Muscovites either completely agreed or agreed somewhat with that statement—exactly the same percentage as believed in the existence of a global "Zionist" plot against Russia a year earlier. Twenty-four per cent of respondents in the 1993 survey said that the question was "hard to answer"—again, exactly the same as the percentage of "undecideds" in 1992.³³

In the October 1993 survey respondents were also asked about their political preferences. Table 14 crossclassifies political preferences by belief that Jews abuse their rights.

Table 14 is extremely interesting in the light of the results of the Russian parliamentary elections of 12 December 1993. The single most popular party in Russia was Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's nationalistic and antisemitic Liberal Democratic Party, which won 24 per cent of the popular vote (although "only" 15.6 per cent of the parliamentary seats, making it the third strongest parliamentary bloc). Zhirinovskiy supporters were nearly four times more likely to agree that Jews abuse their rights than were supporters of the leading reform candidates, Gaidar and Yavlinsky (34 versus 9 per cent). Due to his strong showing in the parliamentary elections, Zhirinovskiy has declared his candidacy for the 1996 presidential election. Most observers agree that he is a serious contender even though his recent antics have tended to discredit him and his party appears to be splintering.

31 V. O. Rukavishnikov *et al.*, "Social tension: Diagnosis and prognosis", *Sociological Research*, vol. 32, no. 2, 1993, 58.

32 Arthur Hertzberg, "Is anti-semitism dying out?", *The New York Review of Books*, 24 June 1993.

33 Yuri Levada, "The new Russian nationalism: Ambitions, phobias and complexes", "Economic and Social Changes: Public Opinion Monitoring Information Bulletin", Intercentre, All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research, no. 1 (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 1994), 17.

TABLE 14
 Political Preference by Belief that Jews Abuse their Rights
 (n=2,293; in per cent)

political preference	"Do you believe that Jews abuse their rights?"			index*
	disagree	agree	hard to answer	
Gaidar	72	9	19	63
Yeltsin	64	13	23	51
Yavlinsky	72	9	19	63
Rutskoi	28	43	29	-15
Zhirinovskiy	38	34	28	4
Travkin	44	34	22	10
Communists	36	36	28	0
National Salvation Front	28	56	16	-28

* index = disagree minus agree

Source: Adapted from Levada.

A stronger presidential candidate may be Alexander Rutskoi. Rutskoi is an Afghanistan war hero who was at one time Yeltsin's Vice-President. However, the gap between the two men widened and in October 1993 Rutskoi led the occupation of the Russian White House. Recently released from prison, Rutskoi has quickly rebuilt his People's Party of Free Russia. Radio Free Europe reported on 17 March 1994 that, together with the leaders of the Communist and Agrarian parties (which form the second largest parliamentary bloc, with 24.9 per cent of the seats), the People's Party of Free Russia has formed the united front Accord for Russia. The front has proclaimed as its main aims the preservation of "historic Russia" and the halting of "mindless reforms".³⁴

It is ominous given these developments that Rutskoi attracts proportionately even more antisemites than Zhirinovskiy. Thus in the October 1993 poll fully 43 per cent of Rutskoi supporters agreed that Jews abuse their rights, compared to 28 per cent who disagreed and 29 per cent who found it hard to answer (see Table 14). Only the far-right National Salvation Front attracted proportionately more antisemites than Rutskoi. It is in the context of these anti-Jewish sentiments that one must understand an editorial comment in the 3 March 1994 edition of the newspaper *Selskaya zhizn* (Rural Life):

[W]hen it comes to the degree of broad renown and popular trust enjoyed by future candidates, the name of Rutskoi is today on everyone's lips. The numerous letters to the editorial offices are . . . confirmation of this. The fact that the authors of these letters are not members of the liberal intelligentsia or the capital's "gilded youth" trading in the kiosks strikes me as important; they are people remote from group or party prejudices—people of action. Perhaps this is the voice of reason and justice? "Justice will remain on Rutskoi's side!"—this is how M. Zimin, labour veteran of the Lenin state farm in Vladimir Region's Muromskiy District headed his letter to the editorial offices. Whether this will be the case or not, time will tell. We have not long to wait.

34 *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Daily Report*, no. 53, 17 March 1994.